THE LEVELS OF WAR

The military strategy is an intelligence-driven, intellectual process that results in possible future or definite action.

The waging of war ie the implementation of strategy is conducted at four distinct yet inter-related levels. These levels are known as the levels of war and consist of:

1.      The political level

2.      The strategic level

3.      The operational level

4.      The tactical level.

The Political Level: Sometimes referred to as War by Political Means, this is the highest level of war and is often ignored by the military. Although the Grand Strategy or National Strategy is the highest level of strategy, the political level of war is, likewise, the highest level of war and is associated with political, economical and/or covert politico-military operations. Sometimes referred to as War by Political Means, it is the applying of political and/or economical sanctions against a country that is considered to be conducting unacceptable political practices. Likewise, financial sanctions aimed at wearing down or exhausting a country economically are further examples of war at the political level.  Other examples of the war at the political level include expelling of diplomatic staff, pressure to ensure international isolation of a threat country, international boycotts, international support to nationalist groups, and the conduct of highly-sensitive, high-level covert operations aimed at achieving a specific political goal and so forth. The conduct of highly-sensitive, high-level covert operations are usually deniable by the government. Where war at the political level may require discretionary warfare, these types of operations straddle the boundary between political and strategic level warfare yet remain highly sensitive and are usually deniable. War at the political level is ultimately aimed at bringing about a regime change without overtly committing the armed forces to direct battle.

The Strategic Level: At this level of planning, strategists and planners will ultimately be left with four definitive choices of how the government will want to resolve the situation. These are: 

·        Neutralising rebel or insurgent forces intent on usurping government support through violent means

·        Annihilating the opposing forces

·        Exhausting the opposing forces

·        Attrition of the opposing forces.

The threat, the terrain, Own Forces capabilities and the economy or support to sustain the war will determine how it will be fought at this level. Military operations conducted at this level are referred to as strategic warfare. War at the strategic level will encompass either distant or close strategic offensives as well as strategic defensive warfare.  Strategic defensive warfare can take the form of conventional, unconventional and semi-conventional operations and can include long-distance offensives, cross-border raids (sanctioned or not sanctioned) and Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations.

The Operational Level: War at the Operational Level is aimed at achieving the strategic military objectives through a series of battles and/or campaigns, conventional or otherwise, aimed at achieving the theatre objectives and can last for weeks, months and even years. These actions are not restricted to operations beyond the borders of the country but may unfold nationally as well.

The Tactical Level: At this level of war, short term engagements are fought between Own Forces and the enemy utilising Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) as the foundation of the engagements.

It is at the levels of war that the strategy unfolds via the approved military strategy, commander’s intent, designs for battle, operational plans and action. However, a lack of sound intelligence will result in weak or poorly executed strategies that may bring about a collapse of the government or a defeat of the armed forces.

Prematurely extricating the armed forces from operations that have been poorly planned and executed may lead to grave embarrassment of the state and a decline in regional and international respect. In turn, this may adversely impact on both the security of the state and even the tenure of the government.  

RELENTLESS PURSUIT: A NEGLECTED COIN PRINCIPLE?

Fighting an apparently elusive enemy during COIN operations can be very frustrating, especially for the men in the field.

The frustration is increased when it appears that the enemy has the initiative – which he indeed has at times - as he can chose his place, time and method of attack. These attacks are usually of short duration but have the sole aim of killing, wounded or delaying own forces members – and getting maximum publicity for their cause.

When the enemy believes he has the initiative, he becomes bolder and more daring. When we believe that the enemy has the initiative, it places us in a reactive state-of-mind, thus giving the enemy the initiative.    

Wresting the initiative from the enemy is not as easy as it sounds, but it is not impossible. We need to place the enemy in a position of continual disadvantage and then exploit it with speed, aggression and firepower.

One aspect I feel is not emphasised enough in COIN operations is the principle of “relentless pursuit”.

