“EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES” AND THE DARK NET

Almost two decades after closing its doors due to international pressure and concerns at its successful activities in support of legitimate under-siege African and other governments, Executive Outcomes (EO) continues to be used by conmen and criminals alike to serve their purposes – and deflect blame in my/our direction.

I have written about and exposed numerous of these conmen and criminals on countless occasions yet they seem to continually pop-up somewhere and by virtue of their actions, seem to imply that EO still exists and was/is involved in criminal activities – something the company never entertained. 

My attention was today brought to a company calling themselves “Executive Outcomes” who claim “to be the biggest gun retailer on the Dark Net. ‘Our shops and warehouses are located in Midwest U.S. and our international re-shippers are located in the following countries . . . ’ “

The Dark Net, also known as the Tor Project has some interesting funders and backers who purport to campaign for “liberty and free speech”. It is a pity these organisations don’t campaign for honesty and truth as well. See https://www.torproject.org/about/sponsors.html.en

Some information on this bogus company can be found on http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2512136/Its-just-child-porn-Fake-passports-guns-cocaine-hitmen-hire-clicks-away-internet.html

Also see http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/15/bitcoin-guns_n_3070828.html for more on this company.
I can only shake my head at these wannabes and conmen.

I suspect that it is no coincidence that they claim to be “Executive Outcomes”.

(RE)STRUCTURING AFRICAN ARMIES

The age of colonialism and the subsequent decolonisation of Africa along with the Cold War has long past and despite the geographical tragedies that occurred in terms of arbitrary borders, the continent needs to come to terms with itself. It also needs to take responsibility for both its internal and external security.

Africa can no longer afford to lay the blame for its woes outside of the continent. Whereas several of Africa’s problems may indeed originate from beyond its shores, countries need to review their national security strategies and act accordingly. Failure to do so simply renders them more vulnerable to the numerous threats and threat networks that are able to penetrate and exploit the numerous security lapses that exist.

Cooperation between the threats operating in Africa is increasing as criminal, insurgent and terrorist networks cross and even join paths. Indeed, in several places across Africa, criminal networks support insurgent and terror networks and visa versa and on occasion, they are part of the same threat network. In parts of Africa, they have morphed into proxy forces under the control of foreign governments. On occasion, foreign interests coincide with the aims of the threats and/or threat networks and either wittingly or unwittingly support these networks.

As the threats and the threat networks across the continent have increased, so too has Africa’s military capacity to deal with them been gradually reduced – due in part to a lack of focussed intelligence and foresight, incoherent strategies, incorrect structures, inadequate doctrine, substandard training and obsolete equipment. This slow decay becomes very difficult, costly and time consuming to reverse – time that is often not available.  Added to this has been the rise of ethnic and political tensions infused with religious extremism.

African countries need to strengthen their defensive and offensive intelligence gathering capabilities in order to provide early warning to strategists and planners. A strong intelligence capability will furthermore allow predictions to be made in terms of real or potential threats that may or will manifest themselves. This ought to act as a guideline in terms of organisational structures, training and equipment.

To enter into a conflict or a war implies a progressive move towards economic, political and populace exhaustion. This exhaustion becomes even more evident when the conflict or the war is allowed to drag on indefinitely due to a lack of actionable intelligence along with an inability of the armed forces to contain/destroy the threat and both military and civilian casualties increase and infrastructure and equipment is either damaged or destroyed. This damages the economy which is needed to sustain the efforts of the armed forces.

However, without wide intelligence coverage and a coherent strategy, the exhaustion is multiplied – especially if the means to achieve the ends are not present or the means are lacking in ability, equipment and the political and national will is eroded or non-existent.

The primary problem however lays with the means: most African armies are organisational clones of their once colonial masters or their later East Bloc allies. This has resulted in incorrect organisational structures, incorrect training, inadequate doctrine, terrain and enemy-irrelevant TTPs and incorrect – often obsolete - equipment and so forth.

An incorrect organisational structure that is poorly prepared and postured prohibits rapid deployment and response and is usually accompanied by cumbersome command and control lines, inadequate logistics, inadequate personnel administration and that, in turn, impacts on morale and forces armies to become reactive as opposed to proactive.

The current structures most African armies follow are not conducive to rapid deployment or focussed effort. We have proven the concept that smaller, more agile units, correctly structured and trained and well-led are able to manoeuvre at speed – if they have the necessary assets at their disposal. These forces are able to operate independently and yet rapidly regroup to form a larger, very aggressive, efficient and potent fighting force.

