FAILING TO LISTEN

As has become quite usual and an almost daily occurrence, rebel forces throughout central Africa have gained momentum and succeeded in defeating government forces. Often, the government forces appear to be very well trained in running away whilst the rebel forces appear to be better trained, have more cohesion, are better armed and even have better mobility than the government forces.

I am also amazed at how easily - and quickly - governments dismiss intelligence in favour of disinformation. Could it be that they believe the “advice” given them by foreign governments or so-called “subject matter experts” is more credible than that given by people who do actually have “ears on the ground”?

The escalation of tensions in the so-called Great Lakes region is a fine example of governments’ failure to listen. It appears they are advised to adopt the ostrich approach (sticking their heads in the sand and hoping the problem will simply go away) – an approach that is apparently becoming the norm. This approach apparently assures governments that the problem will indeed “go away” if it is simply ignored.

Often these rumours are clustered around other rumours that give credibility to the false sense of security that an interested party is trying to develop. Selected “leaks” to the media result in these rumour-clusters being given more credibility – and this is then fed back to the government as fact “as the media said so”.   

The end-result is that when they finally pull their heads out of the sand, the problem has become a crisis. Those who so generously misadvised at great financial cost have by then long flown the coup. The crisis rapidly escalates into a blood-letting of aggrieved citizens and ill-disciplined troops and the entire system of government collapses.

The culture of failing to listen is partly the result of being fed so much rubbish that it becomes literally impossible for governments to distinguish fact from fiction.

Without naming and shaming governments, we warned four different governments of threats being developed in their countries long before the threats manifested themselves. This intelligence (by the time we advised them, we were no longer giving them simple information) was discarded as rumours, whilst rumours and innuendo that painted a rosy picture were seen a “credible intelligence”. We are still trying to warn another government that a coup is imminent. No doubt they are also being advised it is nothing other than a rumour.

The impact this “intelligence” (rumours, innuendo and false stories) has on the Pillars of State is enormous in that it ultimately alters the perceptions of the populace and leads to a reaction that the governments have often not anticipated. The collapse of the armed forces simply adds to the unanticipated reaction as soldiers and civilians alike join rebel forces and begin a campaign of looting and intimidation.  

Then of course, we have the SANDF’s 2013 misadventure into Central African Republic (CAR). Again, a badly advised government force, ill-trained and totally unprepared for the rebel assault on the government of CAR. Needless to say, this has irreparably tarnished the reputation of the SANDF.

Whereas I mourn the death of every soldier, we must not forget that the SANDF has also been the beneficiary of “free advice” and “free training”. Sadly, this resulted in the Seleka rebel coalition outgunning and out-manoeuvring the SANDF. This confirms that not only was the overall SANDF strategy flawed but that the strategy had its foundation resting on poor intelligence – and no strategy can succeed if it is developed off assumptions and rumours.

Additionally, even the best strategy and operational designs will fail if the armed forces are not trained and equipped to implement the operational plans. Inadequately trained forces with poor leadership simply add fuel to the fire.  

This all goes back to failing to listen to good advice and instead opting for bad advice aimed at disadvantaging the recipient.

As long as governments fail to listen – instead relying on disinformation – this cycle of chaos will continue. 

THE “SPECIALISTS”

It would almost be funny were it not so sad.

I come across many people on an almost-daily basis that have travelled from beyond the continent to Africa to witness “first-hand” the problems the continent has. Some are businessmen, some are academics, some are members of NGOs and some are from foreign government PMCs.

Almost to a man (or woman), they become “specialists” in African politics and security-related matters only a few days after having set foot on the continent. They firmly believe that they understand our problems better than we do, they have all the solutions and know exactly how our future will look if only we would listen to them. They question but then immediately disregard the answers they get as it does not match with their perceived reality – which is often totally removed from our reality. It is not uncommon to get a response to an answer to the effect that “No, you are wrong. I read on … (chose your search engine) what your problems are”

Many of these newly-born specialists may be well-meaning in their intentions but their actions often result in fuelling already volatile situations or they grossly miscalculate the diverse and complex environment they have entered. But being specialists, they believe they can solve the problem they themselves created and then make it even worse.

Apart from the many tourists that visit Africa, everyone else has one goal tied to their visit: to make money. On the surface, there is nothing wrong with that as we all work to make a profit. However, when they intend to make their money by manipulation, bad advice, acting with little or no integrity, promoting suspicion and even by blatantly lying, my hackles begin to rise. Sadly, some of these charlatans get appointed to serve as “specialist government advisors”. They develop hypothetical solutions to overcome imaginary problems and then implement their “solutions” regardless of reality.

