About Me

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I saw active service in conventional, clandestine and covert units of the South African Defence Force. I was the founder of the Private Military Company (PMC) Executive Outcomes in 1989 and its chairman until I left in 1997. Until its closure in 1998, EO operated primarily in Africa helping African governments that had been abandoned by the West and were facing threats from insurgencies, terrorism and organised crime. EO also operated in South America and the Far East. I believe that only Africans (Black and White) can truly solve Africa’s problems. I was appointed Chairman of STTEP International in 2009 and also lecture at military colleges and universities in Africa on defence, intelligence and security issues. Prior to the STTEP International appointment, I served as an independent politico-military advisor to several African governments. Until recently, I was a contributing editor to The Counter Terrorist magazine. All comments in line with the topics on this blog are welcome. As I consider this to be a serious look at military and security matters, foul language and political or religious debates will not be entertained on this blog.

Thursday, August 27, 2015

THE TRAGEDY THAT IS LIBYA


The end result of “regime-change” in Libya has brought nothing but bloodshed and misery to the majority of Libyans whilst giving radical Islamists another foothold on the African continent. Libya has become a failed state. Its infrastructure is in tatters and its oil exports rapidly dwindling. It has indeed undergone “regime change”. And while Libya burns, the world talks.

Two governments currently “rule” a divided Libya—maybe soon to be three different governments. One government is recognised by the international community, the other by the hard-line extremists. The plan to divide Libya into two or perhaps even three different states seems to be nearing completion.

I was never a fan of Muammar Ghaddafi or a supporter of his style of government. But, it is almost inconceivable that the plan to oust Gaddafi and his government did not appreciate or even consider the consequences of his demise. It did not require a very intelligent person to foresee what was coming.  Libya rapidly went from controlled hell to uncontrolled hell.

During 2013, I was invited to address the Libyan authorities on several occasions. We were asked to assist them develop a strategy aimed at containing what was then already becoming a highly toxic situation. Matters have since deteriorated significantly into a far more complex and dangerous situation and is unlikely to get better soon—if ever.

On each visit I undertook to Libya, I tried to impress on the Libyan government (at that time) what was likely to happen in their country if no drastic intervention was considered and decisive action taken. I believed that Libya would become an uncontrolled, divided tract of land where conflict between tribes and competing terror franchises became the order of the day.

On my last visit to Libya in July 2013, I was promptly apprehended on arrival in Tripoli, my passport forcibly taken from me (I stopped protesting when a rifle was shoved into my face) and I was locked in a small room in the immigration hall. After several hours, I was finally taken to see the Chief of Intelligence (who incidentally was the person who had invited me to Libya) where he apologised for the “harsh manner” in which I was received on my arrival but claimed that a foreign government had requested they no longer speak to me. I, in turn, wasn’t too happy especially as I was supposedly a guest of the Libyan government and was there only because they had invited me to speak to them. The Chief of Intelligence also informed me that our assessment and prediction of what was coming for Libya was deemed to be “incorrect and alarmist” by Western governments they had met with. Sadly I had heard that story before.

So, it is with almost morbid fascination that I now watch the daily fumbling of foreign powers trying to contain a very cancerous situation that could have been prevented a long time ago. The “democracy” and “freedom” they promised the people of Libya has come to nought. Instead, the chaos and destruction of Libya has become a rallying point for extremists from Africa and beyond.

The negative fall-out has resulted in what I refer to as “terror-creep” as the extremists expand their areas of influence and interest across North Africa, reaching as far afield as Nigeria. Left unchecked, they will expand their influence even further into Europe and deeper into Africa.

Air strikes may degrade some of the terror forces and disrupt their logistical and other support structures—for a while. But unless the results of the air strikes are immediately exploited by well-trained and correctly equipped and led ground forces, the effects will remain negligible, unexploited, achieve only minor success and simply harden the resolve of those who thrive on terror and misery.  

