VICTIMS OF DOCTRINE—BECAUSE ‘THE BOOK’ SAYS SO!

As a young officer, I had little to no clue what our doctrine was or indeed even what ‘doctrine’ really entailed. I viewed it as one of those grey areas. I know it was taught but obviously, my mind was elsewhere at that time. Instead, I hid my ignorance by saying stupid things like “Doctrine can be really boring…”

Later on in my career, I finally understood that doctrine is merely a guide to activity and action. It sets out a way for us how to do things in certain situations but does not prescribe what we must do. I would later discover that ‘guide’ is the operative word.

However, I often found that many of my colleagues believed that our doctrine was written in stone…”Because ‘the book’ says so…” No deviation from the doctrine was allowed or, at times, even tolerated.

I had no compunction in deviating from ‘the book’ if I thought my actions and orders would save lives and result in success. I could always face the music later—and I often did. But, I fear we have become so caught up by what ‘the book’ says, that we set ourselves up for failure time and again. This strict adherence to ‘the book’ gives us a very blinkered and rigid approach to conflict and war.

Guided by ‘the book’, we consistently repeat the same mistakes until they become ‘muscle memory’—and simply the way we do things. In the process, we have become dogmatic, and predictable, thus denying ourselves agility, balance, flexibility, initiative, surprise, and speed of action/reaction when we need it most. Yet, despite the casualties, we seem determined to grasp defeat from the jaws of victory.

For decades now, African armies have been using outdated Western and Eastern doctrines and this is marked by a record of very little success on the continent.

Whereas these doctrines were, at a time relevant, I fear they no longer are.

The doctrines ascribed to by many Africa armies are unaligned, and have become stagnant and in many instances, irrelevant. Of course, certain elements may retain relevance but the time has come for African armed forces to revisit their doctrines and, with a very sharp knife, cut out what is no longer applicable or relevant—and replace it with doctrine that is applicable, realistic, and relevant. We need to shake off the outdated doctrinal shackles of World War II, some of it unconnected with todays’ high tempo, technology-driven warfare that is shrouded in uncertainty. Yet, these antiquated doctrines remain in use and remain unrevised despite many important lessons having being learned. And so, we continue to fail the National Security Strategy and ultimately, the National Strategy.

When assessing the inability of many African armies to perform effectively in the field, it becomes clear that there are numerous doctrinal failures and mismatches. There is nothing wrong with the quality of manpower, as long as they are trained, equipped and well led. Despite a measure of training, victory remains elusive as tactical successes are seldom, if ever, translated into operational or strategic successes.

Currently, the doctrines in use by many African armies are not aligned with the National Security Strategy, nor with the National Military Strategy and the subsequent campaign strategies make no allowance for complex AOs, have little regard for the environmental impact on operations, incorrectly assume all troops are trained to a high level, do not make allowances for a lack of equipment, take no cognisance of the threat or enemy, and so forth.

Being fortunate to be given latitude by some African armies, I have come to realise that doctrine needs to be simplified, made relevant and realistic, and then imprinted on the minds of soldiers as soon as possible.

Simplifying doctrine and teaching it to troops at a very early stage of their training has numerous advantages. Most importantly, it teaches them how planned combat operations will unfold, and how forces are integrated into a unified units and sub-units, and how and why their actions will support the combat operations to achieve the commander’s intent, and so forth.

Understanding a simplified doctrine that is devoid of ‘management’ terms, outdated and unconnected approaches, cumbersome, and irrelevant information has, in my experience, had a marked difference in how troops approach their missions and how they fight. I have witnessed that when doctrine is explained to them, a visible understanding occurs—and it then shows in how they approach combat operations.

But, we remain self-deluded with our doctrine, believing it is written in stone and therefore not subject to adaption, discussion or change.

As long as we do what the outdated ‘book’ says, we will remain victims of our doctrine as we will become what we want the enemy to become—confused and predictive.

