About Me

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I saw active service in conventional, clandestine and covert units of the South African Defence Force. I was the founder of the Private Military Company (PMC) Executive Outcomes in 1989 and its chairman until I left in 1997. Until its closure in 1998, EO operated primarily in Africa helping African governments that had been abandoned by the West and were facing threats from insurgencies, terrorism and organised crime. EO also operated in South America and the Far East. I believe that only Africans (Black and White) can truly solve Africa’s problems. I was appointed Chairman of STTEP International in 2009 and also lecture at military colleges and universities in Africa on defence, intelligence and security issues. Prior to the STTEP International appointment, I served as an independent politico-military advisor to several African governments. Until recently, I was a contributing editor to The Counter Terrorist magazine. All comments in line with the topics on this blog are welcome. As I consider this to be a serious look at military and security matters, foul language and political or religious debates will not be entertained on this blog.

Thursday, March 19, 2009

HAS THE WAR ON DRUGS BEEN LOST?

Despite the so-called war on drugs, the world is seeing a rapid rise in illegal drug production, drug trafficking and above all, an increase in the power and influence of the drug syndicates and cartels. Human mules are increasingly being used to slip through porous borders and even not-so-porous borders. Drug crops continue to expand and grow. Within the African markets, the popularity of cocaine is becoming, by far, the most popular and lucrative drug. Yet, everyone seems quite content to talk about it and do as little as possible or, do just enough to look as though they are actually doing something.

Latin America, Africa and the Far East are becoming increasingly active in the drug trade, these “products” making their way to the US and Europe. Just how much of the proceeds from this crime are being invested into terrorism is not officially known. But, it is known that the illegal weapons trade makes use of the same routes, possibly indicating a larger involvement of terrorist organisations.

Many African countries offer unmonitored coastlines, poorly paid officials, porous borders, inadequate training, and booming informal markets.

South Africa and West Africa in particular are becoming progressively more open to the illegal drugs trade and currently act as major transit routes. Senegal in particular has been targeted by Columbian drug lords due to its well-developed transport and telecommunications networks. Ironically, we know it, speak about it and yet do nothing.

At home, our Minister of Intelligence, Siyabonga Cwele’s wife has been implicated in an international drug trafficking scandal. Ironically, the Minister’s spokesman has said that the honourable member will make it a “priority” to investigate the allegations against his wife. But, these allegations most probably will quietly die away – as they usually do, despite what appears to be overwhelming evidence.

According to UN estimates, 50 tons of cocaine alone a year, worth almost $2-billion at European wholesale prices, passes through West Africa. This exceeds the national income of some countries. At present, the amount of illegal drugs being routed through South Africa is unknown – and if anyone does know, they are not talking.

The production of cocaine has surged across Latin America. The Andes “exports” more than 750 tons of cocaine a year. In the process, peasants are pushed off their lands, gang wars have become part of daily life, state officials and institutions seem powerless. This, in turn, has unleashed a wave of violence, terror, population displacements, corruption and above all, power to the cartels.

According to media reports, more than 6 000 people were killed as a result of drug-related violence in Mexico last year. Thus far, more than 1 000 have lost their lives this year. Large tracts of Mexico are, by all accounts, under siege as the cartels brazenly take on the government forces. This violence is steadily creeping towards the USA.

Astonishingly, the European Union and some Latin American countries are calling for a strategy that calls for “harm reduction” measures. This “strategy” will look at elements such as legalising marijuana and assistance with needle exchanges. Such “strategies” are further proof that the war on drugs is either being lost or is simply a fallacy.

The know-how and technology exist to locate and neutralise an enemy soldier. The technology to intercept phone calls, emails and such like is also available. The ability and skill to train and deploy agents and either infiltrate syndicates and cartels or penetrate them is there. The capability to monitor illegal aircraft flights is available. Covert or discretionary warfare strategies and tactics to attack the dealers, syndicates and cartels exist, yet none of this is used. Instead, governments faff around and act as though nothing is happening or express concern but worry about taking action lest it be construed as politically incorrect. Some governments sadly appear only too keen to appease the syndicates and cartels.