These problems are very prevalent in the intelligence, military and law enforcement areas. Of course they are found in the other sectors as well but as we work in the listed fields, this is where I know I am treading on familiar ground.

As we have numerous ears on the ground as well as many friends across the continent, we regard ourselves as fairly well informed. It is, therefore, not unusual for us to be given advance warning of a potential conflict or problem brewing in or close to a certain country. If we can confirm the information we are given, we warn the targeted government that problems are marching towards their horizon. At times, this intelligence is acted on. On other occasions, this intelligence is discussed with foreign governments who then refute our warnings and claim that we are conducting a disinformation campaign in order to get a contract.  

The recent situation in Mali is a good example of intelligence being disregarded and bad advice from “specialists” heeded. Most everyone knows how that panned out. Were it not for the intervention of the French forces, the situation would be vastly different to what it currently is. But that conflict is not over yet.

We have been trying to warn another government of a pending coup but they have been advised by their “advisors” and “specialists” not to talk to us. Numerous other examples exist but I shall refrain from listing them in case the governments we warned are actually seriously considering our warnings.

Many will claim that we warn governments simply to get a contract. I know of several people and/or organisations that have made it their mission to make these claims and try to influence governments not to listen to what we have to say or to discredit us. These individuals and /or organisations are likewise “specialists” on both me and our company. They know more about me than I know about myself. But, truth be told, there is no way we could accept that many contracts from so many governments.

Back to reality: Much of the so-called specialist advice given to African governments is aimed at ensuring conflicts either start or escalate. Peace does not enter the equation although it is bandied about as a buzzword - yet it remains ever elusive. Attention is often diverted from existing problems by creating new problems. Conflict and war implies large profits – and the longer these conflicts continue, the longer the profits roll in. Sometimes these specialists even support both sides engaged in the conflict just to make sure they are covered, regardless the winner.

Many African governments are not masters of their own destiny. Through bad advice, manipulation, economic blackmail and the like, they have become the puppets that jump to their puppet masters’ strings. When they don’t jump at the appropriate time, they are branded as rogue governments. So, to maintain their positions, when asked to jump they then simply ask “How high?”

It can be argued that many African governments are to blame for the situations they find themselves in. Whereas that holds true in some instances, much of what we witness in Africa, especially in the security forces, has come about as a result of bad advice, poor training, incorrect structures, inadequate weapons, irrelevant doctrines and so forth. Co-join this situation to poor statecraft advice and we see what we see…To rectify this, new statecraft and defence approaches are planned and implemented – and fail.

Many of these so-called specialists that visit our shores may come with good intentions. However, given their “vast knowledge” of the continent and their deep “research” on Africa, it is no wonder that such a mess is created. Promises are easily made and then just as easily broken. But then, perhaps this is the aim all along – erode the Pillars of State and create chaos. Out of the chaos will come anger, civil disobedience, racial hatred and tensions, strikes, rebellions, religious intolerance, an increase in transnational crime, a collapse of law and order, distrust towards government agencies, armed conflict and insurgencies – and ultimately, a dysfunctional government or a government teetering on collapse.  This creates numerous problems on the security front but also abundant lucrative opportunities on the economic front.

The ultimate result of their “specialist advice” in terms of human suffering boggles the mind.

As I mentioned earlier, it would almost be funny were it were not so sad. 

AN APOLOGY FROM EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES PROTECTIVE SERVICES

In early June 2012, Jason alerted me to a company posing as the reborn Executive Outcomes. Not only did Executive Outcomes Protective Services (EOPS) imply that they traced their origins back to the real EO, they also claimed that I had died...These lies were placed on their website (www.eopssecurity.com)

In response to these fraudulent claims, I posted my view on the matter on my blog on 11 June 2012. See http://eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecurityblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/my-early-demiseby-eops.html I also asked a certain Mr M Dominguez to respond to my questions on my untimely death. He never did.

I was once again alerted to EOPS by Jason who directed me to an entry at http://wolfesteel2000.blogspot.com/2012/09/eeben-barlow.html submitted by Charles Wolfe, the newly appointed Regional Manager for the notorious EOPS. His apology on the net reads as follows:

Eeben Barlow

On behalf of Executive Outcome Protective Services I would like to apologize for the way our website has been written. Mr. Dominguez greatly regrets not speaking to anyone for advise on how the Company History should have been written.