Relentless pursuit implies the enemy is pursued with speed and aggression, without stopping, pushing him past the limits of his endurance whilst we continually substitute the men doing the pursuit with fresh troops. This forces the enemy into a state of exhaustion as he has no time to eat or rest. It also impacts negatively on his morale, leads to panic and subsequently leads him to make mistakes.

When the enemy is tired and hungry, he becomes weak thus slow in his movements, disorientated and prone to making poor decisions. It is these mistakes we need to identify and exploit in order to seize the initiative.

Troops conducting the relentless pursuit should not be over-burdened with equipment and gadgets. They should only carry the very essentials of what is required to achieve their mission.

Implementing relentless pursuit requires, amongst others, that troops:

&1. Can eat whilst on the move

&2. Can track an enemy at speed

&3. Have the ability to leap-frog ahead of the enemy by means of helicopters

&4. Have outstanding communications

&5. Are aggressive

&6. Are adept at night operations

&7. Must outgun the enemy

      Troops need to be “taught” how to eat whilst on the move. During relentless pursuit, troops cannot stop to prepare meals as this will give the enemy time to make good his escape.  Dry rations and water is all these troops need to carry with them especially since they will only be moving for a few hours before being relieved by fresh troops.

The ability to track humans is an essential prerequisite. Good trackers can tell the age of a track as well as indicate if the enemy is carrying heavy loads, the types of weapons he has (this is identified when locating enemy resting points), if the enemy is moving hurriedly, what he is eating and so forth. Good trackers are also able to identify disturbances in the soil or tripwires indicating a possible landmine or IED.

The use of helicopters to substitute troops after a few hours of follow-up adds to the concept of relentless pursuit. Tired troops can be replaced with fresh troops in order to maintain momentum and keep the pressure on the enemy.  Once the trackers have analysed the age of the tracks to within an hour or less, helicopters can be used to deploy troops into blocking positions as well as deliver troops onto tactically advantageous ground. Alternatively, troops can be deployed to seal off villages and prevent their use to the enemy.

Good communications is essential to ensure that pursuit forces do not engage in so-called friendly-fire incidents. Communications is also essential to enable the calling for air support, fresh troops, and reinforcements and so on. By frequently reporting the pursuit forces coordinates, operations officers will be able to plot and even predict the enemy’s intended direction of movement.

Troops need to develop their aggression level to such a point that the enemy fears them. Aggressive pursuit is aimed at initiating contact as heavily with the enemy as possible.  

Pursuit must continue after dark and into and during the night. Equipment such as night vision goggles and illumination flares must be used to the optimal. Battlefield illumination, when closing with the enemy, is useful for slowing an enemy’s progress or forcing him to show himself prematurely.

The enemy must be engaged at maximum range, terrain depending, in order to force him to deploy tactically. Long distance engagements may not cause enemy casualties but it will slow his progress and allow own forces to begin offensive tactical manoeuvres. Weapons such as the 20mm PAW, 60mm patrol mortars, RPG-7s and so forth can force the enemy to slow his progress, take cover and thus slow his escape.

When the enemy scatters (bombshells), at least one set of tracks should be taken to ensure a successful pursuit as it is likely that the enemy may regroup at an emergency RV.

To apply relentless pursuit, the troops need to be fit, mentally alert and ready to immediately take offensive action.  

Failure to apply relentless pursuit will continue to give the enemy options and advantages, often at our own peril.  

PROGRESS IS SLOW...

I have had numerous calls, mails and posts asking about the progress of my planned book on strategy and tactics.

Unfortunately, I have not had the time I would have wanted in order to continue with my writing simply due to work-related pressure. Added to this is pressure from my publisher to pull my finger out of my ear...

However, I recently made a change of direction with the content as I have realised that many African armies are using NATO/US/UK/old USSR approaches to strategy. Whereas many elements of these approaches remain relevant, they cannot be used as a template in African operational theatres.

