MISSING THE POINT WITH COUNTER INSURGENCY (COIN)

I thoroughly enjoy discussions on conflicts, insurgencies and wars and the countering of these actions, regardless if I agree with them or not. I know many criticise and do not agree with my viewpoints and view them as too simplistic. What I consider to be critical in the ending of a conflict, an insurgency or civil war has been very successfully applied in practise. Food for thought is, however, never bad food regardless of how it is served.

Insurgencies are not new, nor does fighting them require a “new” way of fighting. Nor do fighting insurgencies need to be long, protracted and costly affairs if the strategy is balanced. However, there seems to be a misguided belief that if we can define an insurgency precisely, we can defeat it. Whereas a definition holds value, its value is lost if the cause is not fully understood.

Ending an insurgency may not always be easy but it is certainly very possible. Contrary to the belief of some, an insurgency is not a spontaneous event but rather a threat that has been allowed to develop over a period of time. It is a political problem that has been brought about by dysfunctional or poor governance, a sense of political isolation and the suppression of hope along with a combination of anger, hatred and revenge that has impacted negatively on the populace and caused the populace immense distress. When the populace feel they have lost hope and have nothing more to lose by rising up against the government, they will do exactly that.

One of the strategic objectives of an insurgency may be to develop their planned armed struggle into a civil war to pit citizen against citizen and in so doing, collapse the Pillars of State and along with them, the established political order. This requires mobilising the quiet majority of the populace to disrupt government efforts through armed violence, civil disobedience, terrorism, violent crime, civil unrest and violent protests. Tribalism, religion, racial and ethnic tensions along with economic disparities are often used as motivators in the calls for the populace to rise up.  

If an under-threat government makes use of a foreign allied military force to assist it suppress the insurgency, the populace’s “silent majority” will generally accept this decision as long as the combined force does not target them. The foreign forces will, however, be closely watched in terms of their actions, discipline and attitude towards the populace. Uncontrolled behaviour, unlawful acts and/or attacks on civilians by the foreign forces will simply become a rallying call for the populace to join – or at the very least – support the insurgency.

Conversely, the populace may believe that the arrival of foreign forces allows them to take the law into their own hands and extract revenge against those insurgents and their supporters hiding in plain sight. Once this cycle of violence begins, it is very difficult to stop and its effects are usually long-lasting.

However, relying solely on foreign forces to ultimately defeat the armed insurgents will result in a hollow victory for the government forces as when the foreign forces leave, the insurgency will simply resurface and be characterised by more intense violence.

If a country has been invaded and occupied by a foreign force that shows little or no respect towards the government, the law enforcement agencies, the armed forces and the populace, their property, culture, traditions, political system and religion, the anger, discontent and humiliation of the subjugated will in all probability give rise to a rebellion or an insurgency in order to eject the occupiers. Added to this is the oft-imposed morality and ideology of the occupying forces that results in additional anger, confusion and discontent. It is this anger that will result in attacks on the occupying force by the populace and the local soldiers and policemen that have been “forced” to partner with the occupation forces – the so-called “green-on-blue” attacks.

The ability of an insurgent group to attack across numerous spheres of the state gives them a flexibility the government has allowed them to have – by creating a condition of dissatisfaction that can be exploited. This is in part due to a lack of a coherent realistic national strategy and a poor, unstructured and unaligned national security strategy and its various components, coupled to poor governance and neglect of the populace. Add to this a lack of credible intelligence and the means to act/react on intelligence and the insurgents are given the initiative whilst the security forces fall into the trap of becoming reactive.

By exploiting both the mainstream and social media for disinformation and propaganda purposes, insurgents create the perception that they are more successful and stronger than they really are. It also gives them an instrument for reaching other fence-sitting or neutral members of the populace. Every action and success is aimed at showing their determination and even minor tactical successes are proclaimed to be major tactical victories. This can, along with the collateral damage caused by the security forces, harness both local and international support and sympathy for their cause.

International support such as funding, weapons, training and sanctuaries and sympathy – along with unvetted NGOs and “charity organisations” -  especially when the insurgents are acting as a proxy force on behalf of a foreign government or sponsor whose intentions are the placement of a puppet government, can result in sanctions on an international level. These sanctions are aimed are weakening the government whilst strengthening the insurgents. Apart from the wholesale death and destruction of innocents and their property, the international support has a tendency to escalate out of control and bring additional governments into the conflict to support one side or the other.

The first-line of defence against an insurgency is – apart from good governance – aggressive, pro-active intelligence gathering coupled to coordinated law enforcement actions. Sadly, many governments choose to ignore the wall as the writing becomes more obvious, especially if it does not match their perception of reality.

When the armed forces are called on to provide counter insurgency support to the law enforcement agencies, it is usually an indication of failure by government and the intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The mission of the armed forces ought to be the creation of a climate in which government can govern and the law enforcement agencies can again begin enforcing the law.

When an insurgency or conflict has entered into the armed or military phase, the Trinity of Gravity needs to be identified, isolated, attacked and neutralised, allowing the government to regain control. 

I believe the concept of using the armed forces to establish control over the entire Trinity of Gravity is both flawed and wishful thinking as soldiers are neither trained to govern nor enforce the law – nor are they trained to be diplomats. The bottom line is that if the armed forces do not take effective control of the insurgents, the insurgents will simply take control of the populace – at the expense of everyone including the armed forces.

