Someone recently sent me a link to a discussion being held on the pros and cons of MRAPs in combat theatres.
Whereas everyone partaking contributed valuable input into the mentioned debate, it seems to me that we may have lost the plot along the way.
The MRAP (along with the older MPV) was designed and built to deliver troops to an area in relative safety from landmines and IEDs. This required the MRAPs/MPVs to have a very good cross-country ability and thereby prevent the troops from being road-bound at all times. Additionally, sappers were used to clear the roads of mines/IEDs.
The MRAP/MPV was not developed as a wheeled safety cocoon from which the troops had to fight. It was meant to be a method of delivery to a starting point for aggressive combat patrolling but it gave some protection to the troops enroute to the starting point. The standard ambush drills were very effective if coming under fire enroute to the delivery point as they allowed the troops to immediately retaliate with fire – and debus as soon as possible and fight from the ground.
The MPVs were armed with 7, 62 mm Browning MGs in order to give fire support to the dismounted infantry – not to lead the fight or hold ground. This basic principle of deployment remains as applicable today as it was in years gone by.
Wars and conflicts are won by men on the ground, implementing sound strategies with good tactics and taking the fight to the enemy. Wars have not, and will never been won by “dominating” the roads and ignoring the rest of the terrain.
Given the firepower we have allowed the enemy to amass, and the lessons we have taught him (I think it was Napoleon who said: Never fight a single enemy for too long as you will teach him all you know) we need to be able to deliver troops relatively safely and fresh to a starting point for operations.
I recall that in the old-SADF we never had the air mobility we needed to deliver a large number of troops to a specific point to commence with area operations – hence our reliance on vehicles. In this process we learnt the following:
1. MPVs/MRAPs must be standardised to allow for ease of logistical support
2. MPVs/MRAPs must be simple to maintain and operate
3. Stay off the roads where possible
4. When bound to roads, clear the roads ahead of the vehicles
5. Dismounted infantry protection teams for the sappers are responsible for locating enemy ambush positions, trip wires, electrical cables, indications of enemy movement and so forth
6. The MPV/MRAP is a delivery system and not a fighting vehicle
7. Dismount and clear defiles before passing through them
8. Avoid routine
9. Follow immediate actions drills immediately and correctly
10. Good drivers are essential
A sound doctrine for the role of the MPVs/MRAPs is essential. There are immediate action drills in case of a landmine or IED and when coming into contact with the enemy. It was these very basic drills that saved my sappers and I when we got hit by a hefty landmine in 1980. Had we not been in an MPV, we would have all been killed. Had we not followed our drills, the casualties could have been rather heavy.
The MPVs/MRAPs were never designed to be infantry fighting vehicles. They were not built to dominate terrain – that is the task of infantry – on foot. Nor were they designed as a substitute for mechanised infantry fighting vehicles. That was not their role then and it is still not their role.
Personally, I believe that most modern MRAPs are over-designed, too heavy, too complicated to maintain and have lost the edge they ought to give the infantry. Likewise, the infantry are to blame for using these vehicles for roles they were never designed for.
I also believe that the MPV/MRAP is an ideal vehicle for motorised infantry, especially in COIN operations. However, its role in conventional warfare operations can, if used correctly and within the doctrine, prove to be invaluable.
A good driver can “idle” the vehicle cross-country and get to within 15 meters of the enemy before they are even aware that it is there. By then, the infantry have long debussed and formed into an assault line with the MPV acting as a mobile fire support base. If we could do that in the 1980s, there is no reason why it cannot be done today.
I am sure the debate about MPVs/MRAPs will continue for years to come but we need to define its role, develop the doctrine for operational deployment and make sure we abide by it. If we do this, the MPV/MRAP will do what it was meant to do: save lives and reduce casualties. Furthermore, it will remain an essential vehicle able to save lives especially in areas where landmines and IEDs are used.
However, if we continue to view the MPV/MRAP as an infantry fighting vehicle and keep to the roads with a predictable routine, we surrender any advantage it can give us.
Showing posts with label MRAPs. Show all posts
Showing posts with label MRAPs. Show all posts
Monday, November 22, 2010
Wednesday, October 6, 2010
BOOSTING THE PLATOON’S FIREPOWER WITH THE HUNTER MGP/MFT
Coming up against a well-entrenched or well-defended enemy position, and not always having air support available, the motorised infantry platoon can find itself in a difficult and vulnerable position. This position is made even more difficult if the enemy is operating out of a fortified village or old buildings and the infantry platoon has to attack without much cover.
