About Me

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I saw active service in conventional, clandestine and covert units of the South African Defence Force. I was the founder of the Private Military Company (PMC) Executive Outcomes in 1989 and its chairman until I left in 1997. Until its closure in 1998, EO operated primarily in Africa helping African governments that had been abandoned by the West and were facing threats from insurgencies, terrorism and organised crime. EO also operated in South America and the Far East. I believe that only Africans (Black and White) can truly solve Africa’s problems. I was appointed Chairman of STTEP International in 2009 and also lecture at military colleges and universities in Africa on defence, intelligence and security issues. Prior to the STTEP International appointment, I served as an independent politico-military advisor to several African governments. Until recently, I was a contributing editor to The Counter Terrorist magazine. All comments in line with the topics on this blog are welcome. As I consider this to be a serious look at military and security matters, foul language and political or religious debates will not be entertained on this blog.
Showing posts with label SANDF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SANDF. Show all posts

Thursday, October 31, 2013

THANK YOU MILITARY ACADEMY

The Military Academy is an educational training unit of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) that houses the Faculty of Military Science of the University of Stellenbosch. As an institution, it offers undergraduate university education along with Professional Military Development for career-orientated officers.  Having successfully completed their undergraduate studies, the students are awarded a B Mil degree from University of Stellenbosch. 

The Academy, additionally, works at developing the SANDF’s future leaders and plays an important role in preparing and shaping the SANDF’s future leadership corps and equipping them with knowledge and insight to cope in dynamic and complex environments.

I was therefore greatly honoured to be invited by Professors Abel Esterhuyse and Francois Vrey to discuss my thoughts on conflict and war in Africa with the third-year strategy students at the Military Academy. My visit would be a quick one: an early morning flight to Cape Town and a return back to Johannesburg that afternoon.

My friend Mich and his colleague Botha met me on arrival and we had some time to catch up since we last saw one another during the drive to Saldanha.

Having never been to the Academy, it was both an eye-opener and a very enjoyable experience for me. What struck me most was the manner in which I was welcomed and the friendliness of everyone who I met and interacted with.

Having introduced me to his audience – which included not only the strategy students but other members of the Faculty as well as some members of 4 Reconnaissance Regiment - Prof Vrey handed me the floor and I was able to discuss my thoughts on conflict and war in Africa.

 Prof Francois Vrey (right) and I after the discussion

Most encouraging though were the questions asked after my discussion. Even more encouraging was the fact that most if not all members of the audience seem to realise and understand what is truly happening on our continent – and expressed their concerns both during question time and in private. These questions covered a range of topics from EO to current operations and why Africa is experiencing the problems we read about each day.

The comments even extended to the ICC and the question of who was indeed the greatest war criminal of modern times and who was most responsible for the slaughter of innocent civilians – an African warlord or a President who has hidden the slaughter of thousands of innocents under the guise of “collateral damage”.

As a token of thanks, Prof Vrey presented me with a book he and Prof Abel had edited – “On Military Culture”. Printed by UCT Press, the book is a welcome addition to my library.
 
Lunch was taken in the officer’s mess where Professor Very and I were subject to more questions – and some concerns - from the strategy students.

I left the Military Academy with a belief that if the final-year students are a reflection of our future officer corps, we are certainly on the road to improvement. I can but only hope that their new-found knowledge will be sought by others and not been seen as a threat by some senior officers.

My thanks to the Military Academy for giving me the opportunity to speak to the students and the other attending members. It was truly a privilege.

My thanks also to Mich and Botha for getting me there and back in time to catch my flight.

Monday, March 25, 2013

FAILING TO LISTEN


As has become quite usual and an almost daily occurrence, rebel forces throughout central Africa have gained momentum and succeeded in defeating government forces. Often, the government forces appear to be very well trained in running away whilst the rebel forces appear to be better trained, have more cohesion, are better armed and even have better mobility than the government forces.

I am also amazed at how easily - and quickly - governments dismiss intelligence in favour of disinformation. Could it be that they believe the “advice” given them by foreign governments or so-called “subject matter experts” is more credible than that given by people who do actually have “ears on the ground”?

The escalation of tensions in the so-called Great Lakes region is a fine example of governments’ failure to listen. It appears they are advised to adopt the ostrich approach (sticking their heads in the sand and hoping the problem will simply go away) – an approach that is apparently becoming the norm. This approach apparently assures governments that the problem will indeed “go away” if it is simply ignored.

Often these rumours are clustered around other rumours that give credibility to the false sense of security that an interested party is trying to develop. Selected “leaks” to the media result in these rumour-clusters being given more credibility – and this is then fed back to the government as fact “as the media said so”.   

The end-result is that when they finally pull their heads out of the sand, the problem has become a crisis. Those who so generously misadvised at great financial cost have by then long flown the coup. The crisis rapidly escalates into a blood-letting of aggrieved citizens and ill-disciplined troops and the entire system of government collapses.

The culture of failing to listen is partly the result of being fed so much rubbish that it becomes literally impossible for governments to distinguish fact from fiction.

Without naming and shaming governments, we warned four different governments of threats being developed in their countries long before the threats manifested themselves. This intelligence (by the time we advised them, we were no longer giving them simple information) was discarded as rumours, whilst rumours and innuendo that painted a rosy picture were seen a “credible intelligence”. We are still trying to warn another government that a coup is imminent. No doubt they are also being advised it is nothing other than a rumour.

The impact this “intelligence” (rumours, innuendo and false stories) has on the Pillars of State is enormous in that it ultimately alters the perceptions of the populace and leads to a reaction that the governments have often not anticipated. The collapse of the armed forces simply adds to the unanticipated reaction as soldiers and civilians alike join rebel forces and begin a campaign of looting and intimidation.  

Then of course, we have the SANDF’s 2013 misadventure into Central African Republic (CAR). Again, a badly advised government force, ill-trained and totally unprepared for the rebel assault on the government of CAR. Needless to say, this has irreparably tarnished the reputation of the SANDF.

Whereas I mourn the death of every soldier, we must not forget that the SANDF has also been the beneficiary of “free advice” and “free training”. Sadly, this resulted in the Seleka rebel coalition outgunning and out-manoeuvring the SANDF. This confirms that not only was the overall SANDF strategy flawed but that the strategy had its foundation resting on poor intelligence – and no strategy can succeed if it is developed off assumptions and rumours.

Additionally, even the best strategy and operational designs will fail if the armed forces are not trained and equipped to implement the operational plans. Inadequately trained forces with poor leadership simply add fuel to the fire.  

This all goes back to failing to listen to good advice and instead opting for bad advice aimed at disadvantaging the recipient.

As long as governments fail to listen – instead relying on disinformation – this cycle of chaos will continue.