I wish to advise all followers and visitors to my blog that I shall not be posting for at least two weeks.
As I shall be unavailable over the period 26 June 2009 to 15 July 2009, it will not be possible for me to respond to your comments, which I appreciate and value.
Upon my return, I shall post all comments that may have been received.
However, please do not stop visiting the blog…
By the way, my first posting upon my return will discuss the myth of “peacekeeping”.
Till then, everything of the best to you all.
Thursday, June 25, 2009
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
GETTING IT RIGHT THE FIRST TIME AROUND
In war, there are no second prizes. Commanders at all levels ought to recognise this. Wars are either won or lost. Winning is dependent on good training, good equipment, good strategies, good tactics, good battle drills, good command and control and above all, good planning.
But a good plan cannot be executed with poorly trained troops, regardless the type and quality of gadgets they are issued with. Nor can a bad plan be “fixed” with firepower.
Many armies seem to train and prepare exclusively for so-called peacetime missions. There are many reasons for this but the single most important reason is that those giving the instruction have no combat experience. With no real experience, troops are often not given the vital information they need to conduct their missions and more importantly, survive on the battlefield. To compensate for their lack of real situations, they mechanically follow a text book approach. That coupled to an inability to view training as the single most important preparation prior to combat, has led to a dramatic rise in casualties.
The problem with this approach to training is that when faced with real combat situations, many things begin to fall apart. Troops do not have the self-belief to cope with these difficult – and often terrifying – situations. They are not mentally prepared for what they are facing. They do not have the self-discipline to remain calm under fire. They are not sure if they can trust the soldier next to, or behind them to do what he should be doing. They have not been taught to adapt to rapidly changing situations.
Soldiers are not prepared for combat by mindless classroom work. Whereas the foundation of the soldier is discipline, his survival on the battlefield depends on good training, an ability to follow orders and to be flexible in his execution of orders. Good training allows soldiers to think…along the lines of the planned action.
Discipline is, regardless of what the detractors may say and think, vital for the survival of soldiers on the battlefield. It is this discipline that leads to unit pride, self-discipline and the strength of mind to cope with life-threatening situations. Good discipline also contributes enormously to unit cohesion. But discipline does not revolve around self-discipline alone. It includes fire discipline, equipment maintenance – without being told to do so, cleanliness and respect.
Parade ground work lays the foundation of military discipline. It teaches soldiers to react instinctively to orders. Likewise, physical training (PT) aids in the development of fitness and endurance. Both of these activities build character and push men to their limits. Men who have discovered that their limits are way beyond what they thought, suddenly develop a new-found pride in themselves. But when these activities are used solely for punishment and mindless time fillers, they lose their value and instead, breed resentment.
Cross-training of soldiers is equally important, not only to increase confidence but to allow men to operate and use different weapons and equipment. Cross-training adds to the flexibility of units and added flexibility creates new opportunities on the battlefield. We cannot expect every soldier to be a specialist diver, pilot, tank commander and so forth, but we can expect him to be the best prepared he can be for his role within the unit – and most importantly to be able to carry out his orders efficiently. Cross-training aids in this.
Are soldiers taught to use a map and compass when the GPS goes down? Can they replace a broken firing pin of an enemy assault rifle? Can they treat a serious wound? Can they improvise a diversion? Can they use most weapon systems within their own unit? Can they call in an airstrike or guide a helicopter into an LZ? Can they lay a hasty ambush at night? Can they…?
Commanders are keen to prepare “Lessons Learnt” after an operation but are those lessons learnt passed all the way down the hierarchy? Are they given to trainers who understand the importance and implication of those lessons? Can the trainers apply those lessons learnt to the advantage of their recruits?
Those who are tasked with training and preparing soldiers for combat often forget the great responsibility they have. When the trainers have no real experience, their training will be mediocre at best – especially when the instructor cannot answer the questions of recruits sensibly, instead claiming that it is “because we have always done it like that” or “because I say so”.
“Train hard, fight easy” is an old adage but without the correct instructors, discipline, confidence, tactical plans and mission predictions, it will never become a reality.
We only have one chance to do it right because there are no prizes for losers.
But a good plan cannot be executed with poorly trained troops, regardless the type and quality of gadgets they are issued with. Nor can a bad plan be “fixed” with firepower.
Many armies seem to train and prepare exclusively for so-called peacetime missions. There are many reasons for this but the single most important reason is that those giving the instruction have no combat experience. With no real experience, troops are often not given the vital information they need to conduct their missions and more importantly, survive on the battlefield. To compensate for their lack of real situations, they mechanically follow a text book approach. That coupled to an inability to view training as the single most important preparation prior to combat, has led to a dramatic rise in casualties.