Whether mechanised, motorised, riverine or air delivered, these forces are able to conduct numerous offensive tasks from a single large-scale conventional attack to smaller swarm attacks, COIN operations, raids and ambushes and so forth. It is this very concept that allows for the relentless pursuit of an enemy force.

This structure furthermore enables dispersed defence, forcing any enemy to attack over a very wide front whilst simultaneously dispersing his forces and exposing them to numerous flank and swarm attacks.

Unfortunately, many African armies have tried to clone foreign armies or have been ill-advised and misled in terms of intelligence, strategy, organisational structure, training, equipment and other related defence and security issues. Additionally, African armies have become very political in terms of appointments and missions. In turn, this has allowed numerous threats to be ignored, misjudged and subsequently not taken seriously until it has become almost too late. It has also resulted in a hesitancy to adapt their forces to deal with the current and future threat networks.

However, these remain mere factors that are often overlooked but that impact negatively on the abilities of African armies to achieve mission success.

For African armed forces to engage a threat or a threat network efficiently, rapidly and with economy of force, serious consideration needs to be given to restructuring the armies and training and equipping them accordingly.

BLACKLISTED? WHY AM I NOT SURPRISED??

Several senior African government representatives who have recently come through my door have told me that they have been “instructed” and “warned” not to meet or talk with me/STTEP by the “US Government”. But, they also tell me that for too long they have been misled and will now meet with whomever they wish to meet. Like me, they too believe that African governments have a rightful say in terms of who they want to talk to and get advice from and not be dictated to whom - and who not - they may talk to. (See my previous posting titled “HYPOCRISY AND THE POWER OF PERCEPTION”).

Then I recalled that several years ago, a senior US officer said to me: “If you are not with us, you are against us – if you’re against us, then you are the enemy. It is as simple as that”. I shrugged off this comment as it merely smacked of playground bullying. Little did I realise just how prophetic his words would become. By implication, no one is allowed to criticise anything the US does in Africa – even when it fails dismally - as it seems criticism is now construed as “terrorism”.

Earlier this week, I had a conversation with someone in the US who told me that during a discussion with a congressman it had been emphatically stated that STTEP has been blacklisted by the US Department of State (DoS). We are now “persons of interest”. We are now placed in the same category as subversive groups. Was I surprised? No, not really.

But, I suppose that makes anyone who speaks to us or is in any manner or form associated with us also “persons of interest” and therefore attempts will be made to blacklist them as well. 

I was aware of the fact that the FBI had spent time, money and effort investigating a totally legitimate contract a US company had with STTEP so I knew that for some reason we were considered as “unsavoury” in their eyes. We also know the US company was threatened if they did not terminate the contract with us. Was the US concerned that we were about to succeed and that questions would then be asked and which they would not be able to answer?

One does not have to be a rocket scientist to see certain indications and footprints on the ground and then be able to make a fairly accurate prediction of what is coming. These predictions are usually correct – and they hold no good for Africa. The examples are there to see for anyone who follows happenings in Africa.

As I was told earlier this week: “In times of universal deceit, the truth is a revolutionary act”. We have been there, done that and patiently waited for the truth to surface – which it now finally seems to be doing.

I often wonder if US citizens are aware of the duplicitous nature of US foreign policy in Africa? I am sure that many would disapprove if they really knew and understood what was happening. I know that many US servicemen are equally alarmed at what is happening but they go where their government orders them to go. We understand that as we too have walked that path. We also know that many fine US citizens are really keen and willing to invest more than just talk to make Africa work and conflicts end. Conversely, we are also aware of the immense anger, distrust and dislike that is gradually building up against the US from numerous quarters in Africa. We are privy to that on an almost daily basis. When I mentioned our being blacklisted to an ambassador this morning, his response was “Then it proves you are doing something right - don’t stop!”

One would therefore think that as the US is trying to win friends they would not make such an effort to alienate people who simply disagree with them.

Recently, one of our directors was apprehended on arrival in the US after “babysitting” a US NGO in a conflict zone. He was subject to a lengthy interrogation and his laptop was confiscated and sucked dry. If they were so keen to know what was on his laptop, all they had to do was ask but instead, he was treated like a criminal. Two subsequent “interviews” have since followed. Since the return of his laptop, it has never been the same. It appears the DoS even regards Africans who assist US citizens and NGOs as threats to US national security.