Preventing and/or defeating an insurgency, therefore, begins with the display of political will by the government coupled to ever-improving delivery of government services, the continued gathering of intelligence and the enforcement of law in all its facets – and not with the armed forces trying to play politics and govern.  

MISJUDGING THE CENTRE OF GRAVITY

Everyone knows how important it is to attack and destroy the enemy’s centre of gravity whilst preserving our own centre of gravity from enemy attacks. But, despite all the intellectual arguments about the centre of gravity and the numerous approaches to determining this critical factor, strategists and commanders continually seem to get it wrong, especially during counter insurgency (COIN) operations.

Clausewitz in his work “On War” considered the centre of gravity to be "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends...the point at which all our energies should be directed". If the enemy’s centre of gravity is attacked and destroyed, he will lose his will to fight and thus be emasculated – the perfect time to direct all our energies and resources against him to ensure his total destruction.

This belief held true when massed armies faced one another on the battlefield. The modern battlefield has, however, changed somewhat and whereas the centre of gravity remains very important, it can no longer be viewed as a central point upon which the enemy’s success or failure hinges.

One of the aims of war is to annihilate the enemy (the other is to exhaust the enemy) but it seems that annihilation is not politically correct nowadays. It seems we would rather opt for a ceasefire – so much more politically correct - and besides, it protects the human rights of the enemy – regardless if he cares about our human rights or not or subscribes to the Rules of War, the Geneva Convention or any other rules or laws.

But, allowing the enemy to retain his forces and strength by means of a ceasefire simply gives him the opportunity to rebuild his forces, re-establish his perceived centre of gravity and thus prolong the conflict.

During the initial phase of a revolution, the role of intelligence is critical in identifying and confirming the mobilisation of the masses prior to the commencement of the armed struggle phase. If the revolutionary leadership is not identified and neutralised at this early phase, the struggle will most certainly develop to the insurgency phase. However, early on in this phase, the leadership is the centre of gravity. But once the revolution has progressed to the phase of armed struggle and insurgency, their elimination will, in many instances, simply make them martyrs.

Nevertheless, as the revolution develops, the leadership requires two vital elements to sustain its efforts: manpower and finances. I therefore believe that the COIN scenario does not have a single centre of gravity but rather a trinity consisting of the insurgent leadership, the people and finances. This complicates the identification and destruction of the centre of gravity as countering an insurgency requires a multi-facetted approach and not a “fix bayonets and charge” or a “shock and awe” approach.

The “trinity of gravity” is, additionally, given credence by certain members of the media who will often propagate the aims and desires of insurgent forces in a manner which leans towards sympathetic support.

The decades-long war in Angola serves as an example: The rebel force UNITA was led by the charismatic Dr Jonas Savimbi, a dedicated Maoist but who the media had turned into a “Christian” who was working for a “democratic” Angola. Savimbi was the media’s darling.

To sustain his war for “democracy”, Savimbi and UNITA resorted to the illegal mining and selling of diamonds to obtain funds to keep the war going. This financial powerbase allowed UNITA to purchase their hardware and pay troops in the field. Additional to this, UNITA denied these funds to the government and furthermore attempted to block oil leaving Angola (part of the Govt of Angola’s economic base) thus slowly bleeding the government to death on the battlefield.

The local population were, especially in areas under UNITA influence, the feeder for troops for operations as well as giving UNITA forces safe passage, intelligence, logistical support and succour. Those who did not give this support suffered the consequences.

This posed several strategic questions: What was UNITA’s centre of gravity? Where was it located? How did it operate? What would the result of its destruction be?

In short, there was no single centre of gravity but rather a trinity of gravity. This, in turn, led to a multidimensional strategy aimed at:
1. Attacking and disrupting UNITA units. These actions consisted of guerrilla warfare, mobile warfare and heliborne operations aimed at giving the enemy no respite. Not only did this cause enemy casualties but also significantly lowered morale to the point where rebel troops started deserting. Maximum employment of human and technical sources were used to determine where the enemy was, how he was organised, etc, thus effective plans could be laid to attack and destroy him.
2. Influencing the local population to reduce their belief in and support to UNITA. This was achieved by establishing clinics, providing clean water and giving protection to them. To use Mao Zedong’s view, albeit in reverse, we removed the "water” and the “fish” had nowhere to go. The locals were also treated fairly and their property respected and not damaged. This became very apparent when towns and villages were retaken from UNITA – the locals came begging for assistance, something that was then given to them.
3. The prize was not the elimination of Dr Savimbi but rather the taking and holding of the diamond fields, thus denying the rebels their source of income. (If Savimbi’s field army was destroyed, he would anyway lose his ability to gain support). Without income from diamonds, the rebels were unable to replace captured or destroyed equipment.

When these three strategic objectives had been reached, the rebels were forced to sue for peace. Sadly though, the Angolans were, in turn, forced by the international community to merely opt for an unconditional ceasefire and not the destruction of the rebel forces. This resulted in the rebels being able to rearm, reorganise and go back to war. When this conflict restarted, Dr Savimbi again became the initial single centre of gravity and it was only with his death that the war finally ended but at that time, his influence had waned and he did not have the economical muscle or the support from the local population he once had.

The same situation was prevalent in Sierra Leone – no single centre of gravity but rather a trinity.

Therefore, to quote Clausewitz, the “hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends...the point at which all our energies should be directed” should not, in the COIN situation, be seen as a single point but rather as a trinity.

If strategists misunderstand or misjudge the concept of “centre of gravity”, the conflict will be simply be prolonged and thus give the enemy the time and space he needs to achieve his goals.