VERY SHORT NOTES ON STRATEGY

The phrase “If we don’t know where we are going, we can be sure we will never know how to get there” essentially refers to an absence of a strategy. However, the term “strategy” appears to have become confusing, misleading and frequently misused.

As I often find myself engaged in assisting with the development of strategies, I realise how difficult it must be for our clients to grapple with a subject that is both vague and unknown and that has, along the way, lost its true meaning.

I also find it incredibly sad that so many of the senior officials I engage with have been incorrectly educated as to what strategy really is and what its aim is. However, I cannot blame them as even when they want to discover more on this apparently vague concept, they revert to the internet which is fraught with numerous misleading articles on strategy and pages and pages of gobbledygook.

Strategy is neither an operational design nor a tactical plan – although these two concepts form an integral part in the implementation of strategy. It is therefore somewhat surprising to find that many label a very basic plan as a “strategy” or believe that strategy is the same as “tactics” – which it is not.

In its most simple form, strategy is a disciplined, intellectual, intelligence-driven exercise that ought to give us a guideline roadmap that will enable us to reach our ultimate desired destination or end state. This guideline roadmap may have several options or alternatives that can be used to get to our desired end-goal but it will need constant assessment of the risks enroute and readjustments as new intelligence becomes available on the opportunities, obstacles and other possibilities that present themselves. However, it must remain realistic.

This requires having to make choices – sometimes challenging ones – determine and prioritise objectives, identify and appreciate risks and how best to reduce them and make alliances and compromises to our advantage.  

The guideline roadmap must remain flexible (to be flexible we need options) and allow us to predict, exploit, defend and bypass all opportunities and threats, thus allowing us to reach our desired end destination or achieve our desired end state.

National strategy is, therefore, about determining and deciding on realistic options to achieve a desired future condition or future state and knowing how best to achieve it. By implication, it provides governmental direction to achieve the national political objectives in a complex, ever-evolving and dynamic strategic environment. This allows us to work at achieving our desired end goal with the resources we have – or are planning to acquire.

If, for example, we are developing a National Security Strategy (NSS), our strategy will be focussed on supporting the National Strategy and securing, strengthening and protecting the integrity of the state along with its interests and will therefore be influenced by factors such as:

1.     The National Strategy and its subsequent policies

2. The international view ie how we perceive the world and how we want the world to perceive us
3. The regional view ie how we want the region to perceive us and how we perceive the region
4. The national view ie how we want our citizenry to perceive the state
5. Our interests ie what is important to the state both nationally and internationally
6. The threats that may impact on our interests and national security.

In its most basic form, our NSS is expressed in terms of realistic ENDS, WAYS and MEANS. These three concepts relate to:

1. Our desired realistic END goal or end state
2. The approaches and concept routes (options) ie the application of instruments that will allow us to determine the WAY to meet the ENDS
3. The MEANS we have available ie the instruments of power including the capabilities, assets and resources we have to achieve our security objectives and goals

This approach will tell us how we need to organise and structure ourselves to accomplish our goals. Furthermore, it will allow us to identify any strategic deficiencies we may have and how these deficiencies can be exploited by hostile forces or how we need to overcome them.

For our NSS to succeed, it must be aligned with the strategies of other government agencies and departments to ensure unity of effort to achieve a common end-state.

The validity of our strategy must be tested against the relevant principles.

The invisible thread that ties the ENDS, WAYS and MEANS together is known as “doctrine” – a set of time-proven procedures, rules and policies that tell us “how” to do things and not “what” to do. Doctrine is however a guide to action and must not prevent or restrict our ability to think, analyse and adapt.

To strengthen, support and enable the implementation of the NSS, assessment and consideration must be given to:

1. Operations by other government agencies/departments
2. Political warfare operations
3. Economic warfare operations
4. Strategic warfare operations and so forth.

