FIGHTING ORGANISED CRIME

I am often surprised at the amount of companies, listed and/or private, that are haemorrhaging due to serious organised crime attacks. It seems that many companies prefer to keep quiet about the effects of crime, lest it negatively influence their shareholders. Some believe that it may reflect poorly on their abilities to manage if they admit their losses to crime. Others simply just refuse to acknowledge that they are victims of crime.

This is, I believe, in itself criminal as it is misleading shareholders and allowing the criminals to simply continue with their actions. In short, it amounts to a fraudulent representation of the company. In times of a global financial melt-down, it is imperative that crime is tackled in an aggressive manner.

In South Africa, those that are supposed to police crime are very seldom keen to do their duty. Many of them are, indeed, part of the problem and not part of the solution. Whereas there are police officers trying to make an impact on crime, they are few and far between. Sadly though, success is not something that is evident in these counter-crime actions. Public regard for crime scene investigators and detectives is reaching an all-time low. Their lack of interest in attending to crime scenes is well documented with excuses as feeble as “we don’t have a vehicle…” Visible policing is seen by many to simply be a reconnaissance operation by men in police uniforms before they strike.

The police’s lack of will to seriously fight organised crime has given rise to a proliferation of security companies, some good but many simply exploiting the lack of policing. These companies hire men off the streets, place them in uniform and suddenly they have a security company they can sell to unsuspecting businesses. Before long, these companies know every weakness of the client they are supposed to be protecting. Often these weaknesses are exploited by the security companies themselves.

In order to effectively fight organised crime, companies need to understand the fundamentals of crime and the criminal networks they are up against. Once the criminal workings are understood, the companies need to seize the initiative from the criminals and regain control over their profit margins.

Simply knowing that they are losing money to crime does not solve the crime problem. Installing cameras is not the only or best way to counter crime. Technology has its limitations and can be circumvented – especially when there are so-called power outages. Creating a mini-fortress with booms, guards and fences simply makes a company prisoner to its own working environment and advertises the fact that it has something valuable behind the fortress walls.

Visible security measures such as fences and access control systems are an important part of the overall strategy to combat organised crime. But it is not the only action a company should employ to protect its premises, assets and staff.

Fighting organised crime is an action that should be planned in detail and should encompass many varied levels of action. These plans should be pro-active in nature and make provision for a host of different crime scenarios.

As the global economic melt-down continues, crime will escalate. Loose groupings of criminals will become more structured and organised. Their methodology will become more aggressive and their actions bolder. As their profits soar, they will become better armed, equipped and wheeled. They will also exploit the very obvious lack of policing to a greater extent.

The majority of companies are quite content to simply be re-active. It appears as though the premise exists that although crime is hurting profit margins, companies are still able to survive. If they are able to survive despite the crime, why take positive aggressive action? Indeed, if it may have a financial implication, why do it at all?

The indications that kidnappings, extortion, sabotage and the like are being planned are already evident. Will companies have pre-warning? I doubt it. Will they be able to react quickly in the event of the kidnapping of a senior executive? Unlikely. Do they know who within their ranks is feeding information to criminals? No, they don’t. Do they usually know anything about the company providing their security? Have they made the security company liable for any burglary, theft or other losses they may suffer while under their watch? Are security companies given a time-line in which to perform adequately and resolve the crime issues within a company?

Whereas a security company may give a warm, fuzzy feeling to the company, they are often there simply because someone is paying their salaries – and often it is a poor salary that would welcome an additional income. Visible they are, effective - not always.

To successfully combat organised crime, companies need prior knowledge. With prior knowledge (intelligence) criminal actions can be predicted and pre-emptive actions taken. Gathering this information requires the ability to identify the criminal gangs and penetrate and infiltrate them with trained agents. Professional agents, subject to regular polygraph testing and other loyalty checks, will be able to position themselves in such a manner that they can gather the information required.

Armed with the criminal intelligence required, the companies will be able to coordinate their fight against the crime threatening their businesses. Additionally, it will allow the companies under threat to seize the initiative and play an active and offensive role in fighting crime.