Western intelligence services have also happily supported – and in some instances even protected – drug lords and their cartels with the belief that this would lead to a reciprocal assistance in terms of intelligence. But, this has not been the case as the cartels have exploited the intelligence services and given very little, if anything, in return. Where they have played a role, it was in exposing their competition. An attitude of my enemy’s friend is also my friend does not always yield positive results.

In a world where even drug trafficking seems to have become politically correct at the expense of law abiding citizens, it is an astonishing phenomenon to witness. Of course, there are those that argue that people are growing, producing and trafficking drugs because of their economic circumstance. Such a strawman argument implies that anyone who is economically disadvantaged may commit crime, due to his or her circumstance.

The reach of this criminal activity is far and wide. Countries, communities and families are all targeted. Raking in billions of dollars annually, the ultimate aim of many cartels is that of power and control. They smilingly pose for photographs with heads of state – the gilt-framed photographs adorn their office walls for all to see. They count influential people as their friends and supporters. They have the money to buy whatever they wish – even the law. This gives them a sense of being untouchable and in a manner of speaking, they are.

Fighting the illegal drug trade requires a strong strategy – a strategy that governments will not be afraid to implement, regardless of the human rights of the dealers, syndicates and cartels. It, additionally, requires a genuine desire to eradicate the problem. If the drug wars are to be won, it requires determination from governments to do exactly that. This requires courage and national will – character traits few governments seem to have.

It is time for governments to either take the politically correct avenue and legalise drugs or do the correct thing and fight it in order to stop it. If the decision is made to destroy this trade, then strong action is called for. This action should call for an intensification of real intelligence gathering and hard action to attack and destroy the dealers, syndicates and cartels.

But, at present, it is obvious that the current war against the drug trade has failed dismally. If anything, it has made the syndicates and cartels stronger, more brazen and wealthier.

This is indeed a very strange way to fight a war.


My next posting will take a brief look at physical security.

Added on 19 March 2009: And so it continues - http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/269419

Added on 20 March 2009: It just gets worse…see http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7-1442_2488987,00.html, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1163468/Spanish-police-seize-42-piece-dinner-set--entirely-cocaine.html, http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7-1442_2488985,00.html and
http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7-1442_2488915,00.html One consolation is that at least some busts are being made.

Added on 23 March 2009: It just gets worse… http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7-1442_2490222,00.html

Friday, March 13, 2009

REASSESSING SECTION TACTICS WITH THE 20mm PAW

I recently had the opportunity to visit a South African weapons-developer who has designed and built a 20mm Personal Assault Weapon (PAW). The light-weight, shoulder-fired, semi-automatic and devastating 20 x 42mm PAW can – accurately - deliver a variety of 20mm rounds onto a target some 1000m distant. Using either a 7-shot box-magazine or a 6-shot drum-magazine, this weapon has the potential to become an enemy’s worst nightmare.

The PAW weighs in at 6kgs and has the recoil of a 12-gauge shotgun. This is due to the unique recoil-mitigation system that was developed to enable either left-handed or right-handed firing of the weapon. Although it boasts a range of 1000m, it is not always that easy to engage a target at that distance. However, supplementing the section/squad firepower, the PAW will easily allow effective and accurate fire at a range of 800m.


I am a firm believer that terrain is the primary driver of tactics. Furthermore, I believe that tactics should continue to evolve as we get to know and understand the enemy and his weapon systems better. Lessons learnt in combat ought, additionally, to be a contributing factor to our evolving tactics and battlecraft. The arrival of the 20mm PAW will, however, drastically change the combat landscape.