Sometimes I recall the GOC of the Indonesian Special Forces commenting to me many years ago that the West will one day learn that you cannot negotiate with terrorists over a cup of tea.

If the current “peace talks” fail, then perhaps it is time to put the tea away and start doing something other than talking.

Monday, July 6, 2015

COMPOSITE WARFARE: THE CONDUCT OF SUCCESSFUL GROUND FORCES OPERATIONS IN AFRICA





As a continent, Africa presents her armies with a vast, dynamic and multidimensional operating environment. It has numerous complex and diverse ethnic, religious, cultural and tribal interests and loyalties, along with many multifaceted threat-drivers coupled to varied and infrastructure-poor terrain plus vast climatic variations. The continent is, furthermore, characterized by numerous half-won conflicts and wars fought by incorrectly structured, inadequately trained and ill-equipped armies. For many reasons, these forces have difficulty adapting to the complex, demanding and rapidly changing environments they do battle in. Similarly, the armies have difficulty in decisively defeating the various threats they face. Many of these problems stem from the fact that numerous modern-day African armies are merely clones of the armies established by their once-colonial masters, their Cold War allies or their new international allies. Many of the principles and tactics, techniques and procedures they were - and still are - being taught relate to fighting in Europe and not in Africa. Some of these concepts are not even relevant to Africa.
This book is intended as a guide and textbook for African soldiers and scholars who wish to understand the development of hostilities, strategy, operational design, doctrine and tactics. It also illustrates the importance of nonpartisanship and the mission and role of the armed forces. Officers, NCOs and their subordinates need to, furthermore, understand their role in defending and protecting the government and the people they serve. They additionally need to know how to successfully accomplish their numerous missions with aggression, audacity, boldness, speed and surprise. The book provides the reader with valuable information relating to conventional and unconventional maneuver. It also discusses how African armies can, with structured and balanced forces, achieve strategic, operational and tactical success. It covers the role of government along with operations related to war, operations other than war and intelligence operations and how these operations, operating in a coordinated and unified manner, can secure and strengthen a government.
Composite Warfare draws on the author's experiences and lessons in Central, Southern, East, West and North Africa where he has served numerous African governments as a politico-military strategist, division commander, division adviser, battalion commander and special operations commander.

 

Sunday, May 31, 2015

UPDATING THE NIGERIAN NARRATIVE


There have been, since my posting “FEEDING THE NARRATIVE”, numerous media reports on STTEP’s work in Nigeria.

I, on behalf of STTEP, gave only one interview. I spoke on behalf of the company and not on behalf of the Nigerian Army as any such an attempt would amount to a fraudulent representation of the Nigerian Army. (By the way, I did not run to the media as some have alluded. The media in SA began their usual campaign of condemnation and my one interview was aimed at countering the false narrative they were so keen to propagate to benefit Boko Haram.)

The remainder of the so-called news reports that followed consisted of information lifted off the SOFREP website and many reports were padded with innuendo and fabrications. Some of the journalists even intimated that they had interviewed me when they hadn’t.  

Whereas I fully understand that some in the media need to ensure that their misleading narrative gets as much media play as possible, it is nevertheless a blot on the integrity and honesty of the many good journalists out there trying to make sure they report on real happenings and not figments of their imaginations—or that of their handlers.

I do not mind the mainstream and social media ageing me, demoting me, spelling my name incorrectly, using a stock photo from 1993 (I am told I looked a lot better then than I do now!), and claiming to know my military record. However, these “forgivable errors” merely point to a lack of very basic research. And by the way, Google is not a research asset.

I have no intention of trying to defend either the Nigerian Army or STTEP against fabrications and deception as that would require a book on its own—and quite frankly, I don’t have the time to do so. I do, however, need to point out some of the more obvious deceptions they have tried—and continually try—to carry out:
 
1.    I was a co-founder of Executive Outcomes: This lie has been repeated ad nauseum and forms the foundation of much of the rubbish written about EO. As it has been repeated so often, it has now become “the truth”. Any person who claims that he founded EO or was a co-founder (other than myself and a person who very briefly held shares in the company in 1989/90) is a liar and that can be proven by a quick search at the Registrar of Companies in Pretoria, South Africa. As EO was established in 1988/9 and worked under the radar, it only came to prominence in 1993/4. There are however some who lay claim to founding or being co-founders of EO. Basic research will prove them to be nothing other than liars. Some of these liars have even turned their claims into a business.