The problem with this approach to training is that when faced with real combat situations, many things begin to fall apart. Troops do not have the self-belief to cope with these difficult – and often terrifying – situations. They are not mentally prepared for what they are facing. They do not have the self-discipline to remain calm under fire. They are not sure if they can trust the soldier next to, or behind them to do what he should be doing. They have not been taught to adapt to rapidly changing situations.
Soldiers are not prepared for combat by mindless classroom work. Whereas the foundation of the soldier is discipline, his survival on the battlefield depends on good training, an ability to follow orders and to be flexible in his execution of orders. Good training allows soldiers to think…along the lines of the planned action.
Discipline is, regardless of what the detractors may say and think, vital for the survival of soldiers on the battlefield. It is this discipline that leads to unit pride, self-discipline and the strength of mind to cope with life-threatening situations. Good discipline also contributes enormously to unit cohesion. But discipline does not revolve around self-discipline alone. It includes fire discipline, equipment maintenance – without being told to do so, cleanliness and respect.
Parade ground work lays the foundation of military discipline. It teaches soldiers to react instinctively to orders. Likewise, physical training (PT) aids in the development of fitness and endurance. Both of these activities build character and push men to their limits. Men who have discovered that their limits are way beyond what they thought, suddenly develop a new-found pride in themselves. But when these activities are used solely for punishment and mindless time fillers, they lose their value and instead, breed resentment.
Cross-training of soldiers is equally important, not only to increase confidence but to allow men to operate and use different weapons and equipment. Cross-training adds to the flexibility of units and added flexibility creates new opportunities on the battlefield. We cannot expect every soldier to be a specialist diver, pilot, tank commander and so forth, but we can expect him to be the best prepared he can be for his role within the unit – and most importantly to be able to carry out his orders efficiently. Cross-training aids in this.
Are soldiers taught to use a map and compass when the GPS goes down? Can they replace a broken firing pin of an enemy assault rifle? Can they treat a serious wound? Can they improvise a diversion? Can they use most weapon systems within their own unit? Can they call in an airstrike or guide a helicopter into an LZ? Can they lay a hasty ambush at night? Can they…?
Commanders are keen to prepare “Lessons Learnt” after an operation but are those lessons learnt passed all the way down the hierarchy? Are they given to trainers who understand the importance and implication of those lessons? Can the trainers apply those lessons learnt to the advantage of their recruits?
Those who are tasked with training and preparing soldiers for combat often forget the great responsibility they have. When the trainers have no real experience, their training will be mediocre at best – especially when the instructor cannot answer the questions of recruits sensibly, instead claiming that it is “because we have always done it like that” or “because I say so”.
“Train hard, fight easy” is an old adage but without the correct instructors, discipline, confidence, tactical plans and mission predictions, it will never become a reality.
We only have one chance to do it right because there are no prizes for losers.
Saturday, June 6, 2009
THE IMPORTANCE OF MISSION PLANNING
Mission planning requires more than just throwing the dice and hoping for good luck. It is an art that requires an in-depth understanding of numerous critical elements or factors that may impact on the mission – both positively and negatively - and an assessment/analysis of how those elements or factors can be either negated, overcome or exploited to give the PMC the advantage it requires in the execution of the mission.
Any mission can be broken down into:
1. Strategic objectives: These objectives are usually derived from the client’s strategic objectives but are further analysed and fine-tuned to the PMC management level
2. Tactical objectives: These objectives stem from the PMC management’s strategic objectives and are an indication of the priority objectives (or targets) and the secondary objectives (or targets) that the PMC needs to achieve in order to successfully accomplish the mission.
From these objectives are derived the Strategic Operational Concept and the Tactical Operational Concept. These concepts are NOT the final plans but merely serve as direction-pointers to ensure that the mission remains the prime focus of the PMC.
Only once the Strategic Operation Concept and the Tactical Operational Concept are fully understood can the mission planning proper begin.
The role of on-going real-time intelligence plays a crucial role in the development of both the Strategic Operational Concept and the Tactical Operational Concept and allows adjustments to be made to the concepts. It is also this intelligence that will ultimately determine the mission-profile of the PMC. The mission-profile, in turn, will determine the amount of manpower, weapons, ammunition (first-line and first-line reserve), the phase(s) of war, tactics and so forth that will be followed.
In order to enhance the development of the tactical plan, it is imperative that intelligence- and reconnaissance - teams are deployed as early as possible in order to ensure a real-time intelligence feed on the targets. This allows further adjustments to be made to the tactical plan and, in turn, the mission profile to be adjusted if necessary.