Strategy is seldom, if ever, tied to a specific timeframe. Rather, it is expressed in terms of short-, medium- and long-term objectives and goals.

Another misconception is that strategy is something we need to hurriedly develop simply to have a strategy and that it remains forever relevant. Nothing could be further from the truth as it remains under constant review and is continually adapted and expanded on as new intelligence flows in and new options present themselves.

If no strategy exists, it may take several months – or longer - to develop a very basic strategic outline. However, it is and will remain an on-going process and a critical component of a state’s aspirations.

Ultimately, a national strategy is about how the country’s leadership will use its instruments of influence and power, along with its assets and resources to meet its desired political objectives and achieve its desired end state.

 

THOUGHTS ON FRAGILE AND FAILED STATES Part 1

A lot of people have asked my thoughts on fragile and failed states. I believe the following with regard to fragile and failed states:

The distinction between a fragile and failed state is often blurred - depending on what definition is being used to describe the state - and who uses it and for what purpose.

It is generally perceived that a fragile state is a state that lacks the ability and/or the capacity to secure its Pillars, govern its environs and as a result, risks dissolution or rampant lawlessness along with extreme poverty, hunger and starvation coupled to a very high rate of unemployment and a negative economic growth curve.

A fragile state is, however, not necessarily on its way to becoming a failed state as a state can evolve from a fragile state to a more stable and secure state. A fragile state is, however, often a precursor to a failed state and is indeed often a state that has reached that tipping point.

Africa has numerous examples of states that are regarded as either fragile or failed. This classification does, however, depend on who stands to gain what from their fragility or failure.

It is generally accepted that fragile or failed states occur when governance fails, law and order cease to function effectively and the armed forces are unable to fulfil their mandates. But, generally speaking, governance as perceived by the populace is only one element that results in fragility or failure.

There are both internal and external threat drivers that can result in fragility or failure of a state.

When the Pillars of the State have been sufficiently eroded, it results in instability of the state. Once sufficient erosion has occurred, one or more of the pillars can collapse resulting in a domino effect across the spectrum of the state and thereby result in collapse or failure.

Regardless of how we view the state, there are certain general characteristics common to those we have worked in. These include inter alia the following:

1.     Lack of Grand Strategy or an unrealistic Grand Strategy

2.     Lack of National Security Strategy

3.     Fragmented, antagonistic political powerbases

4.     Weak central government and lack of or deficiency in governance

5.     Inability to implement policy

6.     Rampant corruption

7.     Poor to non-existent service delivery

8.     Weak economic strategy coupled to poverty

9.     Questionable loyalty of forces

10.  Breakdown of Law and Order

11.  Rampant transnational crime

12.  Regional and international isolation

13.  Increase in uncontrolled, heavily-armed and opposing militia groups

14.  Local, regional and international media pressure (mainstream and social)

15.  Weak intelligence structures/failing to listen to intelligence

16.  No professional Civil Service 

From a military point of view, we note the following characteristics usually abound:

1.     Lack of military strategy

2.     Mismatch between military strategy and national strategy

3.     Lack of military leadership and C3I

4.     Poor discipline

5.     Poor training

6.     Lack of salaries hence involvement in crime

7.     Poorly maintained, unserviceable and often inadequate equipment

8.     Inability to develop realistic, executable operational plans

9.     Poor TTPs

10.  Lack of trust or even fear from populace

11.  Units are incorrectly structured to counter threats

12.  Lack of coherent, workable doctrine

13.  Unrealistic expectations of their abilities

14.  Don’t understand the threat

15.  Not political astute and are partisan

16.  Largest ethnic group often dominates armed forces

17.  Disunity between forces/units and other security elements ie police, etc

It is critically important that a government recognises the downward slide towards fragility or failure and takes immediate and drastic intervention. Such intervention may result in government having to reassess its situation, realise that it has made mistakes and take immediate corrective action. These mistakes can be identified and rectified by monitoring the Pillars of State and their impact on the situation.