I believe the weapon system should be used at section (squad) level along with the 40mm MGL – another good weapon which is also made in South Africa. Along with the section machinegun, these two weapons are capable of delivering accurate and devastating firepower onto any objective. In turn, this allows for several “new” options during fire-and-manoeuvre.

The weapon can be used in a variety of environments such as open terrain, bush terrain, urban warfare, mountain warfare, and long-range convoy or vehicle ambushes and so on. It is furthermore not restricted to a specific type of operation. It also gives the Infantry section the ability to engage low-flying aircraft and helicopters.
In brief, this is a devastating weapon. I believe that if correctly used, it will enable the infantry section to lay down fire-intensity that has, till now, been unheard of.

Wednesday, March 4, 2009

CONSIDERING THE USE OF A PMC OR A PSC

I have always advocated the use of a Private Military Company (PMC) or a Private Security Company (PSC) above that of the UN or a foreign armed force’s training teams. The recent revelations of UN corruption and sexual abuse towards those they have undertaken to protect has simply strengthened my thoughts on the matter.

My belief is that the professional PMC/PSC comes with no political strings attached, views its mission as a matter of honour, is subject to the laws of the contracting country and is contracted to achieve an agreed aim within a defined time.

The predicament many governments face lies in selecting the PMC/PSC - which company is professional and which is not. Which company has a credible history and not one consisting of fantasy? Which company will place its mission first – above its commercial interests? Which company will, regardless of the circumstances, deliver what it promises? Which company can substantiate its track-record with facts as opposed to bluster, false propaganda and lies? Do they subscribe to a high standard of training and advice and follow a strict code of conduct?

Adding to this problem is that there has been an unprecedented growth in PMCs and PSCs. But, as with all businesses, there are those that can add value to any contract they undertake. But there are also those companies that aspire to be PMCs or PSCs but are lacking in expertise, experience and any semblance of a reputation.

These imposters prey on vulnerable governments and/or corporations in Africa and the East. They cannot give a government sound advice on strategy or tactics. They have no real experience or expertise in the field they claim to be specialists in. Their conduct in the field is despicable. They ascribe to the lowest possible training standards. In short, they are fly-by-night con-artists who are out to make a quick buck at the expense of their client. In this process of deception and incompetence, they tarnish the reputation of the PMCs and PSCs who are able to deliver on their promises.

Some newly-established PMCs/PSCs scour the market place looking for people with a reputation to add to their list of contacts/associates/partners and directors in order to use these names to open doors for them. They believe that these names will bring in the business. They use these names to develop proposals on their behalf and then end up selling the proposals as their own work or without the permission or knowledge of the author. With this lack of honour towards those who they rope in to assist themselves, imagine their lack of honour towards their clients.

A number of PMCs/PSCs are sponsored by Western governments who have motives that are not always obvious. These PMCs become their favoured companies to use – and they act on behalf of the sponsoring government’s foreign policy and also act as intelligence fronts. They are not there to help clients but rather to advance their government’s agendas – usually to the detriment of the client-government.

I, like many others, know of some PMCs and PSCs out there, that thrive on false track records. They use the histories of companies they have never been involved with – and use the track-records of those companies on their glamorous brochures and smart websites in order to dupe governments and corporations into employing them. They claim to have “24-hour crisis response centres” – which don’t exist. The end result is that they cannot accomplish what they undertook to deliver or were contracted to do. They can (sometimes) talk the talk but are unable to walk the walk.

Perhaps the time has come to expose those companies that pose as Private Military Companies and Private Security Companies. It is time to name and shame those that make false claims to the detriment of their clients. It is time to stop those irresponsible companies that are ruthlessly exploiting under-siege governments and in the process damaging a very important industry. It is time the real PMCs stood up and cleaned up the industry, instead of waiting for the media or a foreign government to make that exposure.

I am sure that under-siege governments would welcome knowing who they can trust to deliver a professional service that will serve their interests and who to stay away from. As long as the poser companies are allowed to continue with their nefarious activities, governments will be left wondering.