This follows that many subsequent doctrines are in many instances also irrelevant to Africa. This can be attributed to many reasons which I shall not expound on here. Additionally, they have fallen into the trap of using buzz-words and catch-phrases that tend to create their own confusion – and do not contribute to resolving conflicts or wars.

Therefore, the focus of the book has now changed to strategic military operations in specifically Africa. The book will, however, also be of interest to military commanders and students studying conflicts and wars elsewhere across the world.

On the positive side, there is already interest in printing the book in Arabic, Spanish and Chinese. Also, I have been approached by two African Command and Staff Colleges who wish to use the book as a textbook.

I will try to keep you all updated on the progress.

IS AN IFV AN MPV/MRAP OR VISA VERSA?

I have noticed a disturbing trend in today’s counter insurgency (COIN) orientated conflicts – IFV’s are being deployed as MPVs/MRAPs and visa versa. Whereas this is not only a serious deployment error, it poses a grave danger to the lives of the occupants of the IFVs and MPVs/MRAPs.

Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) were developed to allow infantrymen to accompany armour formations in relative safety, debus close to or on the objective and provide some protection to the Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) accompanying them. IFVs are also referred to as Mechanised Infantry Combat Vehicles (MICVs). The infantrymen associated with these vehicles are referred to as “mechanised infantrymen” and they accompany armoured formations into battle.

IFVs provide better armour protection to the occupants than normal Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), are equipped with heavy weapons such as 20mm or 30mm cannons and some IFVs allow the infantrymen to engage targets with their assault rifles by means of firing ports. The heavy armament allows the vehicle to act as a direct fire-support base for the infantrymen once they have debussed from their IFVs and are fighting through the objective or holding ground of tactical importance.

Despite the improved armour IFVs have, they are not built to withstand blasts from landmines, off-route mines and IEDs. They are designed and built to accompany conventional mechanised forces and add to the shock-effect of the armoured attack and not operate against unconventional forces in a piece-meal manner.

In contrast, the Mine Protected Vehicle/Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle (MPV/MRAP) is designed to transport troops in areas that have a high probability of small-arms ambushes, landmines, off-route mines and roadside IEDs. However, there are design parameters that need to be considered when developing MPVs/MRAPs. These include size, weight, blast- and ballistic protection and so forth.

The MPV/MRAP is not an IFV, but infantrymen can engage the enemy with their weapons from these vehicles. Additionally, these vehicles often make use of a turret-mounted weapon such as a 12,7mm or a 20mm machine gun. The function of the MPV/MRAP is to transport troops to a debussing point from where the troops will locate and engage the enemy on foot. As such, these vehicles remain within the realm of motorised infantry and are vulnerable to anti-tank weapons and heavy machine guns.

Both IFVs and MPVs/MRAPs - be they tracked or wheeled - have good cross-country mobility. This in itself ought to be exploited by the forces using these vehicles and they should remain off the existing roads, making use of the off-road capabilities of the vehicles. (We referred to this as “bundu-bashing”).

These vehicles, despite their protection, have very specific deployment tactics and when road-bound, should be accompanied by combat engineers who sweep the road for mines and IEDs, the sappers in turn being protected by infantrymen who follow a definite formation. There is a specific drill and tactic the sappers follow in order to ensure the road is clear of all threats. Counter-ambush drills are applied as soon as a threat appears imminent.

Obstacles such as urban areas, defiles, mountainous terrain and so forth also require the adjustment of tactics in order to minimise ambushes, mines, IEDs and anti-tank weapon threats. It also requires an understanding and “reading” of the terrain itself and how the enemy may exploit it to achieve his aims.

In the South African border war context, MPVs/MRAPs were developed after taking note of lessons learnt in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict. It was realised that soft-skinned vehicles cannot be effectively up-armoured using sandbags and metal plates. It was due to these lessons learnt that true MPVs/MRAPs such as the Casspir, Buffel, Kwevoel and others were born. In turn, the South African Police’s counter-insurgency unit known as “Koevoet” pioneered the use of the MPV/MRAP as an offensive vehicle, but they remained off roads whenever possible and didn’t use the vehicle as a traditional IFV. Indeed, the latest generation MPV/MRAP known as the Puma M26 is a classic example of this type of vehicle.