A fragile area or region within the borders of a country can result in the fragility extending into other areas within the same state. This can erode a stable state and result in a fragile or failed state and impact negatively on neighbouring states. However, these fragile or failed “pockets” within the state do not necessarily constitute a failed state.

I will attempt to discuss how fragility and/or failure of a state can be rectified in my next posting.

BUSINESS "WARFARE" PROGRAMMES

And now for something completely different…

I have had repeated requests over the years to develop programmes or workshops to share my successful warfare strategies with the corporate world.

I now finally have some time to present these programmes and workshops on "battle field" strategies and tactics in a business environment.

To successfully manoeuvre within the complex and dynamic business battlefield, players need to understand the environment in which they plan to operate. Known as the Operating Environment (OE), it is this environment that shapes and guides their operations. It is also the OE that can either result in success for those who have correctly assessed it or spell disaster for those who enter it unprepared.

The programmes and workshops cover a number of fields including assessing and understanding the Operating Environment, leadership, strategy, the importance of doctrine, business “designs for battle”, the principles of marketing warfare, phases of marketing warfare, market penetration and exploitation, operating in hostile environments, intelligence and counter intelligence, security and asset protection and more.

Each workshop or training programme is designed to meet the specific requirements of an organisation - and is therefore unique.

Interested parties can contact me directly on the blog.

ISN'T IT TIME TO ASK QUESTIONS?

Some of my Nigerian friends and I were discussing the situation in Mali and the apparent lack of good advice, intelligence, strategy, training, intelligence forecasting and threat analysis that led to the current situation there. Virtually everything required to make a government strong, secure the state and protect the populace was sorely lacking. (To the folks who asked me about Mali, www.beegeagle.wordpress.com will be able to offer a lot of insight into the current efforts in West Africa and Mali. My friend “Beegeagle” runs this very popular blog - 10 000 visits a day should give an idea of its popularity).

During these discussions, I suggested that it is time for African governments to begin asking some very hard questions, especially in terms of some of the “free” advice and training governments and their armed forces are given. After all, even the SANDF has “benefitted” from some of this advice and training.

But, back to Mali where a very simplistic background is as follows:

The geo-political, economical and threat changes, challenges and developments that have taken place since the so-called Arab Spring have impacted severely on both North and West Africa. The pre-coup Malian government was certainly not as pure as the driven snow. As early as 2003, the former President of Mali allegedly allowed extremist control of the North whilst allegedly raking in huge sums of money from narco-trafficking and ransom payments.  Added to this was the issue of depleted land resources – one reason for Tuareg discontent with the Malian government -  overgrazing of the semi-arid lands bordering Mali and Niger and the subsequent desertification of those lands. Then there was the steady rise of AQIM, MOJWA and others who had the potential to form hostile anti-government alliances. The collapse of Libya added to the flow of weapons and combat experience into the conflict areas. It appears that no-one was able to predict this or even noticed.

Initially the removal from power of President Amadou Toumani Touré by a coup may have appeared to be to the benefit of Mali and the region. This regime change took place a mere five weeks before a presidential election was to be held with the outgoing President stating that he was not interested in running for office again. But then, a poorly foreign-trained army’s discipline collapsed, opening the door to uncertainty, chaos and an offensive by the extremists in the North. Whilst the extremist offensive was being planned, we twice warned the new government of Mali of the threat build-up and the need to take immediate and drastic action to curb it before the extremist offensive could gain momentum. (To those who think this was an attempt to gain employment – don’t let your imagination run away with you).  They were either advised not to listen to the warnings or to simply ignore our “disinformation”.

Poor governance resulted in Mali’s Vital Interests and National Interests becoming even more threatened as the country’s pillars of state came under increasing attack. Some of these interests happened to coincide with the Foreign Interests of France, who arguably had the courage to intervene to protect their interests and their citizens living in Mali.