Planning is a vital component for success and although luck can play a role, it is the ultimate plan, carried across to everyone partaking in the operation with clarity that determines the success of any mission. Team leaders must be allowed to display flexibility within the overall plan and, in turn, must develop their own plans at their level.
Once the tactical concept has been developed, it must, along with the operational plans - at all levels - be tested against the principles of the relevant operation. The ultimate aim is to ensure the correct men, correctly equipped, are at the right time and place to achieve the mission. This requires constant coordination between the various elements that will partake in the execution of the plan. In turn, casualties will be reduced.
Mission planning can be a tedious process but it requires continued focus on the outcome of the operation.
It will do planners good to remember that there are no second prizes in an operation and that no amount of firepower can rectify a poor plan.
Any mission can be broken down into:
1. Strategic objectives: These objectives are usually derived from the client’s strategic objectives but are further analysed and fine-tuned to the PMC management level
2. Tactical objectives: These objectives stem from the PMC management’s strategic objectives and are an indication of the priority objectives (or targets) and the secondary objectives (or targets) that the PMC needs to achieve in order to successfully accomplish the mission.
From these objectives are derived the Strategic Operational Concept and the Tactical Operational Concept. These concepts are NOT the final plans but merely serve as direction-pointers to ensure that the mission remains the prime focus of the PMC.
Only once the Strategic Operation Concept and the Tactical Operational Concept are fully understood can the mission planning proper begin.
The role of on-going real-time intelligence plays a crucial role in the development of both the Strategic Operational Concept and the Tactical Operational Concept and allows adjustments to be made to the concepts. It is also this intelligence that will ultimately determine the mission-profile of the PMC. The mission-profile, in turn, will determine the amount of manpower, weapons, ammunition (first-line and first-line reserve), the phase(s) of war, tactics and so forth that will be followed.
In order to enhance the development of the tactical plan, it is imperative that intelligence- and reconnaissance - teams are deployed as early as possible in order to ensure a real-time intelligence feed on the targets. This allows further adjustments to be made to the tactical plan and, in turn, the mission profile to be adjusted if necessary.
Planning is a vital component for success and although luck can play a role, it is the ultimate plan, carried across to everyone partaking in the operation with clarity that determines the success of any mission. Team leaders must be allowed to display flexibility within the overall plan and, in turn, must develop their own plans at their level.
Once the tactical concept has been developed, it must, along with the operational plans - at all levels - be tested against the principles of the relevant operation. The ultimate aim is to ensure the correct men, correctly equipped, are at the right time and place to achieve the mission. This requires constant coordination between the various elements that will partake in the execution of the plan. In turn, casualties will be reduced.
Mission planning can be a tedious process but it requires continued focus on the outcome of the operation.
It will do planners good to remember that there are no second prizes in an operation and that no amount of firepower can rectify a poor plan.
Sunday, May 24, 2009
FEEDING THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS
In my previous posting I had a brief look at the Intelligence Cycle, a process many speak of but often neglect. This process can be likened to a huge machine that uses information as its fuel. But, this process can either be a highly valuable asset – or a lame duck.
But apart from knowing this process exists, what sources of information are available to feed this process and how are they determined and guided?
It is important to know that there is a vast difference between “information” and “intelligence” - the former being raw, unprocessed data and the latter collated and evaluated information from the different available sources.
The information-feed from sources can be likened to the fuel that drives the intelligence machine. Without sound and credible information – there can be no intelligence process. It then simply becomes a matter of “garbage in, garbage out”. In order to prevent a garbage-like scenario, the identification, selection and exploitation of sources is paramount.
Whereas the PMC operating in a hostile environment will not be able to access the same type of sources as a sophisticated armed force, it can, nevertheless, access a large amount of different sources to provide the information-feed into the intelligence machine. The methods of collection are categorised as either overt or covert. Sources on the other hand can be directed, non-directed or casual.
These information sources can be briefly listed as follows:
1. Space – ie satellites,
2. Aerial – ie aerial observation platforms
3. Ground – ie reconnaissance, GSR, FCR and so forth
4. Maritime – ie ships, boats, etc
5. Underwater sensors, especially at choke points
6. Agents – both penetration and infiltration
7. Electronic warfare – ie radio, telephone, facsimile and email intercepts
8. Open literature – open sources in the public domain
9. Allied forces operating in close proximity
10. Prisoners-of-war, especially those recently captured
11. Defectors from the enemy’s intelligence services
12. Established data base that has been built-up over time
13. Local population who are resident in the area of operations and so forth.
It is of great importance to the intelligence staff of the PMC to focus their efforts on the available sources and to correctly task and guide these sources where possible. Without correct guidance, tasking and leading, the sources will fail to provide the required information and ultimately, this will lead to an intelligence failure.