The SADF used its MPVs/MRAPs extensively to keep pressure on the enemy, conduct follow-up operations, transport troops to new deployment areas, escort convoys and such like. They were not used in a traditional mechanised infantry role.

IFVs, in turn, were deployed as elements of combat teams and battle groups and were not used piece-meal for COIN operations.

The trend of using IFVs as MPVs/MRAPs and visa versa is irresponsible and will simply present the enemy with easier targets, increase own forces casualties and thus boost enemy morale while reducing own morale.

The IFV is not an MPV/MRAP; the two vehicle-types are vastly different and should not be used interchangeably.

RANDOM THOUGHTS ON COUNTERING AN INSURGENCY (Part 3)

Developing the strategy to fight an insurgency in a third country should be based primarily on the assessment whether that conflict is in the national interests of the state considering such an action. However, if the State itself is engaged in such a conflict within its borders, it would naturally be in its interests to end the conflict as soon as possible. In both instances, this will require a significant shift in terms of strategy, doctrine and tactics.

Whereas COIN operations can buy time, prevent the whole-sale slaughter of civilians, allow the insurgents to be hunted down and destroyed, success is ultimately dependent on political reform and the establishment of a system of effective service delivery. If the government attempting these reforms is deemed incompetent or corrupt, the locals will be lost to the insurgents.

COIN campaigns tend to be protracted campaigns with the local population as the main target for insurgent propaganda and recruitment. Whereas the COIN forces should focus on clearing, securing, influencing and retaining/holding areas under the influence of the insurgents, the insurgents will attempt to reduce the operational footprint of the security forces whilst creating the perception that they have the larger operational footprint. In turn, the insurgents and their supporters will attempt to use the media to create the perception that the insurgents are “everywhere”. To build on this perceived footprint, insurgents will conduct bold raids/strikes into so-called safe areas such as bases, convoys and so forth.

By creating a safe area in which civil-military actions can successfully take place will provide a firm base for security forces to operate from into the adjacent area. This will, furthermore, allow the security forces to keep “one foot on the ground”, maintain initiative and momentum and not be caught off balance. If the traditional ink-spot strategy is followed, similar actions ought to take place before moving on the next area or “spot”. But, civil-military actions are doomed to failure if the local population does not accept and “buy-in” to the concept. Getting locals to buy-in to any concept is problematic if they are not homogenous in terms of ethnic and racial make-up.

It is vitally important that the local population feel that they are secure, not “the enemy” and not “conquered” by the security forces. This requires that security forces are well-versed in the customs and traditions of the locals in the area they are operating in in order not to offend or alienate the locals. Failure to abide by this very basic requirement will result in resentment from the locals and a desire to see the security forces leave their area. In turn, this may result in the locals siding with the insurgents. The insurgency may then become an insurrection.

Actions against the insurgents must be decisive, swift and ruthless. This requires both good intelligence and the deployment of small reconnaissance teams that are able to locate and call air support or fire force-type units to swiftly engage the insurgents. This will provide the security forces with the basic principles of flexibility, mobility, momentum, initiative and decisive actions. But, force levels need to remain high in secure areas to prevent the insurgents from enlarging their footprint into safe areas. To achieve this, security forces require the correct training, discipline and leadership.

Strategic communication lies at the core of successful command. Commanders ought to recognise the fact that every action, however small, will generate an effect on the operation and this effect will impact on the local population. This effect will alter perceptions and to many locals, perception equals the reality of the world they live in. When the locals realise that there is a desire to improve their lot, they will often start providing the security forces with intelligence on the insurgents. Others, who may have actively supported the insurgents, may also change their perception of the government and the security forces.