Nigeria and its West African allies also committed men to the conflict as a successful takeover of Mali by the extremists will certainly pose a threat to West Africa. Extremist success in Mali would only embolden the enemy and provide other similar groups with a safe haven/springboard from where to plan and launch their operations into Europe and deeper into Africa. Additionally, success in Mali will give the extremists a new front from where to launch operations into Algeria. Perhaps they will do this under the guise of “democratic forces” and the international community will once again jump in to help “democratic extremists” as they did in Libya, Syria, Egypt and so forth.

Regardless of the situation, it is the development and escalation of the crisis in Mali that prompted us to beg whether questions should not be asked - and answered. These questions included inter alia the following:

1.     Did the “free” advice given to Mali not indicate or even hint at the importance of threat analysis and intelligence forecasting? If so, why not?

2.     What advice and support were the Malians given by their advisors during the development of their National Security Strategy?

3.     What did the “free” military advice and training consist of?

4.     Who trained the Malian armed forces?

5.     What happened to the Mali intelligence effort?

6.     Who trained the Malian intelligence services?

7.     Was no one able to predict the proliferation of weapons into Mali after the collapse of Libya?

8.     Why were Malian army units so rapidly overwhelmed by the extremists?

9.     Where was the so-called Rapid Intervention Unit?

The list of questions goes on and on...

To anyone who doubts my comments – and concerns – about the level of training given to the Malian armed forces, take a look at the training of their “Rapid Intervention Force” at http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=01NBUiA3Tjs 

I have witnessed the results of a lot of this so-called “free” advice and training that is given to African armed forces. In a nutshell, it is pathetic. A look at what happened and is still happening in CAR, DRC, S Sudan and other states is testimony to poor training, bad advice, incoherent doctrines, a lack of intelligence, a lack of strategy, poor discipline and a lack of motivation and will.  

African armies have a choice in terms of training, advice and support: Accept the freebies and suffer the consequences or pay for it and have someone to hold to account.

But, the answers to many of these questions will be found in a line in Bob Dylan’s famous song: “The answer my friend, is blowing in the wind...” 

THREAT PREDICTION

Threat prediction is a vital pre-requisite of strategy development. It can, however, be a difficult and problematic task if the intelligence analysts as well as the planners and strategists do not have accurate intelligence at hand, do not understand the historical trends that have manifested over time, and do not understand the political strategies of their own government and those of the target country or target grouping.

If the intelligence services do not utilise all available resources at their disposal, and cultivate new resources where intelligence gaps exist, they will directly contribute to intelligence failures. Intelligence failures can, in turn, lead to misjudging the enemy, doctrinal failures and faulty or disjointed threat predictions and subsequently poor, unrealistic or irrelevant strategies.

The value of threat prediction and its analysis is that it provides benchmarks and indicators that can be used to constantly assess and re-adjust the overall military strategy. The need for flexibility in the developing military strategy is vital in order to prevent a tunnel-vision view of the threats a government may be facing.

The nature of modern warfare and, more broadly, armed conflict has changed dramatically from the classical or historical perspective of war. The days of two opposing armies meeting one another on an open field to engage in a classical conventional battle are, for the time being, long gone.

Although the ever-present threat of a conventional land, sea and air battle will always remain very real, modern war and/or conflict may be characterised by many different concepts such as religious fanaticism, ethnic hatred, radical ideologies, resource grabbing, xenophobia, mass mobilisation of the disadvantaged, a breakdown of law and order, a perceived weakness of the opposition, a growth in power by armed organised crime syndicates and so forth. These factors, more than ever, require detailed investigation – something that can only be achieved by means of a strong, dedicated and aggressive intelligence gathering and analysis capability. 