Given the bad publicity that PMCs and PSCs have attracted within certain segments of the media – and not all of it has been unfair - a house-cleaning operation will not bring about much of a change. Anti-PMC/PSC sentiments will forever remain, especially by the UN, NGOs and multi-nationals with hidden agendas. But, if the industry is cleaned up from within, their calls for action against the industry will simply be hollow.

Saturday, February 28, 2009

IS OUR MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN CRISIS?

I recall as a young officer how the subject of “Leadership” was always part of any military course curriculum. It was an aspect of military training that was given very serious attention. It later became a way of life to many young SADF officers and NCOs during combat operations where we were expected to lead 17- and 18-year olds into battle. We were expected to lead by example, never ask more of our men than we were capable of, always accept responsibility for the actions of our men and above all, make sure our planning would achieve the overall mission.

Along with our NCOs, we became the “father” and “mother” of all men under our command. We were expected to protect them at all costs and we often did – even when we knew our men were in the wrong. We supplemented our leadership with discipline and training – and leading from the front. When things went wrong, our men looked to us for guidance and their safety. When we were in the wrong, we were hauled over the coals by our company or battalion commanders – a most unpleasant experience.

This approach to leading men was something that was entrenched into us, assisted sometimes with a good kick up the backside. It could be found from platoon- to battalion level and within combat teams and battle groups. It was very evident at small-team level and during covert operations. It was also occasionally found at theatre-level. But sadly, it ended there as many of us were to realise.

Although it can be argued that the South African political leadership - prior 1994 - was to some extent coerced by foreign pressure into the actions it took, they also prepared themselves to jump ship with alacrity. Thus, I can only suspect that they also suffered a serious lack of moral fibre. Added to this wide streak of yellow was a distinct lack of a grand strategy – and the desire of some of the politicians to rather see themselves as soldiers, despite the fact that their military experience was, in one instance, limited to singing in a choir.

The fact is that South Africa needed to change its internal policies – many in the military agreed with that. What we did not agree with was the wholesale betrayal and lack of leadership displayed by politicians and generals alike. Whereas some politicians wanted to be generals and tried to dictate military strategy, the converse was also very evident. Some generals wanted to be politicians and in the process were prepared to ignore their military duties and ingratiate themselves with the politicians. This sad state of affairs removed any chance of the military remaining apolitical in terms of the government and the citizens of South Africa, regardless of their political persuasion.

The Chief of the South African Army, Genl Solly Shoke recently admitted in a press conference (13 Feb 2009) that the Army had made some serious mistakes with regard to training. He also expressed his concern at the lack of discipline in the Army. But these problems lie not with the soldiers – they lie with the leaders of the Army, including Genl Shoke himself. The soldiers can only be as good as their leaders. It is one thing to blame soldiers for their poor discipline and lack of training but where did the problem start? And what did their leaders do to rectify these problems?

This sad state of affairs has, furthermore, manifested itself as a breakdown of command and control. Recently, the Pretoria High Court, in an unprecedented judgement, ordered the SANDF to do its job properly. (http://jv.news24.com/Beeld/Suid-Afrika/0,,3-975_2476192,00.html) Actions such as these are cause for extreme concern and ought to immediately rectified.

But, from where I am sitting, I see this as a problem not only confined to South Africa or Africa.

The West is currently going through a rather serious crisis. The results of Global War on Terror (GWOT), coupled to the global economic meltdown will, despite what many say, be felt for years to come. It is especially in times such as these that politicians need to show leadership. It, however, appears to me as though the Western democracies are lacking in courage, direction and leadership. This has led to a floundering of foreign policy and a lack of strategic direction.

The division and disarray that exists at the political level seems to be permeating through to the military level. Adding further confusion is the desire of politicians, once they have committed the armed forces, to interfere in military strategies and the execution of tactics. But soldiers need effective leadership, discipline, training and above all, the support of their political masters. When this support is lacking, leadership becomes feeble and problematic.