Counter insurgency campaigns are primarily foot-soldier campaigns. Whereas vehicles play a major role in the campaign, they should never be used as “mechanised forces” unless absolutely necessary. Vehicles create targets for IEDs and landmines and where possible, trooping and deployments should be achieved by the use of helicopters. The tendency of the modern soldier to want to remain on or close to a vehicle also reduces the footprint of the security forces in terms of area domination and restricts them to certain areas or channels. But there is a danger that this tendency or laziness may permeate through to base protection, guard duties and other essential protection services. In turn, this will embolden the insurgent to conduct strikes at security force bases and outposts.

Night operations are equally important in COIN ops. Again, these operations should not be conducted by vehicle-borne troops as vehicle noise and lights can be seen over great distances and alert the insurgents who can either prepare ambushes, lay IEDs/landmines or simply exfiltrate out of the area. Security forces need to remember that the night is neutral and can be exploited by either party.

The importance of the elders/chieftains who exercise control over the local population should never be negated or ignored. If these traditional leaders are not integrated into the civil-military plans, these programmes will fail and give initiative to the insurgents. When these programmes are underfunded, undermanned, lack control and focus, they are doomed to failure. Penny-pinching does not win a COIN conflict.

Incentive programmes towards the local population such as rewards for actionable intelligence as well as protection and support for insurgents who lay down their arms need to be considered.

Poor strategies, a lack of leadership and focus as well as the incorrect deployment of security forces will fail to isolate the insurgents from the local population. This is due to the fact that insurgents remain unidentifiable until the population turns against them. This is the crux of any successful COIN campaign.

Without a definite national interest, a coherent strategy and poorly led, trained and equipped troops, the COIN conflict will become a graveyard for those engaging in it.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY STRATEGY

Another bit of blatant advertising – an abridged extract from my in-process book Techniques of War (a working title).

If we arrive, as our forefathers did, at the scene of battle inadequately equipped, incorrectly trained and mentally unprepared, then this failure will be a criminal one because there has been ample warning — Michael Elliot-Bateman

In the modern, conflict-ridden world, Elliot-Bateman’s comment remains as relevant as ever. After all, part of battle orders are to ensure that the correct men (unit), arrive at the correct time and place, adequately prepared and equipped to do battle with the opposing forces – and win. But these orders are derived from the battle appreciation. This appreciation is a thorough assessment of all the factors that can impact on the plan and include factors such as the enemy, terrain, climate, weapons, deployments and so forth. The appreciation, in turn, leads to the formulation of the commander’s tactical plan. This plan encompasses the deployment of forces under his command and is taken right down to section and sub-section level.

Getting to the tactical plan requires careful thought and an in-depth appreciation of the situation – all based on good, sound and credible intelligence. But the tactical plan is rooted in the military strategy, a process that is on-going and constantly adjusted.

The development of the military strategy is descendent from the grand strategy of the state. It is the grand strategy that defines how the state would like to position itself in the world and how it will want to be perceived. Additionally, the grand strategy comprises the government’s action and/or reaction to real or perceived threats, opportunities, weaknesses and strengths.

From the grand strategy is born the National Security Strategy (NSS) – considered by many strategists to be part of the grand strategy and by others as a strategy developed with the aim of supporting the grand strategy with all of the security components at the state’s disposal. It is the NSS that ultimately defines “who” and “what” the enemy is.

If viewed as a separate strategy instead of a continuum of the grand strategy, the NSS entails the art and science of assessing, developing, applying, coordinating and monitoring all instruments of national power to achieve objectives that will enhance and ensure the national security of the nation. Additionally, it gives rise to the creation of an ability to deter an enemy threat and when necessary, to project force (usually military force) in order to secure the state’s national security interests and goals. The projection of force can be overt, clandestine or covert in nature.