This approach does, however, require short-, medium- and long-term planning, coupled to the professional training and management of the agents. There are some companies that have adopted a pre-emptive approach to fighting crime and they ought to be applauded. Their security executives think “outside the box”, are professional, dedicated and protect the company as though it were their own. They are quick to take bold, decisive action. They view every possible threat as a challenge and they have the support of their senior executives. Their success grows from strength to strength – and nothing breeds success like success.

Sadly though, a great many companies in South Africa and elsewhere are still in the “crime-denial” phase. While they remain in denial, the crime syndicates play the field, dictate the profit margins and grow stronger.

Crime at government-level and trans-national crime is a topic for another day…

My next posting will look at the recklessness of confusing “strategy” with “gadgetry”.

THE LOST ART OF INTELLIGENCE TRADECRAFT

The survival and longevity of the state is dependent on the acquisition of reliable information and intelligence that will allow analysts to predict the future intentions of the aggressor. Whereas information can be gained from overt sources, the reliability of this information needs to be tested against other known intelligence available – and must therefore be subject to the intelligence process, a process that ought to be objective. Good intelligence acquisition is, additionally, a responsibility a government has towards its citizens.

Overt sources are, however, prone to flying disinformation and information that is subjective and therefore biased. Furthermore, such overt information can often be used to deliberately mislead the analysts and thus lead to a misinterpretation of the threat a state is facing.

Although covert or secret sources account for a relatively small percentage of the overall intelligence picture, the lack of this type of information can lead to misunderstanding and misjudging the aggressor. The knock-on effect from this lapse in information gathering and subsequent analysis can cost a state dearly.

Electronic espionage, satellite surveillance, communications intercepts and other high-tech systems can all help build up the picture of the enemy, but even these high-tech sources are prone to deception, especially when dealing with a sophisticated aggressor.

In order to enter the mind-set and determine the intentions of the enemy, the state’s intelligence gathering apparatus requires agents that are able to access the required information. The essential elements of information that emanate from the analysts can usually only be gleaned from infiltration and penetration agents – something the West has discarded in favour of high-tech espionage. In the process, “intelligence tradecraft” or “espionage tradecraft” has sadly been neglected. Recent examples of the folly of this neglect are the short but ill-fated Bosnian war, the recent Israeli incursion into Lebanon, the war on Iraq, the Mumbai attack and so on.

But, agents too can be “turned” or “dangled” by the enemy or even report what they think their handlers want to know. This can, additionally, lead to an inflow of disinformation aimed at confusing the analysts – or even an intelligence overload which can result in information and intelligence becoming lost in the intelligence machine.

When this purposeful reporting of disinformation is aimed at achieving a specific strategic intent – and is missed by the analysts as being part of a larger agenda – the resultant actions that stem from it can cause massive embarrassment to a government and even lead to its demise.

Case officers or agent handlers ought to be trained in the various methods of agent identification, agent recruitment, methods of establishing cover, agent communications, false flag recruitments and operations, access exploitation and so forth. But more importantly, they need to be trained to identify deception and alternate agendas on the part of their agents – and know how to act once such deception has been identified.

Additionally, case officer selection remains an important criterion. A case officer who does not know how the enemy operates, what the application of the enemy’s weapon systems are, doesn’t understand the strategy and tactics of the enemy, has no real experience of war or conflict and so on will be easily deceived by the agent. Once an agent discovers that the deception is accepted due to a lack of experience, understanding and knowledge, it can be expected that he/she will continue to deceive or even fabricate information.

Apart from understanding and applying good tradecraft, the case officer should realise that he is the agent’s manipulator, psychologist, “friend”, paymaster and mentor. He must be able to motivate, direct and manage the agent in such a manner that the agent feels that there is professionalism attached to his handling.

Agents also need to be trained to survive the environment they are expected to operate in. A danger exists, however, when the agent is over-trained and acts in a manner that draws attention to his/her covert activities. Such actions can lead to the compromise of the agent, the case officer and intelligence operation – usually with severe international repercussions. Over-training an agent can also lead to a finger pointing at the state trying to conduct the espionage operation as tradecraft can be unique in its application.

