BOOSTING THE PLATOON’S FIREPOWER WITH THE HUNTER MGP/MFT

Coming up against a well-entrenched or well-defended enemy position, and not always having air support available, the motorised infantry platoon can find itself in a difficult and vulnerable position. This position is made even more difficult if the enemy is operating out of a fortified village or old buildings and the infantry platoon has to attack without much cover.

Although the platoon does have its inherent machine guns down to section level, these weapons are often not able to engage the enemy at range or provide sustained fire support during an assault. Given the weight of both gun and ammunition, the machine gunner is also restricted in when and how he can use his machinegun.

In open terrain, the motorised infantryman is given some protection against enemy fire in the MRAP but the situation is compounded when he has to debus to assault an objective. However, with sparse cover, it is difficult at best to manoeuvre in the open whilst under fire.

This operational disadvantage can be overcome using a Mobile Gun Platform (MGP) or Mobile Fire Team (MFT) such as the OTT-designed and built “Hunter”, classified as a Light Strike Vehicle (LSV) by the manufacturer. (www.ott.co.za)

The Hunter is a true MGP/MFT, designed and built to operate over very rough and rugged terrain in dry, sparse areas.


Capable of delivering massive sustained firepower against enemy positions, the Hunter is perfectly suited to the conduct of numerous counter insurgency missions such as fire support, follow-up operations, suppressing fire during assaults, casualty extraction, reconnaissance, raids, ambushes, base protection, border patrols and so forth.

Its role during conventional operations as a raiding vehicle is equally formidable.

As a MGP/MFT the Hunter can, depending on the mission, be armed with:

1. A 20mm rapid-fire cannon or a 14,5mm HMG
2. 2 x 12,7mm HMGs
3. 2 x PKM machineguns

Any weapon system can be removed and replaced with alternate weapon systems such as the AGS-17 MGL. The vehicle can also be fitted with grenade launchers, giving it the ability to produce a smoke screen.

Although some doctrinal issues are still being worked on, there will be between 6 and 8 MGPs/MFTs attached to each motorised infantry company. This will, depending on the mission, allow the company commander to detach 2 MGPs/MFTs to each platoon and still maintain a reserve for deployment elsewhere.


The Hunter gives the company the following advantages:

1. Mobility across rugged terrain
2. Increased firepower
3. Flexibility
4. Rapid deployment
5. Manoeuvrability
6. Night fighting ability

With a maximum gradient of 60 degrees and a sustained road speed of between 70 and 80 km/h, the Hunter will be able to maintain its position in an MRAP deployment. It also has an off-road operating range of approx 500kms (with an additional 120 km with Jerry cans).

A command post vehicle is currently under development.

This MGP/MFT will be a very welcome addition to any offensive/defensive motorised infantry task.

DO WE REALLY KNOW OURSELVES?

When Sun Tzu wrote about the need to know both the enemy and yourself, his words held an importance many nowadays seem to simply ignore.

I am extremely fortunate in that I still get to meet many senior military officers from across the world and one thing that strikes me as odd is that very few truly know “themselves”. Of course, they know what training they and their men have had and mostly know how to use it but they are not always fully aware of their capabilities if their real or perceived combat scenario were to change suddenly.

As an ex-soldier, I am fully cognisant of how rapidly we can develop tunnel vision and neglect our abilities to think laterally. Sometimes, we need to think outside the box. At other times, we need to ask...and listen.

Asking appears to be something many of us shy away from lest we be seen as unable to do our tasks. But, when lives are at stake and the choice is either success or failure or victory or defeat, there can be no shame in asking.

By “knowing ourselves”, we should be aware of our weak and strong points. Whereas we seldom want to admit we have weak points, it is too late to come to this realisation when the pressure is on, the lead is flying and we have run out of options. At such a time, pride will be of no value to us.

If we truly know ourselves, we will know our true capabilities. Having had the privilege to serve under one of the best small team commanders in the old SADF, I recall once being loaded with 15 magazines for my AK, a 100-round belt for the PKM, 20 40mm rounds plus the launcher, 2 bunker bombs, the VHF radio as well as the HF radio – along with my food, water and shockpack. With my knees buckling, I made it known that I would be rather useless when we hit contact with the enemy. My commander looked at me and with a smile said that he was very well aware of that but as he knew every man in the team, he knew what they could do. I was the green one and he needed to first find out what I was capable of. It was a lesson I would never forget.