The NSS (or alternatively the grand strategy) provides the guidelines for the development of the military strategy. This strategy consists of the planning, preparation, implementation, execution and coordination of the military forces at the disposal of the state to pursue its desired strategic goals. The formulated strategic goals may be offensive, defensive or containment in nature and will involve the military, intelligence, law-enforcement, diplomatic and economic resources at the disposal of the state.

The aim of the military strategy is, ultimately, to gain supremacy over the opposing forces/state(s) and reduce or destroy their will to fight. It is therefore the application of military resources aimed at achieving grand or national strategic objectives. As a strategy, it culminates in a violent act and should, in the main, be tested against the principles of strategy. These principles are often viewed as similar to the principles of war.

Constant changes in the operational environment will shape the military strategy and, therefore, such changes need to be constantly monitored and the military strategy adapted to these changes. These changes may, additionally, impact on any broad, pre-set tactical plans.

In Africa, many governments have neglected the formulation of, and adherence to, a grand strategy. In such a scenario, the development of the military strategy needs to be carefully coordinated with the government’s general policy. These policies, in turn, tend to be very party political in nature and it is, therefore, necessary to confirm the strategy at the highest level, pointing out all realistic advantages and disadvantages – as well as the potential political impact, both nationally and internationally. It needs to be pointed out that the political impact of a military strategy in Africa will differ from that of a Western nation.

Given the complexities regarding ethnicity, language, culture, tradition, beliefs and so forth, African military strategies tend to be very theatre-bound and usually re-active in nature inst4ead of pre-emptive. Many of these complexities are part of the historic legacy of drawing country borders during times of colonisation and splitting tribes into different countries.

Considering the battle for resources that is currently being waged in Africa, another part of the problem lies with the physical location of the natural resources, especially where a particular resource straddles international borders or is located within the domain of a specific grouping of people or tribe.

Adding fuel to this volatile mix is the funding of a specific group of armed guerrillas/rebels or terrorists who use the natural resources to fund their actions. It is especially in this area of interest that the military strategy should focus – deprive the opposing forces from their source of funding but in such a manner that the NSS or grand strategy remains intact.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WAR

(Parts of this posting are from my upcoming book “The Techniques of War”, albeit as a very condensed version. Please note that this is NOT a comprehensive view of these two very important concepts).

There exists some confusion regarding the differences between strategy and tactics. Whereas this is understandable when talking to people who are not part of the military, it is frightening to know that there are senior military men who do not know the difference between the two and how they inter-relate to one another.

To fully understand the difference between the two, one needs to understand the meanings of the words, both being derived from the Greek “stratēgos” and “taktikē”.

Strategy is derived from the Greek words “stratos” and “ago”, implying or referring to the leading of, and giving direction to, an army. In modern warfare, the army is led to achieve the political aims of the government it serves. Therefore, a country’s military strategy is an off-shoot of the government’s greater political strategy, known as the Grand or National Strategy.

“Taktikē” is the art of organising and coordinating an army so that it may do battle, using the correct techniques to overcome the enemy. In brief, these techniques – referred to as “tactics” – are relevant to the various phases of warfare.

The above definitions lead one to realise that strategy gives direction and strategic aim to the military and the tactics are the methods or techniques employed to achieve those aims. Furthermore, this implies that strategy is executed at the highest levels of the military whereas tactics permeates downwards to the lower levels such as unit and sub-unit level and even lower.

When a nation’s armed forces are committed to war, the war is fought at three distinct yet inter-related levels. These three levels are:

1. Strategic Level
2. Operational Level
3. Tactical Level

Warfare at the strategic level can be broken down into four distinctive types of strategic warfare. These four types are:

1. Offensive Warfare
2. Defensive Warfare
3. Attrition Warfare
4. Revolutionary Warfare.

Again, the aims and objectives of the different types of strategic warfare are determined by the government’s national policies which are in turn derived from the Government’s National or Grand Strategy. The decision to implement one of the types of strategic warfare is dependent on the perceived threat facing the nation. This threat is determined by a process of collecting information and processing it into intelligence.