2.    STTEP was driving around in tanks in Nigeria: This remarkable comment was made by a journalist who obviously does not know the difference between a tank and an MRAP but who is still deemed to be a “defence journalist” and who happens to be a suspected intelligence agent. I rest my case.

3.    STTEP consists of white racists: Ironically, these reports attempt to create racial tension and nothing else. I am not too sure what race has to do with competence and effectiveness but apparently it means a lot to those journalists. Truth is that the company has white, black and brown Africans in its ranks, some coming from national armies and others from those who fought national armies. Plus, many of our applicants are black which makes a mockery of this comment—unless they too are “white racists”.

4.    EO/STTEP have invaded in Africa in attempts to “colonise” it: Neither EO before it nor STTEP have ever engaged in anti-government actions—anywhere. Some ex-EO men were recruited (several years after EO closed its doors) by a man who (still) puts himself out to be a co-founder of EO (a blatant lie) and he misled them regarding a coup attempt that failed. The initial comments regarding EO “invading” countries was however written by a well-known foreign intelligence asset, despite EO being invited there by the legitimate government to assist them.  Besides, how do Africans colonise Africa especially when invited there by the government of the day? The stupidity of this comment boggles the mind.

5.    I lied to men regarding medical and CASEVAC procedures: This comment by an internet troll claims I lied to my men regarding medical and CASEVAC procedures and options and left wounded men to die. Ironically, as an ex-SADF transport officer who was never part of either EO or STTEP, this troll also appears to know more than I do. No person in his right mind would want to work for a company that treats its employees in such a manner, yet we are overwhelmed with applications… Or is this lie being bandied about for another reason?

6.    I alone was responsible for the training and deployment of 72 Mobile Force in Nigeria: The journo who wrote this has no clue about something known as “team work”. I lay claim to nothing and all credit for the training must be given to the STTEP leader group and training team who achieved a remarkable result in a very short space of time with very little equipment and under extremely difficult and trying conditions.

7.    I sit in my office and expect the men to do what I won’t do: There are those who know me and then obviously many who do not. Suffice to say, I will never ask anyone to do something I am either unwilling or afraid to do. Many who have worked with me can attest to that.

8.    I recently gave a lecture in Europe on STTEP’s tactics in Nigeria: This comment was the result of a poor deduction made by someone who read my blog entry on the RDDC. The journalist who wrote that comment also hinted that he had actually interviewed me—he hadn’t.

9.    We trained the Nigerian Army (NA) in “relentless pursuit”: This comment was way off mark. Relentless pursuit is an element of exploitation and not an operational approach on its own. Another journalist then went on to claim that STTEP was using Boko Haram’s tactics against them!

10. STTEP only consists of ex “apartheid-era” soldiers: Shame, but something must be said to create the perception that we are white racists who harbour the politics of a previous government. Of course, whatever can be said to create racial tensions must be said. And of course, no mention is made of the many black Africans who wish to join STTEP as that would totally upset the narrative. And by the way, many who work with us are not ex “apartheid-era” soldiers.

11. STTEP gets paid for its work: This shocking revelation has truly exposed us as getting paid for our services. The journalist who wrote this obviously works for free. Yes, we do get paid but we get paid a LOT less than foreign PMCs who operate in Africa will multi-million dollar budgets, funded by foreign governments. In this instance, we were a sub-contractor and had no room for any negotiations regarding payment. STTEP has done contracts where it worked for zero-profit to support those who needed help but of course, that must never be mentioned.

