THOUGHTS ON FRAGILE AND FAILED STATES Part 1

A lot of people have asked my thoughts on fragile and failed states. I believe the following with regard to fragile and failed states:

The distinction between a fragile and failed state is often blurred - depending on what definition is being used to describe the state - and who uses it and for what purpose.

It is generally perceived that a fragile state is a state that lacks the ability and/or the capacity to secure its Pillars, govern its environs and as a result, risks dissolution or rampant lawlessness along with extreme poverty, hunger and starvation coupled to a very high rate of unemployment and a negative economic growth curve.

A fragile state is, however, not necessarily on its way to becoming a failed state as a state can evolve from a fragile state to a more stable and secure state. A fragile state is, however, often a precursor to a failed state and is indeed often a state that has reached that tipping point.

Africa has numerous examples of states that are regarded as either fragile or failed. This classification does, however, depend on who stands to gain what from their fragility or failure.

It is generally accepted that fragile or failed states occur when governance fails, law and order cease to function effectively and the armed forces are unable to fulfil their mandates. But, generally speaking, governance as perceived by the populace is only one element that results in fragility or failure.

There are both internal and external threat drivers that can result in fragility or failure of a state.

When the Pillars of the State have been sufficiently eroded, it results in instability of the state. Once sufficient erosion has occurred, one or more of the pillars can collapse resulting in a domino effect across the spectrum of the state and thereby result in collapse or failure.

Regardless of how we view the state, there are certain general characteristics common to those we have worked in. These include inter alia the following:

1.     Lack of Grand Strategy or an unrealistic Grand Strategy

2.     Lack of National Security Strategy

3.     Fragmented, antagonistic political powerbases

4.     Weak central government and lack of or deficiency in governance

5.     Inability to implement policy

6.     Rampant corruption

7.     Poor to non-existent service delivery

8.     Weak economic strategy coupled to poverty

9.     Questionable loyalty of forces

10.  Breakdown of Law and Order

11.  Rampant transnational crime

12.  Regional and international isolation

13.  Increase in uncontrolled, heavily-armed and opposing militia groups

14.  Local, regional and international media pressure (mainstream and social)

15.  Weak intelligence structures/failing to listen to intelligence

16.  No professional Civil Service 

From a military point of view, we note the following characteristics usually abound:

1.     Lack of military strategy

2.     Mismatch between military strategy and national strategy

3.     Lack of military leadership and C3I

4.     Poor discipline

5.     Poor training

6.     Lack of salaries hence involvement in crime

7.     Poorly maintained, unserviceable and often inadequate equipment

8.     Inability to develop realistic, executable operational plans

9.     Poor TTPs

10.  Lack of trust or even fear from populace

11.  Units are incorrectly structured to counter threats

12.  Lack of coherent, workable doctrine

13.  Unrealistic expectations of their abilities

14.  Don’t understand the threat

15.  Not political astute and are partisan

16.  Largest ethnic group often dominates armed forces

17.  Disunity between forces/units and other security elements ie police, etc

It is critically important that a government recognises the downward slide towards fragility or failure and takes immediate and drastic intervention. Such intervention may result in government having to reassess its situation, realise that it has made mistakes and take immediate corrective action. These mistakes can be identified and rectified by monitoring the Pillars of State and their impact on the situation.

A fragile area or region within the borders of a country can result in the fragility extending into other areas within the same state. This can erode a stable state and result in a fragile or failed state and impact negatively on neighbouring states. However, these fragile or failed “pockets” within the state do not necessarily constitute a failed state.

I will attempt to discuss how fragility and/or failure of a state can be rectified in my next posting.

THE DANGERS FACING REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENTS

Numerous people have asked me for my thoughts regarding revolutionary governments.

Indeed, Africa has seen numerous governments come to power through revolutions - some relatively peaceful, some very violent. Invariably, the scars of the revolution remain and left unattended can result in an uprising of the populace or even a counter-revolution.

Without exception, every revolutionary government I have come into contact with is already politically and economically fragile with growing security and stability challenges. Without acknowledging their fragility and taking the necessary actions to strengthen the Pillars of State, they find themselves on the road to failure.  

Some of these revolutions have been internally motivated and some inspired and motivated by foreign interests. Regardless of how they came to power, most African revolutionary governments have similar characteristics. Failure to manage these characteristics can result in the government becoming a failed state.

Many of these governments believe that stability and economic growth “will improve” over time. It seldom does.

As these governments tend to be caught up in the moment, they miss the numerous threats and challenges facing them – until it is almost too late.  This failure results in them ultimately being forced to fight several fires on numerous fronts with little if any significant impact.

The lack of substantial visible improvements to their lot is usually viewed by the populace as an inability of the government – or even a lack of interest - to provide them with much needed security and stability.  This is especially prevalent in the early days of a revolutionary government.

It is, however, the characteristics of a revolutionary government that define its initial weaknesses. I view these characteristics and weaknesses as follows:  

1.     An over optimistic view of the future

2.     A belief that the majority of the populace share their visions for the future

3.     A lack of strategic, operational and tactical intelligence

4.     Lack of – or a fractured grand strategy

5.     Lack of – or a fractured national security strategy

6.     Lack of an acceptable Constitution

7.     A weak central government

8.     Fragmented powerbases

9.     Fragmented popular support

10.  Porous borders

11.  A lack of basic services

12.  A breakdown of law and order coupled to an increase in general and organised crime

13.  The uncontrolled flow of weapons

14.  Strong militia groups, each with their own agenda

15.  Disunity of the security forces coupled to questionable loyalty

16.  The polarisation of popular support that can result in assassinations, bombings, protests etc.

17.  A lack of cohesion, communication and cooperation between the security forces

18.  An increase in Internally Displaced People (IDPs)

Left unattended, these characteristics/weaknesses will result in an increase in negative media reporting, both locally and internationally as both the mainstream and social media exploit the situation. This negative perception results in a lack of inward investments, depriving the new government of much needed foreign investment and economic growth. This creates a ripple-effect across the population and often results in the populace becoming poorer than they were before the revolution.

Additionally, this creates the climate for a counter-revolution to be planned and launched by disgruntled militia groups and sectors of the previous regimes supporters. The counter-revolution will often manifest itself through acts of terror such as assassinations, bombings, an increase in violent crime, attacks against the leadership of the security forces and threats against the political and business leadership.

This volatile situation “empowers Salesmen to impersonate Statesmen” (credit to “Lionberger”s comment on my posting “The Specialists”) who simply add fuel to the fire as these salesmen- with no track record of success - dispense their bad advice at great financial and political cost to the government.  Equally unforgivable is the selling of security equipment to these governments that will have little if any use to securing the State.

Until revolutionary governments acknowledge and manage/rectify their weaknesses and find the correct people to advise and assist them, they will remain fragile and position themselves on the cusp of failure.