Whereas modern military technology, if correctly applied, can prove to be a force- multiplier on the battlefield, strategists and planners cannot rely on technology alone, as technology is prone to failure, often at critical times. Over-reliance on technology may, therefore, present several serious disadvantages to the user. Correctly used as a battlefield support system, technology can play a valuable role in locating, confusing and even overcoming the enemy. Technology, however, needs to be balanced against the operating environment, the threat and the ability to maintain and apply the technology correctly. It remains a secondary weapon and not the primary weapon of an armed force.

Intelligence analysts, along with military planners and strategists furthermore need to consider a host of different and varying factors that may lead to political tension and thus negatively influence the security of the state, its citizens and the operating environment.   

Political tension, on the other hand, may be the result of economic tension, natural resource distribution, border disputes, perceived political sabotage, ethnicity, religious differences and so forth.

Therefore, from a strategic planning point-of-view, several factors need to be closely assessed in terms of how they can be used to the advantage of the armed forces and how they can be successfully exploited thus denying the enemy from gaining an advantage.

Additionally, these factors need to be viewed in terms of the disadvantage they may hold for the political- and the military machinery. Of equal importance is the fact that the opposing forces will be assessing the same factors of the state or grouping they view as an aggressor.

The advantage will thus lie with the strategists and planners who are able to accurately predict the threats facing the state and identify the weaknesses and exploitation possibilities in order to develop realistic options that can be implemented.

PS: I have been travelling as well as ill and have therefore been unable to regularly update the blog. My apologies...

CUT THE SOURCE OF THE FUNDING

Fighting the complex and diverse wars of today requires us to be prepared to face an enemy who has no scruples in utilising crime, and total terror against innocent civilians in order to coerce their support with the aim of placing themselves into power.

This does not mean that conventional land battles are something of the past and unconventional warfare something of the future. The fact remains that armies need to prepare for both scenarios as well as their various off-shoots.  In many instances, they will need to conduct these missions in support of the law enforcement agencies.

Utilising unconventional methods, and in the process developing their armed gangs, we have allowed these unconventional forces to move funds and equipment, ie arms and ammunition, and in some instances, sympathetic governments have even provided these thugs with passports or allowed their territories to be used for “training”.

This has given numerous terrorist groups freedom of movement as well as financial freedom. Sometimes hidden beneath layers of ostensibly legitimate business, their activities aimed at instilling terror continue – and in some instances they are still able to move large sums of money, albeit in the shape of resources, to fund their activities and crimes. Even more so when they act as proxies for governments who plan the demise of neighbouring states or aim at creating regional instability.

Much has been done with international banking laws and regulations to follow the money trail but I suspect it is the wrong approach to follow. Ex-President Thabo Mbeki recently made the claim that Africa loses US$ 50 Bn annually to illegal activities. Whereas I cannot vouch for the accuracy of this figure, I do know that the amount lost in terms of monetary value is huge.   Not only has this undermined the continent, some of this funding has also enriched and empowered those that seek to cause instability.

I dislike using the “when we” label, but when Executive Outcomes assisted African governments with devising military strategies, the prime strategic military targets were the sources of funding. This led to an outcry in the local and international media with wild claims that the company was interested in seizing the sources of funding – mainly diamonds and oil – for its own purposes.

Had those who shouted the loudest spent five minutes thinking about it, the reasons for following that strategy would have become quite obvious:

1.      Deny the enemy his source of income

2.      With no income, no weapons can be purchased or replaced

3.      With no funding, freedom of movement is curtailed

4.      With no funding, the enemy will slowly bleed itself into destruction.

What the military-strategists-posing-as-journalists failed to understand was that the enemy – call them rebels, terrorists, activists or whatever – were resorting to criminal and terror activities in order to overthrow legitimate governments. In their foolish attempts to create suspicion on the company, these so-called journalists were not only assisting the rebels but also condoning crime. The crimes got worse when young children were forced to kill their parents and elders as they were coerced into joining rebel or terror networks. This was conveniently not reported.