12. STTEP is a threat to Africa’s security and stability: It appears that working to ensure an end to conflict, as quickly as possible, constitutes a threat to Africa’s national security and stability. I suspect this comment is made because STTEP is actually seen as a threat to numerous nefarious foreign agendas and interests, not to mention some NGO’s who thrive on conflict as it fuels their income.

13. STTEP has claimed the credit for Boko Haram’s losses:  Unlike those who make false claims, STTEP will NEVER take credit for something it didn’t do. This pithy comment is merely aimed at trying to discredit the Nigerian Army and attempt to create antagonism between the NA and the company. False claims that STTEP rescued hostages in Sambisa forest is another falsehood as that was done by the NA.

14. STTEP engaged in a “secret” war in Nigeria: This sensationalist comment apparently expects the Nigerian Army to send early warning to the enemy that they are about to launch an attack. Maybe the journalist felt that “secret” would add a sinister twist to his story. Or maybe he felt that the Nigerian Army were “playing dirty” by not telling the enemy what their intentions were?

15. STTEP engaged in a “dark war” against Boko Haram: I am not too sure what a “dark war” is. Perhaps the foreign news editor who came up with this comment could enlighten me what it actually means. Or maybe his “sources” that never existed would know what he meant.

16. STTEP is part of the “Executive Outcomes Group”: The so-called “EO Group” (http://www.eogroup.biz) are conmen who are trying to use a defunct company’s name and reputation to gain contracts—albeit under false pretences. Despite being (telephonically) confronted over this fraudulent business practice, they still persist in their deception. Maybe the media should talk to them as they claim—on their website—they have “10 000 employees working in 70 countries”. 

I suppose I could go on and on…but my ramblings will merely become boring—even to myself. Besides, it gives the media the opportunity to say I ramble on and on…

Perhaps now the many decent and honourable journalists will understand our suspicion talking to them. They have been tainted by their very unethical, unprofessional and unscrupulous colleagues who continually abuse their positions to feed a false agenda and narrative—and who, apart from their salaries, most often get paid by their shadow paymasters as well.

Does that make me hateful of the media?

No, only very cautious as trust is not given unconditionally, it is earned.

Friday, May 8, 2015

SUCCESSFUL COMBAT OPERATIONS


Whereas influences such as adherence to the principles, air superiority, relative strengths, selection, training, equipment, doctrine, communications, leadership, terrain, operational design, and so forth play a crucial role in determining the outcome of any combat operation, I believe the most important criterion for ground forces to attain victory on the battlefield are:
 
  1. Timing: The timing of any attack or strike is crucial to throwing an enemy off balance and seizing the initiative, especially if the enemy’s intentions and routine are known and the forces are able to conduct both day and night operations. Climatic conditions and variations, along with terrain, must be considered to enable the timing of the attack or strike to place the enemy at a distinct disadvantage. The timing for lifting stand-off bombardments and air delivered fire must enable the ground forces to close with the enemy and annihilate him. Timing can increase operational and tactical surprise and result in increased momentum and tempo.  
  2. Synchronicity: The manoeuvre of forces along with direct and indirect fire must be synchronised with close air support to achieve the best effect to degrade and destroy the enemy and his materiel. This requires the force to have good communications at all times. Similarly, swarm attacks must be synchronised to coincide with other operations in the enemy’s deployment area.
  3. Surprise: Surprise is a force-multiplier and is the result of agility, speed, shock action, operational security and deception. Its aim is to throw the enemy off balance, regain and maintain the initiative and momentum, and disrupt and exploit the enemy’s confusion. The enemy must be forced to defend over multiple fronts against both conventional and unconventional direct and indirect approaches. Surprise must always be exploited.
  4. Tempo: Tempo is the result of momentum combined with speed of action/reaction. Aimed at forcing the enemy into a defensive or reactive posture, it enables the attacking forces to increase momentum, pressure and shock action and thereby force the enemy into a disadvantage. High-tempo operations must give the enemy no respite but must be logistically sustainable.
  5. Manoeuvre: Horisontal and vertical envelopment/manoeuvre options are dictated by terrain and the manoeuvre assets a force has at its disposal. Rapid manoeuvre, ever-increasing momentum and tempo, and synchronised firepower is essential to annihilate the enemy.   
  6. Firepower: Focused firepower is required to overwhelm and annihilate the enemy. All direct, indirect and air-delivered fire must be coordinated and synchronised to achieve maximum effect. Uncoordinated firepower will not achieve a decisive result.
  7. Speed: Speed of action/reaction is required to disrupt the enemy’s intentions, increase momentum and tempo, place additional pressure on the enemy and buckle his defences or disrupt his intentions. Speed of action and reaction can seize the initiative from the enemy and surprise him. Manoeuvre assets add to speed.     
  8. Logistics: An efficient and functional logistical system is required to sustain operations. A failure in logistics will reduce momentum, tempo, manoeuvre, firepower and speed and thereby cede initiative to the enemy. A force lacking in logistics will lose momentum and become a vulnerable force that is unable to withstand enemy attacks.
However, the manner in which the armed forces are organised, structured, trained, equipped, and led will determine the manner in how they will fight to achieve victory—or flee the battlefield in disarray.