We have again become the “bad guys” despite the fact that neither EO (1989 – 1996) and later STTEP (2006 -) had and have never acted illegally – although we were constantly subject to such untrue claims by those who wanted the conflicts to continue - never invaded countries but were always invited there by the governments, worked alongside government forces, were/are always accountable to the contracting government, never attempted to depose governments, always fulfilled our contracts, never raped women and children, never smuggled opium or any other drugs, never lied to and/or cheated a government, never murdered civilians, never bribed or blackmailed government officials into giving us a contract, actually ended long-running conflicts rapidly, always been honest with African governments, never engaged in criminal behaviour, never engaged in acts of terrorism against the US or any other government and so forth. This appears to be simply a continuation of trying to prevent an African company that has a record of success of working in Africa and solving African problems. That right is apparently solely reserved for the US DoS despite the fact that success remains sadly elusive for them and that destruction and destabilisation in Africa will continue to be their legacy.

This may also explain the reason my blog’s comments are being tampered with and on occasion blocked or deleted before I can post and respond to them.

Be that as it may – STTEP and I will never give up on Africa as we were born here and will die here. We love our Continent despite its many problems which we are very well aware of. I believe we understand those problems better than most who live beyond our shores.

If it is the desire of US DoS or any other foreign government to promote conflict in Africa, we will criticise that approach and when we are asked by the targeted African governments, we will work at ending conflicts and trying to see this wealthy continent flourish.

If our desire to see a peaceful, prosperous and successful Africa has resulted in us being blacklisted by the US, then so be it. At least, we now know where we stand.

But, if we stand for nothing, we will fall for anything.

We are not prepared to do that.

We will leave that to the so-called superpower which is now fast losing its power in Africa.

LET US NEVER FORGET…

Today marks the Day of Remembrance – also known as Armistice Day or Poppy Day - a memorial day that Commonwealth countries have observed since the end of World War I to in honour of those servicemen who fell in the line of duty.

 

On this day I remember those who died on active service as members of the South African Defence Force and of course, those men from Executive Outcomes who died trying to make Africa a better place. You will never be forgotten. 

 

Let us remember them with the words of Robert Laurence Binyon's poem "For the Fallen":

They went with songs to the battle, they were young,
Straight of limb, true of eye, steady and aglow.
They were staunch to the end against odds uncounted,
They fell with their faces to the foe.

They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old;
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We will remember them.

 

Let us never forget the sacrifices that were made for us.

HYPOCRISY AND THE POWER OF PERCEPTIONS

I wrote this piece in response to “Mark from Utah” who sent me a private mail lambasting both myself and STTEP. Unfortunately, he has yet to discover the spell checker on his computer or learn to write without having to resort to blasphemy and swearing. As for South Africans having no right to work in Africa, you are obviously wired to the moon. I thank you for your negligible contribution, Mark.

 

For helping legitimate African governments with political and military advice and training, my men and I are frequently branded as “mercenaries” by some in the media and some foreign non-African governments. There is an old adage “Sticks and stones may break my bones…”

When foreign companies do the same – they are “Private Military Contractors” (PMCs).

Ironically, we are not – and have never been - part of an invasion force intent on occupying an African country. We are invited to African countries by the legitimate governments who believe and know that we will not deceive them or come with a hidden agenda. It is, after all, the right of any government to decide who they wish to use to assist them – and not the right of the media or a foreign government to dictate who they may or may not use.

We have never killed innocent civilians, raped women, destroyed property or involved ourselves in any criminal acts such as antiquity and resource/mineral smuggling, weapon smuggling, human trafficking and such. We have not entered those countries that asked for help with an agenda other than ending the conflicts and saving innocents – but that apparently makes us the “bad guys”.

We have never wasted a client government’s money, abandoned them, played both sides of the fence, broken their trust or run away from their problems. Nor have we ever tried to sell them over-priced obsolete equipment that has no role to play in their conflicts.

As Africans, we have both a duty and a right to assist governments that wish to bring about stability – especially if they have asked for our help. That stability is to the advantage of our entire continent. I believe our working in Africa carries more validity than that of the many “one-week wonders” we have encountered in our travels across the continent. I suppose the next move will be an attempt to prohibit all South African companies from operating in Africa.

Yes, we served in our country’s armed forces and as such some of us operated in foreign countries – much as US and European forces do today. The armed forces do not chose where they will be deployed. However, the SADF’s pre-emptive strikes were condemned by the very governments that today follow similar policies. As an instrument of policy, the armed forces go where they are sent as part of the larger grand strategy of the State.