Intelligence failures are not necessarily only due to the poor identification and exploitation of sources but also due to a lack of knowledge on the target area and the peoples who reside there. Intelligence failures can also be the result of arrogance and a belief that the opposing forces are unsophisticated, untrained and therefore unable to wage war effectively.
It is this arrogance of superiority that has led to many forces being unable to correctly assess their opponents on the field of battle – and has, in turn, led to higher than expected casualties and ultimately defeat.
Identifying and exploiting the available sources prior to entry into a hostile area is the key to any successful military campaign. Failure to do so is the key to defeat.
But apart from knowing this process exists, what sources of information are available to feed this process and how are they determined and guided?
It is important to know that there is a vast difference between “information” and “intelligence” - the former being raw, unprocessed data and the latter collated and evaluated information from the different available sources.
The information-feed from sources can be likened to the fuel that drives the intelligence machine. Without sound and credible information – there can be no intelligence process. It then simply becomes a matter of “garbage in, garbage out”. In order to prevent a garbage-like scenario, the identification, selection and exploitation of sources is paramount.
Whereas the PMC operating in a hostile environment will not be able to access the same type of sources as a sophisticated armed force, it can, nevertheless, access a large amount of different sources to provide the information-feed into the intelligence machine. The methods of collection are categorised as either overt or covert. Sources on the other hand can be directed, non-directed or casual.
These information sources can be briefly listed as follows:
1. Space – ie satellites,
2. Aerial – ie aerial observation platforms
3. Ground – ie reconnaissance, GSR, FCR and so forth
4. Maritime – ie ships, boats, etc
5. Underwater sensors, especially at choke points
6. Agents – both penetration and infiltration
7. Electronic warfare – ie radio, telephone, facsimile and email intercepts
8. Open literature – open sources in the public domain
9. Allied forces operating in close proximity
10. Prisoners-of-war, especially those recently captured
11. Defectors from the enemy’s intelligence services
12. Established data base that has been built-up over time
13. Local population who are resident in the area of operations and so forth.
It is of great importance to the intelligence staff of the PMC to focus their efforts on the available sources and to correctly task and guide these sources where possible. Without correct guidance, tasking and leading, the sources will fail to provide the required information and ultimately, this will lead to an intelligence failure.
Intelligence failures are not necessarily only due to the poor identification and exploitation of sources but also due to a lack of knowledge on the target area and the peoples who reside there. Intelligence failures can also be the result of arrogance and a belief that the opposing forces are unsophisticated, untrained and therefore unable to wage war effectively.
It is this arrogance of superiority that has led to many forces being unable to correctly assess their opponents on the field of battle – and has, in turn, led to higher than expected casualties and ultimately defeat.
Identifying and exploiting the available sources prior to entry into a hostile area is the key to any successful military campaign. Failure to do so is the key to defeat.
Sunday, May 10, 2009
UNDERSTANDING “INTELLIGENCE”
The term “intelligence” is both misunderstood - and abused - by many. Essentially, in the military sense, it is an in-depth knowledge of the enemy that allows the prediction of the future based on current, sound and credible source-information. It is this foreknowledge that allows the prediction of the enemy’s intentions that will enable a force to adopt the correct mission profile and posture, manoeuvre its forces correctly and be at the correct place and time to overwhelm the enemy with fire.
Of course, the silly old joke that military intelligence is a misnomer is due to the fact that many who work in the field of military intelligence have no idea what they are supposed to be doing and no clue how to achieve it. Instead, they conjure up incredible source-information and make predictions from this nonsense and thus arrive at incorrect conclusions and the resultant incorrect predictions.
This leads to mission failure and a loss of credibility to the fighting forces, something we seem to be witnessing on an almost daily basis in conflicts around the world.
The ability to gather credible information is based on the ability to “see into the heart of the enemy”, know where to find the information required and to identify and utilise every available source that can gain access to the information required. The value of human sources is often sacrificed in this regard, instead making maximum use of technical or electronic collection, despite it being easily misled.
An inability to analyse where the required information can be found leads to the collection of “history” and not “intelligence”.
In order to ensure the correct process is followed in this attempt at gaining access to classified enemy material, a simple cycle, known as the “Intelligence Cycle” is followed. This cycle consists of the following basic actions:
1. Determining WHAT information is required ie defining the Intelligence Problem
2. Determining WHERE to find the information, ie what access is required and how to exploit that access. This is known as the Intelligence Appreciation
3. Collecting the information by means of sources and agents
4. Processing the gathered information by means of the Intelligence Process. This is where the information gathered is evaluated, collated and interpreted. It is at this stage that the information is transformed into intelligence
5. Disseminating the intelligence, ie giving it to those people/units that need to know the available intelligence in order to plan their operations.