Tuesday, May 5, 2015

THANK YOU RDDC!




It was a great honour and privilege to have been invited to Copenhagen, Denmark, to address interested parties and Masters-level students at the Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC) on “New Wars”.

Whereas my contribution to the seminar and the subsequent debate as well as the lectures on New Wars was miniscule at best, it was heartening to see the interest shown by those I engaged with regarding the many conflicts we experience – and will continue to experience – in Africa.

The visit to the RDDC also allowed us to discuss numerous issues such as politics in Africa, the development of conflict and war, why governments fail, the scourge of poaching and where they think Africa is possibly going wrong.

We also discussed issues such as the threats facing Africa, the role of foreign powers, the UN and PMCs and why many if not most of these interventions fail or deliver very little results – in many instances only escalating the already-existing tensions and conflicts. 

These discussions made me realize that the intent of those I spoke with at the RDDC have a genuine desire to see an improvement in Africa’s lot. To Africa, that can only be good.

My sincerest thanks to the Royal Danish Defence College as well as everyone who partook in our discussions and in particular to Professors Thomas Mandrup and Stig Jenson for the friendship and the opportunity given to me.

Saturday, April 25, 2015

FEEDING THE NARRATIVE


The recent activities of STTEP International Ltd in Nigeria have given rise to a multitude of comments from some in the media, much of it aimed at trying to discredit both the Nigerian Army (NA) and STTEP and create as much controversy as possible. The term "objectivity" does not appear to be applicable to these journalists. Apart from spewing disinformation, they appear to have a need to proclaim their great understanding of African politics, military strategy and operations—despite usually getting it very wrong.

The comments and "observations" some in the media made on STTEP's involvement in Nigeria bordered on the ridiculous but these comments are important to feed the perceptions they need to create and force a continuation of their false narrative. 

Of course, the media's version of the history of Executive Outcomes (EO) was also dug up and rehashed and likewise became a focus of their attention. (I was—and still am—amazed that some journalists still believe they know more about EO than I do and now it appears they know more about STTEP than I do).

In the days of EO, some of the journalists who led the media assault were paid intelligence agents of disinformation. I exposed several of them in my book in 2007.

I have been reliably informed that some of those who escaped my book are still around and writing. So it came as no great surprise to me that some of these are the same journalists who jumped on the Nigeria bandwagon. After all, they were part of the same group that ferociously attacked EO for helping African governments. Instead, they prefer writing about the chaos, suffering, murder and mayhem these terror groups bring. This is, after all, how they make their living—and then they refer to us as "mercenaries".

One only has to look at what is written and by who to determine their agendas, where their narrative is heading and sometimes who their shadow paymasters are.