Although the platoon does have its inherent machine guns down to section level, these weapons are often not able to engage the enemy at range or provide sustained fire support during an assault. Given the weight of both gun and ammunition, the machine gunner is also restricted in when and how he can use his machinegun.
In open terrain, the motorised infantryman is given some protection against enemy fire in the MRAP but the situation is compounded when he has to debus to assault an objective. However, with sparse cover, it is difficult at best to manoeuvre in the open whilst under fire.
This operational disadvantage can be overcome using a Mobile Gun Platform (MGP) or Mobile Fire Team (MFT) such as the OTT-designed and built “Hunter”, classified as a Light Strike Vehicle (LSV) by the manufacturer. (www.ott.co.za)
The Hunter is a true MGP/MFT, designed and built to operate over very rough and rugged terrain in dry, sparse areas.
Capable of delivering massive sustained firepower against enemy positions, the Hunter is perfectly suited to the conduct of numerous counter insurgency missions such as fire support, follow-up operations, suppressing fire during assaults, casualty extraction, reconnaissance, raids, ambushes, base protection, border patrols and so forth.
Its role during conventional operations as a raiding vehicle is equally formidable.
As a MGP/MFT the Hunter can, depending on the mission, be armed with:
1. A 20mm rapid-fire cannon or a 14,5mm HMG
2. 2 x 12,7mm HMGs
3. 2 x PKM machineguns
Any weapon system can be removed and replaced with alternate weapon systems such as the AGS-17 MGL. The vehicle can also be fitted with grenade launchers, giving it the ability to produce a smoke screen.
Although some doctrinal issues are still being worked on, there will be between 6 and 8 MGPs/MFTs attached to each motorised infantry company. This will, depending on the mission, allow the company commander to detach 2 MGPs/MFTs to each platoon and still maintain a reserve for deployment elsewhere.
The Hunter gives the company the following advantages:
1. Mobility across rugged terrain
2. Increased firepower
3. Flexibility
4. Rapid deployment
5. Manoeuvrability
6. Night fighting ability
With a maximum gradient of 60 degrees and a sustained road speed of between 70 and 80 km/h, the Hunter will be able to maintain its position in an MRAP deployment. It also has an off-road operating range of approx 500kms (with an additional 120 km with Jerry cans).
A command post vehicle is currently under development.
This MGP/MFT will be a very welcome addition to any offensive/defensive motorised infantry task.
Although the platoon does have its inherent machine guns down to section level, these weapons are often not able to engage the enemy at range or provide sustained fire support during an assault. Given the weight of both gun and ammunition, the machine gunner is also restricted in when and how he can use his machinegun.
In open terrain, the motorised infantryman is given some protection against enemy fire in the MRAP but the situation is compounded when he has to debus to assault an objective. However, with sparse cover, it is difficult at best to manoeuvre in the open whilst under fire.
This operational disadvantage can be overcome using a Mobile Gun Platform (MGP) or Mobile Fire Team (MFT) such as the OTT-designed and built “Hunter”, classified as a Light Strike Vehicle (LSV) by the manufacturer. (www.ott.co.za)
The Hunter is a true MGP/MFT, designed and built to operate over very rough and rugged terrain in dry, sparse areas.
Capable of delivering massive sustained firepower against enemy positions, the Hunter is perfectly suited to the conduct of numerous counter insurgency missions such as fire support, follow-up operations, suppressing fire during assaults, casualty extraction, reconnaissance, raids, ambushes, base protection, border patrols and so forth.
Its role during conventional operations as a raiding vehicle is equally formidable.
As a MGP/MFT the Hunter can, depending on the mission, be armed with:
1. A 20mm rapid-fire cannon or a 14,5mm HMG
2. 2 x 12,7mm HMGs
3. 2 x PKM machineguns
Any weapon system can be removed and replaced with alternate weapon systems such as the AGS-17 MGL. The vehicle can also be fitted with grenade launchers, giving it the ability to produce a smoke screen.
Although some doctrinal issues are still being worked on, there will be between 6 and 8 MGPs/MFTs attached to each motorised infantry company. This will, depending on the mission, allow the company commander to detach 2 MGPs/MFTs to each platoon and still maintain a reserve for deployment elsewhere.