I have also learnt that we should be realistic about what we can and cannot do, what we are capable of and not capable of. It is this “knowing” that prevents us from making unrealistic demands on the men under our command, setting unrealistic expectations or even having unrealistic expectations of our weapons systems.

But this knowing goes further. There are many different ways to solve a problem. Sometimes, we are well prepared by our military schools but more than often the theoretical war does not match the real war. Situations and terrain change rapidly and frequently as does the enemy. There is no standard template-plan that we can simply superimpose on any given military problem. We need to think beyond the box but sometimes even our boxes are small and limited.

Additionally, we need to know the enemy we are facing, his weapon systems and capabilities, his tactics and techniques – and his weak points. We also need to know how and why he fights. Only then can we devise workable strategies and actions to counter and defeat him.

Fortunately, many of the senior officers I meet are keen to get new thoughts and ideas. They want to discuss and dissect previous successful and less successful operations. They pose theoretical scenarios and discuss them. They want to debate the pros and cons of tactics, techniques and procedures. There is a desire to learn and make new “discoveries”. These discoveries of “new methods” breed a deeper understanding and analysis of any given situation. They do not let ego and pride get in their way. Expanding our knowledge of ourselves and our enemy aids in flexibility to situations as well as being able to rapidly adjust to new situations.

(This does of course presuppose that those giving the advice know what they are talking about and are doing so with the intent to help. Sadly, I have come across some advice-givers in Africa who very definitely have alternate agendas).

Often military strategies are devised on guess-work and totally removed from reality. Those who are on the ground must be able to adapt and change to meet the unexpected and still achieve mission-success. What happened to the adage “Time spent on planning is never wasted?”

Like many of my contemporaries, I have seen senior officers held hostage by their pride. Many insurmountable problems could have been solved, had it not been for misguided pride and poor planning. At times such as those, there is a fine line between pride and stupidity.

Whether it is pride or just plain stupidity and arrogance to underestimate the enemy, the terrain, and overestimate our abilities and so forth is in this context irrelevant. The fact is that sometimes we don’t really know ourselves and we end up tripping ourselves – and giving the enemy an advantage he will exploit.

IT IS TIME TO HUNT THE RHINO POACHERS

To many, this posting may not have much to do with my core focus but there are many things that get my blood boiling: Abuse of kids and the elderly, murder, armed robbery, unacceptably high violent crime levels, the ruthless exploitation of Africa and poaching...

Of late, there has been an alarming rise in poaching in South Africa, especially rhino poaching. Indeed, the black-market demand for rhino horn has led to concerns that the current rate of killings will soon outstrip the births of rhino.

In Asia, the rhino horn is famed for its so-called medicinal powers and the demand keeps growing. This demand has, in turn, pushed up the price of the rhino horn making it a highly valued commodity and the rhino a method of making money quickly. The national game parks and smaller game reserves are all targets at present – and usually easy targets at that.

As South Africa is considered to be the last stronghold of a viable rhino population in Africa, this has made the country a prime target for this despicable poaching. According to the International Rhino Foundation, South Africa has already lost more than 31 rhinos to poachers this year.

The situation has become so bad that recent reports stated that the poachers were now even using helicopters to deploy their shooters. If this is not a cause for concern, then nothing is.

Gone are the days of the past where these poachers used home-made weapons. Nowadays, the poaching of rhinos is controlled by highly organised crime syndicates who use high-powered rifles, veterinary drugs, night vision equipment, helicopters, body armour and trackers to hunt their unsuspecting prey.

At last some action is being taken. A local radio station (www.jacarandafm.com) has put their money where their mouth is and began a campaign to generate awareness of the siege the rhinos are under as well as to collect funds towards stopping this crime.

A website to generate further understanding (www.stoprhinopoaching.com) was also created to raise awareness of the rhino’s plight as lately we are losing about a rhino a day to these murderous scum. In conjunction with Radio Jacaranda, the local radio station, a special 12-hour “rhinothon” was launched on 10 September to generate funds from the public who wish to get involved in stopping this.