E.O.P.S. had no intentions of portraying that our employees came from your founded EO company. Mr. Dominguez was very inspired by your professionalism and dedication and wanted only to be portrayed in the same manner. We have great respect for what you have done in South Africa and abroad, and would like for you to understand what we are trying to accomplish here in South Florida by providing security services with the same mindset and goals such as yours.

I will be changing the way it is written as the Newly appointed Regional Manager. And again we apologize for the misunderstanding.

To be fair, it takes some courage to have to write an apology regarding gross misrepresentation.  Charles Wolfe was true to his word and some changes were made on their website, most importantly writing the “late” me out of their site.

However, on their website, they still refer to themselves as “Executive Outcomes”. Some folks just don’t get it. Whereas imitation may be a great form of flattery, false testimony does not endear one to the bearer of that testimony.

I would like to wish EOPS well with their business but as long as they infer their origins, I cannot do that. 

HAPPY CHINESE NEW YEAR 2013

I apologise for being late this year in wishing my Chinese friends a very happy New Year – a traditional Chinese celebration that began yesterday, 10 February 2013.  

The Chinese New Year (also known as the Lunar New Year) takes place in the early months of our calendar year, typically in January or February. In 2013, the Lunar New Year began on 10^th February and its beginning marks 15 days of celebration and the start of the Year of the Snake.

The celebrations will culminate in the Lantern Festival on 25^th February.

According to Chinese tradition, each year is dedicated to a specific animal, these being the following 12 animals:  Boar, Dragon, Dog, Horse, Monkey, Ox, Rat, Rabbit, Ram, Rooster, Snake and Tiger. It is believed that each of these animals bestow their characteristics to the people born in their year.

The Year of the Snake (2013) heralds the end of the Year of the Dragon (2012).

May you all have a very happy, healthy and prosperous Year of the Snake.

Gong Xi Fa Ca and Gong Hei Fa Choi!

USING HUMOUR TO COPE AND SURVIVE

I remember clearing for mines around a young soldier who had just stepped on an anti-personnel mine. His broken body had been dragged him into the shade of a tree and the medic was gently tending to his injuries and bandaging him up. The injured soldier was a good tennis player and he had just lost a leg.

Another sapper, eating some bully beef out of a tin with a stick, ambled over to his injured friend.  In shock and in pain, the injured man, understandably too scared to look at his injuries asked the sapper “Is it bad?”

His friend the sapper knelt down next to him and said: “Always look on the bright side – in future you only need to buy one “takkie” (tennis shoe)”.

This remark was made without malice or flippantly. It is the way soldiers talk to cope with the horrors they need to deal with. Living on the edge gives rise to a dark sense of humour only those who have been there can fully appreciate and even understand.

It therefore shouldn’t have come as too much of a surprise to find some in the media complaining about recent photo of a French soldier wearing a skeleton mask. Wearing a mask or a scarf to protect one from the dust and debris is rather normal. The fact that his mask resembles a skull is part of the dark humour soldiers develop. It keeps them going.

 Photo by Issouf Sanogo, AFP

What did they think he was doing in Mali – baking a cake for the extremists? The next thing they will probably complain about is the aggressive-looking weapons soldiers carry or that their uniforms frighten the enemy. Or maybe even that their weapons can actually kill people.

I am sure that if a company of soldiers wearing masks such as these appeared out of the dust, even the most hardened enemy will be taken aback and worried that he is being attacked by death itself. Which is exactly what should happen anyway.

The photo has resulted in a flurry of condemnation. Even a French military spokesman apologised and stated that the wearing of the mask was unacceptable and not representative of French military action. A hunt is now on to identify the soldier in the picture. Why on earth is that?

Similarly, there are those in the British media who are complaining about Capt Wales (Prince Harry to those who know him better) commenting on the fact that he had fired his Apache helicopter guns at the Taliban and had taken some of them “out of the game” – a common term used instead of “Hell, yes, I blew them to smithereens and there was blood and gore splattered over the entire area”.

Predictably, his frank comments – which do not in the least appear to have been boastful - drew a backlash from anti-war activists who, no doubt when their lives are threatened will call for people such as Capt Wales to save them and take the threat “out of the game”. Perhaps they will hope that someone will come along and “whack” or “slot” the threat to keep them safe so that they can continue to complain.