The Hunter gives the company the following advantages:
1. Mobility across rugged terrain
2. Increased firepower
3. Flexibility
4. Rapid deployment
5. Manoeuvrability
6. Night fighting ability
With a maximum gradient of 60 degrees and a sustained road speed of between 70 and 80 km/h, the Hunter will be able to maintain its position in an MRAP deployment. It also has an off-road operating range of approx 500kms (with an additional 120 km with Jerry cans).
A command post vehicle is currently under development.
This MGP/MFT will be a very welcome addition to any offensive/defensive motorised infantry task.
Saturday, October 31, 2009
IS AN IFV AN MPV/MRAP OR VISA VERSA?
I have noticed a disturbing trend in today’s counter insurgency (COIN) orientated conflicts – IFV’s are being deployed as MPVs/MRAPs and visa versa. Whereas this is not only a serious deployment error, it poses a grave danger to the lives of the occupants of the IFVs and MPVs/MRAPs.
Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) were developed to allow infantrymen to accompany armour formations in relative safety, debus close to or on the objective and provide some protection to the Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) accompanying them. IFVs are also referred to as Mechanised Infantry Combat Vehicles (MICVs). The infantrymen associated with these vehicles are referred to as “mechanised infantrymen” and they accompany armoured formations into battle.
IFVs provide better armour protection to the occupants than normal Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), are equipped with heavy weapons such as 20mm or 30mm cannons and some IFVs allow the infantrymen to engage targets with their assault rifles by means of firing ports. The heavy armament allows the vehicle to act as a direct fire-support base for the infantrymen once they have debussed from their IFVs and are fighting through the objective or holding ground of tactical importance.
Despite the improved armour IFVs have, they are not built to withstand blasts from landmines, off-route mines and IEDs. They are designed and built to accompany conventional mechanised forces and add to the shock-effect of the armoured attack and not operate against unconventional forces in a piece-meal manner.
In contrast, the Mine Protected Vehicle/Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle (MPV/MRAP) is designed to transport troops in areas that have a high probability of small-arms ambushes, landmines, off-route mines and roadside IEDs. However, there are design parameters that need to be considered when developing MPVs/MRAPs. These include size, weight, blast- and ballistic protection and so forth.
The MPV/MRAP is not an IFV, but infantrymen can engage the enemy with their weapons from these vehicles. Additionally, these vehicles often make use of a turret-mounted weapon such as a 12,7mm or a 20mm machine gun. The function of the MPV/MRAP is to transport troops to a debussing point from where the troops will locate and engage the enemy on foot. As such, these vehicles remain within the realm of motorised infantry and are vulnerable to anti-tank weapons and heavy machine guns.
Both IFVs and MPVs/MRAPs - be they tracked or wheeled - have good cross-country mobility. This in itself ought to be exploited by the forces using these vehicles and they should remain off the existing roads, making use of the off-road capabilities of the vehicles. (We referred to this as “bundu-bashing”).
These vehicles, despite their protection, have very specific deployment tactics and when road-bound, should be accompanied by combat engineers who sweep the road for mines and IEDs, the sappers in turn being protected by infantrymen who follow a definite formation. There is a specific drill and tactic the sappers follow in order to ensure the road is clear of all threats. Counter-ambush drills are applied as soon as a threat appears imminent.
Obstacles such as urban areas, defiles, mountainous terrain and so forth also require the adjustment of tactics in order to minimise ambushes, mines, IEDs and anti-tank weapon threats. It also requires an understanding and “reading” of the terrain itself and how the enemy may exploit it to achieve his aims.
In the South African border war context, MPVs/MRAPs were developed after taking note of lessons learnt in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict. It was realised that soft-skinned vehicles cannot be effectively up-armoured using sandbags and metal plates. It was due to these lessons learnt that true MPVs/MRAPs such as the Casspir, Buffel, Kwevoel and others were born. In turn, the South African Police’s counter-insurgency unit known as “Koevoet” pioneered the use of the MPV/MRAP as an offensive vehicle, but they remained off roads whenever possible and didn’t use the vehicle as a traditional IFV. Indeed, the latest generation MPV/MRAP known as the Puma M26 is a classic example of this type of vehicle.
The SADF used its MPVs/MRAPs extensively to keep pressure on the enemy, conduct follow-up operations, transport troops to new deployment areas, escort convoys and such like. They were not used in a traditional mechanised infantry role.