The apparent lack of ability to plan the career path of an agent is also a factor that hampers covert intelligence gathering operations. Agents need to know that they play an important role but this role should never be over-emphasised. That said, the agent needs to know where he is supposedly going and how he will get there.

Long-term planning to gain the access required, infiltrate and/or penetrate aggressor organisations and monitor what the enemy is planning in the short-, medium- and long-term becomes vitally important to the safeguarding of the state and its citizens.

But, in an age of high-tech gadgetry, many governments have neglected the art of classical espionage and in the process have lost the intelligence advantage and are rapidly losing the intelligence war – a war that is vital to their survival.

My next posting will take a look at the catastrophe unfolding in the so-called Great Lakes region.

Added on 14 December 2008: See the following link for an admission by the US that it lacks intelligence on the pirates:
http://www.news24.com/News24/Africa/News/0,,2-11-1447_2441944,00.html

Added on 26 December 2008: I must admit that I found this totally stupid. Has any thought been given to how many women and young boys will now be raped? I simply cannot accept the reasoning behind this latest bit of idiocy. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1101874/U-S-hands-Viagra-pills-Afghan-warlords-return-vital-Taliban-intelligence.htm

CHOOSING TO DISINFORM

It is unfair to the many ethical, honourable, hard-working, nose-in-the-muck journalists and researchers to include them in this posting, so this posting, although generalising to a large extent, does not cover their good work. Instead, it is aimed at those who have a responsibility to inform but instead chose to rather specialise in misinforming – and they know exactly who they are. They alone give the media and institutes the bad reputation they sometimes do not deserve. It gets worse when these journalists and researchers view themselves as armchair strategists and want to, through the written word, dictate military and security strategies and tactics. The resultant damage and chaos that is born from their drivel is enormous.

The media does not only comprise journalists who write for the daily newspapers, but also those who work for radio stations, journals, television, credible research organisations, bloggers and the like. It also includes researchers whose work is often transmitted via the media. Deeply embedded in the fabric of the media are small groupings who strive to misinform wherever possible. Only they can explain their actions.

By fabrication, innuendo, fantasy, grey propaganda, black agents (not skin colour) and regurgitation they weave and twist their lies into an almost believable truth. Those targets that are aware of what they are doing are not hoodwinked but, by and large, the majority of the population swallow their fabrications as “truth”.

Words such as “an unnamed source”, “it is assumed that”, “allegedly”, “intelligence sources believe”, “reportedly” and such like are used to blur their lines between fact and fiction, truth and lies and achieve the impact that they hope for. The impact is even greater when some of them feed this to their secret masters who classify it as “secret” and then distribute it to a select policy-making audience.

Again, and no doubt very tediously, I make my statements based on my experience and the manner in which EO was tarnished in the media by these so-called journalists and researchers. Yet, as I recently discovered, there is great unhappiness when someone is caught out and is then quick to point the finger at others whose “work” was used in the “research” without checking the facts – something that shows that some are unwilling to take responsibility for their actions. They claim “freedom of speech” as a democratic right only they are apparently entitled to. They and they alone reserve the right to pass judgement without any facts at hand. I recall trying to give them my side of the story – along with evidence to back up what I was saying – but I was told that what I had to say was “not in the public interest”.

Of course, it is well known that a journalist is only as good as his/her sources. But when their sources are the actual people/organisations that may be paying them a secret second salary in order to achieve a strategic aim, they become a danger to society. They are the very ones who, instead of honouring their profession and informing the people, fall into the trap of disseminating propaganda, lies and disinformation. Unfortunately, several respectable authors have used this disinformation in their books, thus helping to spread fiction dressed as fact.

All government agencies use journalists to get their message out to the public in a surreptitious manner. The media is also used extensively to counter political opposition and proclaim a government’s holy agenda. This use of the media is well known and has become almost acceptable. But, when government–, semi-state departments and multi-national corporations use these agents-of-influence (witting or unwitting) to negate/counter/smear a private company in order to protect themselves and their illegal activities, the situation begins to change somewhat. When these misinformers start claiming that a company is about to conduct murder, assassinations, are part of a neo-colonising advance guard, are planning coups, are being paid in mineral concessions, imply burglaries of government offices and the like, they deserve to be exposed. Don’t you agree De Wet Potgieter, Stephan Laufer, Anthony Lobaido, Khareen Pech, Ingo Capraro, Jakkie Cilliers, David Beresford, Talif Deen, Bruce Venter, Sean Cleary and your multitude of similar-ilk friends? (To list them all would be a mission impossible – but many of them inhabit the internet and are easily found there).