Whereas all of these initiatives are a step in the right direction, it is shocking to learn that rhino poachers who are caught in the act, are merely allowed out of custody on bail. Five of them recently caught in the act, were given bail of a mere SA Rands 10 000 (approx US$ 1350). Looking at history, it is unlikely that they will turn up on the day of their hearing. Instead they will most probably merely “disappear” and continue with their poaching elsewhere. These particular scumbags have already been linked to 8 more cases of rhino poaching in an area known as Makhado. With that type of legal action, the poachers remain the winners.

There is a time for everything and the time is long past to start hunting the poachers and giving them no mercy when finding them. If they are allowed to continue with their actions, South Africa will no longer be home to the Big Five – instead we will only have the Big Four. That sad day is coming if drastic action is not taken.

I, like many of my like-minded friends, would have no compunction in hunting and taking armed action against these criminals and their paymasters.

Although systems are being put in place to prevent the poaching of rhino, it remains to be seen just how effective they will be.

However, if aggressive action is taken, relentless follow-up operations conducted and directed fire aimed at them, I am sure that any rhino poachers will think twice before carry out their orders.

If we turn the hunter into the hunted, the rhino horn will soon lose its lustre and we will be able to save these magnificent creatures.

THE DANGER OF CREATING (MIS)PERCEPTIONS

An exit strategy can only be effectively implemented if an operation has been successfully executed.

In turn, an operation can only be considered successful if:

• All planned operational objectives have been met or surpassed
• The enemy’s trinity of gravity has been destroyed (not merely disrupted in the short-term)
• The enemy has lost the will to fight
• The enemy is forced to negotiate from a point of weakness.

The exit strategy is, of course, always part of the overall strategy (or should be) and is indeed, from a military point-of-view, implemented upon the successful conclusion of combat operations. It is therefore usually the final phase of the military strategy. Thereafter follows the continuation of the political strategy aimed at ensuring stable governance, political advancement and so forth.

Military operations that are undertaken without an exit strategy are nothing other than poorly planned military operations as all operations have a beginning and an end. Similarly, all combat operations have a beginning and an end, whether it is a patrol, an attack or a retrograde operation.

When strategists run out of options and hurriedly discuss force level “draw-downs” and “troop surges” it becomes apparent that the strategy was both incomplete and flawed from the very beginning. Had there been a comprehensive sound strategy to begin with, these types of comments would not have been necessary.

The problem is, in my opinion, amplified when it is coupled to an uncoordinated, poorly-planned media strategy. By exclaiming the surges and draw-downs before the successful conclusion of military operations, we add value to and boost the enemy’s propaganda efforts. We both trumpet to the enemy that we planned badly and need more troops or actually tell the enemy that we are unable to sustain our combat operations and therefore need to withdraw.

Either way we bolster enemy morale and embolden their commanders who in turn become even more daring in their actions as we have presented them with additional options. This impact on own forces morale needs no explaining, this apart from having fewer troops in theatre to deal with the enemy.

Had we initially planned in depth and ensured our strategy was intelligence driven, these actions would simply happen without unnecessary fanfare and in the process, may even catch the enemy off guard.

But an additional danger we create for ourselves is alienating those members of the local population who remained neutral and did not actively support the enemy. The local population’s desire to survive, despite all the hardships they may face, will encourage them to, if not actively, then at least covertly, begin to side with and support the enemy. This survivalist approach to supporting the enemy, who thanks to our poor plans, may begin with providing snippets of information and can escalate to assisting in areas such as logistics, communications, early warning and so forth. It can even boost enemy recruitment efforts. This switch of support alters our operational landscape drastically.

In short, whether true or not, we actually tell the enemy that he has won the fight. Again, the psychological impact needs no explaining. Bolstered by what he perceives to be our defeat, the enemy will begin to take control of the local population, especially in areas not extensively patrolled, thus adding to the environmental hostility our troops must operate in.

On the homefront, these perceptions may initially be well received but at their heart lays a certain amount of expectation that, if not met, creates the belief that a deception has taken place. This can lead to anger and pressure to withdraw our forces, even if it implies a withdrawal without much honour.

Conversely, by creating these perceptions, real or imagined, it seems little thought is given to the negative influence this may have on our own operations and how these perceptions may endanger our troops.

I believe this is irresponsible and nothing short of madness.

WHY ARE WE ALWAYS SO REACTIVE?

In a world of war and conflict, why is it that we continue to be so reactive?

Is it because we do not develop decent, workable strategies based on sound, credible intelligence? Is it because we continually want to believe that “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” – even when he isn’t? Is it that we lack the ability to interpret events to the extent that we cannot be forward-looking? Is it because we simply want to ignore the lessons of history?