IFVs, in turn, were deployed as elements of combat teams and battle groups and were not used piece-meal for COIN operations.
The trend of using IFVs as MPVs/MRAPs and visa versa is irresponsible and will simply present the enemy with easier targets, increase own forces casualties and thus boost enemy morale while reducing own morale.
The IFV is not an MPV/MRAP; the two vehicle-types are vastly different and should not be used interchangeably.
Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) were developed to allow infantrymen to accompany armour formations in relative safety, debus close to or on the objective and provide some protection to the Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) accompanying them. IFVs are also referred to as Mechanised Infantry Combat Vehicles (MICVs). The infantrymen associated with these vehicles are referred to as “mechanised infantrymen” and they accompany armoured formations into battle.
IFVs provide better armour protection to the occupants than normal Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), are equipped with heavy weapons such as 20mm or 30mm cannons and some IFVs allow the infantrymen to engage targets with their assault rifles by means of firing ports. The heavy armament allows the vehicle to act as a direct fire-support base for the infantrymen once they have debussed from their IFVs and are fighting through the objective or holding ground of tactical importance.
Despite the improved armour IFVs have, they are not built to withstand blasts from landmines, off-route mines and IEDs. They are designed and built to accompany conventional mechanised forces and add to the shock-effect of the armoured attack and not operate against unconventional forces in a piece-meal manner.
In contrast, the Mine Protected Vehicle/Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle (MPV/MRAP) is designed to transport troops in areas that have a high probability of small-arms ambushes, landmines, off-route mines and roadside IEDs. However, there are design parameters that need to be considered when developing MPVs/MRAPs. These include size, weight, blast- and ballistic protection and so forth.
The MPV/MRAP is not an IFV, but infantrymen can engage the enemy with their weapons from these vehicles. Additionally, these vehicles often make use of a turret-mounted weapon such as a 12,7mm or a 20mm machine gun. The function of the MPV/MRAP is to transport troops to a debussing point from where the troops will locate and engage the enemy on foot. As such, these vehicles remain within the realm of motorised infantry and are vulnerable to anti-tank weapons and heavy machine guns.
Both IFVs and MPVs/MRAPs - be they tracked or wheeled - have good cross-country mobility. This in itself ought to be exploited by the forces using these vehicles and they should remain off the existing roads, making use of the off-road capabilities of the vehicles. (We referred to this as “bundu-bashing”).
These vehicles, despite their protection, have very specific deployment tactics and when road-bound, should be accompanied by combat engineers who sweep the road for mines and IEDs, the sappers in turn being protected by infantrymen who follow a definite formation. There is a specific drill and tactic the sappers follow in order to ensure the road is clear of all threats. Counter-ambush drills are applied as soon as a threat appears imminent.
Obstacles such as urban areas, defiles, mountainous terrain and so forth also require the adjustment of tactics in order to minimise ambushes, mines, IEDs and anti-tank weapon threats. It also requires an understanding and “reading” of the terrain itself and how the enemy may exploit it to achieve his aims.
In the South African border war context, MPVs/MRAPs were developed after taking note of lessons learnt in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict. It was realised that soft-skinned vehicles cannot be effectively up-armoured using sandbags and metal plates. It was due to these lessons learnt that true MPVs/MRAPs such as the Casspir, Buffel, Kwevoel and others were born. In turn, the South African Police’s counter-insurgency unit known as “Koevoet” pioneered the use of the MPV/MRAP as an offensive vehicle, but they remained off roads whenever possible and didn’t use the vehicle as a traditional IFV. Indeed, the latest generation MPV/MRAP known as the Puma M26 is a classic example of this type of vehicle.
The SADF used its MPVs/MRAPs extensively to keep pressure on the enemy, conduct follow-up operations, transport troops to new deployment areas, escort convoys and such like. They were not used in a traditional mechanised infantry role.
IFVs, in turn, were deployed as elements of combat teams and battle groups and were not used piece-meal for COIN operations.
The trend of using IFVs as MPVs/MRAPs and visa versa is irresponsible and will simply present the enemy with easier targets, increase own forces casualties and thus boost enemy morale while reducing own morale.
The IFV is not an MPV/MRAP; the two vehicle-types are vastly different and should not be used interchangeably.
Sunday, September 13, 2009
UPDATE ON THE PUMA M26-15
When I recently got the opportunity to revisit the Puma and go on a test drive, I gladly accepted it. Apart from being very impressed with what I experienced, I also got a lot of new information on this very versatile vehicle.