Each type of Strategic Warfare can be further broken down into different sub-types of warfare. As an example, Offensive Warfare can be subdivided into either a Distant Strategic Offensive or a Close Strategic Offensive – the type being determined by the proximity of the offensive.

At the Operational Level, usually confined to a specific theatre of operations, the military strategy is accomplished by the setting of operational objectives, within that specific theatre, to meet the military strategy’s goals. Poor planning, non-compliance to doctrine and inadequate tactics can result in failure, thus impacting negatively on the overall military strategy.

The tactical level is that level where the techniques to attain the strategy are implemented by various unit levels such as a division, a brigade, a company or even a section. It is, therefore, at the tactical level that tactics come into play. The tactics employed will be dependent on numerous factors such as the phase of war, the enemy, the terrain, the weather, own forces capabilities, the local population and so forth.

Whereas the principle aim of war is to always achieve victory over the enemy, regardless of the type of warfare, the modern-day war can be viewed as having five main strategic goals:

1. To repulse an aggressive act by the enemy, contain and destroy it.
2. To invade, conquer and destroy an enemy.
3. To seize and exploit the resources of an enemy.
4. To energise foreign policy by means other than diplomacy.
5. To gain favourable public opinion and strengthen national resolve and will.

To achieve these strategic goals, the military will adopt a specific posture in order to accomplish its allocated mission. The posture will thus be determined by the perceived enemy threat and will therefore determine the military’s doctrine and tactics.

The tactics, in turn, are related to the specific phase of warfare that is being implemented. These phases - excluding the intermediate or transitional phases - are:

1. The advance
2. The attack
3. The withdrawal
4. The defence

Sound military strategies will lead to well-developed doctrines, good planning based on sound intelligence and correct application of tactics. It is, however, at the tactical level that the war can be either won or lost.

HAS “STRATEGY” BECOME “GADGETRY”?

Looking at how modern wars are being fought, I have come to suspect that “strategy” has somehow been replaced with “gadgetry”. There seems to be a misguided belief that whoever has the most technologically-enhanced gadgets will definitely win a war. But gadgets do not replace the commander’s aggression, initiative, leadership or ability to be flexible on the battlefield. Nor do gadgets enhance the soldier’s adaptability.

The art of strategy development – and it is an art – ought to give cognisance to technology but it should never be replaced with technology. Nor can poorly-developed strategies be rectified by adopting a technology-superior posture. This fallacy leads to a flawed military strategy and impacts negatively on the subsequent doctrine, operational level command structures and ultimately on the tactics to overcome an enemy.

In parallel with gadgets comes “troop surges” – another mistaken approach to winning wars. Both of these “concepts” create a false sense of security and raise false battlefield expectations. When these expectations are not met, questions are directed at the wrong causes for mission-failure.

Many strategists and planners view the modern-day battlefield as a giant computer screen and the battles nothing other than a detached computer game. This game, however, costs lives and the more reliance the forces have on technology, the more they seem to get stuck in a rut, unable to seize the initiative or adapt to rapidly changing battlefield scenarios.

Whereas technology ought to be regarded as a realistic force-multiplier and casualty-reducer, it is not a primary approach to warfare. Gadgets and technology do not replace disciplined, well-trained and well-led men – they merely enhance their mission-success and open other options for engaging the enemy. The belief that technological gadgets will make war faster, more efficient, more precise and more decisive is proving to be somewhat erroneous. Gadgetry does not constitute the “magic bullet” to winning a war.

The fixation on technological superiority and its associated gadgets has led to a decline in discipline, training, leadership and battle drills and subsequently, a neglect of the human and psychological dimensions of war. Soldiers are no longer prepared for battle. Their belief that their gadgets will allow them to win is a doomed appraisal of the coming battle. When their gadgets and technology fail, their fighting spirit rapidly declines, unit cohesion is lost and morale is negatively affected.

