MISSING THE POINT WITH COUNTER INSURGENCY (COIN)

I thoroughly enjoy discussions on conflicts, insurgencies and wars and the countering of these actions, regardless if I agree with them or not. I know many criticise and do not agree with my viewpoints and view them as too simplistic. What I consider to be critical in the ending of a conflict, an insurgency or civil war has been very successfully applied in practise. Food for thought is, however, never bad food regardless of how it is served.

Insurgencies are not new, nor does fighting them require a “new” way of fighting. Nor do fighting insurgencies need to be long, protracted and costly affairs if the strategy is balanced. However, there seems to be a misguided belief that if we can define an insurgency precisely, we can defeat it. Whereas a definition holds value, its value is lost if the cause is not fully understood.

Ending an insurgency may not always be easy but it is certainly very possible. Contrary to the belief of some, an insurgency is not a spontaneous event but rather a threat that has been allowed to develop over a period of time. It is a political problem that has been brought about by dysfunctional or poor governance, a sense of political isolation and the suppression of hope along with a combination of anger, hatred and revenge that has impacted negatively on the populace and caused the populace immense distress. When the populace feel they have lost hope and have nothing more to lose by rising up against the government, they will do exactly that.

One of the strategic objectives of an insurgency may be to develop their planned armed struggle into a civil war to pit citizen against citizen and in so doing, collapse the Pillars of State and along with them, the established political order. This requires mobilising the quiet majority of the populace to disrupt government efforts through armed violence, civil disobedience, terrorism, violent crime, civil unrest and violent protests. Tribalism, religion, racial and ethnic tensions along with economic disparities are often used as motivators in the calls for the populace to rise up.  

If an under-threat government makes use of a foreign allied military force to assist it suppress the insurgency, the populace’s “silent majority” will generally accept this decision as long as the combined force does not target them. The foreign forces will, however, be closely watched in terms of their actions, discipline and attitude towards the populace. Uncontrolled behaviour, unlawful acts and/or attacks on civilians by the foreign forces will simply become a rallying call for the populace to join – or at the very least – support the insurgency.

Conversely, the populace may believe that the arrival of foreign forces allows them to take the law into their own hands and extract revenge against those insurgents and their supporters hiding in plain sight. Once this cycle of violence begins, it is very difficult to stop and its effects are usually long-lasting.

However, relying solely on foreign forces to ultimately defeat the armed insurgents will result in a hollow victory for the government forces as when the foreign forces leave, the insurgency will simply resurface and be characterised by more intense violence.

If a country has been invaded and occupied by a foreign force that shows little or no respect towards the government, the law enforcement agencies, the armed forces and the populace, their property, culture, traditions, political system and religion, the anger, discontent and humiliation of the subjugated will in all probability give rise to a rebellion or an insurgency in order to eject the occupiers. Added to this is the oft-imposed morality and ideology of the occupying forces that results in additional anger, confusion and discontent. It is this anger that will result in attacks on the occupying force by the populace and the local soldiers and policemen that have been “forced” to partner with the occupation forces – the so-called “green-on-blue” attacks.

The ability of an insurgent group to attack across numerous spheres of the state gives them a flexibility the government has allowed them to have – by creating a condition of dissatisfaction that can be exploited. This is in part due to a lack of a coherent realistic national strategy and a poor, unstructured and unaligned national security strategy and its various components, coupled to poor governance and neglect of the populace. Add to this a lack of credible intelligence and the means to act/react on intelligence and the insurgents are given the initiative whilst the security forces fall into the trap of becoming reactive.

By exploiting both the mainstream and social media for disinformation and propaganda purposes, insurgents create the perception that they are more successful and stronger than they really are. It also gives them an instrument for reaching other fence-sitting or neutral members of the populace. Every action and success is aimed at showing their determination and even minor tactical successes are proclaimed to be major tactical victories. This can, along with the collateral damage caused by the security forces, harness both local and international support and sympathy for their cause.

International support such as funding, weapons, training and sanctuaries and sympathy – along with unvetted NGOs and “charity organisations” -  especially when the insurgents are acting as a proxy force on behalf of a foreign government or sponsor whose intentions are the placement of a puppet government, can result in sanctions on an international level. These sanctions are aimed are weakening the government whilst strengthening the insurgents. Apart from the wholesale death and destruction of innocents and their property, the international support has a tendency to escalate out of control and bring additional governments into the conflict to support one side or the other.

The first-line of defence against an insurgency is – apart from good governance – aggressive, pro-active intelligence gathering coupled to coordinated law enforcement actions. Sadly, many governments choose to ignore the wall as the writing becomes more obvious, especially if it does not match their perception of reality.

When the armed forces are called on to provide counter insurgency support to the law enforcement agencies, it is usually an indication of failure by government and the intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The mission of the armed forces ought to be the creation of a climate in which government can govern and the law enforcement agencies can again begin enforcing the law.

When an insurgency or conflict has entered into the armed or military phase, the Trinity of Gravity needs to be identified, isolated, attacked and neutralised, allowing the government to regain control. 

I believe the concept of using the armed forces to establish control over the entire Trinity of Gravity is both flawed and wishful thinking as soldiers are neither trained to govern nor enforce the law – nor are they trained to be diplomats. The bottom line is that if the armed forces do not take effective control of the insurgents, the insurgents will simply take control of the populace – at the expense of everyone including the armed forces.

Preventing and/or defeating an insurgency, therefore, begins with the display of political will by the government coupled to ever-improving delivery of government services, the continued gathering of intelligence and the enforcement of law in all its facets – and not with the armed forces trying to play politics and govern.  

(RE)STRUCTURING AFRICAN ARMIES

The age of colonialism and the subsequent decolonisation of Africa along with the Cold War has long past and despite the geographical tragedies that occurred in terms of arbitrary borders, the continent needs to come to terms with itself. It also needs to take responsibility for both its internal and external security.

Africa can no longer afford to lay the blame for its woes outside of the continent. Whereas several of Africa’s problems may indeed originate from beyond its shores, countries need to review their national security strategies and act accordingly. Failure to do so simply renders them more vulnerable to the numerous threats and threat networks that are able to penetrate and exploit the numerous security lapses that exist.

Cooperation between the threats operating in Africa is increasing as criminal, insurgent and terrorist networks cross and even join paths. Indeed, in several places across Africa, criminal networks support insurgent and terror networks and visa versa and on occasion, they are part of the same threat network. In parts of Africa, they have morphed into proxy forces under the control of foreign governments. On occasion, foreign interests coincide with the aims of the threats and/or threat networks and either wittingly or unwittingly support these networks.

As the threats and the threat networks across the continent have increased, so too has Africa’s military capacity to deal with them been gradually reduced – due in part to a lack of focussed intelligence and foresight, incoherent strategies, incorrect structures, inadequate doctrine, substandard training and obsolete equipment. This slow decay becomes very difficult, costly and time consuming to reverse – time that is often not available.  Added to this has been the rise of ethnic and political tensions infused with religious extremism.