As we work at actually assisting African governments end their conflicts as rapidly and economically as possible, we are condemned. For assisting African governments achieve stability and end conflicts or terrorism, we attract the wrath of those who wish these actions, along with the slaughter of innocents, to continue despite preaching the opposite. Our record of success speaks volumes as far as I am concerned. Indeed, it has never been equalled. But, to prevent a client government or corporation from having to contend with the hostility that usually follows if we are used, we are now forced to do what we do in secret.

Despite the media lies that followed EO around, pushing destabilisation agendas and attempting to ensure the longevity of African rebel and terrorist groups, we have never been paid in oil, diamonds or any other mineral. I have yet to see the numerous mining concessions that the media, the UN and some foreign governments have claimed I/we were and are being paid with. Ironically, these perceptions still follow us around – despite being nothing other than cheap lies to advance criminal and rebel groups along with terrorism.

Fortunately, many of those “journalists” who so willingly sold their lies and souls to the media are now either without work or have been disgraced – one even very recently - for being caught out peddling other people’s agendas. The specialists who provided expert knowledge on EO have all been proven wrong – as will those who provide “expert” insights into STTEP.

We are not hired and paid for by our government to promote or push South Africa’s foreign policy – unlike many foreign PMCs. This however places us on a very un-level playing field as we are forced to compete with “free” offers. Sometimes we win, many times we don’t. Ironically, governments that accept these free offers usually end up losing their countries anyway.

We do not interfere with the agendas and foreign interests of outside governments – unless those interests coincide with fermenting unrest and promoting armed violence. More than anything, that puts us on the wrong side. Even the FBI have involved themselves in investigating us.

It is encouraging to note that some African governments are beginning to question the hypocrisy and attempts at creating false perceptions practised by some.

If nothing else, that is a good place to start.

THANK YOU MILITARY ACADEMY

The Military Academy is an educational training unit of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) that houses the Faculty of Military Science of the University of Stellenbosch. As an institution, it offers undergraduate university education along with Professional Military Development for career-orientated officers.  Having successfully completed their undergraduate studies, the students are awarded a B Mil degree from University of Stellenbosch. 

The Academy, additionally, works at developing the SANDF’s future leaders and plays an important role in preparing and shaping the SANDF’s future leadership corps and equipping them with knowledge and insight to cope in dynamic and complex environments.

I was therefore greatly honoured to be invited by Professors Abel Esterhuyse and Francois Vrey to discuss my thoughts on conflict and war in Africa with the third-year strategy students at the Military Academy. My visit would be a quick one: an early morning flight to Cape Town and a return back to Johannesburg that afternoon.

My friend Mich and his colleague Botha met me on arrival and we had some time to catch up since we last saw one another during the drive to Saldanha.

Having never been to the Academy, it was both an eye-opener and a very enjoyable experience for me. What struck me most was the manner in which I was welcomed and the friendliness of everyone who I met and interacted with.

Having introduced me to his audience – which included not only the strategy students but other members of the Faculty as well as some members of 4 Reconnaissance Regiment - Prof Vrey handed me the floor and I was able to discuss my thoughts on conflict and war in Africa.

 Prof Francois Vrey (right) and I after the discussion

Most encouraging though were the questions asked after my discussion. Even more encouraging was the fact that most if not all members of the audience seem to realise and understand what is truly happening on our continent – and expressed their concerns both during question time and in private. These questions covered a range of topics from EO to current operations and why Africa is experiencing the problems we read about each day.

The comments even extended to the ICC and the question of who was indeed the greatest war criminal of modern times and who was most responsible for the slaughter of innocent civilians – an African warlord or a President who has hidden the slaughter of thousands of innocents under the guise of “collateral damage”.

As a token of thanks, Prof Vrey presented me with a book he and Prof Abel had edited – “On Military Culture”. Printed by UCT Press, the book is a welcome addition to my library.

 

Lunch was taken in the officer’s mess where Professor Very and I were subject to more questions – and some concerns - from the strategy students.

I left the Military Academy with a belief that if the final-year students are a reflection of our future officer corps, we are certainly on the road to improvement. I can but only hope that their new-found knowledge will be sought by others and not been seen as a threat by some senior officers.

My thanks to the Military Academy for giving me the opportunity to speak to the students and the other attending members. It was truly a privilege.

My thanks also to Mich and Botha for getting me there and back in time to catch my flight.