It is no secret that illegally mined gold and diamonds are leaving the African shores to be sold elsewhere. Much of these profits are filtered back into radical terror networks. This continued access to funds allows them to perpetuate their activities, be they crime or terror actions.

It is also no secret that some countries in Africa have become transit points for drugs shipments to Europe – some of these shipments being coordinated by criminal groups with close association with terror groups.

Despite these facts, we have done very little or nothing to attack the source of the funding. Instead, we have given these forces the freedom to continue with their activities. Ironically, they are doing so in total safety with no real aggressive efforts to stop them.

We need to drastically step up our intelligence gathering capabilities, formulate intelligence-based strategies to attack the sources of funding to reclaim our stability and neutralise those who threaten it. We need to conduct this with aggression and vigour and give no quarter to those who seek to disrupt peace and replace it with terror.  

As long as we leave the sources of funding intact, we allow these people to continue with their actions, erode our belief in the state, damage our safety and security and implement their form of rule through savagery.

PROGRESSION OF WAR AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA

Africa has been wracked by numerous wars, civil wars, rebellions and insurgencies, conflicts that have all been very similar in progression - a progression that closely follows Mao Zedong’s views on how these actions ought to be conducted.

This does not imply that those insurgencies have all been Maoist in thought and deed but rather that the Maoist progression model has been relatively easy to implement.

In the West, those who ferment such a revolution with the aim of overthrowing a government are often viewed as “freedom fighters” or “non-state actors”. Within Africa they are not viewed as such as the term itself gives those who turn to armed conflict a legitimacy that is often undeserved. As such revolutions inevitably make use of extreme torture of captured opponents, brutality towards the innocent and extreme terrorisation of the local populace, they are instead referred to as “rebels”, “terrorists” or “criminals”. 

Africa has also been witness to numerous coup d’etats, the results which have often led to the establishment of military juntas that are inexperienced in political matters and therefore prone to mismanaging the political responsibilities associated with government. This has been partly due to the large influence of politics within the military as well as the quest for ultimate power.

Conventional wars, as understood in the Western sense of conventional land battles, are not common to Africa. Although there have been large, isolated classical conventional battles on the continent post 1945, it is the manner of conduct and approach to war that differs vastly from Western military thinking. Examples of such conventional battles are the Ugandan invasion of Tanzania in 1978-79 and the South African Defence Force battles against Cuban and Angolan forces in 1987. Such conventional actions have all followed the same progression:

·        Antagonism, anger or perceived danger/threat

·        Diplomacy

·        Failed diplomacy

·        Build-up of forces

·        War

The African model for revolution is often misunderstood by Western military thinkers. This model invariably follows the following progression: 

·        The mobilisation of the people against real or perceived oppression

·        A phase of armed struggle utilising the operational environment as well as the political environment. This is usually in the form of guerrilla warfare and may include acts of terrorism. However, soft targets are of primary importance to show results and get mass media attention. It is this phase of war that is referred to as an insurgency and the fight against it is referred to as counter-insurgency. Engagements are of short duration and the insurgent will then melt away into the bush and blend into local population concentrations

·        Mobile warfare aimed primarily at rear areas with the aim of cutting supply lines and capturing arms and ammunition. This is not a phase where Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) are employed but should rather be viewed as a phase in which the insurgents mount large-scale operations. Vehicles or motorcycles may be used to deliver them to close proximity of their targets

·        Conventional warfare – a phase where mass support from the people has been given to the insurgent movement – a phase where numbers and anger will tell.

As can be noted, the above progression closely follows the Maoist model for revolution despite the fact that many insurgent groups are not Maoist organisations.

This type of progression, with variations, has become a very successful conflict-model and has proven itself in numerous armed insurrections in Africa. Although not every revolution in Africa has been successful, many important lessons are evident – lessons that remain applicable to counter-insurgency students – regardless of origin.

It is only by knowing and understanding this progression of conflict that an effective counter can be designed and implemented.