African countries need to strengthen their defensive and offensive intelligence gathering capabilities in order to provide early warning to strategists and planners. A strong intelligence capability will furthermore allow predictions to be made in terms of real or potential threats that may or will manifest themselves. This ought to act as a guideline in terms of organisational structures, training and equipment.

To enter into a conflict or a war implies a progressive move towards economic, political and populace exhaustion. This exhaustion becomes even more evident when the conflict or the war is allowed to drag on indefinitely due to a lack of actionable intelligence along with an inability of the armed forces to contain/destroy the threat and both military and civilian casualties increase and infrastructure and equipment is either damaged or destroyed. This damages the economy which is needed to sustain the efforts of the armed forces.

However, without wide intelligence coverage and a coherent strategy, the exhaustion is multiplied – especially if the means to achieve the ends are not present or the means are lacking in ability, equipment and the political and national will is eroded or non-existent.

The primary problem however lays with the means: most African armies are organisational clones of their once colonial masters or their later East Bloc allies. This has resulted in incorrect organisational structures, incorrect training, inadequate doctrine, terrain and enemy-irrelevant TTPs and incorrect – often obsolete - equipment and so forth.

An incorrect organisational structure that is poorly prepared and postured prohibits rapid deployment and response and is usually accompanied by cumbersome command and control lines, inadequate logistics, inadequate personnel administration and that, in turn, impacts on morale and forces armies to become reactive as opposed to proactive.

The current structures most African armies follow are not conducive to rapid deployment or focussed effort. We have proven the concept that smaller, more agile units, correctly structured and trained and well-led are able to manoeuvre at speed – if they have the necessary assets at their disposal. These forces are able to operate independently and yet rapidly regroup to form a larger, very aggressive, efficient and potent fighting force.

Whether mechanised, motorised, riverine or air delivered, these forces are able to conduct numerous offensive tasks from a single large-scale conventional attack to smaller swarm attacks, COIN operations, raids and ambushes and so forth. It is this very concept that allows for the relentless pursuit of an enemy force.

This structure furthermore enables dispersed defence, forcing any enemy to attack over a very wide front whilst simultaneously dispersing his forces and exposing them to numerous flank and swarm attacks.

Unfortunately, many African armies have tried to clone foreign armies or have been ill-advised and misled in terms of intelligence, strategy, organisational structure, training, equipment and other related defence and security issues. Additionally, African armies have become very political in terms of appointments and missions. In turn, this has allowed numerous threats to be ignored, misjudged and subsequently not taken seriously until it has become almost too late. It has also resulted in a hesitancy to adapt their forces to deal with the current and future threat networks.

However, these remain mere factors that are often overlooked but that impact negatively on the abilities of African armies to achieve mission success.

For African armed forces to engage a threat or a threat network efficiently, rapidly and with economy of force, serious consideration needs to be given to restructuring the armies and training and equipping them accordingly.

VERY SHORT NOTES ON STRATEGY

The phrase “If we don’t know where we are going, we can be sure we will never know how to get there” essentially refers to an absence of a strategy. However, the term “strategy” appears to have become confusing, misleading and frequently misused.

As I often find myself engaged in assisting with the development of strategies, I realise how difficult it must be for our clients to grapple with a subject that is both vague and unknown and that has, along the way, lost its true meaning.

I also find it incredibly sad that so many of the senior officials I engage with have been incorrectly educated as to what strategy really is and what its aim is. However, I cannot blame them as even when they want to discover more on this apparently vague concept, they revert to the internet which is fraught with numerous misleading articles on strategy and pages and pages of gobbledygook.

Strategy is neither an operational design nor a tactical plan – although these two concepts form an integral part in the implementation of strategy. It is therefore somewhat surprising to find that many label a very basic plan as a “strategy” or believe that strategy is the same as “tactics” – which it is not.

In its most simple form, strategy is a disciplined, intellectual, intelligence-driven exercise that ought to give us a guideline roadmap that will enable us to reach our ultimate desired destination or end state. This guideline roadmap may have several options or alternatives that can be used to get to our desired end-goal but it will need constant assessment of the risks enroute and readjustments as new intelligence becomes available on the opportunities, obstacles and other possibilities that present themselves. However, it must remain realistic.

This requires having to make choices – sometimes challenging ones – determine and prioritise objectives, identify and appreciate risks and how best to reduce them and make alliances and compromises to our advantage.  

The guideline roadmap must remain flexible (to be flexible we need options) and allow us to predict, exploit, defend and bypass all opportunities and threats, thus allowing us to reach our desired end destination or achieve our desired end state.

National strategy is, therefore, about determining and deciding on realistic options to achieve a desired future condition or future state and knowing how best to achieve it. By implication, it provides governmental direction to achieve the national political objectives in a complex, ever-evolving and dynamic strategic environment. This allows us to work at achieving our desired end goal with the resources we have – or are planning to acquire.

If, for example, we are developing a National Security Strategy (NSS), our strategy will be focussed on supporting the National Strategy and securing, strengthening and protecting the integrity of the state along with its interests and will therefore be influenced by factors such as:

1.     The National Strategy and its subsequent policies

2. The international view ie how we perceive the world and how we want the world to perceive us
3. The regional view ie how we want the region to perceive us and how we perceive the region
4. The national view ie how we want our citizenry to perceive the state
5. Our interests ie what is important to the state both nationally and internationally
6. The threats that may impact on our interests and national security.

In its most basic form, our NSS is expressed in terms of realistic ENDS, WAYS and MEANS. These three concepts relate to:

1. Our desired realistic END goal or end state
2. The approaches and concept routes (options) ie the application of instruments that will allow us to determine the WAY to meet the ENDS
3. The MEANS we have available ie the instruments of power including the capabilities, assets and resources we have to achieve our security objectives and goals

This approach will tell us how we need to organise and structure ourselves to accomplish our goals. Furthermore, it will allow us to identify any strategic deficiencies we may have and how these deficiencies can be exploited by hostile forces or how we need to overcome them.

For our NSS to succeed, it must be aligned with the strategies of other government agencies and departments to ensure unity of effort to achieve a common end-state.

The validity of our strategy must be tested against the relevant principles.

The invisible thread that ties the ENDS, WAYS and MEANS together is known as “doctrine” – a set of time-proven procedures, rules and policies that tell us “how” to do things and not “what” to do. Doctrine is however a guide to action and must not prevent or restrict our ability to think, analyse and adapt.

To strengthen, support and enable the implementation of the NSS, assessment and consideration must be given to:

1. Operations by other government agencies/departments
2. Political warfare operations
3. Economic warfare operations
4. Strategic warfare operations and so forth.

Strategy is seldom, if ever, tied to a specific timeframe. Rather, it is expressed in terms of short-, medium- and long-term objectives and goals.