In a world where foreign policies are based on appeasement and accommodation and the exploitation of emotions, the development of guilt among the strong, and a hatred for political systems, it is to be expected that the military will become part of this policy.

When a lack of political courage, direction and leadership manifests itself, its effects are dramatic on the military. Military leadership then becomes a system that follows its own appeasement and accommodation – the results of which could be disastrous.

Monday, February 23, 2009

THE PHENOMENON OF CHILD SOLDIERS

According to the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of a Child, any person who has not yet reached the age of 15 years and partakes in an armed conflict is defined as a “child soldier”. Sadly, this criterion is simply ignored by many. In 2002, an optional UN protocol came into effect; it declared that State Parties should take all “feasible measures to ensure that persons below the age of 18 do not take a direct part in hostilities and that they are not compulsorily recruited into their armed forces".

When Executive Outcomes (EO) was operating in Sierra Leone in 1996, we tried very hard to get members of the media to give coverage to the child-soldiers fighting in that conflict. Sadly, this did not interest them as they were apparently more concerned at finding reasons to get EO out of that country so that the rebels could continue with their orgy of violence. We also appealed to the UN on this issue but they seemingly did not understand their own conventions and protocols on children. The men, however, continued to do what they could to get the children out of the firing-line and help the process of rehabilitating them. These efforts applied to both government and rebel forces. For this, EO was given a certificate of appreciation by the Sierra Leone organisation “Children Associated with the War”.

But, the use of children in war is nothing new. Indeed, children have been soldiers and casualties in most, if not all wars. Modern media reporting, however, makes it easier to highlight their plight on television and in the printed media. But, these children that have been robbed of their innocence are not a phenomenon unique to Africa.

The vast majority of these children are forcibly acting as “trigger-men” and “cannon-fodder” after being brutally inducted into war by torture, rape, threats, murder, and so forth. They are given real guns and told to kill whoever stands in their paths. As an example, in Sierra Leone, boys were forced to rape their mothers or sisters before killing their parents. There is no clear chance to escape and any attempt at escaping is met with extreme violence, torture and even death.

Once inducted into their life of murder and mayhem, they are easily influenced by their “leaders” and peers. Killing becomes a way of life. However, when they are in the opposite trenches trying to kill those who wish to stop them, they become valid battlefield targets – and often lose life and limb without understanding the reason for their being there. Those that survive, suffer enormous emotional trauma.

Estimates are that approximately between 250 000 and 300 000 children are currently serving as soldiers, actively engaged in conflict, across the world. They act not only as soldiers but also as spies, porters, sexual distractions, messengers and so forth. Some of these children are used to lead the assaults against government forces and even to act as suicide bombers. And it is not only boys who are forced into the world of warcraft.

But rebel forces are, however, not the only ones to use children to bolster their forces. Several governments are equally guilty of recruiting children – or coercing them – into their forces. This desire to swell the number of men under arms points directly to a flawed strategy of winning any conflict.

Actively participating in armed conflict as soldiers not only traumatises the children, it also violates their very rights as children. Robbed of their youth and forced to kill, main or torture, they are devoid of any moral compass. Their education is killing - or to be killed. They have no schools, homes, medical facilities and so on. In fact, all they have is a gun and ammunition. In using these weapons of war, many of these child soldiers commit horrific atrocities, effectively making them war criminals. But, international law restricts their punishment as they remain children.

This problem can manifest itself in a serious manner at the end of hostilities as these child-soldiers have the ability and the means to enter into a life of serious organised crime. With their only real education being that power comes through the gun, where will it end?

Added on 24 February 2009: David Isenberg sent me this interesting copy of a thesis document submitted to the University of Victoria. Thank you, David.
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp04/MQ62035.pdf

Wednesday, February 18, 2009

SO WHO REALLY DECIDES?