Whereas it can be argued that both strategy and gadgetry are focussed on achieving a defined goal, the two concepts employ vastly different approaches. On the modern battlefield, technology ought to be used to enhance tactics – and not to define strategy.

The character of warfare, present and future, is continually changing. These changes are brought about by the changing weaponry, technology, counter-measures and so forth. For soldiers to cope under these unpredictable circumstances, they need to be well-trained thus allowing them to make the necessary battlefield adjustments to survive and win the battles.

Despite all the technological advancements that have been made and the gadgets available, basic intelligence on the enemy is still lacking. This has led to planners misunderstanding the nature of the looming battle and underestimating the enemy. Appreciation and plans become based on guess work. Yet, the enemy appear to learn from their mistakes and they use technology to enhance their tactics – not to determine their strategy.

It is time for the modern military machine to go back to the very basics of warfare. The enemy, his weapons and combat capabilities need to be fully appreciated and understood. Battle appreciations and plans need to be based on realistic assessments of the fighting forces that will be committed to battle. Technology must be realistically factored into all tactical plans but it should never become the driving force behind the tactics.

Nor should “strategy” ever be substituted by “gadgetry”.

DISREGARDING THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

I recall having to study the principles of war – along with those of the different phases of war – during my various military courses, especially on the Combat Team and Battle Group commander’s courses. These principles are not something someone had just made up to ensure we had more work to study – although at the time, we suspected as much.

Grand strategy leads to military strategy. Military strategy aids in determining the doctrine. The implementation of the doctrine culminates in tactics – the art of deploying forces according to terrain and using their deployment, movement and firepower to overwhelm the enemy. To achieve success and to ensure that the battle is won, certain time-proven principles need to be employed.

Principles, in turn, are “battlefield philosophies” or “battlefield truths” that have been established over time to be vital in succeeding and surviving on the battlefield. But, when it comes to the general principles of war, these are derived from the political philosophy of the government the armed force serves.

When the state takes the decision to enter into a war, it ought to refrain from interfering in military matters as such interference can only hamper the military planners and commanders from attaining their aim. However, the political masters ought to lay down political guidelines that need to be factored into any military strategy and subsequent planning as the conflict remains an extension of the political policies (foreign policy) of the state. Thereafter, once politicians have committed to war, they should take a step back and leave the military to do what it is supposed to do best – go to war and win it. History is littered with cases where political intervention has simply prolonged the wars.

In order for an armed force to successfully carry out its mission, it should never rely purely on superior firepower, gadgets and technology. Nor should it ever base its plans on firepower alone as a poor plan cannot always be rectified by firepower alone. The unplanned, uncontrolled and uncoordinated use of firepower does not win wars.

Buzz-words lead to buzz-actions that serve little to no purpose when soldiers are under fire, out-manoeuvred and have lost the initiative.

Whereas the overall military strategy ought to be based on a well-defined military goal, it is a folly to attempt to achieve this too soon without thorough planning and preparation. Whereas it may look like a good idea to bomb the opposing president’s palace, and may even appear to look like a short-cut to winning the war, invariably it isn’t. This “shock-and-awe” approach is bound to create problems that were never foreseen by the planners and once the problems appear, they cannot be rapidly overcome. Such an action may also strengthen the national resolve of the enemy.

The different phases of war such as the advance, the advance to contact, the attack, the consolidation, the exploitation, the defence, the area domination and the withdrawal – all have principles that are vitally importance to success. Whereas the strict adherence to the principles will not guarantee a victory, they will ensure that detailed planning was done. Detailed planning allows for unforeseen contingencies on the battlefield to be rapidly overcome. It gives flexibility to commanders.

Soldiers who are lacking in basic training, discipline, poor leadership and inadequate command and control will not be able to win wars with technology and firepower alone. When their technology fails, they will find themselves in a vacuum they cannot easily extricate themselves from.