Another misconception is that strategy is something we need to hurriedly develop simply to have a strategy and that it remains forever relevant. Nothing could be further from the truth as it remains under constant review and is continually adapted and expanded on as new intelligence flows in and new options present themselves.

If no strategy exists, it may take several months – or longer - to develop a very basic strategic outline. However, it is and will remain an on-going process and a critical component of a state’s aspirations.

Ultimately, a national strategy is about how the country’s leadership will use its instruments of influence and power, along with its assets and resources to meet its desired political objectives and achieve its desired end state.

 

FAILING TO LISTEN

As has become quite usual and an almost daily occurrence, rebel forces throughout central Africa have gained momentum and succeeded in defeating government forces. Often, the government forces appear to be very well trained in running away whilst the rebel forces appear to be better trained, have more cohesion, are better armed and even have better mobility than the government forces.

I am also amazed at how easily - and quickly - governments dismiss intelligence in favour of disinformation. Could it be that they believe the “advice” given them by foreign governments or so-called “subject matter experts” is more credible than that given by people who do actually have “ears on the ground”?

The escalation of tensions in the so-called Great Lakes region is a fine example of governments’ failure to listen. It appears they are advised to adopt the ostrich approach (sticking their heads in the sand and hoping the problem will simply go away) – an approach that is apparently becoming the norm. This approach apparently assures governments that the problem will indeed “go away” if it is simply ignored.

Often these rumours are clustered around other rumours that give credibility to the false sense of security that an interested party is trying to develop. Selected “leaks” to the media result in these rumour-clusters being given more credibility – and this is then fed back to the government as fact “as the media said so”.   

The end-result is that when they finally pull their heads out of the sand, the problem has become a crisis. Those who so generously misadvised at great financial cost have by then long flown the coup. The crisis rapidly escalates into a blood-letting of aggrieved citizens and ill-disciplined troops and the entire system of government collapses.

The culture of failing to listen is partly the result of being fed so much rubbish that it becomes literally impossible for governments to distinguish fact from fiction.

Without naming and shaming governments, we warned four different governments of threats being developed in their countries long before the threats manifested themselves. This intelligence (by the time we advised them, we were no longer giving them simple information) was discarded as rumours, whilst rumours and innuendo that painted a rosy picture were seen a “credible intelligence”. We are still trying to warn another government that a coup is imminent. No doubt they are also being advised it is nothing other than a rumour.

The impact this “intelligence” (rumours, innuendo and false stories) has on the Pillars of State is enormous in that it ultimately alters the perceptions of the populace and leads to a reaction that the governments have often not anticipated. The collapse of the armed forces simply adds to the unanticipated reaction as soldiers and civilians alike join rebel forces and begin a campaign of looting and intimidation.  

Then of course, we have the SANDF’s 2013 misadventure into Central African Republic (CAR). Again, a badly advised government force, ill-trained and totally unprepared for the rebel assault on the government of CAR. Needless to say, this has irreparably tarnished the reputation of the SANDF.

Whereas I mourn the death of every soldier, we must not forget that the SANDF has also been the beneficiary of “free advice” and “free training”. Sadly, this resulted in the Seleka rebel coalition outgunning and out-manoeuvring the SANDF. This confirms that not only was the overall SANDF strategy flawed but that the strategy had its foundation resting on poor intelligence – and no strategy can succeed if it is developed off assumptions and rumours.

Additionally, even the best strategy and operational designs will fail if the armed forces are not trained and equipped to implement the operational plans. Inadequately trained forces with poor leadership simply add fuel to the fire.  

This all goes back to failing to listen to good advice and instead opting for bad advice aimed at disadvantaging the recipient.

As long as governments fail to listen – instead relying on disinformation – this cycle of chaos will continue. 

THREAT PREDICTION

Threat prediction is a vital pre-requisite of strategy development. It can, however, be a difficult and problematic task if the intelligence analysts as well as the planners and strategists do not have accurate intelligence at hand, do not understand the historical trends that have manifested over time, and do not understand the political strategies of their own government and those of the target country or target grouping.

If the intelligence services do not utilise all available resources at their disposal, and cultivate new resources where intelligence gaps exist, they will directly contribute to intelligence failures. Intelligence failures can, in turn, lead to misjudging the enemy, doctrinal failures and faulty or disjointed threat predictions and subsequently poor, unrealistic or irrelevant strategies.

The value of threat prediction and its analysis is that it provides benchmarks and indicators that can be used to constantly assess and re-adjust the overall military strategy. The need for flexibility in the developing military strategy is vital in order to prevent a tunnel-vision view of the threats a government may be facing.

The nature of modern warfare and, more broadly, armed conflict has changed dramatically from the classical or historical perspective of war. The days of two opposing armies meeting one another on an open field to engage in a classical conventional battle are, for the time being, long gone.

Although the ever-present threat of a conventional land, sea and air battle will always remain very real, modern war and/or conflict may be characterised by many different concepts such as religious fanaticism, ethnic hatred, radical ideologies, resource grabbing, xenophobia, mass mobilisation of the disadvantaged, a breakdown of law and order, a perceived weakness of the opposition, a growth in power by armed organised crime syndicates and so forth. These factors, more than ever, require detailed investigation – something that can only be achieved by means of a strong, dedicated and aggressive intelligence gathering and analysis capability. 

Whereas modern military technology, if correctly applied, can prove to be a force- multiplier on the battlefield, strategists and planners cannot rely on technology alone, as technology is prone to failure, often at critical times. Over-reliance on technology may, therefore, present several serious disadvantages to the user. Correctly used as a battlefield support system, technology can play a valuable role in locating, confusing and even overcoming the enemy. Technology, however, needs to be balanced against the operating environment, the threat and the ability to maintain and apply the technology correctly. It remains a secondary weapon and not the primary weapon of an armed force.

Intelligence analysts, along with military planners and strategists furthermore need to consider a host of different and varying factors that may lead to political tension and thus negatively influence the security of the state, its citizens and the operating environment.   

Political tension, on the other hand, may be the result of economic tension, natural resource distribution, border disputes, perceived political sabotage, ethnicity, religious differences and so forth.

Therefore, from a strategic planning point-of-view, several factors need to be closely assessed in terms of how they can be used to the advantage of the armed forces and how they can be successfully exploited thus denying the enemy from gaining an advantage.

Additionally, these factors need to be viewed in terms of the disadvantage they may hold for the political- and the military machinery. Of equal importance is the fact that the opposing forces will be assessing the same factors of the state or grouping they view as an aggressor.

The advantage will thus lie with the strategists and planners who are able to accurately predict the threats facing the state and identify the weaknesses and exploitation possibilities in order to develop realistic options that can be implemented.

PS: I have been travelling as well as ill and have therefore been unable to regularly update the blog. My apologies...