The Puma offers a very viable and cost-effective alternative to the ageing Casspir and Mamba APC’s. Not only does the Puma offer mine/blast protection equal to that of the Mamba, it offers superior ballistic protection over both the Casspir and the Mamba.
The Puma M26 MPV is an evolutionary development of the Puma 4x2 MPV that is in service in Iraq where it proved its crew survivability during Improvised Explosive Device (IED) incidents.
As an MPV/MRAP, Puma is designed to carry a section of 8 plus a driver and vehicle commander (total of 10 occupants). The modular interior layout can, at additional costs, be changed to re-configure the vehicle for any one of the following roles:
1. Command and control vehicle
2. Tactical ambulance with one stretcher or four sitting patients plus first line/tactical medical equipment
3. A 6-seater tactical patrol vehicle
4. A tactical fire-support vehicle with 60mm mortar and 40mm AGL/heavy machinegun.
Some basic technical specifications on the Puma are as follows:
1. Crew: 10 (2+8)
2. Maximum Gross Vehicle Mass: 8 000 kg
3. Drive: Selectable 4x4
4. Steering wheel orientation: Right hand drive. Left Hand drive is available at no additional cost
5. Ballistic protection: 7,62 x 51mm NATO Ball and 5,56 x 45mm NATO Ball (B6+/ STANAG Level 1)
6. Mine protection: 8kg TNT anywhere under the vehicle and 10kg TNT under any wheel
7. Entrance doors: One rear plus two side doors in driver’s compartment
8. Roof hatches: 2 on the rear part of the roof. The hatch doors open to the outside of the roof and can be locked in the closed, vertical or horizontal positions
9. Gunner’s hatch: A round gunner’s hatch with optional 3600 cupola ring with (optional) NATO type fitting for a pintle mounted light (or medium) machine gun is fitted on the roof
10. Firing ports. A total of 11 firing ports are fitted in the hull
11. Radio fitments. Universal racks and fitments for two radios are fitted
12. Rifle brackets. Two OTT designed universal rifle brackets are fitted in the driver’s compartment
13. Wheels: Total of 5 (4 plus 1 spare)
14. Air conditioner. High capacity air conditioner is fitted as standard.
Armies who face the threat of IEDs and landmines on a daily basis or who find their vehicle movement under constant ambush will do well to consider the Puma.
Personally, I believe that this vehicle will make a massive impact on the battlefield and aid in troop-survivability.
The Puma offers a very viable and cost-effective alternative to the ageing Casspir and Mamba APC’s. Not only does the Puma offer mine/blast protection equal to that of the Mamba, it offers superior ballistic protection over both the Casspir and the Mamba.
The Puma M26 MPV is an evolutionary development of the Puma 4x2 MPV that is in service in Iraq where it proved its crew survivability during Improvised Explosive Device (IED) incidents.
As an MPV/MRAP, Puma is designed to carry a section of 8 plus a driver and vehicle commander (total of 10 occupants). The modular interior layout can, at additional costs, be changed to re-configure the vehicle for any one of the following roles:
1. Command and control vehicle
2. Tactical ambulance with one stretcher or four sitting patients plus first line/tactical medical equipment
3. A 6-seater tactical patrol vehicle
4. A tactical fire-support vehicle with 60mm mortar and 40mm AGL/heavy machinegun.
Some basic technical specifications on the Puma are as follows:
1. Crew: 10 (2+8)
2. Maximum Gross Vehicle Mass: 8 000 kg
3. Drive: Selectable 4x4
4. Steering wheel orientation: Right hand drive. Left Hand drive is available at no additional cost
5. Ballistic protection: 7,62 x 51mm NATO Ball and 5,56 x 45mm NATO Ball (B6+/ STANAG Level 1)
6. Mine protection: 8kg TNT anywhere under the vehicle and 10kg TNT under any wheel
7. Entrance doors: One rear plus two side doors in driver’s compartment
8. Roof hatches: 2 on the rear part of the roof. The hatch doors open to the outside of the roof and can be locked in the closed, vertical or horizontal positions
9. Gunner’s hatch: A round gunner’s hatch with optional 3600 cupola ring with (optional) NATO type fitting for a pintle mounted light (or medium) machine gun is fitted on the roof
10. Firing ports. A total of 11 firing ports are fitted in the hull
11. Radio fitments. Universal racks and fitments for two radios are fitted
12. Rifle brackets. Two OTT designed universal rifle brackets are fitted in the driver’s compartment
13. Wheels: Total of 5 (4 plus 1 spare)
14. Air conditioner. High capacity air conditioner is fitted as standard.
Armies who face the threat of IEDs and landmines on a daily basis or who find their vehicle movement under constant ambush will do well to consider the Puma.