6. The situation is again subject to the Intelligence Appreciation in order to locate WHERE additional information may be found and the cycle begins anew.
This process remains an on-going cycle in order to continually update the information on the enemy. It is this information and ultimately the subsequent intelligence derived from there that allows commanders to apply flexibility in their planning and adapt to changing battlefield scenarios. Intelligence is also a vitally important component to ensure that forces will not be surprised and overwhelmed by the enemy.
The main problem with many intelligence operations (apart from incompetence) is that mistakes are made during the initial phases of the Intelligence Cycle, thus resulting in the wrong intelligence targets being identified. The problem is further compounded when intelligence officers taint the collected information with their own bias instead of cold-and-clinical reporting of information. Additionally, many analysts “bend” the collected information in order to suit their beliefs and previous assessments.
By knowing and understanding the forces that oppose them, the analysts, commanders and planners will be able to make accurate Intelligence Predictions.
Poorly selected sources, the lack of human agents, agents with limited access, incorrect exploitation of sources, over-reliance on electronic or technical sources and so forth simply continue to compound the problem, leading to the incorrect evaluation and interpretation of the information. It is this flawed process that leads to poor battle plans, the loss of life and ultimately victory to the enemy. When these poorly conceived plans are implemented, no amount of battlefield bravery can rectify the damage done due to a lack of intelligence – or poor intelligence.
Intelligence ought to be one of the prime sub-actions a PMC carries out once it enters a hostile or conflict area. Without intelligence, it will not know what to expect in the area, which locals are hostile, what the language/religious distribution of the population is and so forth. Nor will it know the local customs and traditions of the peoples in the area – something that can cost it dearly.
The PMC that uses intelligence wisely will be successful in its mission but it needs to first understand the process – and application - of Intelligence in all of its facets.
Of course, the silly old joke that military intelligence is a misnomer is due to the fact that many who work in the field of military intelligence have no idea what they are supposed to be doing and no clue how to achieve it. Instead, they conjure up incredible source-information and make predictions from this nonsense and thus arrive at incorrect conclusions and the resultant incorrect predictions.
This leads to mission failure and a loss of credibility to the fighting forces, something we seem to be witnessing on an almost daily basis in conflicts around the world.
The ability to gather credible information is based on the ability to “see into the heart of the enemy”, know where to find the information required and to identify and utilise every available source that can gain access to the information required. The value of human sources is often sacrificed in this regard, instead making maximum use of technical or electronic collection, despite it being easily misled.
An inability to analyse where the required information can be found leads to the collection of “history” and not “intelligence”.
In order to ensure the correct process is followed in this attempt at gaining access to classified enemy material, a simple cycle, known as the “Intelligence Cycle” is followed. This cycle consists of the following basic actions:
1. Determining WHAT information is required ie defining the Intelligence Problem
2. Determining WHERE to find the information, ie what access is required and how to exploit that access. This is known as the Intelligence Appreciation
3. Collecting the information by means of sources and agents
4. Processing the gathered information by means of the Intelligence Process. This is where the information gathered is evaluated, collated and interpreted. It is at this stage that the information is transformed into intelligence
5. Disseminating the intelligence, ie giving it to those people/units that need to know the available intelligence in order to plan their operations.
6. The situation is again subject to the Intelligence Appreciation in order to locate WHERE additional information may be found and the cycle begins anew.
This process remains an on-going cycle in order to continually update the information on the enemy. It is this information and ultimately the subsequent intelligence derived from there that allows commanders to apply flexibility in their planning and adapt to changing battlefield scenarios. Intelligence is also a vitally important component to ensure that forces will not be surprised and overwhelmed by the enemy.
The main problem with many intelligence operations (apart from incompetence) is that mistakes are made during the initial phases of the Intelligence Cycle, thus resulting in the wrong intelligence targets being identified. The problem is further compounded when intelligence officers taint the collected information with their own bias instead of cold-and-clinical reporting of information. Additionally, many analysts “bend” the collected information in order to suit their beliefs and previous assessments.
By knowing and understanding the forces that oppose them, the analysts, commanders and planners will be able to make accurate Intelligence Predictions.
Poorly selected sources, the lack of human agents, agents with limited access, incorrect exploitation of sources, over-reliance on electronic or technical sources and so forth simply continue to compound the problem, leading to the incorrect evaluation and interpretation of the information. It is this flawed process that leads to poor battle plans, the loss of life and ultimately victory to the enemy. When these poorly conceived plans are implemented, no amount of battlefield bravery can rectify the damage done due to a lack of intelligence – or poor intelligence.
