THE ART OF WAR GIFT

As a young officer – and later – I read just about every version of Sun Tzu’s Art of War I could lay my hands on. Resting in my bookcase, I have six different copies and interpretations of this incredible work. The last edition I bought was Sun Tzu’s Art of War by General Tao Hanzhang in 2011.

Now I have seven – and the latest edition is the most special edition I could ever dream of having. Besides, as I said to LP a while back, I am not an e-book type; I love the feel and smell of books. However, the latest addition to my Sun Tzu collection is an incredible piece of art in its own right albeit somewhat very different from those normally found in bookstores. 

My very good friend Raymond Cheung presented me with this version of Sun Tzu’s Art of War over dinner at the Ye Shanghai restaurant on the 26 December 2011 and it is an edition I will treasure for the rest of my life.

Although my photographs can never do justice to this amazing gift, I would nevertheless like to share it with you all.

This version of the Art of War is presented in its own redwood presentation case:

 

Once the presentation case is opened, this is what one finds:

Inside is a bamboo scroll, a stand, a pair of surgical gloves and a magnifying glass with which to read the scroll with as the print is very small. The surgical gloves are included to ensure that sweaty hands do not degrade the writing on the scroll.

When the scroll is removed, it can be placed on its own stand:

The scroll has Sun Tzu’s Art of War in both Chinese and English and can be opened and read at will:

 

Obviously, the print is very fine, hence the magnifying glass.

I look at this incredible gift daily and marvel at the skill it took to produce this edition.

Thank you, Raymond!

DO WE REALLY KNOW OURSELVES?

When Sun Tzu wrote about the need to know both the enemy and yourself, his words held an importance many nowadays seem to simply ignore.

I am extremely fortunate in that I still get to meet many senior military officers from across the world and one thing that strikes me as odd is that very few truly know “themselves”. Of course, they know what training they and their men have had and mostly know how to use it but they are not always fully aware of their capabilities if their real or perceived combat scenario were to change suddenly.

As an ex-soldier, I am fully cognisant of how rapidly we can develop tunnel vision and neglect our abilities to think laterally. Sometimes, we need to think outside the box. At other times, we need to ask...and listen.

Asking appears to be something many of us shy away from lest we be seen as unable to do our tasks. But, when lives are at stake and the choice is either success or failure or victory or defeat, there can be no shame in asking.

By “knowing ourselves”, we should be aware of our weak and strong points. Whereas we seldom want to admit we have weak points, it is too late to come to this realisation when the pressure is on, the lead is flying and we have run out of options. At such a time, pride will be of no value to us.

If we truly know ourselves, we will know our true capabilities. Having had the privilege to serve under one of the best small team commanders in the old SADF, I recall once being loaded with 15 magazines for my AK, a 100-round belt for the PKM, 20 40mm rounds plus the launcher, 2 bunker bombs, the VHF radio as well as the HF radio – along with my food, water and shockpack. With my knees buckling, I made it known that I would be rather useless when we hit contact with the enemy. My commander looked at me and with a smile said that he was very well aware of that but as he knew every man in the team, he knew what they could do. I was the green one and he needed to first find out what I was capable of. It was a lesson I would never forget.

I have also learnt that we should be realistic about what we can and cannot do, what we are capable of and not capable of. It is this “knowing” that prevents us from making unrealistic demands on the men under our command, setting unrealistic expectations or even having unrealistic expectations of our weapons systems.

But this knowing goes further. There are many different ways to solve a problem. Sometimes, we are well prepared by our military schools but more than often the theoretical war does not match the real war. Situations and terrain change rapidly and frequently as does the enemy. There is no standard template-plan that we can simply superimpose on any given military problem. We need to think beyond the box but sometimes even our boxes are small and limited.

Additionally, we need to know the enemy we are facing, his weapon systems and capabilities, his tactics and techniques – and his weak points. We also need to know how and why he fights. Only then can we devise workable strategies and actions to counter and defeat him.

Fortunately, many of the senior officers I meet are keen to get new thoughts and ideas. They want to discuss and dissect previous successful and less successful operations. They pose theoretical scenarios and discuss them. They want to debate the pros and cons of tactics, techniques and procedures. There is a desire to learn and make new “discoveries”. These discoveries of “new methods” breed a deeper understanding and analysis of any given situation. They do not let ego and pride get in their way. Expanding our knowledge of ourselves and our enemy aids in flexibility to situations as well as being able to rapidly adjust to new situations.

(This does of course presuppose that those giving the advice know what they are talking about and are doing so with the intent to help. Sadly, I have come across some advice-givers in Africa who very definitely have alternate agendas).

Often military strategies are devised on guess-work and totally removed from reality. Those who are on the ground must be able to adapt and change to meet the unexpected and still achieve mission-success. What happened to the adage “Time spent on planning is never wasted?”