PSEUDO OPERATIONS - FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE

Considering the manner in which organised gangs and insurgents, be they political, criminal, religious or militant choose to conduct their terror and criminal actions, I believe that we need to adapt our operational approaches and begin laying greater emphasis on:

1. Intelligence, in particular HUMINT
2. Pseudo operations
3. Tactical ground and air support

Intelligence ought to act as the commander’s eyes and ears. If he has no current intelligence, he is both blind and deaf and a blind and deaf commander has no real value in today’s small wars and conflicts. Whereas it is good and well to have technical intelligence and satellite coverage, we also need to know “what” the enemy is thinking. We can only know what the enemy is thinking if we have someone within his ranks.

Infiltrating or penetrating the enemy’s ranks requires the ability to make intelligence predictions insofar as which organisations should be targeted. These predictions, although not always correct, do however given an indication of what to expect and where. It is better to have someone in a potential or real enemy’s ranks and not need him than to have no one in the enemy’s ranks and need him.

Intelligence is a critical essential but we often fail to recognise its value. Strategies are intelligence driven and the strategy can only fail if it is developed with no intelligence. At the tactical level, it is intelligence that enables us to locate, bind, strike, exploit and disrupt any threat. Indeed, it has an influence on the tactics, techniques and procedures we apply.

Well trained and led pseudo teams, operating off current intelligence can wreak havoc amongst the enemy and decimate its ranks. But to do that, we need to adjust our thinking and our approach. But it bears remembering that pseudo teams are not “special forces” – instead they are irregular troops operating under normal command and control.

The strategy of attrition applied by these gangs gives them an almost mythical status of invincibility. Added to that is the publicity they enjoy from their deeds in the mass media. Using low-tech equipment and improvisation, they are able to achieve high-value results and attain the initiative.

Pseudo teams, recruited from the areas they originate from are ideal trackers, interpreters and in most instances, know the terrain they operate in like the back of their hand. They are able to detect changes in the human environment incoming units cannot see. Furthermore, they are often highly-motivated as they have been the prime beneficiaries of the violence against them and they are driven by a desire for justice and revenge.

I do not advocate doing away with the traditional battalion, company and platoon formations when fighting these wars. I do, however, believe that especially in Africa, these formations do not always give the dividends one would expect. I furthermore believe that the time has come to incorporate a pseudo element into the motorised infantry battalion.

Once deployed into an area, this pseudo element should begin working with the local population, identifying potential candidates for pseudo work and training and equipping them to take the fight to the enemy. Such sub-units and sub-sub-units will enhance the reconnaissance and intelligence gathering capabilities of the motorised infantry battalion, be able to conduct snatch operations, disrupt enemy plans and actions and so forth.

A good pseudo team is able to sustain itself in the field although a system of caches to replenish food and ammunition is essential. But their true value lies in being able to fight the enemy with its own tactics and techniques and when necessary, call in tactical air support or heliborne combat troops to take over the engagement and exploit the fire-fight. This ground and air support is essential and adds a great degree of flexibility to pseudo operations.

To avoid “friendly fire”, areas where these teams operate need to be classified as restricted operations areas. Targeted tactical air support needs to be on call.

Fighting the enemy with overwhelming firepower does not always achieve the results we seek. Additionally, this mass of fire inevitable leads to collateral damage (people and infrastructure) thus driving the locals into the ranks of the enemy and reducing our chances of recruiting locals for our pseudo teams.

When we change our mindset and think outside of the box, we will be able to train, deploy and exploit pseudo teams, regain the initiative and reap the benefits of fighting fire with fire.

WHY ARE WE ALWAYS SO REACTIVE?

In a world of war and conflict, why is it that we continue to be so reactive?

Is it because we do not develop decent, workable strategies based on sound, credible intelligence? Is it because we continually want to believe that “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” – even when he isn’t? Is it that we lack the ability to interpret events to the extent that we cannot be forward-looking? Is it because we simply want to ignore the lessons of history?

Whereas we cannot predict the future, we can – with some effort – have a very good indication what it may hold in terms of war and conflict.

The wars, conflicts and problems we witness were all prefaced with numerous indications that they were about to happen. From the piracy off the coast of Somalia to the drug wars in Mexico to the criminal insurgencies in other countries – all have provided us with clues that a problem was rapidly approaching.

Yet, we seem to stand by and wait until the problem reaches a situation that it cannot easily be contained – and then we try to take action. Ironically, we then cannot understand why it is so difficult to resolve the issues, win the wars and end the conflicts. A 10-ton truck free-wheeling downhill cannot be stopped by simply jumping into its path. With enough men at hand, we can probably stop it but at an enormous cost in lives lost and collateral fall-out.

By allowing the enemy to gain momentum and maintain the initiative, we lose the ability to put a rapid end to it. Our reactive actions are almost akin to trying to stop that free-wheeling truck. And despite all the warnings, we act surprised when we are unable to stop it.

Some time ago I spoke with a senior commander in an African country. His country had recently discovered a valuable natural resource. He was very excited at how this resource would benefit his country and his people. I, in turn, warned him that his country’s problems were about to start in earnest. I wasn’t being cynical – I was being realistic. After all, hasn’t history shown that when a new resource is found in Africa, problems are sure to follow?

With all of our early-warning systems, intelligence gathering capabilities, diplomatic liaisons, mass media reporting, satellite surveillance and so forth, I find it very hard to believe that we have not yet reached a stage where we can be proactive.

Is it possibly that we simply don’t want to be proactive and instead prefer to rather be reactive and suffer all the disadvantages this laissez-faire approach hands us? Do we rather want to attempt to stop these problems once they are unstoppable – will that make us feel better? Or do we only want to be pre-emptive when carrying out the first phase of a strategy and thereafter wait for the enemy to gain the initiative?

It is said that a wise man in times of peace prepares for war.

To prepare effectively for war, we need to know what to expect and from whom. Still, we seem to wait and react only once we think the enemy has shown his hand. But the enemy too knows about deception and it is a foolish enemy who shows his hand in the opening stages of a conflict. We cannot expect all of our enemies to always be foolish.

If we continue to miss all of the warning signals flashed at us, we will continue to be reactive. The implication is that we will continue to be surprised, unprepared and find ourselves fighting on the back foot – often against untrained, ill-disciplined, out-numbered and technology-poor enemies.

Until such time as we begin to exploit our assets and resources to maximum effect and look for exploitation options whenever and wherever we can, we will remain at a disadvantage both on and off the battlefield.

We may appear to be politically correct but we will lose the battle – and there is no second prize for the loser - and the truck will keep rolling.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Whereas there can be no doubt that Rules of Engagement (RoE) are important in determining how, when, where and against who armed force shall be used, are we not sometimes restricting ourselves with RoE and in the result causing the deaths of our own soldiers?