Even the extremists are complaining – and getting publicity - about his attitude to killing – something they certainly have no qualms about.  

Now what did these good armchair analysts think he was doing in an Apache helicopter? Was he supposed to merely observe the enemy whilst they were firing at him or his friends on the ground?

Soldiers need to deal with the stress and fear that accompanies them every day of their lives when in a combat zone. They cannot grieve for their friends who have lost life and limb in a firefight – they need to get the job done as quickly as possible. To do this, they develop their own language to cope with the horrors they need to deal with, smell and witness.  This language is littered with dark humour outsiders will not understand. To maintain some sanity in an insane world, they wear strange things, do strange things and say strange things.

However, war is not some game that is played according to gentlemen’s rules.  The aim is to identify, locate, neutralise, annihilate, disrupt or destroy the enemy or break his will to such an extent that he no longer has the stomach to fight. If wearing a mask and using dark humour or saying strange things will speed-up the process of achieving the aim, then it should be done.

If the media and the politicians don’t like the way in which soldiers cope with their jobs or if they don’t like their humour or their sayings, perhaps they should go and do the fighting instead. We can then sit on the sideline and criticise.

To the soldiers out there, regardless of where you are, do not let the media and politicians dictate your humour and prevent you from “wearing a mask”. If that is what you need to do to cope or scare the hell out of the enemy and destroy him, then do it.   

ISN'T IT TIME TO ASK QUESTIONS?

Some of my Nigerian friends and I were discussing the situation in Mali and the apparent lack of good advice, intelligence, strategy, training, intelligence forecasting and threat analysis that led to the current situation there. Virtually everything required to make a government strong, secure the state and protect the populace was sorely lacking. (To the folks who asked me about Mali, www.beegeagle.wordpress.com will be able to offer a lot of insight into the current efforts in West Africa and Mali. My friend “Beegeagle” runs this very popular blog - 10 000 visits a day should give an idea of its popularity).

During these discussions, I suggested that it is time for African governments to begin asking some very hard questions, especially in terms of some of the “free” advice and training governments and their armed forces are given. After all, even the SANDF has “benefitted” from some of this advice and training.

But, back to Mali where a very simplistic background is as follows:

The geo-political, economical and threat changes, challenges and developments that have taken place since the so-called Arab Spring have impacted severely on both North and West Africa. The pre-coup Malian government was certainly not as pure as the driven snow. As early as 2003, the former President of Mali allegedly allowed extremist control of the North whilst allegedly raking in huge sums of money from narco-trafficking and ransom payments.  Added to this was the issue of depleted land resources – one reason for Tuareg discontent with the Malian government -  overgrazing of the semi-arid lands bordering Mali and Niger and the subsequent desertification of those lands. Then there was the steady rise of AQIM, MOJWA and others who had the potential to form hostile anti-government alliances. The collapse of Libya added to the flow of weapons and combat experience into the conflict areas. It appears that no-one was able to predict this or even noticed.

Initially the removal from power of President Amadou Toumani Touré by a coup may have appeared to be to the benefit of Mali and the region. This regime change took place a mere five weeks before a presidential election was to be held with the outgoing President stating that he was not interested in running for office again. But then, a poorly foreign-trained army’s discipline collapsed, opening the door to uncertainty, chaos and an offensive by the extremists in the North. Whilst the extremist offensive was being planned, we twice warned the new government of Mali of the threat build-up and the need to take immediate and drastic action to curb it before the extremist offensive could gain momentum. (To those who think this was an attempt to gain employment – don’t let your imagination run away with you).  They were either advised not to listen to the warnings or to simply ignore our “disinformation”.

Poor governance resulted in Mali’s Vital Interests and National Interests becoming even more threatened as the country’s pillars of state came under increasing attack. Some of these interests happened to coincide with the Foreign Interests of France, who arguably had the courage to intervene to protect their interests and their citizens living in Mali.

Nigeria and its West African allies also committed men to the conflict as a successful takeover of Mali by the extremists will certainly pose a threat to West Africa. Extremist success in Mali would only embolden the enemy and provide other similar groups with a safe haven/springboard from where to plan and launch their operations into Europe and deeper into Africa. Additionally, success in Mali will give the extremists a new front from where to launch operations into Algeria. Perhaps they will do this under the guise of “democratic forces” and the international community will once again jump in to help “democratic extremists” as they did in Libya, Syria, Egypt and so forth.