Some of them are highly agitated that I did not give them exclusive interviews especially after my six-part interview with SOFREP (http://sofrep.com). Others are calling for my/STTEP's immediate arrest and prosecution for assisting a legitimate African government that is under attack by the terrorist group known as Boko Haram. I learnt during the EO days that giving an interview to some journalists only seemed to disrupt the false narrative they were spinning. When reality did not match their agendas, it was immediately discarded and replaced with their agendas.

Some journalists have written offering to assist me in reducing the "criminality of our actions". It appears that if South Africans are called on to assist an African government fight terrorism it is considered to be "criminal". When South Africans are contracted by a foreign PMC, then it is no longer criminal!

Problem in point: STTEP is not a South African company...

What is particularly upsetting to them is that an African-managed and staffed company can be successful in Africa. This goes against everything they stand for. Instead, they appear to think assistance to the NA should have come from a foreign PMC, little knowing that foreign armies and PMCs have spent considerable time in Nigeria where "window-dressing training" has been the order of the day. But look through the window, and the room is empty.

Then there are the famous Internet trolls who allege that STTEP used "exactly the same tactics" that they spoke about to someone a while ago.

Others claim that what STTEP achieved in Nigeria was "pure luck"—much as the media claimed about EO in Angola, Sierra Leone and Indonesia. I would love to see them achieve what STTEP's training team achieved in 3 months—under exceptionally difficult and trying conditions.

Others allege that I, in person, do not do enough to condemn South Africa's politics to African governments for fear we will not get or lose contracts.

I do not need to discuss South Africa's politics with African governments—they discuss it with me. I, on the other hand, do not join in as I am a South African and regardless of what our government does or does not do, I do not hang out our dirty washing in public, nor am I in any position to change it. I am a militarist, not a politician. I leave political decisions and solutions to the politicians and only offer advice when they ask for it.

Some trolls have even expressed their disgust that STTEP has not taken up arms against the SA government! I choose to live in South Africa. Despite its challenges and problems, I remain patriotically South African and African—and will never take up arms against any legitimate government, least of all my own.

Others harp on the fact that STTEP uses "former black communist terrorists". They certainly know how to display their ignorance. STTEP will use and continue to use the right man for the job, regardless of his colour or his past political beliefs. Despite the fact that our black employees outnumbered us "palefaces" we are still regarded as "racists"—and geriatric ones at that.

Given all of the above, I am proud of what my "geriatric", "racist", "mercenary" group of trainers achieved in a very short space of time—and I am especially proud that the unit they established performed so well in action. I am equally proud that my training team and leader group were able to add value to the NA's fight against terrorism.

I suppose that is what upsets the desk-borne strategists and tacticians so much as it disrupts their false narrative...

Whenever the media embark on their agenda-driven reporting on myself and the men of STTEP, I am reminded of Hunter S Thompson's view of journalism, especially as he was a journalist:

"Journalism is not a profession or a trade. It is a cheap catch-all for fuck-offs and misfits—a false doorway to the backside of life, a filthy piss-ridden little hole nailed off by the building inspector, but just deep enough for a wino to curl up from the sidewalk and masturbate like a chimp in a zoo-cage."
(Hunter S. Thompson, Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas: A Savage Journey to the Heart of the American Dream)

Saturday, June 14, 2014

CARVING-UP THE CONTINENT

Several folks have asked why I have not updated the blog and what the status of my book on warfare is.

Unfortunately – or fortunately – I have been otherwise occupied but will start updating some of the blog comments shortly.

For those who asked, the book is now complete and the artwork is being finalised. Once the artwork has been inserted, the manuscript must be edited and then only will it go to the printers.

Hereunder follows an extract from the book which is now almost 18 months behind schedule. The book is intended to be a textbook that focuses on warfare in Africa. The extract is taken from Chapter 6 (unedited) of the book:

…………………………………………………………………………………………

As a continent, Africa remains under the constant threat of destabilisation along with numerous internal, intractable crises aimed at fuelling suspicion and exploiting differences amongst the populace. These threats are aimed at creating fractious states that will be ripe for foreign intervention and ultimately the division of countries.