Whereas we cannot predict the future, we can – with some effort – have a very good indication what it may hold in terms of war and conflict.

The wars, conflicts and problems we witness were all prefaced with numerous indications that they were about to happen. From the piracy off the coast of Somalia to the drug wars in Mexico to the criminal insurgencies in other countries – all have provided us with clues that a problem was rapidly approaching.

Yet, we seem to stand by and wait until the problem reaches a situation that it cannot easily be contained – and then we try to take action. Ironically, we then cannot understand why it is so difficult to resolve the issues, win the wars and end the conflicts. A 10-ton truck free-wheeling downhill cannot be stopped by simply jumping into its path. With enough men at hand, we can probably stop it but at an enormous cost in lives lost and collateral fall-out.

By allowing the enemy to gain momentum and maintain the initiative, we lose the ability to put a rapid end to it. Our reactive actions are almost akin to trying to stop that free-wheeling truck. And despite all the warnings, we act surprised when we are unable to stop it.

Some time ago I spoke with a senior commander in an African country. His country had recently discovered a valuable natural resource. He was very excited at how this resource would benefit his country and his people. I, in turn, warned him that his country’s problems were about to start in earnest. I wasn’t being cynical – I was being realistic. After all, hasn’t history shown that when a new resource is found in Africa, problems are sure to follow?

With all of our early-warning systems, intelligence gathering capabilities, diplomatic liaisons, mass media reporting, satellite surveillance and so forth, I find it very hard to believe that we have not yet reached a stage where we can be proactive.

Is it possibly that we simply don’t want to be proactive and instead prefer to rather be reactive and suffer all the disadvantages this laissez-faire approach hands us? Do we rather want to attempt to stop these problems once they are unstoppable – will that make us feel better? Or do we only want to be pre-emptive when carrying out the first phase of a strategy and thereafter wait for the enemy to gain the initiative?

It is said that a wise man in times of peace prepares for war.

To prepare effectively for war, we need to know what to expect and from whom. Still, we seem to wait and react only once we think the enemy has shown his hand. But the enemy too knows about deception and it is a foolish enemy who shows his hand in the opening stages of a conflict. We cannot expect all of our enemies to always be foolish.

If we continue to miss all of the warning signals flashed at us, we will continue to be reactive. The implication is that we will continue to be surprised, unprepared and find ourselves fighting on the back foot – often against untrained, ill-disciplined, out-numbered and technology-poor enemies.

Until such time as we begin to exploit our assets and resources to maximum effect and look for exploitation options whenever and wherever we can, we will remain at a disadvantage both on and off the battlefield.

We may appear to be politically correct but we will lose the battle – and there is no second prize for the loser - and the truck will keep rolling.

LEAVING THE SHORE BUT MISSING THE BOAT

When the political leadership commits the armed forces to a conflict or a war, one would assume that the “homework” was done ... and that the scope of the mission would not be misleading. Once the political commitment has been made, the military’s primary mission is to end the conflict or war as quickly as possible – not to change its mission before it has achieved its aim.

It is, therefore, with great interest that I have been reading numerous articles and blog postings on recent conflicts and wars, especially those relating to Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN Ops). What strikes me as odd is that there are some authors who regard these types of operations as “new” and who, in turn, are calling for a “new” approach and doctrine to combating an insurgency – an approach that assumes the primary role of the military is to “build the nation”.

Insurgencies are not a new military phenomenon and they are common-place in Africa. Revolt against the constituted authority is often encountered by people who wish to replace the government with one of their own and for reasons of their own.

Most of the African insurgencies are – or have been - associated with megalomaniacs who want nothing but total power ie, Savimbi, Kony, Mugabe, Sankoh, Taylor and others. These “leaders” will stop at nothing to achieve their aims and, once in power, will do everything possible to cling to power. Their primary weapon becomes terror against the local population in order to force their support – or subdue them. This can include murder, rape, torture, kidnapping of children, plunder and so forth.

Insurgencies are also launched by proxy forces to further the aims and ambitions of one government against another. This gives a level of deniability and ensures that political aims are furthered without committing government forces to the conflict or war. Africa has numerous examples of proxy forces – usually supported by foreign powers - engaged in such conflicts and wars.