Regardless of the situation, it is the development and escalation of the crisis in Mali that prompted us to beg whether questions should not be asked - and answered. These questions included inter alia the following:

1.     Did the “free” advice given to Mali not indicate or even hint at the importance of threat analysis and intelligence forecasting? If so, why not?

2.     What advice and support were the Malians given by their advisors during the development of their National Security Strategy?

3.     What did the “free” military advice and training consist of?

4.     Who trained the Malian armed forces?

5.     What happened to the Mali intelligence effort?

6.     Who trained the Malian intelligence services?

7.     Was no one able to predict the proliferation of weapons into Mali after the collapse of Libya?

8.     Why were Malian army units so rapidly overwhelmed by the extremists?

9.     Where was the so-called Rapid Intervention Unit?

The list of questions goes on and on...

To anyone who doubts my comments – and concerns – about the level of training given to the Malian armed forces, take a look at the training of their “Rapid Intervention Force” at http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=01NBUiA3Tjs 

I have witnessed the results of a lot of this so-called “free” advice and training that is given to African armed forces. In a nutshell, it is pathetic. A look at what happened and is still happening in CAR, DRC, S Sudan and other states is testimony to poor training, bad advice, incoherent doctrines, a lack of intelligence, a lack of strategy, poor discipline and a lack of motivation and will.  

African armies have a choice in terms of training, advice and support: Accept the freebies and suffer the consequences or pay for it and have someone to hold to account.

But, the answers to many of these questions will be found in a line in Bob Dylan’s famous song: “The answer my friend, is blowing in the wind...” 

WHY THE ARMED FORCES FAIL AT COIN

The armed forces can, despite their relative strengths in terms of manpower, firepower and other resources, fail at effectively neutralising and destroying an armed insurgency. The reasons for these failures include, inter alia, the following:

1.     Lack of support: When the armed forces are tasked to respond to an insurgency, they need maximum government support to achieve mission-success. This support extends beyond mere political and moral support but also in terms of providing it with the equipment and resources it requires. A lack of support from government will result in a lack of determination from the armed forces to accomplish their mission. Similarly, a lack of support from the local populace will cost the armed forces dearly in terms of manpower, intelligence, national support and may result in the populace giving support to the insurgents.

2.     Lack of intelligence: A lack of sound and credible intelligence at the strategic level will impede the armed forces’ strategy to counter the coming insurgency whilst at the operational and tactical levels it will restrict the armed forces’ efforts to plan and execute effective COIN operations. Intelligence must provide clear options on where, when and how actions can be conducted and with what force levels. Misappreciating the enemy will result in poor plans and efforts to locate and destroy the enemy and add to the enemy’s momentum. Additionally, a lack of intelligence will lead to unclear and vague orders. A lack of intelligence also prevents knowing the enemy – a crucial factor in defeating the enemy.

3.     Poor strategies: Poor strategies – and a subsequent lack of relentless strategic thinking - are not only the result of a lack of intelligence but also due to an inflexible, non-adaptive approach to formulating strategy.  The inability to formulate a strategy that attacks the insurgent forces over both a wide and a deep front will cost the armed forces in terms of domination, momentum, initiative and success. Additionally, operational developments must never drive strategy although operational developments can lead to an adjustment of strategy. Poor strategies also result in “mission creep”.

4.     Belief: An over-confident belief in their own abilities coupled to a belief that the enemy is inferior, poorly trained, ill equipped and operating with poor leadership will place the armed forces at a disadvantage of their own making. This misguided, at times arrogant belief can result in the armed forces suffering tactical defeats at the hands of the insurgents. In a COIN conflict, relative strengths is not a decisive factor.

5.     Lack of preparation: If the armed forces are not correctly prepared in terms of training and equipment, they will remain ineffective and reactive. Using incorrect doctrine, TTPs, approaches and equipment are indicative of a lack of preparation.

6.     Poor training: Conventional TTPs are not always relevant to COIN operations. Training must be mission-specific and aimed at allowing the armed forces to “out guerrilla” the insurgents. This requires an in-depth knowledge of the enemy and his TTPs. Initiative, adaptability and flexibility must be emphasised in training. Command and control must be decentralised.