As a general guideline, the development of tensions along with destabilisation and revolution follows a predictable pattern in resource-rich countries:

1.     The build-up of hostilities: The ethnic, religious, political and tribal differences along with clan rivalries within a country are exploited and fuelled to increase historical tensions, political anger, dissent, disunity and hostility. The approach adopted by the sponsor-governments will be to ostensible promote “democracy”, “liberate the oppressed” and “remove a dictatorship”. Non-violent and violent protests and strikes will be encouraged by the sponsors of the hostilities. The hostilities will increase as attacks and bombings on government and private buildings and facilities along with essential infrastructure take place. Educational, emotional and symbolic targets such as schools, buses, places of worship, large outdoor congregations, sports stadiums, tourist hotels and groups and so forth will be targeted. Kidnappings of HVI’s and large groups of innocent and/or vulnerable people will occur. Provocative statements will be made on both mainstream and social media platforms to further add to tensions and suspicions. Agitators, armed militias, insurgent and even terrorist groups will be given or promised support and encouraged to conduct armed attacks against the government. The pattern of armed destabilisation will aim to fuel radical actions and thereby force the intelligence services, the law enforcement agencies and the armed forces to either overreact – in which case they will be condemned - or to operate over a wide front thereby stretching their abilities and resources. Ultimately, this will render the country weak, endanger the population, create both fear and an uncontrollable refugee problem and economically drain the country, thus rendering it vulnerable to foreign intervention and manipulation.

2.     Internationalising the hostilities: The escalating violence between contrasting ethnic, religious and/or tribal groups will result in international calls for the situation to be contained. The government will be faced with a growing insurgency supported by acts of terrorism. Calls will be made by foreign governments, international bankers, the United Nations and advocacy groups and NGOs for sanctions, humanitarian aid and assistance and even for armed foreign intervention to establish “democracy” and “stability”. Limited air attacks will be aimed at damaging the economy and destroying the infrastructure. Covert support by the sponsors, including arms, finances and moral support will be channelled to one or more of the clashing factions to ensure a continuation and an escalation of hostilities. Agitators, insurgent leaders and warlords will be the prime beneficiaries of this covert assistance and support. International think-tanks and crisis-resolution groups will be established to mediate the “problem” and envoys will be despatched to negotiate settlements and assist with the establishment of “democracy” and “security” or the “removal of a dictatorship”. Every attempt to bring the problem under the international spotlight will be propagated and exploited. However, the powers that created the destabilisation will be planning on how best to divide the country and gain strategic and economic advantages from such a division.

3.     Intervention and division: Resultant from the internationalisation of the destabilisation and the subsequent chaos and carnage, an increase in international debates will take place and methods devised on how best to contain and resolve the situation. The conflict will become commercialised and agreements made in lieu of assistance. Weapons, ammunition, vehicles and training will be given or sold to the side that can pay for them – and sometimes to both sides. Calls will be made for international peacekeeping forces to be deployed under the auspices of the UN or the AU to separate the warring factions. Foreign governments will despatch military advisors to “monitor” the situation and provide advice. Often, the advice will be aimed at increasing the problem as opposed to resolving the problem. Where training is given, it will be sub-standard and/or irrelevant as the government forces are set-up for failure. If necessary, air attacks will be intensified in order to destroy as much of the essential infrastructure as possible. Calls will be made for the country to be divided into two or more “new states” to bring about peace and stability and ensure “democracy” and “freedom” for the populace caught between the warring parties or factions. By engineering the division of countries and installing puppet or proxy governments that serve the interests of the sponsoring governments, the beneficiaries of the natural resources ie energy and minerals will be the powers that instigated the destabilisation. The newly-found pseudo-states will now (hopefully) serve the interests of their benefactors.


It is therefore important that governments do not merely label threats by the actions or the tactics they apply but instead determine the root cause of the problem and understand the aim and/or purpose of the threat’s actions and deeds along with its support.