As no two fragile or failed
states are the same, there can be no universal template to bring about positive
change or a reversal from the brink of collapse to a stable and prosperous
state. Rather, it requires a series of coordinated actions and activities to
bring about this change.
A
common sight in a fragile state…
However, when studying fragile
or failed states, there will be certain common characteristics that these
states share. In my previous posting, I listed several of the common
characteristics we have witnessed within certain fragile states we have worked
in.
When I look at the concept of
a state in Africa, I view it as a group of people (usually an ethnic, cultural
or religious majority) positioned to rule as a government within a defined
territory and implementing a defined constitution. Whether or not we view that
constitution as “good” or “bad” does not detract from the fact that that
grouping of people exercise influence over those who reside in that territory.
In turn, this influence - whether
positive or negative - can spill across national borders and impact on the
region. An example of influence impacting on a region is the current
instability witnessed in the Great Lakes region and its effect on several
neighbouring states.
We should not sugar-coat
problems simply to be politically-correct. Nor, I believe, should we try to be
politically-correct when large tracts of Africa are in crisis as we only
deceive ourselves and do a disservice to Africa. It does, however, depend on
who is defining the state as either fragile or failed and who stands to gain
what from the state in question’s collapse.
Africa has many examples of
states bordering on fragile and/or failed. It also has numerous examples of
states that are transitioning from a failed/fragile state to a more palatable
revolutionary government. However, some fragile or failed states have the
resources to turn the tide but are hampered from doing so by corruption,
tenderpreneurship and local, regional and international influences and pressures,
some overt and some not so overt.
As decolonisation wound down,
many government departments found themselves unable to cope with the lack of service-savvy
administrators. This void was rapidly filled by family and friends of the
ruling-party who had no training in what to do and/or how to do it. This
resulted in a decrease/collapse of essential services, including education. As
governments changed, so too did the personnel in these institutions. This lack
of continuity and experience has ultimately resulted in a lack of a
professional civil service coupled to a lack of accountability.
I firmly believe the
much-used/abused term of “nation-building” – when it has been passed to the
armed forces to accomplish - is nothing other than a blame-shifting exercise
where politicians do not want to take responsibility for their actions and
instead try to implicate the armed forces in the failure that will follow.
Rebuilding a fragile or failed
state is not the responsibility of the armed forces. The armed forces, in
support of the law enforcement agencies, need to create a climate of stability
and security to enable government departments and agencies to fulfil their
missions.
Therefore, assuming the state
is not engaged in a civil war, rectification requires inter alia the following:
1. Strong political
will that drives ever-improving governance
2. Reassessment of
Grand/National Strategy, National Security Strategies and Policies
3. Cross-party
political communication to reach consensus
4. Strong national
will
5. An acceptance of
accountability
6. Popular support ie recognition
of government legitimacy
7. Development of
national pride/patriotism
8. Refocused monetary
and fiscal policies
9. Attractive, secure
foreign investment opportunities
10. Establishment of
industries (creating job opportunities)
11. Increased and
improved service delivery
12. Increased
productivity
13. Increased and
improved (objective) law enforcement
14. An objective
judiciary
15. Improved
international perceptions/relations
16. Increased
effectiveness of - and pride in - the armed forces
17. Increased
effectiveness of intelligence services
18. A combination of
the above.
In order to efficiently manage
themselves, these states ought to:
1. Identify and
neutralise internal threat-drivers
2. Work at
neutralising external threat-drivers
3. Avoid appointing substandard
and incompetent “advisors”
4. Continually re-evaluate
national strategy and adjust where necessary
5. Increase legitimacy
of state
6. Focus efforts to
reduce/eradicate corruption
7. Find a balance
between austerity measures and reduce unnecessary government spending
8. Implement, develop
and expand affordable economic and political reforms
9. Increase efficiency
in terms of service delivery
10. Reduce violent and
non-violent political actions
11. Target programmes
aimed at increased education and poverty reduction and so forth.
It can be argued that many fragile
and failed states in Africa only have themselves to blame for the situation
they find themselves in – as they allowed it to happen whilst fostering a
culture of non-accountability. However, on closer inspection, a portion of the
blame can be laid before the door of regional and international forces.
Unless Africa takes
responsibility for itself and its leaders become accountable to the people they
govern, states will continue to find themselves on the cusp of fragile or failed
- or civil war - and the legacy left to our children will be shameful. However,
there is no quick fix – only hard work, dedication and positive commitment and drive.
But, Africa needs to start
somewhere before it is too late.