VERY SHORT NOTES ON STRATEGY

The phrase “If we don’t know where we are going, we can be sure we will never know how to get there” essentially refers to an absence of a strategy. However, the term “strategy” appears to have become confusing, misleading and frequently misused.

As I often find myself engaged in assisting with the development of strategies, I realise how difficult it must be for our clients to grapple with a subject that is both vague and unknown and that has, along the way, lost its true meaning.

I also find it incredibly sad that so many of the senior officials I engage with have been incorrectly educated as to what strategy really is and what its aim is. However, I cannot blame them as even when they want to discover more on this apparently vague concept, they revert to the internet which is fraught with numerous misleading articles on strategy and pages and pages of gobbledygook.

Strategy is neither an operational design nor a tactical plan – although these two concepts form an integral part in the implementation of strategy. It is therefore somewhat surprising to find that many label a very basic plan as a “strategy” or believe that strategy is the same as “tactics” – which it is not.

In its most simple form, strategy is a disciplined, intellectual, intelligence-driven exercise that ought to give us a guideline roadmap that will enable us to reach our ultimate desired destination or end state. This guideline roadmap may have several options or alternatives that can be used to get to our desired end-goal but it will need constant assessment of the risks enroute and readjustments as new intelligence becomes available on the opportunities, obstacles and other possibilities that present themselves. However, it must remain realistic.

This requires having to make choices – sometimes challenging ones – determine and prioritise objectives, identify and appreciate risks and how best to reduce them and make alliances and compromises to our advantage.  

The guideline roadmap must remain flexible (to be flexible we need options) and allow us to predict, exploit, defend and bypass all opportunities and threats, thus allowing us to reach our desired end destination or achieve our desired end state.

National strategy is, therefore, about determining and deciding on realistic options to achieve a desired future condition or future state and knowing how best to achieve it. By implication, it provides governmental direction to achieve the national political objectives in a complex, ever-evolving and dynamic strategic environment. This allows us to work at achieving our desired end goal with the resources we have – or are planning to acquire.

If, for example, we are developing a National Security Strategy (NSS), our strategy will be focussed on supporting the National Strategy and securing, strengthening and protecting the integrity of the state along with its interests and will therefore be influenced by factors such as:

1.     The National Strategy and its subsequent policies

2. The international view ie how we perceive the world and how we want the world to perceive us
3. The regional view ie how we want the region to perceive us and how we perceive the region
4. The national view ie how we want our citizenry to perceive the state
5. Our interests ie what is important to the state both nationally and internationally
6. The threats that may impact on our interests and national security.

In its most basic form, our NSS is expressed in terms of realistic ENDS, WAYS and MEANS. These three concepts relate to:

1. Our desired realistic END goal or end state
2. The approaches and concept routes (options) ie the application of instruments that will allow us to determine the WAY to meet the ENDS
3. The MEANS we have available ie the instruments of power including the capabilities, assets and resources we have to achieve our security objectives and goals

This approach will tell us how we need to organise and structure ourselves to accomplish our goals. Furthermore, it will allow us to identify any strategic deficiencies we may have and how these deficiencies can be exploited by hostile forces or how we need to overcome them.

For our NSS to succeed, it must be aligned with the strategies of other government agencies and departments to ensure unity of effort to achieve a common end-state.

The validity of our strategy must be tested against the relevant principles.

The invisible thread that ties the ENDS, WAYS and MEANS together is known as “doctrine” – a set of time-proven procedures, rules and policies that tell us “how” to do things and not “what” to do. Doctrine is however a guide to action and must not prevent or restrict our ability to think, analyse and adapt.

To strengthen, support and enable the implementation of the NSS, assessment and consideration must be given to:

1. Operations by other government agencies/departments
2. Political warfare operations
3. Economic warfare operations
4. Strategic warfare operations and so forth.

Strategy is seldom, if ever, tied to a specific timeframe. Rather, it is expressed in terms of short-, medium- and long-term objectives and goals.

Another misconception is that strategy is something we need to hurriedly develop simply to have a strategy and that it remains forever relevant. Nothing could be further from the truth as it remains under constant review and is continually adapted and expanded on as new intelligence flows in and new options present themselves.

If no strategy exists, it may take several months – or longer - to develop a very basic strategic outline. However, it is and will remain an on-going process and a critical component of a state’s aspirations.

Ultimately, a national strategy is about how the country’s leadership will use its instruments of influence and power, along with its assets and resources to meet its desired political objectives and achieve its desired end state.