Many governments in Africa are faced with growing external military threats, insurgencies, political upheaval and an escalation in violent crime. Indeed, this brutal phenomenon is not something new - Africa has faced it for decades – and will continue to face it in the foreseeable future.

Should a government decide - something it ought to be able to do without interference from foreign powers - that it wants to utilise outside sources to help it resolve these problems, it has four options:

1. Call on the United Nations and a multitude of NGOs to help
2. Call on the West to help
3. Call on the East to help
4. Call on a Private Military Company to help.

Arguably the largest sheltered employment agency in the world, the UN has time-and-again shown its ineptitude, inability and its partiality for rebel groups and other trouble-makers when “assisting” governments in Africa. The recent exposures detailing crimes by UN peacekeepers - in Africa and beyond - are likewise a major indication of its lack of control over itself. Additionally, the UN has, according to its own track-record, prolonged conflicts instead of bringing them to a closure. This large bumbling organisation and its associated NGOs have a habit of calling for ceasefires and giving the rebel movements critical time to prepare for their next offensive. Their dismal lack of achievement, which has no timeline and a never-ending budget, must surely rate at the bottom of the list of choices.

The West has a history of betraying African governments and backing both sides in a conflict. Coupled to this is the approach of giving sub-standard training under the guise of “military aid”. But these aid packages come at a price – “toe the line or else”. Additionally, the West is not beyond its own fraud and corruption. Take for example the latest report on the US military leadership in Iraq:

In what could turn out to be the greatest fraud in US history, American authorities have started to investigate the alleged role of senior military officers in the misuse of $125bn (£88bn) in a US-directed effort to reconstruct Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The exact sum missing may never be clear, but a report by the US Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) suggests it may exceed $50bn, making it an even bigger theft than Bernard Madoff's notorious Ponzi scheme”.
(http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/a-fraud-bigger-than-madoff-1622987.html%20dated%2016%20February%202009)

And to think that the West is continually pointing a finger at Africa for corruption and fraud…but maybe this will serve as a warning for Africa.

Apart from this shocking exposé, the West’s recent containment strategies have not exactly yielded encouraging or significant results.

The East has always been keen to sell its weapons into Africa. More recently, the East has involved itself in a massive overt resource-exploitation drive in Africa. Despite voiced concern by the West, this has led to huge financial investments into Africa and in the process, some of these investments have found their way to both government and rebel forces. But the East has, like the West, not always dealt honourably with Africa. It too has its agendas and is not afraid to pursue them vigorously, regardless of the cost in terms of human lives or political integrity. But the East brings with it money and overt support to the government they are dealing with.

The last choice an African government has is it that it can contract a PMC to assist it. All such assistance is negotiated in terms of risk, cost and time and the PMC is contractually bound to give what it offered. Furthermore, the PMC is obligated to provide tailor-made training, achieve agreed results at a predetermined fee and fulfil its contractual obligations within a set time. The problem with PMCs is that they require careful vetting in terms of their REAL experience and not their own-imagined experience, their track record and their integrity. Ultimately, the fly-by-night, con-artist-types of PMCs should be exposed and weeded out – and there are many of them. (Note: Jake and Matt of http://combatoperator.com/blog/ and http://www.feraljundi.com/ respectively are working hard at showing the other side of the coin).

But for an African government to make such a decision, it is faced with problems that range from international condemnation, sanctions, political and economical blackmail, threats and even active support to the rebel movements.

To contract a PMC, these governments-in-need apparently require the permission of the UN, the NGOs, multi-national corporations, foreign governments and so on.

So, the question begs to be asked: Who decides what an African government can do to improve its security situation, ensure its territorial integrity, train its armed forces and assist it with the development of its national security strategy?

It appears that the under-siege government has no say in the matter and must instead bow to inept, unethical and/or corrupt foreign militaries.