Personally, I believe that this vehicle will make a massive impact on the battlefield and aid in troop-survivability.
Thursday, August 13, 2009
THE NEW GENERATION PUMA MPV/MRAP
Mine Protected Vehicles (MPVs) have progressed significantly since their first deployment during the Rhodesian bush war. Despite at that time being very primitive, they were nevertheless highly effective and saved countless lives.
It was the South Africans who took these developments further and developed vehicles such as the “Buffel” (Buffalo), Casspir, “Kwevoel” and so on. In simple terms, the vehicles were built with V-shaped hulls as it is known that an explosive shock wave travels the path of least resistance and the V-shaped hull allows the shockwave to disperse up the sides of the hull, thus deflecting the blast away from the hull. In turn, this minimises injury and even death.
I know how effective this technique of blast-deflection is as I survived in a Buffel that hit a British Mk7 anti-tank mine. That made my name the first entry into the war diary of 1 January, 1980. That was 29 years ago – and at that period, the Buffel had already seen active service for some time. The Casspir, along with the Buffel, were arguably the first Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles to enter the combat zone anywhere in the world. Ironically, old South African MPVs/MRAPs are still, today, making their mark in combat zones in Africa and the Middle East.
What I cannot understand – or even believe – is why the British army is still using Land Rovers as combat vehicles. Similarly, the US is using the Humvee. Whereas these vehicles may have a distinctive role to play, it is not something any soldier should be sent into a mine-threat zone or enemy strong-area in. The armour these vehicles have on their sides gives no protection to landmines and IEDs.
But the question that needs to be answered is “what constitutes an ‘ambush protected’ vehicle”? Is it protection against small arms fire or does that include protection against anti-tank weapons? If the latter, then we are a long way from finding a true “ambush protected” vehicle as even the M1 tank is not resistant to certain anti-tank missiles.
However, the typical MPV/MRAP is a very expensive vehicle. That is, until OTT Technologies came along…
With the Puma M26-15, OTT Armoured vehicles (a unit of OTT Technologies), has developed a cost-effective medium MPV/MRAP without compromising the safety of the crew. The M26-15 is a continuation of the Puma 4 x 2 MPV that has been successfully deployed in Iraq.
The Puma M26-15 recently passed its dynamic automotive tests with flying colours.
The main design parameter was to develop a lower cost and robust mine protected vehicle that can be deployed effectively and safely in the harsh environments of Africa and other developing regions whilst offering excellent protection against small arms fire. The M26-15 has a crew complement of 10 (driver and commander plus 8). The vehicle is robust and easy to maintain in the field making it an MPV/MRAP with a low life-cycle cost.
The 8 ton Puma M26-15 has a sustained road speed of 80 km/h, a gradient of 60% and a side slope capability of more than 25⁰. Wide windows ensure a exceptional situational awareness while 12 firing ports plus two roof hatches and a 360⁰ cupola with a pintle mount for a light machine gun ensures quick and furious retaliation from the crew in case of an ambush.
I am very fortunate to have been one of the very few who have to date seen this vehicle – and I am very impressed.
As with any new vehicle, the actual tactical deployment of the vehicle needs to be confirmed.
Something that bothers me is that modern-day soldiers believe they ought to drive into battle. This is the role of mechanised infantry as these soldiers need to dismount prior to or on top of the objective – if all anti-tank weapons have been silenced. If not, they debus before the objective and fight their way through it with the vehicle giving fire support.
MPVs and MRAPs do not constitute mechanised infantry. The deployment of these vehicles therefore calls for an in-depth look at how they should be deployed to give the protection they ought to give. Whereas they can carry weapon systems able to give very good suppressive and supporting fire, they still need to be deployed correctly.
OTT’s new generation Puma will give the infantry the protection they need – as long as the vehicle is not deployed as a mechanised infantry vehicle. If used correctly, it will give the soldier an advantage, allowing him to arrive close to the combat zone, fresh to fight and still allow for effective fire-and-manoeuvre.