In Operations Related to War (ORW), the RoE are really very straightforward, especially as one of the aims of war is the annihilation of the enemy force. However, care still needs to be exercised in order to prevent civilian casualties or causing unnecessary, excessive damage to private property. But even in well planned and executed ORW, it is not always possible to prevent civilian casualties or minimise damage to property, especially in and around urban environments.

It is, however, when we embark on Operations Other than War (OOTW) that these rules can become restrictive and, in many instances, counterproductive. “Don’t shoot until you are shot at” is difficult to accept when you know a sniper is tracking your movements.

RoE, and the approach to applying such rules, differ from culture to culture. Furthermore, OOTW are often applicable to hostile environments and an enemy that does not abide by any laws, be they local, regional or international.

Whereas it is commonly accepted that excessive force in OOTW will result in alienating the local population and cause resentment which may strengthen the cause of the rebels/terrorists/insurgents, the rules still need to be very carefully crafted.

Ultimately, the RoE are applicable to both military and law enforcement operations that take place within the scope of both ORW and OOTW and are aimed at:

1. Preventing own forces casualties
2. Increasing force legitimacy
3. Minimising collateral damage
4. Preventing unnecessary civilian casualties
5. Increasing operational legitimacy.

Any commander’s aim is to, apart from achieving mission success, prevent casualties amongst his own forces whilst increasing the casualties amongst the enemy’s forces. But sometimes the RoE appear to disregard this fact in favour of not upsetting the politicians, the enemy or the media.

When the RoE are so restrictive that a commander cannot perform his mission effectively, tension will inevitably develop between the political masters and the military commanders. When the restrictive RoE leads to own forces casualties, the tensions are bound to escalate.

As all military operations are politically driven, too restrictive rules place the commanders at a disadvantage. When the political masters decide to use military force to achieve their political or diplomatic ambitions or objectives, they ought to consider that the lives that may be lost due to their restrictions could lead to operational disasters and a drop in morale, both on the battlefield and on the home front.

But, military incompetence should not be hidden behind or blamed on restrictive RoE. Blunders such as the so-called peacekeeping missions in Africa are commonly blamed on too restrictive RoE. The lack of will, the inability to gather and act on intelligence or develop sound military strategies is usually ignored at best or simply never mentioned.

On the other hand, too loose RoE can lead to the indiscriminate use of armed force against whoever passes through the sights. Whereas it may appear that artillery and air strikes on densely populated urban areas may break the morale of the enemy and the civilian population, these actions also violate international law as they are construed as “excessive and indiscriminate force” – which they are.

When crafting RoE, we ought to remember that the world has become a tough neighbourhood. If we wish to play in this neighbourhood, we ought to show our toughness – not by allowing our troops to be killed by the enemy but by killing the enemy. We can only do this if we know “who” the enemy is.

Knowing “who” the enemy is requires intelligence that is verified. In ORW this is, again, relatively simple as a state of war exists between two nations. We know who we are fighting. In OOTW, a lack of intelligence allows us to either view the “enemy” as the local population or the local population as the “enemy”. This confusing view on the “enemy” results in RoE that restrict offensive action – one of the fundamental principles of land warfare. In turn, this gives the enemy the initiative.

The lack of intelligence and the loss of the initiative may result in the rebels/insurgents/terrorists resorting to criminal activities to fund their operations. This can result in extortion, kidnapping for ransom, armed robberies and other financially rewarding crimes.

I disagree that today’s wars are either won or lost at the political level. A lack of real progress on the battlefield or in the area of operations, coupled to increased casualty figures, increased defence spending vs lack of results, resentment from the local population, negative media coverage, a decline of morale on the home front and so forth may add to the political pressures to leave a conflict area. But, this is a direct result of the military action.

Without intelligence, we cannot craft sensible Rules of Engagement. The lack of sensible RoE gives the enemy an opportunity to exploit the perceived lack of “fighting spirit”. Not understanding the cultural environment we operate in amplifies this problem.

Whereas Rules of Engagement are important, they should be based on sound intelligence and an understanding of the operational environment and not sacrifice operational freedom or expose troops to unnecessary danger.

THE NEUTRALISATION OF HIGH-VALUE TARGETS

When Sun Tzu wrote “The supreme act of war is to subdue the enemy without a fight” approximately 25 centuries ago, did he see the neutralisation or targeted killings of key enemy personnel as part of the subduing process?

Then again, I have always wondered why is it that when a politician or a prominent person (read “High-Value Target” or HVT) is the subject of a targeted killing, it is known as an “assassination”? Yet, when some lesser mortal meets his or her end, it is a murder. Unless of course, it happens on the battlefield – then he or she is simply “killed”.

The January 2010 targeted killing of a senior Hamas military commander in Dubai has certainly brought the debate on assassinations to the fore. This action to neutralise an enemy of a state is nothing new. In fact, governments through their intelligence agencies the world over have made use of - and still make use of - targeted killings as a method of eliminating enemies of supposed high-value. (Personally, I believe the intelligence agencies ought to be confined purely to the collection of the critical information and not the actual neutralisation if it involves a targeted killing).

Assassination of enemy leaders and commanders is not the only method of eliminating them. It is however the one method that causes the most media interest and speculation. If correctly planned and executed, it remains a highly effective action. When these targeted killings disrupt or impact in part on the enemy’s Centre of Gravity (CoG) they become even more effective.

But, ought these direct-action, covert or clandestine actions to be used purely for military and political purposes or do they also hold value in countering serious and violent organised crime? I believe they do. But as long as we attribute “rights” to these organised crime syndicates – who attribute no rights to their victims – this will probably never happen.

There are essentially two methods of neutralising a high-value target. These are:

1. Removing the target from society
2. Getting society to remove the target.

The first method includes actions such as assassinations, target-specific drone attacks, snatch operations with the aim of interrogating and imprisoning and so forth. This direct approach against the target requires a high level of intelligence gathering and planning. There are many instances where intelligence and planning has failed miserably but there are numerous other instances where it has succeeded. It is, however, the actions that fail that evoke the most interest and speculation. Those that are successful pass almost unnoticed.

The second method utilises an indirect approach and includes grey and black propaganda aimed at discrediting the target or arousing suspicions against him or her. These suspicions, managed correctly, can lead to society taking the desired action and thereby neutralising the target. Here too intelligence and planning play a critical role in order to allow society to be manipulated to take the desired action(s) against the target.

These actions should be conducted in support of national strategic and military operational objectives. By implication they are intelligence driven but are determined at political level and executed at operator level. It is at the level of policy that problems such as inter-service delineation and medium to long-term consequences are assessed and confirmed.

Failure can also be attributed to undue political pressure and the failure to anticipate the consequences when things go wrong, poor inter-service relations and poor operational execution. Compromise – the result of poor or non-existent security - which leads to failure, can have far-reaching political implications thus rendering the ultimate outcome a failure – despite the fact that operationally, the action may have succeeded. Likewise, unnecessary collateral damage can render an operationally successful operation a strategic failure.