Intelligence ought to be one of the prime sub-actions a PMC carries out once it enters a hostile or conflict area. Without intelligence, it will not know what to expect in the area, which locals are hostile, what the language/religious distribution of the population is and so forth. Nor will it know the local customs and traditions of the peoples in the area – something that can cost it dearly.
The PMC that uses intelligence wisely will be successful in its mission but it needs to first understand the process – and application - of Intelligence in all of its facets.
Saturday, May 2, 2009
ANOTHER MONUMENTAL UN MESS IN THE DRC
On 29 April 2009, the BBC ran an interesting article on the DRC. Who else could be the main actors in this story but the UN’s result-lacking mission to the DRC (MONUC) and an ex-rebel leader wanted for war crimes?
According to the BBC – a comment based on a Congolese army paper - an indicted war criminal is currently playing a leading role in the joint-MONUC/Congolese Army’s chain of command in the DRC. “General” Bosco Ntaganda – better known as "the Terminator" - is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged forced enrolment of child soldiers in 2002-2003.
Here is an extract from the BBC’s report on this matter:
“The BBC's Thomas Fessy in the capital, Kinshasa, has seen an internal Congolese army document, dated 4 April 2009, which refers to Gen Ntaganda as the deputy co-ordinator for the joint mission's operations.
Our correspondent says the paper - which notes that Gen Ntaganda spoke during an operations meeting - proves he is playing a major role in the chain of command.
A high-ranking Congolese army official confirmed the former rebel leader was involved in the operations, describing him as an adviser to the operations commander.
The UN's peacekeeping force in DR Congo, which is known as Monuc, denied the report”.
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8023978.stm)
One needs to ask if MONUC is unaware of whom Ntaganda is and if so, why haven’t they been reading the indictments by the ICC as relates to the DRC. Or are they using Ntaganda because he is more capable than their own officers?
Can it be possible that a so-called “peacekeeping organisation”, with unlimited resources and funding (17 000 men plus), is actually this incompetent? Quick to condemn others, this bloated, inefficient organisation masquerading as a “peacekeeping force” needs to be held accountable for its failures and ineptitude.
Even the New York-based Human Rights Watch has expressed its dismay:
"We are very worried by this information and it seems to us that the United Nations is acting like an ostrich with its head in the sand…
"It's time now this is addressed head on. Rather than denying or ignoring the role being played by Bosco Ntaganda, the UN should be actively seeking his arrest and transferring him to The Hague."
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8023978.stm)
Whereas it is well known that MONUC apparently has somewhat of a history of partiality towards rebels in the DRC, it will be interesting to see if UN Reporter Talif Deen, who so vigorously attacked EO for daring to assist legitimate governments in Angola and Sierra Leone, will use his pen to further expose their duplicity , hypocrisy and gross incompetence. I do, however, have my doubts…
It also remains to be seen if the UN will appoint a Special Rapporteur such as Mr Enrique Ballesteros to investigate these allegations. Perhaps, in keeping with his previously long-winded title for the EO report he so falsely penned, they could name this new effort of hiding the truth “Report on the question on the use of an indicted War Criminal as a means of assisting the UN’s Mission in the DRC (MONUC) to ensure the continued violation of human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination”.
If the UN is incapable of finding officers who are not wanted by the International Criminal Court to command operations to locate and destroy rebels, it is time to contract a PMC to do what should be done. This will cost a fraction of the wastage the UN is currently thriving on, achieve more results faster and bring about an end to this lengthy conflict for once and for all.
Sadly though, the UN are simply prolonging it.
According to the BBC – a comment based on a Congolese army paper - an indicted war criminal is currently playing a leading role in the joint-MONUC/Congolese Army’s chain of command in the DRC. “General” Bosco Ntaganda – better known as "the Terminator" - is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged forced enrolment of child soldiers in 2002-2003.
Here is an extract from the BBC’s report on this matter:
“The BBC's Thomas Fessy in the capital, Kinshasa, has seen an internal Congolese army document, dated 4 April 2009, which refers to Gen Ntaganda as the deputy co-ordinator for the joint mission's operations.
Our correspondent says the paper - which notes that Gen Ntaganda spoke during an operations meeting - proves he is playing a major role in the chain of command.
A high-ranking Congolese army official confirmed the former rebel leader was involved in the operations, describing him as an adviser to the operations commander.
The UN's peacekeeping force in DR Congo, which is known as Monuc, denied the report”.
