The numerous terror
attacks, violent (and non-violent) protests and riots, along with armed uprisings
Africa has— and is witnessing—are an indication that its security services—in
particular the intelligence services—are failing their governments, the
continent, and their people. Of course, these violent and non-violent actions
are moreover an indication of much deeper issues that governments need to give
attention to.
But, it is also an
indication that intelligence gained from open sources and allied intelligence
liaison holds little to no value for African governments as it is neither actionable
nor pre-emptive. In many instances this ‘allied intelligence’ is deceptive,
misleading, false and purely historical in nature despite being piously
referred to as ‘intelligence sharing’ aimed at ending conflicts and wars.
Instead, ‘intelligence’
is frequently used as a channel through which to disseminate fabricated
information to create a false sense of security—or exaggerate a threat—with the
hopes of eliciting and/or fermenting chaos or a heavy-handed government response.
(It is also used to discredit business threats or cast a doubt over people and
companies). In addition, the training given to African intelligence services by
their so-called allied partners is shockingly sub-standard and in many
instances, irrelevant and aimed at rendering them unable to fulfil even basic
intelligence collection operations, thus purposely setting them up for failure.
The dangers and risks
increase when false information is accepted as ‘intelligence’.
Even with the very best
security measures and procedures in place, a government that lacks intelligence
will be vulnerable to armed uprisings and/or terror threats.
In late-November 2015
sources reported to us that ‘a large terrorist action’ was going to happen
‘soon’ against a Western target/people somewhere in West Africa. We were,
however, unaware of where and what the target was as we had long since left
West Africa. But, if we were aware of a pending (terror) attack somewhere in
West Africa, what were the intelligence services in West Africa and in
particular the Burkina Faso intelligence service and its ‘partnership allies’
doing?
Such attacks are not
spontaneous acts of violence carried out by a group of disaffected people who
suddenly decide to commit an act of terror. These acts are planned over a
period of time and in the process, these groups use a host of different agents,
support agents, sympathisers, and radicals who are prepared—and sometimes willing
to die—to carry their message(s) across.
Social media is frequently
used to distribute instructions, issue warnings, pass on intelligence, and
messages and to mobilise their assets and supporters. Sympathetic NGOs, so-called
‘humanitarian organisations’, and other ‘peace loving’ and ‘democratic and freedom
seeking’ charities are occasionally used to move their weapons and equipment
and assist with distributing the armed protesters and/or terror groups’
propaganda.
But these groups
haemorrhage or leak information if only we are willing to make an effort to
capture it. Oftentimes, this leakage is very obvious and serves as a perfect
early warning of a pending attack.
This begs the question
when considering, for example, the attack in Burkina Faso: Where was the
intelligence that was supposed to identify that planned action or—at the very
least—warn of the potential danger or predict it? Where were the agents and
other sources that were supposed to identify such groups and their plans? Or is
this another case where the intelligence services were taught how to tie their
shoelaces instead of how to do their jobs?
The developing conflict
in Burundi is another case in point. Armed violence, criminality and terrorist
actions are planned in advance…and are NEVER spontaneous. Seldom are they
launched without large-scale foreign backing and support—as Cote d’Ivore demonstrated.
The lack of actionable
and predicted intelligence—or the inability and/or unwillingness of the
intelligence services to collect it—places the government at a severe
disadvantage and provides the enemy or threat with a multitude of advantages
and options. At times, actionable intelligence is discarded when it does not
match the perceived reality of the government or the recipient—or, as has
happened in the past, the intelligence is rejected by a so-called Western ally
as ‘nonsense’ and ‘rubbish’ only for it to come back and bite everyone. Blind
acceptance of misconceived allied assessments is a grave folly. (Sadly for
Africa, some of its so-called allies are silently working at destabelising
governments whilst trying to act the ‘good guys’).
Neglecting the
intelligence required to ensure the security of the nation and the longevity and
stability of a government and the state is both irresponsible and costing
Africa dearly. Instead, governments are increasingly faced with domestic and foreign-funded
anti-government forces (AGFs) and proxy forces intent on sowing terror and
creating chaos with the aim of destabelising entire countries and toppling
governments to ensure foreign control over their interests.
But conflicts and wars in
Africa are never ending—and indeed, will escalate over the coming years. As
long as intelligence is neglected and/or ignored—these actions will continue to
take governments by surprise. The collateral damage and humanitarian fallout from
these conflicts and wars is incalculable.
In early 2016, the United
Nations (UN) called for an estimated US$ 40bn annually to assist and support the growing number of people
requiring humanitarian aid. US Dollars Forty Billion. And apparently this is
not enough….as there is a US$ 15bn funding gap. Indeed, with that amount of
money annually and continually given over a 5-year period, most African
conflicts and wars could be over and the national armies, law enforcement
agencies, and intelligence services retrained and reequipped to be very
effective security forces. It is, after all, the many conflicts and wars that
have resulted in so many people requiring humanitarian aid.
But, as many in
Africa—especially those in the DRC, CAR, Cote d’Ivore, Darfur, Burundi, South Sudan, and
others—can testify, the UN is not exactly objective, trusted or able to live up
to its promises to protect the innocent and keep the peace. The little trust
there was in the UN is rapidly disappearing down a very deep hole. The
perception that the UN peacekeepers are nothing other than ‘tourists in
helicopters’ that commit crimes against the very people they need to protect will
intensify over time.
But, as long as African
governments continue to neglect their security structures and fail to collect
and act on intelligence, they will fail the continent and these funds will go
to organisations that exploit these tragedies to make money.
Ironically, these same
organisations condemn those who actually do something to end conflicts and
wars—probably because ending conflicts and wars is very bad for their business
and their control over African governments.