Many questions arise when a targeted killing is conducted. There are those who question the morality of such actions and others who call on international legal matters to be instituted against the country perpetrating the deed. For some reason, these same voices never seem to be raised when the enemy conducts these actions.

Numerous considerations ought to be appreciated when planning a neutralisation of a specific target. Apart from the “who”, “by when”, “how” and “where”, the following are but some of the critical considerations:

1. Will he or she become a martyr and result in his/her memory being used as a rallying point?
2. Will the person who will take the target’s place be a moderate or a hard-liner?
3. What are the medium and long-term consequences of success/failure?
4. Will the resultant fall-out (political, economical, militarily, etc) be acceptable?
5. What level of collateral damage will be acceptable?
6. To what extent will a non-violent neutralisation allow the political and operational objectives to be met?

The fact of the matter is that neutralisation must take place at an early stage of the threat being identified. If the target is allowed to establish his/her authority and leadership to such an extent that they are seen as the “father” or rallying point of a movement or force, their neutralisation may increase the motivation of the movement or force. To prevent this, it is necessary for:

1. Sound intelligence at early stages of identification to answer the above considerations
2. Decisive government decision-making to respond rapidly and significantly to a developing threat
3. Rapid and decisive action to prevent future manpower, economical and political costs to escalate in order to neutralise or eliminate the target.

The neutralisation of HVTs has a definite place in the modern combat area, especially when it comes to combating insurgencies and organised crime syndicates/cartels. But a lack of decision making at the political level and inter-service bickering often result in no action. It is the lack of action, both direct and indirect, that allows the target to become a HVT, especially when the media manipulates the truth and gives media coverage thus adding to the supposed credibility of the target – and by then any action is often too little, too late.

HAS COIN MADE US LOSE FOCUS?

Counter Insurgency (COIN) is a topic that is currently the subject of hot debate. Its leap to prominence stems from the hard lessons currently being learnt by the forces engaged in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan, Somalia, DRC, Yemen and so forth. Ironically, we seem to be continually thinking up new names, phrases and terms to ascribe to this not-so-new method of doing battle.

Although no universally accepted definition of an insurgency exists, it is commonly accepted that it is a movement with a specific political aim. In achieving its aim, the insurgent movement can resort to violence or to non-violence. But ultimately, the movement is dedicated to using either subversion (active or passive) or armed actions to overthrow a constituted government with the aim of replacing it with their own form of government – with the support of the local population. Guerrilla warfare and acts of terror and intimidation are simply two of the methods the insurgents will regularly adopt to achieve their aim.

There is however nothing new about an insurgency, apart from the weapons availability and technological ability of some insurgents. From my own limited experience, Angola, Sierra Leone and Indonesia were examples of insurgencies where violent actions were employed by the insurgents to overthrow or pressure those governments. But it appears as though a whole new cult-following has been established when it comes to countering insurgency and no cognisance is given to the lessons that have already been learnt and are clear to see. These lessons very clearly point out that an insurgency can be defeated.

Effectively countering the insurgency does not require a dedicated COIN army. It requires a conventionally-trained army doing conventional warfare correctly. This training, with its discipline and fire control, allows for flexible operation plans and an easy adaption to different tactics, techniques and procedures and adds operational flexibility. The army, however, needs core competencies in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations as well as in counter-terror (CT) operations. But it does not need to change its entire posture.

The success of the army will depend on:

• Its ability to gather intelligence. This requires focussed HUMINT operations and not massive technological operations. The HUMINT targets include operational plans of the insurgents, bases and hide-outs, their logistical supply lines, where IEDs/landmines are being manufactured, etc. These critical factors will not be identified using technical means. However, to get to successful HUMINT operations requires sound intelligence strategies and thorough planning.
• Its understanding that the spoils of the conflict are the minds of the local population. A lack of cultural respect and tradition, heavy-handed tactics against innocents, collateral damage and so forth will simply increase the flow of recruits to the insurgents.
• Combined arms competencies to allow for effective operations
• Its ability to influence the local population by means of operations other than war.

An insurgency is however a progression phase of the conflict and is not the main conflict. As such the insurgency lays the groundwork for a future phase of war.

Following the development of conflict, especially in the African context, it can develop in the following phases:

• The mobilisation of the people against real or perceived oppression
• A phase of armed struggle utilising the operational environment – both the political environment and natural terrain. This is usually in the form of guerrilla warfare and may include acts of terrorism. However, soft targets are of primary importance to show results and get mass media attention. It is this phase of war that is referred to as an insurgency and the fight against it as counter-insurgency. Engagements are of short duration and the insurgent will then melt away into the bush and blend into local population concentrations
• Mobile warfare aimed primarily at rear areas with the aim of cutting supply lines and capturing arms and ammunition. This is not a phase where AFVs are employed but should rather be viewed as a phase in which the insurgents mount large-scale operations. Vehicles may be used to deliver them to close proximity of their targets.
• Conventional warfare – a phase where mass support from the people has been given to the insurgent movement – a phase where numbers and anger will tell .

There are many very valuable lessons pertaining to the effective neutralisation of insurgencies. But, one of the most important issues to take note of is that ultimately, the armed forces will find themselves caught in a clash of cultures. Failure to understand, plan and effectively utilise this factor to their advantage will lead to a long, hard war-of-attrition – and allow the insurgents to realise their strategy.

Perhaps it is time we revisited the lessons we have already learnt and somehow forgotten about.

BOOKS I RECOMMEND

I have had countless mails from numerous visitors asking for books I would recommend on military, intelligence and other related issues.

Whereas I do not want to simply write pages of book titles, I have decided to give some of my most valuable books on these issues. Obviously, there are many, many more good books on these subjects. Please note that these books are not listed in any order of preference or importance.

Military:

1. War and our world – John Keegan
2. On War – Carl von Clausewitz
3. On the German Art of War – Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki
4. Understanding Modern Warfare – David Jordan et al
5. The Art of War – Sun Tsu
6. War of the Flea – Richard Taber
7. Mobiele Oorlogvoering (Mobile Warfare) – Col Roland de Vries
8. The Bear went over the Mountain – Lester W Grau
9. Men against fire – SLA Marshall
10. Seven Pillars of Wisdom - T.E. Lawrence
11. Battle tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies – Brent Nosworthy
12. European Armies and the Conduct of War – Hew Strachan
13. Terrorism – Barry Davies (BEM)
14. War in Peace – (Numerous contributors) Orbis Publishing
15. From the Danube to the Yalu – Gen Mark Clark

Intelligence:

1. Aquarium – Victor Suvorov
2. By way of deception – Victor Ostrovsky
3. The Puppet Masters – John Hughes-Wilson
4. Veil – Bob Woodward
5. Memoirs of a Spy Master – Markus Wolf
6. The World of Espionage – Bruce Norman
7. Legacy of Ashes – Tim Weiner
8. Spy Master – Oleg Kalugin
9. Gideon’s Spies – Gordon Thomas
10. The Double Cross System – J C Masterman
11. Hit Team – David Tinnin
12. I was Stalin’s Agent – W G Krivitsky
13. Secrets of German Espionage – Bernard Newman
14. The Truth about Dirty Tricks – Chapman Pincher
15. The Intelligence War (Numerous contributors) Salamander Book

General:

1. The Prince – Niccolo Machiavelli
2. The Art of the Samurai – Yamamoto Tsunetomo
3. The Coming Anarchy – Robert D Kaplan
4. The Seven Military Classics of ancient China – Ralph D Sawyer
5. Power: The 48 Laws – Robert Greene
6. The Quotable Soldier – Lamar Underwood
7. Victory Secrets of Attila the Hun – Wes Roberts, PhD
8. The Master Strategist – Ketan J Patel
9. Battle – R G Grant
10. The 36 Secret Strategies of the Martial Arts – Hiroshi Moriya
11. Oxford guide to Battles – Richard Holmes & Martin Marix Evans
12. The Chinese Martial Code – A L Sadler
13. Confessions of a Political Hitman – Stephen Marks
14. Military Power – Salamander Books
15. The Warrior’s Honor – Michael Ignatieff

African Military History:

1. Total Defence – Neil Orpen
2. Buffalo Soldiers - Col Jan Breytenbach
3. The Silent War – Reg Shay & Chris Vermaak
4. Commando – Deneys Reitz
5. To the bitter end – Emanoel Lee
6. South Africa’s Border War – Willem Steenkamp
7. Continent Ablaze – John W Turner
8. Trekking on – Deneys Reitz
9. Umkhunto We Sizwe - Thula Bopela and Daluxolo Luthuli
10. Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, Pretoria - Piero Gleijeses
11. 32 Battalion – Piet Nortje
12. Warfare by Other Means – Peter Stiff
13. Africa’s Superpower – Paul Moorcraft
14. Images of War – Peter Badcock
15. Flying Cheetahs in Korea – Dermot Moore & Peter Bagshawe

I trust that these books may serve you as well as they have served me.

THE DANGER OF “MISSION CREEP”

One of the key principles of strategy is to “select and maintain the aim or objective”. This principle is furthermore found in the principles of war and in the principles of the offense.

This principle follows closely on the heels of another fundamental truth – Strategy must adhere to the political guidelines as contained in the political strategy. This is due to the fact that military strategy is simply an extension of the political strategy or a manifestation of a country’s foreign policy.

This principle is aimed at ensuring that commanders do not lose focus on their primary and secondary objectives but instead focus their forces on either destroying or neutralising those objectives. Additionally, this principle ensures that commanders are not side-tracked from their mission and that all possible deviations from the primary and secondary objectives have been carefully appreciated and planned.

The final military strategy is tested against the numerous principles of strategy and war.

Each operational plan is also tested against the principles of that particular phase(s) of warfare that is to be executed during the operation.

During the appreciation and plan, the Intelligence Officer (IO) represents the enemy commander and, based on his knowledge of the enemy, presents the enemy’s most likely and most dangerous courses of action. This allows the commander to ensure that his plan is both flexible and workable, that he never loses sight of the allocated objectives and that he is able to cope with any unexpected enemy actions.

In order to fulfil his task effectively, the IO needs “intelligence” if he is to advise his commander correctly. Without “intelligence”, commanders are blind as all strategies and tactical actions are intelligence driven.

However, a new word has crept into the military’s ever-expanding terminology - “mission creep”. Along with this comes “exit strategy” – something I regard as a “defeat and withdrawal with honour” – if there can be such a thing.

But of late, a lot has been said and written about “mission creep” and how important it is to counter this phenomenon.

Many will disagree with me but I believe that mission creep exists because strategists and planners have failed to strategise and plan. Alternatively, their strategies and plans were never intelligence-driven but instead were based on arrogance, guesstimates and best-case scenarios. Coupled to the lack of strategy and planning comes interference at political level, usually contrary to the initial guidelines supplied, which breaks the military focus and alters the objectives. This, in turn, forces commanders to adapt or change their unit’s mission profile and posture and alter their initial military objectives.

A lack of focus on the objective allows the commanders to become side-tracked with issues that are often unrelated to the objective and in order to cope with this deviation, more troops are called for. This is one of the reasons why “troop surge strategies” are implemented. But, I have had my say on what I perceive to be a misguided approach – unless of course, a war of attrition is being fought. But it is highly unlikely that modern society will adopt and execute a long-term war of attrition, especially in terms of casualties and costs.

I am therefore somewhat surprised when “mission creep” is mentioned as something that is inevitable. I believe it is due to a total intelligence failure and subsequent poor strategies and plans.

But, perhaps I am wrong?

RANDOM THOUGHTS ON COUNTERING AN INSURGENCY (Part 2)

An insurgency is the result of an ideology that violently opposes a government’s policies with a vastly different politico-ideology set. That ideology will only grow stronger if the security forces act in a manner that alienates – or has the potential to alienate - the local population. This includes acting as “conquerors” towards the local population and/or offending their traditions and customs.

However, there is a fine balance between acting decisively in terms of military action and winning the “hearts and minds” of the local population. Too much focus on one action will simply weaken the other, especially when this focus is haphazard and uncoordinated. But, the adage that a COIN conflict requires a mere 20% input as opposed to an 80% political input can be misleading as the military operations are 100% operations aimed at locating and destroying the insurgents wherever they may be.

To succeed, COIN forces require an exceptionally high standard of leadership and combat discipline. Good intelligence leads to good planning. Gathering intelligence requires the maximum use of all intelligence sources including the deployment of aggressive reconnaissance teams who can call for the rapid deployment of assault troops/fire force elements. Leadership and purpose will provide the COIN forces with flexibility and also allow the application of deception measures. Good fire discipline will prevent unnecessary collateral damage amongst the local population. However, once the locals regard the security forces as part of the problem, the tipping point has been reached.

There are various scenarios at play during any counter insurgency campaign, but those scenarios are dependent on whether the insurgency is being fought in one’s own country or beyond one’s own borders. Also to consider is whether an outside force is used to assist an under-siege government in its fight against an insurgency. Additionally, the waters become more muddied when the insurgent is supported from a third- or even fourth-country than the one he is operating in. In the latter, cross-border pre-emptive strikes will be called for – but this requires accurate intelligence in order to conduct pin-point strikes.

The situation becomes even more complex when deploying into a country that contains several diverse ethnic or population groups, speaking different languages, with different customs and beliefs and who live by their own rules. The end result is that such fragmented societies are seldom, if ever, able to act as a unified nation. This can present the COIN force with the challenge of deciding which group it will support and how will it control the country once the insurgents have been defeated. Simply having “boots on the ground” will not necessarily lead to acceptance of the COIN force and legitimacy in the eyes of the different factions or groups.