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8023978.stm)
One needs to ask if MONUC is unaware of whom Ntaganda is and if so, why haven’t they been reading the indictments by the ICC as relates to the DRC. Or are they using Ntaganda because he is more capable than their own officers?
Can it be possible that a so-called “peacekeeping organisation”, with unlimited resources and funding (17 000 men plus), is actually this incompetent? Quick to condemn others, this bloated, inefficient organisation masquerading as a “peacekeeping force” needs to be held accountable for its failures and ineptitude.
Even the New York-based Human Rights Watch has expressed its dismay:
"We are very worried by this information and it seems to us that the United Nations is acting like an ostrich with its head in the sand…
"It's time now this is addressed head on. Rather than denying or ignoring the role being played by Bosco Ntaganda, the UN should be actively seeking his arrest and transferring him to The Hague."
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8023978.stm)
Whereas it is well known that MONUC apparently has somewhat of a history of partiality towards rebels in the DRC, it will be interesting to see if UN Reporter Talif Deen, who so vigorously attacked EO for daring to assist legitimate governments in Angola and Sierra Leone, will use his pen to further expose their duplicity , hypocrisy and gross incompetence. I do, however, have my doubts…
It also remains to be seen if the UN will appoint a Special Rapporteur such as Mr Enrique Ballesteros to investigate these allegations. Perhaps, in keeping with his previously long-winded title for the EO report he so falsely penned, they could name this new effort of hiding the truth “Report on the question on the use of an indicted War Criminal as a means of assisting the UN’s Mission in the DRC (MONUC) to ensure the continued violation of human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination”.
If the UN is incapable of finding officers who are not wanted by the International Criminal Court to command operations to locate and destroy rebels, it is time to contract a PMC to do what should be done. This will cost a fraction of the wastage the UN is currently thriving on, achieve more results faster and bring about an end to this lengthy conflict for once and for all.
Sadly though, the UN are simply prolonging it.
Sunday, April 26, 2009
THE COMING BATTLE FOR AFRICA
Living in South Africa, I watch with morbid fascination at how the US and China are racing to recapture Africa – the US with AFRICOM and China with business development and investment. Africa, despite its many problems, is increasingly becoming of more strategic interest and importance to both the US and China.
Whereas the approaches these two nations are following differ vastly, their ultimate aim is the same: control over Africa’s strategic resources – especially oil reserves.
The U.S Africa Command (AFRICOM), established in October 2007, is described as being a Unified Combatant Command of the US Department of Defence and is responsible for U.S. military operations and military relations with 53 African nations. This overtly aggressive entrance into Africa has been criticised by many African governments.
The Chinese on the other hand are following a much more passive approach with business development and investment. This approach, too, has been subject to much criticism as some view it as the Chinese colonisation of Africa. Several African governments reject this allegation, claiming that the Chinese have never betrayed or destabilised African countries as the US has – and African governments have long memories.
Additionally, many African governments feel that the Chinese have been open about their desires: control over and exploitation of resources for the ever-hungry Chinese economy. On the other hand, the US is using the route of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) as their entrance key into Africa but underlying this is the need to control Africa’s oil.
To achieve this, the US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) was transformed into a new programme called the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA). ACOTA’s aim is to “train military trainers and equip African national militaries to conduct peace support operations and humanitarian relief”. To achieve this, ACOTA is contracting US PMCs, some with little or no knowledge of Africa. This, in turn, is going to cause the US more problems in the long run than solutions or influence. But this approach is seen by others to attempt to detract from the US’s plans to militarise their foreign policy.
The Chinese, on the other hand, have financialised their foreign policy with regard to Africa. This includes the identification, procurement and exploitation of resources and strategic commodities. Included in this financial-driven foreign policy are massive credit lines, infrastructure development, export-development and so forth. The latest Chinese export to Africa is the massive Chinese weapons market.
As the war in Iraq winds down, more US PMCs are vying for a stake in ACOTA/AFRICOM. Whereas there is nothing wrong with such a shift in business development, the problem arises when some of these PMCs have no knowledge or experience of the continent. To illustrate this point, I mention some questions I have recently received from US PMCs:
1. Can I help them find someone who speaks “African”? Africa does not have a common language but literally hundreds of languages and dialects.
2. Can I introduce them to someone who has a licence to “carry and use arms” in Africa as they would like to “piggy-back” on such a licence? Africa is a continent with many countries, each with their own laws and regulations – there is no common licence to carry arms.