Nation building and ceasefires will not end these conflicts. They never have and they never will. Nor will negotiation achieve anything much apart from gaining time, unless done from a position of complete strength.

The armed forces are there to conduct military operations, operations that will involve killing those that are trying to destabilise the government and terrorise the local population with armed force. Once committed to the conflict or war, the political leadership should do everything possible to support their armed forces – and accept that killing will take place. For politicians to change the military’s mission mid-stride shows a lack of certainty, poor political planning and a lack of honesty, political leadership and direction.

Ironically, when the troops accomplish their mission with aggression, they are condemned by the very politicians who sent them there and they are tried and found guilty in the media. Have those that are so quick to point fingers not realised that “war” is synonymous with death, killing and destruction?

Committing the armed forces to a conflict implies that there will be casualties. It implies that the armed forces must kill or capture the enemy and break its ability to continue the conflict or war. It also implies that there will be civilians caught up in the conflict. Whereas collateral damage is to be minimised at all costs at all times, the reality is that it is sometimes unavoidable.

The attempts by the political masters to develop new theories of war based mainly on a lack of understanding and experience results in poor strategies, fraught with political interference and unworkable RoE. This problem is amplified when these so-called plans are hatched with little or no intelligence or when the political masters hint that the enemy will be rapidly overcome once hostilities commence. It seems as though some senior officers are only too happy to accept the constraints placed on their forces – and exacerbate the misleading beliefs on the enemy - in order to protect their military careers and further their own political ambitions. The greatest danger to the armed forces is when the military leadership wants to play politics, build nations and call for ceasefires – and forget to give military leadership to their men.

Conversely, the enemy has one but one aim: take power by inflicting the maximum casualties to the armed forces and use the media to give them the publicity they need. The enemy knows this will, additionally, lead to a weakening of resolve and morale on the homefront.

The actions and tactics the insurgents carry out will be aimed at preventing direct contact with the military whilst ensuring maximum attrition of the armed forces – and coercing the local population. To achieve this, use will be made of sabotage actions, ambushes, raids, pseudo-operations, landmines, stand-off mortar bombardments, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), torture, kidnappings, terror and so forth.

The armed forces may recruit members of the local population to assist them in countering the insurgency and to act as not only soldiers but as guides, interpreters, trackers and so on. However, a lack of sophistication by the COIN forces’ approach to the local society and its culture, traditions, religion and so forth will present an ideal opportunity for exploitation by the insurgent forces. Furthermore, poor vetting practices will allow insurgents into the ranks of the COIN forces, biding their time to strike from within thus furthering effecting morale and increasing distrust.

If politicians lack the intelligence necessary to formulate their plans and the political will to see the end of what they have committed to, deny the troops the equipment needed to accomplish their mission(s) and continually interfere with military missions and military strategy, true military success will be a very difficult to achieve. But even this hard slog will have been in vain if the political backbone and integrity is missing.

THE COUNTER TERRORIST MAGAZINE

Published by Security Solutions International (SSI), the Counter Terrorist magazine is the Official Journal of the Homeland Security Professional. SSI also publishes the Counter Terrorist Newsletter in addition to hosting Webinars, interactive learning and the annual Homeland Security Professionals Conference – the central event in the First Responder calendar.



Some months ago, I was approached by Chris Graham – the editor of the Counter Terrorist magazine - and asked if I would be willing to contribute an article or two to the magazine. I am honoured to have written two articles for this magazine. The first article, titled “UN Peacekeeping operations in Africa” appeared in the February/March issue of the magazine and the second article, titled “The Pirates of East Africa” is in this month’s issue (August/September 2010).

All credit must however go to Chris who guided me through the pieces and did an excellent job editing them.

The Counter Terrorist magazine strives to provide impartial and in-depth coverage of subject matter relating to terrorism and counter terrorism. This includes subjects and analysis on issues such as:

1. Catch and Release: Terrorist Recidivism
2. Profile of a Large, Violent, Hierarchical Trans-National Gang Operating Across the USA
3. Piracy and Counter Piracy Operations
4. Unmanned Surveillance Platforms for Domestic Use and so on.

To those who are interested in the so-called asymmetrical approach to warfare, this is an excellent magazine to subscribe to.

The Counter Terrorist magazine can be found on www.thecounterterroristmag.com

Those who are facebook users can also get a look at the August/September issue by visiting http://www.facebook.com/SSINEWS