7.     Foreign intervention: Foreign intervention must be viewed with caution as Africa has witnessed numerous interventions by foreign forces in COIN situations, only to see the insurgent activities escalate. Where foreign forces intervene in support of government COIN operations, their interests need to be clearly defined and understood. Similarly, foreign NGOs, despite their utterances, do not always wish to see an end to the conflicts as such will result in their reason for existence being questioned as well as a reduction in their income.

8.     Neglect of principles: By neglecting the principles of COIN whilst ignoring the principles employed by the insurgents, the armed forces posture themselves incorrectly and give the initiative to the insurgent forces.

9.     Expected to govern: The armed forces are not trained, prepared and equipped to fulfil the role of government and the civil service. This results in the misguided belief that the armed forces must conduct “hearts-and-minds” operations as opposed to destroying the enemy. Whereas the armed forces must create the climate in which government can function ie do its job, expecting them to govern is giving the insurgency new impetus to continue.

10.  Collateral damage: Unnecessary collateral damage to the populace creates resentment, anger and even a desire for revenge. Collateral damage is also perceived by the populace to represent government policy and, as such, breeds a deeper desire to replace government, in turn swelling the ranks of the insurgency.  Collateral damage will, furthermore, reduce the support of the populace towards the armed forces.

11.  Disrespect and maltreatment:  A lack of respect towards the populace, their property, culture, traditions and religions will breed resentment towards the armed forces. As with collateral damage, disrespect and maltreatment, along with an unwillingness to defend and protect the populace, will be viewed as government policy and reduce any support the populace may have towards the armed forces.

12.  Incorrect approach: COIN forces’ primary mission is to conduct enemy-focussed (enemy-centric) operations. By altering the mission of closing with and destroying the enemy in favour of population-centric missions, presents the armed insurgent with numerous advantage as well as the initiative. Disregarding indirect approaches will not favour the armed forces. Agility, flexibility, manoeuvre and relentless aggression must be part of the approach.

13.  Constraints: The armed forces are faced with numerous constraints when conducting a COIN campaign. These include poorly formulated Rules of Engagement, international interference (often aimed at assisting the insurgent forces), UN mandates that counter-act the actions of the armed forces and so forth. Unnecessary constraints prohibit the armed forces from achieving mission-success and can severely impact on morale.

14.  Poor discipline: Poor discipline in executing tactics as well as in relation to obeying commands is indicative of poor training and a lack of leadership. Fire-discipline and when necessary restraint, requires discipline as does the immediate execution of orders. Poor discipline will also manifest itself in the armed forces behaviour towards the populace in the form of rape, theft, assault and so forth.

15.  Inappropriate doctrine: Conventional warfare doctrine does not serve as a template for COIN doctrine. Doctrine is guided by experience, intelligence and the terrain. A failure to develop an appropriate doctrine and to continually assess and adapt it to ensure its relevance will place the armed forces at a disadvantage.

16.  Lack of flexibility: Rigid, inflexible operational plans can lead to disaster, especially when senior officers refuse to adapt their plans to cope with an ever-changing environment and situation. This lack of flexibility is often the result of a lack of knowledge and understanding of the insurgent or his strategy.

17.  Lack of motivation: Poor training, along with a lack of discipline, leadership and equipment will impact negatively on the morale of the armed forces. Demoralised armed forces will lack the motivation to achieve their mission.

18.  Lack of resources: A lack of resources, especially tactical airlift and special weapons can render a well-intentioned and aggressive armed force powerless against the insurgents. A lack of resources can also indicate a government’s lack of faith in its armed forces or even a concern by the government that the armed forces may use their equipment to threaten government.

19.  Not understanding the OE: Failing to understand the operating environment will ultimately result in mission-failure. Terrain, weather, demographics, vegetation and infrastructure all influence the operating environment. Similarly, weapons and equipment are determined by the OE. At the operational and tactical levels, failure to exploit the OE will result in the armed forces surrendering the initiative to the insurgents.

20.   When politicians make the plans: It is not unheard of that politicians want to determine and dictate military strategy as well as influence military operations. These misguided beliefs on their military prowess will hamper the armed forces and afford the insurgents numerous advantages. Politicians are not trained in generalship and the art of war. Instead, they must set the guidelines and policies for war and support the armed forces to execute their mission(s).

Perhaps the greatest danger the populace face is when the government does not trust its armed forces and the armed forces, in turn, do not trust the government. This can result in internal struggles in which the populace will have to choose sides to survive.

Both governments and their armed forces can be successful in combating an armed insurgency if they negate the above reasons for failure and jointly cooperate to defeat the threat.