I hope that governments will take a look at this vehicle as it gives an excellent level of protection to the soldiers they are keen to commit to battle. At least now their fighting men will stand a chance. If fitted with the Bloodhound Mk1 (see my previous post dd April 2009) they will be able to track each vehicle’s movements and position.
Anyone interested in more information can visit OTT at www.ott.co.za and see the full range of vehicles they manufacture.
It was the South Africans who took these developments further and developed vehicles such as the “Buffel” (Buffalo), Casspir, “Kwevoel” and so on. In simple terms, the vehicles were built with V-shaped hulls as it is known that an explosive shock wave travels the path of least resistance and the V-shaped hull allows the shockwave to disperse up the sides of the hull, thus deflecting the blast away from the hull. In turn, this minimises injury and even death.
I know how effective this technique of blast-deflection is as I survived in a Buffel that hit a British Mk7 anti-tank mine. That made my name the first entry into the war diary of 1 January, 1980. That was 29 years ago – and at that period, the Buffel had already seen active service for some time. The Casspir, along with the Buffel, were arguably the first Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles to enter the combat zone anywhere in the world. Ironically, old South African MPVs/MRAPs are still, today, making their mark in combat zones in Africa and the Middle East.
What I cannot understand – or even believe – is why the British army is still using Land Rovers as combat vehicles. Similarly, the US is using the Humvee. Whereas these vehicles may have a distinctive role to play, it is not something any soldier should be sent into a mine-threat zone or enemy strong-area in. The armour these vehicles have on their sides gives no protection to landmines and IEDs.
But the question that needs to be answered is “what constitutes an ‘ambush protected’ vehicle”? Is it protection against small arms fire or does that include protection against anti-tank weapons? If the latter, then we are a long way from finding a true “ambush protected” vehicle as even the M1 tank is not resistant to certain anti-tank missiles.
However, the typical MPV/MRAP is a very expensive vehicle. That is, until OTT Technologies came along…
With the Puma M26-15, OTT Armoured vehicles (a unit of OTT Technologies), has developed a cost-effective medium MPV/MRAP without compromising the safety of the crew. The M26-15 is a continuation of the Puma 4 x 2 MPV that has been successfully deployed in Iraq.
The Puma M26-15 recently passed its dynamic automotive tests with flying colours.
The main design parameter was to develop a lower cost and robust mine protected vehicle that can be deployed effectively and safely in the harsh environments of Africa and other developing regions whilst offering excellent protection against small arms fire. The M26-15 has a crew complement of 10 (driver and commander plus 8). The vehicle is robust and easy to maintain in the field making it an MPV/MRAP with a low life-cycle cost.
The 8 ton Puma M26-15 has a sustained road speed of 80 km/h, a gradient of 60% and a side slope capability of more than 25⁰. Wide windows ensure a exceptional situational awareness while 12 firing ports plus two roof hatches and a 360⁰ cupola with a pintle mount for a light machine gun ensures quick and furious retaliation from the crew in case of an ambush.
I am very fortunate to have been one of the very few who have to date seen this vehicle – and I am very impressed.
As with any new vehicle, the actual tactical deployment of the vehicle needs to be confirmed.
Something that bothers me is that modern-day soldiers believe they ought to drive into battle. This is the role of mechanised infantry as these soldiers need to dismount prior to or on top of the objective – if all anti-tank weapons have been silenced. If not, they debus before the objective and fight their way through it with the vehicle giving fire support.
MPVs and MRAPs do not constitute mechanised infantry. The deployment of these vehicles therefore calls for an in-depth look at how they should be deployed to give the protection they ought to give. Whereas they can carry weapon systems able to give very good suppressive and supporting fire, they still need to be deployed correctly.
OTT’s new generation Puma will give the infantry the protection they need – as long as the vehicle is not deployed as a mechanised infantry vehicle. If used correctly, it will give the soldier an advantage, allowing him to arrive close to the combat zone, fresh to fight and still allow for effective fire-and-manoeuvre.
I hope that governments will take a look at this vehicle as it gives an excellent level of protection to the soldiers they are keen to commit to battle. At least now their fighting men will stand a chance. If fitted with the Bloodhound Mk1 (see my previous post dd April 2009) they will be able to track each vehicle’s movements and position.
Anyone interested in more information can visit OTT at www.ott.co.za and see the full range of vehicles they manufacture.
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