3. Can I suggest some “good” Third-Country nationals they can use in Africa? We who live in Africa take exception to being referred to as third-world nationals on our own continent…
Whereas questions such as these are very serious cause for concern, they also illustrate a complete lack of even basic geographical and linguistic knowledge of Africa. Furthermore, this is akin to a company with no engineering background or skills tendering for a massive engineering contract and then scrambling to find people who will carry out the contract if they are awarded it.
Whereas I understand something of business, I also understand something of Africa. It is PMCs such as these that will, more than likely, undermine the efficiency of African militaries as opposed to enhancing them. They will bring with them more chance of conflict than of peace and stability. Then of course, there is the concern that these PMCs will train African troops poorly – in case they ever have to face them on the battlefield.
These issues are not unknown to the Chinese who will, no doubt, exploit them to the hilt when the time comes. They suspect that AFRICOM and ACOTA will eventually create additional chaos and destabilisation and that this will give them free rein in Africa. Added to this volatile mix is the knowledge that the US military’s adventures in Africa have not been very successful.
Africa, however, ought to realise that it is the creator of many of its own problems and that these problems have given foreign governments an influence and power they ought never to have had.
But, whether we like it or not, the battle lines between the US and China have been drawn across the sand in Africa. We who live here must now just wait for the final battle for Africa to begin.
Whereas the approaches these two nations are following differ vastly, their ultimate aim is the same: control over Africa’s strategic resources – especially oil reserves.
The U.S Africa Command (AFRICOM), established in October 2007, is described as being a Unified Combatant Command of the US Department of Defence and is responsible for U.S. military operations and military relations with 53 African nations. This overtly aggressive entrance into Africa has been criticised by many African governments.
The Chinese on the other hand are following a much more passive approach with business development and investment. This approach, too, has been subject to much criticism as some view it as the Chinese colonisation of Africa. Several African governments reject this allegation, claiming that the Chinese have never betrayed or destabilised African countries as the US has – and African governments have long memories.
Additionally, many African governments feel that the Chinese have been open about their desires: control over and exploitation of resources for the ever-hungry Chinese economy. On the other hand, the US is using the route of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) as their entrance key into Africa but underlying this is the need to control Africa’s oil.
To achieve this, the US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) was transformed into a new programme called the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA). ACOTA’s aim is to “train military trainers and equip African national militaries to conduct peace support operations and humanitarian relief”. To achieve this, ACOTA is contracting US PMCs, some with little or no knowledge of Africa. This, in turn, is going to cause the US more problems in the long run than solutions or influence. But this approach is seen by others to attempt to detract from the US’s plans to militarise their foreign policy.
The Chinese, on the other hand, have financialised their foreign policy with regard to Africa. This includes the identification, procurement and exploitation of resources and strategic commodities. Included in this financial-driven foreign policy are massive credit lines, infrastructure development, export-development and so forth. The latest Chinese export to Africa is the massive Chinese weapons market.
As the war in Iraq winds down, more US PMCs are vying for a stake in ACOTA/AFRICOM. Whereas there is nothing wrong with such a shift in business development, the problem arises when some of these PMCs have no knowledge or experience of the continent. To illustrate this point, I mention some questions I have recently received from US PMCs:
1. Can I help them find someone who speaks “African”? Africa does not have a common language but literally hundreds of languages and dialects.
2. Can I introduce them to someone who has a licence to “carry and use arms” in Africa as they would like to “piggy-back” on such a licence? Africa is a continent with many countries, each with their own laws and regulations – there is no common licence to carry arms.
3. Can I suggest some “good” Third-Country nationals they can use in Africa? We who live in Africa take exception to being referred to as third-world nationals on our own continent…
Whereas questions such as these are very serious cause for concern, they also illustrate a complete lack of even basic geographical and linguistic knowledge of Africa. Furthermore, this is akin to a company with no engineering background or skills tendering for a massive engineering contract and then scrambling to find people who will carry out the contract if they are awarded it.
Whereas I understand something of business, I also understand something of Africa. It is PMCs such as these that will, more than likely, undermine the efficiency of African militaries as opposed to enhancing them. They will bring with them more chance of conflict than of peace and stability. Then of course, there is the concern that these PMCs will train African troops poorly – in case they ever have to face them on the battlefield.
These issues are not unknown to the Chinese who will, no doubt, exploit them to the hilt when the time comes. They suspect that AFRICOM and ACOTA will eventually create additional chaos and destabilisation and that this will give them free rein in Africa. Added to this volatile mix is the knowledge that the US military’s adventures in Africa have not been very successful.
Africa, however, ought to realise that it is the creator of many of its own problems and that these problems have given foreign governments an influence and power they ought never to have had.
But, whether we like it or not, the battle lines between the US and China have been drawn across the sand in Africa. We who live here must now just wait for the final battle for Africa to begin.
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