Like many of my contemporaries, I have seen senior officers held hostage by their pride. Many insurmountable problems could have been solved, had it not been for misguided pride and poor planning. At times such as those, there is a fine line between pride and stupidity.

Whether it is pride or just plain stupidity and arrogance to underestimate the enemy, the terrain, and overestimate our abilities and so forth is in this context irrelevant. The fact is that sometimes we don’t really know ourselves and we end up tripping ourselves – and giving the enemy an advantage he will exploit.

JUST HOW EFFECTIVE ARE COMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS?

Communications operations are conducted at two distinct yet inter-related levels: The strategic level and the tactical level.

At the strategic level, Strategic Communications Operations (SCOs) or STRATCOM, also referred to as Strategic Information Operations, is nothing new in the “war of words” to discredit, demoralise and/or disrupt an opponent and boost the morale of the citizens and own forces. It can even be used to turn a legitimate organisation into an illegitimate organisation. But, the converse is also true: it can turn an illegitimate action into a legitimate action.

At this level, these operations entail more than simple rumour-mongering. They are used to give a government or a force an advantage in their fight against a real or perceived enemy. But they ought to include white, grey and black propaganda in such a manner that the receiver (reader, listener or watcher) at a minimum becomes aware of the message and at best, believes it.

In South Africa, and indeed in Africa, we witness the use of SCOs or propaganda warfare on a daily basis – as well as its effects. Some of it is actually quite good. Some of it is rather pathetic. But, despite my opinion of it, it still reaches many people out there and ultimately, it is the people who decide on how this will influence their lives – or react to it.

The result of all of this is, when comparing the West to the East, is that the US’s AFRICOM is now seen by many in Africa as a wolf in a sheep’s clothing and the Chinese as a sheep in a wolf’s clothing. That in itself shows the effect of these types of operations. It also shows how these types of operations can backfire on the originators.

Truth be told, these operations are financially very expensive. As an example, the US military has spent in excess of US$ 1 billion the past three years in Iraq and Afghanistan alone in trying to counter its enemies there. The result of these operations remains debateable.

Just as warfare has certain primary and dynamic principles, so too do SCO’s have primary and dynamic principles.

The first principle is, in fact, something Sun Tzu penned more than two and a half thousand years ago:

“Know your enemy, know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”

To succeed with any SCO, an intimate knowledge of the enemy or target group is required. If this is knowledge is not present, any hoped for success will remain that – hoped for.

Knowing the “enemy” – or the target audience – will determine such basics as what language the message needs to be transmitted in. Paid-for news articles, advertisements, billboards, radio and television programmes, and even polls and pressure groups need to promote their messages in a language that everyone (or at least the vast majority) will understand. But, language is not the only criterion that is of great importance: culture, beliefs, level of education and so forth all determine how the message should be packaged in order to achieve maximum success.

I am reminded of a foreign company that wrote to me claiming they had a contract to “do Africa” and asked if I could recommend someone who spoke “African”. This is a basic example of how misinformed many are. When these companies get involved in SCOs, the end-result can only be terrifying at best.

The second principle of these types of operations is centralised control. Without centralised control, everyone will be developing and preparing their own uncoordinated messages and subsequently, these messages will clash with one another and render the entire operation a waste of time and money. They will also show that they are simply part of a (poorly) planned operation and therefore lose any potential value they may have had.

How the information will be packaged is likewise very important. The best message, poorly packaged will be poorly received. Incorrect packaging of the message serves no purpose if it will never reach the intended audience or target, let alone achieve the desired effect.

Furthermore, pro-active planning is critical in achieving success. In order to gain the initiative and maintain it, plans need to be formulated well in advance and those plans must be based on intelligence (reality) and not on perceived reality.

SCOs can also used to negate High-Value Targets (HVTs) or turn their followers against them. Again, detailed intelligence, coordination of effort, packaging and pro-active planning is critical to success.

At the tactical level, these operations used to be known as Communications Operations or COMOPS. At this level, the aim is to meet and discuss issues of mutual importance with the village elders and provide much needed assistance and support to the villagers in the Area of Responsibility. In essence, this is the “hearts-and-minds” war and many a young South African soldier can testify in having partaken in such operations.

It is here that, should any semblance of success be wished for, the tribal customs, beliefs and traditions be known, understood and applied by those conducting the COMOPS. It is at this level that vital information and intelligence is gathered and the support of the local population is either won or lost. If the battle is lost at this level, the gunfights that follow will bring about nothing but a hollow victory.

Those that plan these operations, especially at the strategic level, have so much technology at hand – mobile phones, blogs, social networks and so forth – that they have no excuse for their poor performance.