Whereas the COIN forces may claim a “just cause” and legitimacy, it is the local population who will ultimately give that legitimacy and legitimacy is an essential requirement for success. But, it is the regional and international populations/communities that will restrict the COIN forces from often responding with the appropriate ruthlessness against the insurgent, subsequently bringing the legitimacy into question. In turn, a lack of ruthlessness will present the COIN forces as “weak” in the eyes of the local population. But, appropriate ruthlessness against anyone but the insurgent will be sure to intensify both operational and legitimacy problems as well as breed resentment from the locals. The end result is that both the security forces and the government will lose credibility with the local population. This in itself implies a doomed strategy.

Inappropriately equipped and poorly supported COIN forces will find themselves restricted to predictable and routine road-bound actions that will make them easy targets for insurgent fire and IEDs/landmines. Likewise, inadequately planned and prepared Civic Action Groups that are under-equipped, understaffed and under-financed will not be able to play the role they are supposed to play thus given the insurgent an additional advantage.

All civic action plans need to be coordinated with the operational plan to ensure focus of effort under a unified command. This can only be achieved by militarily driving insurgents out of an area and then developing/rebuilding the community in that area. Failure to do this will lead to failed development programmes and, additionally, create numerous power vacuums which the insurgent can and will exploit to his advantage. This advantage will give the insurgent continued initiative and prevent the COIN forces from gaining any momentum in their operations.

When politicians ignore the realities of the conflict they have committed troops to, a disaster is imminent. This lack of understanding will not only demoralise and weaken the COIN forces but will, additionally, give the insurgents a sense of victory.

Countries that want to get involved in a COIN conflict beyond their borders, regardless of how noble this may seem at the time, need to question whether such involvement will serve the interests of their National and Foreign Policy. They also need to carefully consider the political, economical, human and material fall-out that may result from such involvement. These considerations need to be juxtaposed with their strategic abilities and capabilities and carefully assessed. Failure to do so will seriously hamper the entire COIN effort and progress and make a believable and credible exit strategy even more problematic and difficult.

When COIN forces are committed, they need to be correctly equipped, provided with the necessary resources and the political and military will to see the conflict through to the end. As insurgencies tend to be protracted campaigns, there are no short-cuts to victory. Such misguided beliefs will lead to ultimate resistance to the campaign by the citizenry, whilst stimulating the drive of the insurgents.

From a military point-of, winning the insurgency may prove an easy task but ultimately, poor strategies, a lack of planning, poor coordination of effort, inadequate equipment, a shortage of resources, misguided political interference, poor leadership, a lack of flexibility, ineffective tactics and a misunderstanding of the insurgent and his ideology will give victory to the insurgent.

Coupled to a lack of credibility and resentment from the local population, the COIN forces may just as well pack their bags and head home.

RANDOM THOUGHTS ON COUNTERING AN INSURGENCY (Part 1)

Insurgencies are nothing new. History is littered with examples of insurgencies and counter insurgency operations - some successful, some not. But have we learnt anything from this history?

A counter insurgency operation (COIN Op) differs vastly from a conventional or semi-conventional operation in that the enemy (insurgent) is usually not recognisable as he/she moves, as Mao Zedong put it, “like a fish in the water”.

Without a distinctive uniform to aid identification, security force troops are confused and unsure of whom exactly they are fighting. In turn, this can manifest itself as frustration, leading to the excessive use of force and firepower, thus simply strengthening the insurgents’ cause and turning the local population against the soldiers as they become the indiscriminate casualties of the conflict. This, along with the poor treatment and abuse of the local population, will result in a situation where anger and numbers will eventually count against the security forces.

An insurgency is not a stand-off between two armies opposing one another. It is an ideology opposing an army. It does not adhere to the classical principles of the advance, attack and so forth. Instead, it will resort to anything that will further its aims, including terrorism, crime, fear and violence. Inevitably, this leads to the belief that the insurgent has the initiative as he is able to choose the time and place and strike at will, and then blend into the population. Whereas this holds some truth, especially in the early stages of the insurgency, it does not imply that the security forces have to surrender the initiative and become reactive.

But there are several reasons why an insurgency may be viewed as “lost”. These reasons can trace their origins back to the failure of strategists and planners to recognise the potential for an insurgency and to consider or appreciate the worst or most dangerous case scenario that can result due to their strategy or plan. The end result is that the flawed operational concept or plan becomes a constantly changing plan without a clear focus. It is this lack of focus that throws the security forces off balance, leads to casualties and intoxicates the insurgent with success. In turn, this creates the perception amongst the local population that the insurgent is indeed the stronger power.

Security forces need to understand the importance of isolating the insurgent from the local population. Whereas this requires a dedicated and realistic “hearts-and-minds” policy, this policy is doomed to failure if the security forces do not understand the culture, traditions, values and beliefs of the local population. This requires that all members of the security forces are educated about the local population. Without this knowledge, the security forces will misread the insurgents’ political and military strategy and subsequently its aims and objectives.

Furthermore, if this education and understanding is lacking, it will be nigh impossible to recruit and train loyal local population members into a force that will willingly do battle with the insurgents. Instead, the security forces will simply be training and arming the future insurgents.

The operational concept needs to make provision for numerous factors that will most definitely influence its execution. But, in my opinion, the following factors ought to be near the top of the strategist’s list of factors for consideration:

1. Intelligence (historic and current and how this will influence the operational concept)
2. Understanding the local population’s beliefs, values, traditions and so forth
3. Educating the security forces prior to insertion or deployment.

The use of landmines and IEDs by insurgents is nothing new, either. The South African Defence Force, along with the Rhodesian Army, learnt how to counter and negate these insurgent weapons decades ago. These lessons, along with the adaption of tactics, seem to have been lost in the modern COIN ops arenas. Likewise, concepts such as “ink spot strategies”, “area domination”, “small team operations” and so on seem to have been grossly neglected.

Of great importance is also the political will of the government fighting the insurgency and how this political will manifests itself by equipping the security forces. Inadequately equipped forces or a lack of essential equipment will inevitably lead to a drop in security force morale and their will to counter the insurgents. Additionally, casualties will escalate and have a negative influence on the national will to fight or oppose the insurgency. Subsequently, this simply enhances insurgent intoxication.

Numerous windows of opportunity present themselves when fighting an insurgent force. Failure to identify these windows and exploit them can be detrimental to the overall strategy. Whereas the insurgent lacks the discipline, weapon systems and military strength to engage the security forces directly, an indirect approach to defeating the security forces becomes the order of the day. Part of this indirect approach involves the engagement of the media to help influence the political environment they are operating in.

As long as we continue to misdiagnose the environment and ignore or subject the local population to abuse humiliation, the insurgent will retain the initiative. The end result will be a constantly changing strategy with a lack of focus where the security forces are kept off balance by their own flawed strategy.