As a young officer, I
had little to no clue what our doctrine was or indeed even what ‘doctrine’
really entailed. I viewed it as one of those grey areas. I know it was taught
but obviously, my mind was elsewhere at that time. Instead, I hid my ignorance
by saying stupid things like “Doctrine can be really boring…”
Later on in my career,
I finally understood that doctrine is merely a guide to activity and action. It sets out a way for us how to do things in certain situations but
does not prescribe what we must do. I
would later discover that ‘guide’ is the operative word.
However, I often found
that many of my colleagues believed that our doctrine was written in
stone…”Because ‘the book’ says so…” No deviation from the doctrine was allowed
or, at times, even tolerated.
I had no compunction in
deviating from ‘the book’ if I thought my actions and orders would save lives
and result in success. I could always face the music later—and I often did. But,
I fear we have become so caught up by what ‘the book’ says, that we set
ourselves up for failure time and again. This strict adherence to ‘the book’
gives us a very blinkered and rigid approach to conflict and war.
Guided by ‘the book’,
we consistently repeat the same mistakes until they become ‘muscle memory’—and simply
the way we do things. In the process, we have become dogmatic, and predictable,
thus denying ourselves agility, balance, flexibility, initiative, surprise, and
speed of action/reaction when we need it most. Yet, despite the casualties, we seem
determined to grasp defeat from the jaws of victory.
For decades now, African
armies have been using outdated Western and Eastern doctrines and this is
marked by a record of very little success on the continent.
Whereas these doctrines
were, at a time relevant, I fear they no longer are.
The doctrines ascribed
to by many Africa armies are unaligned, and have become stagnant and in many
instances, irrelevant. Of course, certain elements may retain relevance but the
time has come for African armed forces to revisit their doctrines and, with a
very sharp knife, cut out what is no longer applicable or relevant—and replace
it with doctrine that is applicable, realistic, and relevant. We need to shake
off the outdated doctrinal shackles of World War II, some of it unconnected with
todays’ high tempo, technology-driven warfare that is shrouded in uncertainty. Yet,
these antiquated doctrines remain in use and remain unrevised despite many important
lessons having being learned. And so, we continue to fail the National Security
Strategy and ultimately, the National Strategy.
When assessing the
inability of many African armies to perform effectively in the field, it
becomes clear that there are numerous doctrinal failures and mismatches. There
is nothing wrong with the quality of manpower, as long as they are trained,
equipped and well led. Despite a measure of training, victory remains elusive
as tactical successes are seldom, if ever, translated into operational or
strategic successes.
Currently, the
doctrines in use by many African armies are not aligned with the National
Security Strategy, nor with the National Military Strategy and the subsequent
campaign strategies make no allowance for complex AOs, have little regard for
the environmental impact on operations, incorrectly assume all troops are
trained to a high level, do not make allowances for a lack of equipment, take
no cognisance of the threat or enemy, and so forth.
Being fortunate to be
given latitude by some African armies, I have come to realise that doctrine
needs to be simplified, made relevant and realistic, and then imprinted on the
minds of soldiers as soon as possible.
Simplifying doctrine and
teaching it to troops at a very early stage of their training has numerous
advantages. Most importantly, it teaches them how planned combat operations will
unfold, and how forces are integrated into a unified units and sub-units, and how
and why their actions will support the combat operations to achieve the
commander’s intent, and so forth.
Understanding a
simplified doctrine that is devoid of ‘management’ terms, outdated and
unconnected approaches, cumbersome, and irrelevant information has, in my
experience, had a marked difference in how troops approach their missions and
how they fight. I have witnessed that when doctrine is explained to them, a
visible understanding occurs—and it then shows in how they approach combat operations.
But, we remain
self-deluded with our doctrine, believing it is written in stone and therefore
not subject to adaption, discussion or change.
As long as we do what
the outdated ‘book’ says, we will remain victims of our doctrine as we will become
what we want the enemy to become—confused and predictive.