But looking at what is going on around me, I have to ask if these operations are successful. They present a golden opportunity to the user if correctly planned, packaged and executed but when they are haphazardly implemented, they cause more damage than good.

THE NEUTRALISATION OF HIGH-VALUE TARGETS

When Sun Tzu wrote “The supreme act of war is to subdue the enemy without a fight” approximately 25 centuries ago, did he see the neutralisation or targeted killings of key enemy personnel as part of the subduing process?

Then again, I have always wondered why is it that when a politician or a prominent person (read “High-Value Target” or HVT) is the subject of a targeted killing, it is known as an “assassination”? Yet, when some lesser mortal meets his or her end, it is a murder. Unless of course, it happens on the battlefield – then he or she is simply “killed”.

The January 2010 targeted killing of a senior Hamas military commander in Dubai has certainly brought the debate on assassinations to the fore. This action to neutralise an enemy of a state is nothing new. In fact, governments through their intelligence agencies the world over have made use of - and still make use of - targeted killings as a method of eliminating enemies of supposed high-value. (Personally, I believe the intelligence agencies ought to be confined purely to the collection of the critical information and not the actual neutralisation if it involves a targeted killing).

Assassination of enemy leaders and commanders is not the only method of eliminating them. It is however the one method that causes the most media interest and speculation. If correctly planned and executed, it remains a highly effective action. When these targeted killings disrupt or impact in part on the enemy’s Centre of Gravity (CoG) they become even more effective.

But, ought these direct-action, covert or clandestine actions to be used purely for military and political purposes or do they also hold value in countering serious and violent organised crime? I believe they do. But as long as we attribute “rights” to these organised crime syndicates – who attribute no rights to their victims – this will probably never happen.

There are essentially two methods of neutralising a high-value target. These are:

1. Removing the target from society
2. Getting society to remove the target.

The first method includes actions such as assassinations, target-specific drone attacks, snatch operations with the aim of interrogating and imprisoning and so forth. This direct approach against the target requires a high level of intelligence gathering and planning. There are many instances where intelligence and planning has failed miserably but there are numerous other instances where it has succeeded. It is, however, the actions that fail that evoke the most interest and speculation. Those that are successful pass almost unnoticed.

The second method utilises an indirect approach and includes grey and black propaganda aimed at discrediting the target or arousing suspicions against him or her. These suspicions, managed correctly, can lead to society taking the desired action and thereby neutralising the target. Here too intelligence and planning play a critical role in order to allow society to be manipulated to take the desired action(s) against the target.

These actions should be conducted in support of national strategic and military operational objectives. By implication they are intelligence driven but are determined at political level and executed at operator level. It is at the level of policy that problems such as inter-service delineation and medium to long-term consequences are assessed and confirmed.

Failure can also be attributed to undue political pressure and the failure to anticipate the consequences when things go wrong, poor inter-service relations and poor operational execution. Compromise – the result of poor or non-existent security - which leads to failure, can have far-reaching political implications thus rendering the ultimate outcome a failure – despite the fact that operationally, the action may have succeeded. Likewise, unnecessary collateral damage can render an operationally successful operation a strategic failure.

Many questions arise when a targeted killing is conducted. There are those who question the morality of such actions and others who call on international legal matters to be instituted against the country perpetrating the deed. For some reason, these same voices never seem to be raised when the enemy conducts these actions.

Numerous considerations ought to be appreciated when planning a neutralisation of a specific target. Apart from the “who”, “by when”, “how” and “where”, the following are but some of the critical considerations:

1. Will he or she become a martyr and result in his/her memory being used as a rallying point?
2. Will the person who will take the target’s place be a moderate or a hard-liner?
3. What are the medium and long-term consequences of success/failure?
4. Will the resultant fall-out (political, economical, militarily, etc) be acceptable?
5. What level of collateral damage will be acceptable?
6. To what extent will a non-violent neutralisation allow the political and operational objectives to be met?

The fact of the matter is that neutralisation must take place at an early stage of the threat being identified. If the target is allowed to establish his/her authority and leadership to such an extent that they are seen as the “father” or rallying point of a movement or force, their neutralisation may increase the motivation of the movement or force. To prevent this, it is necessary for:

1. Sound intelligence at early stages of identification to answer the above considerations
2. Decisive government decision-making to respond rapidly and significantly to a developing threat
3. Rapid and decisive action to prevent future manpower, economical and political costs to escalate in order to neutralise or eliminate the target.

The neutralisation of HVTs has a definite place in the modern combat area, especially when it comes to combating insurgencies and organised crime syndicates/cartels. But a lack of decision making at the political level and inter-service bickering often result in no action. It is the lack of action, both direct and indirect, that allows the target to become a HVT, especially when the media manipulates the truth and gives media coverage thus adding to the supposed credibility of the target – and by then any action is often too little, too late.