Added on 19 February 2009: For those who thought I am forever having a go at the UN and its incompetence for no reason, please read the following - http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-02-19-un-accused-of-failing-to-protect-drc-civilians I rest my case.

Friday, February 13, 2009

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WAR

(Parts of this posting are from my upcoming book “The Techniques of War”, albeit as a very condensed version. Please note that this is NOT a comprehensive view of these two very important concepts).

There exists some confusion regarding the differences between strategy and tactics. Whereas this is understandable when talking to people who are not part of the military, it is frightening to know that there are senior military men who do not know the difference between the two and how they inter-relate to one another.

To fully understand the difference between the two, one needs to understand the meanings of the words, both being derived from the Greek “stratēgos” and “taktikē”.

Strategy is derived from the Greek words “stratos” and “ago”, implying or referring to the leading of, and giving direction to, an army. In modern warfare, the army is led to achieve the political aims of the government it serves. Therefore, a country’s military strategy is an off-shoot of the government’s greater political strategy, known as the Grand or National Strategy.

Taktikē” is the art of organising and coordinating an army so that it may do battle, using the correct techniques to overcome the enemy. In brief, these techniques – referred to as “tactics” – are relevant to the various phases of warfare.

The above definitions lead one to realise that strategy gives direction and strategic aim to the military and the tactics are the methods or techniques employed to achieve those aims. Furthermore, this implies that strategy is executed at the highest levels of the military whereas tactics permeates downwards to the lower levels such as unit and sub-unit level and even lower.

When a nation’s armed forces are committed to war, the war is fought at three distinct yet inter-related levels. These three levels are:

1. Strategic Level
2. Operational Level
3. Tactical Level

Warfare at the strategic level can be broken down into four distinctive types of strategic warfare. These four types are:

1. Offensive Warfare
2. Defensive Warfare
3. Attrition Warfare
4. Revolutionary Warfare.

Again, the aims and objectives of the different types of strategic warfare are determined by the government’s national policies which are in turn derived from the Government’s National or Grand Strategy. The decision to implement one of the types of strategic warfare is dependent on the perceived threat facing the nation. This threat is determined by a process of collecting information and processing it into intelligence.

Each type of Strategic Warfare can be further broken down into different sub-types of warfare. As an example, Offensive Warfare can be subdivided into either a Distant Strategic Offensive or a Close Strategic Offensive – the type being determined by the proximity of the offensive.

At the Operational Level, usually confined to a specific theatre of operations, the military strategy is accomplished by the setting of operational objectives, within that specific theatre, to meet the military strategy’s goals. Poor planning, non-compliance to doctrine and inadequate tactics can result in failure, thus impacting negatively on the overall military strategy.

The tactical level is that level where the techniques to attain the strategy are implemented by various unit levels such as a division, a brigade, a company or even a section. It is, therefore, at the tactical level that tactics come into play. The tactics employed will be dependent on numerous factors such as the phase of war, the enemy, the terrain, the weather, own forces capabilities, the local population and so forth.

Whereas the principle aim of war is to always achieve victory over the enemy, regardless of the type of warfare, the modern-day war can be viewed as having five main strategic goals:

1. To repulse an aggressive act by the enemy, contain and destroy it.
2. To invade, conquer and destroy an enemy.
3. To seize and exploit the resources of an enemy.
4. To energise foreign policy by means other than diplomacy.
5. To gain favourable public opinion and strengthen national resolve and will.

To achieve these strategic goals, the military will adopt a specific posture in order to accomplish its allocated mission. The posture will thus be determined by the perceived enemy threat and will therefore determine the military’s doctrine and tactics.

The tactics, in turn, are related to the specific phase of warfare that is being implemented. These phases - excluding the intermediate or transitional phases - are:

1. The advance
2. The attack
3. The withdrawal
4. The defence

Sound military strategies will lead to well-developed doctrines, good planning based on sound intelligence and correct application of tactics. It is, however, at the tactical level that the war can be either won or lost.