Ironically, when the misinformers are caught out they act with indignation…

Then of course, there is a despicable little man known as Riaan Stander, an ex-policeman turned National Intelligence agent. Stander penned his now famous “secret reports” which were sent directly to then-President Nelson Mandela and later Thabo Mbeki. Not only were they pure fabrications but they also included the telling comment: “Checked and verified by the analyst”. (For details, see http://cryptome.org/za-disrupt.htm). These fabricated reports were nothing other than a deceptive attempt to prove an undying loyalty to the “new” South African government.

This is the same Stander who found himself irresistibly drawn to secret government funds – of which millions went missing in the process. His secret documents were leaked to selected members of the media who lapped it up – again without checking anything. From there, these documents migrated to the internet. Stander and his documents have subsequently been exposed as frauds – but the damage was already done. These documents have subsequently been taken up by a “historian” in Kwa-Zulu Natal who has almost made it his mission in life to prove them correct.

Apart from maliciously causing companies irreparable damage and the loss of millions of dollars in revenue, their misinformation is used by scholars who write their theses based mainly on mistruths and disinformation. The value of these scholarly works is a big zero, yet in academic circles, they continue to tout their (lack of) knowledge and express their (lack of) understanding on military matters. Some even get awarded international prizes for their “work”. Never mind that a lot of it is made up and cannot even be remotely confirmed…

Some even get appointed to “respected” institutes such as the Institute of Security Studies (in South Africa) where they continue to - under the guise of “researchers” - spurt forth their self-constructed stories. This time their “sources” are people who act as advisors to rebel groups, disgruntled intelligence officers and mining corporations – something that to them is quite acceptable. Yet, these same “knowledgeable” people are not prepared to write about matters of international importance or security as they know that their poisoned pens will be exposed for what they are. Nor are they prepared to write about similar companies operating in areas where the values of resources are higher but where their paymasters have no interests.

When one reads the papers, reports, blogs and books, there appears to have been an entire group working only on EO to generate false stories – or, they were receiving much of their (dis)information from the intelligence services. This “information” was then further shared with their other friends in the media who would publish the story in the mainstream media, quoting from “unnamed intelligence sources”. Once published, a process known as “blow-back” allowed them to re-write their stories and now quote it from the media – the very people they had fed the story to in the first place. Some selected pieces were then also fed to bloggers to help spread the story. Of course, they are also keen to assist authors who are writing on the subject of PMCs and again, this “information” is passed on as fact.

More frightening is the possibility that their misinformation can, regurgitated enough times, become entrenched in the minds of people as “fact”. When these quasi-facts are used to substantiate intelligence they become extremely dangerous and embarrassing, as the US can testify with its invasion of Iraq.

Today, there are still some journalists who generate stories on PMCs based on lies, speculation and political and other agendas. They are the ones who give credibility to rebel and terrorist movements and often champion their causes. Yet, when these journalists find themselves in troubles they are unable to cope with, they expect to be rescued – then even a PMC they have slated will do.

To some journalists and researchers, it appears as though their only aim is to underwhelm the public with information and overwhelm them with propaganda. They are the ones that should be held accountable for the lies and disinformation they spread and the chaos that results from their actions. Their shameful manipulation of information should be stopped by the media bosses.

But, despite these misinformers, there are still honourable journalists and researchers out there who are big enough to admit that they had been hoodwinked. I realised this when I read the full-page apology given to both EO and I in the Star newspaper of 5 November 2007. Others apologised to me in person. But, by then, the damage had well and truly been done.

Added on 7 December: Here is an interesting article on Wars That Matter, That You Hardly Ever Hear About by James Dunnigan:
http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/200812701441.asp (see Point #4)