ARE AFRICAN SECURITY SERVICES ARE FAILING THE CONTINENT?

The numerous terror attacks, violent (and non-violent) protests and riots, along with armed uprisings Africa has— and is witnessing—are an indication that its security services—in particular the intelligence services—are failing their governments, the continent, and their people. Of course, these violent and non-violent actions are moreover an indication of much deeper issues that governments need to give attention to. 

But, it is also an indication that intelligence gained from open sources and allied intelligence liaison holds little to no value for African governments as it is neither actionable nor pre-emptive. In many instances this ‘allied intelligence’ is deceptive, misleading, false and purely historical in nature despite being piously referred to as ‘intelligence sharing’ aimed at ending conflicts and wars.

Instead, ‘intelligence’ is frequently used as a channel through which to disseminate fabricated information to create a false sense of security—or exaggerate a threat—with the hopes of eliciting and/or fermenting chaos or a heavy-handed government response. (It is also used to discredit business threats or cast a doubt over people and companies). In addition, the training given to African intelligence services by their so-called allied partners is shockingly sub-standard and in many instances, irrelevant and aimed at rendering them unable to fulfil even basic intelligence collection operations, thus purposely setting them up for failure.

The dangers and risks increase when false information is accepted as ‘intelligence’.

Even with the very best security measures and procedures in place, a government that lacks intelligence will be vulnerable to armed uprisings and/or terror threats.

In late-November 2015 sources reported to us that ‘a large terrorist action’ was going to happen ‘soon’ against a Western target/people somewhere in West Africa. We were, however, unaware of where and what the target was as we had long since left West Africa. But, if we were aware of a pending (terror) attack somewhere in West Africa, what were the intelligence services in West Africa and in particular the Burkina Faso intelligence service and its ‘partnership allies’ doing?

Such attacks are not spontaneous acts of violence carried out by a group of disaffected people who suddenly decide to commit an act of terror. These acts are planned over a period of time and in the process, these groups use a host of different agents, support agents, sympathisers, and radicals who are prepared—and sometimes willing to die—to carry their message(s) across.

Social media is frequently used to distribute instructions, issue warnings, pass on intelligence, and messages and to mobilise their assets and supporters. Sympathetic NGOs, so-called ‘humanitarian organisations’, and other ‘peace loving’ and ‘democratic and freedom seeking’ charities are occasionally used to move their weapons and equipment and assist with distributing the armed protesters and/or terror groups’ propaganda.

But these groups haemorrhage or leak information if only we are willing to make an effort to capture it. Oftentimes, this leakage is very obvious and serves as a perfect early warning of a pending attack.

This begs the question when considering, for example, the attack in Burkina Faso: Where was the intelligence that was supposed to identify that planned action or—at the very least—warn of the potential danger or predict it? Where were the agents and other sources that were supposed to identify such groups and their plans? Or is this another case where the intelligence services were taught how to tie their shoelaces instead of how to do their jobs?

The developing conflict in Burundi is another case in point. Armed violence, criminality and terrorist actions are planned in advance…and are NEVER spontaneous. Seldom are they launched without large-scale foreign backing and support—as Cote d’Ivore demonstrated.

The lack of actionable and predicted intelligence—or the inability and/or unwillingness of the intelligence services to collect it—places the government at a severe disadvantage and provides the enemy or threat with a multitude of advantages and options. At times, actionable intelligence is discarded when it does not match the perceived reality of the government or the recipient—or, as has happened in the past, the intelligence is rejected by a so-called Western ally as ‘nonsense’ and ‘rubbish’ only for it to come back and bite everyone. Blind acceptance of misconceived allied assessments is a grave folly. (Sadly for Africa, some of its so-called allies are silently working at destabelising governments whilst trying to act the ‘good guys’).

Neglecting the intelligence required to ensure the security of the nation and the longevity and stability of a government and the state is both irresponsible and costing Africa dearly. Instead, governments are increasingly faced with domestic and foreign-funded anti-government forces (AGFs) and proxy forces intent on sowing terror and creating chaos with the aim of destabelising entire countries and toppling governments to ensure foreign control over their interests.

But conflicts and wars in Africa are never ending—and indeed, will escalate over the coming years. As long as intelligence is neglected and/or ignored—these actions will continue to take governments by surprise. The collateral damage and humanitarian fallout from these conflicts and wars is incalculable.   

In early 2016, the United Nations (UN) called for an estimated US$ 40bn annually to assist and support the growing number of people requiring humanitarian aid. US Dollars Forty Billion. And apparently this is not enough….as there is a US$ 15bn funding gap. Indeed, with that amount of money annually and continually given over a 5-year period, most African conflicts and wars could be over and the national armies, law enforcement agencies, and intelligence services retrained and reequipped to be very effective security forces. It is, after all, the many conflicts and wars that have resulted in so many people requiring humanitarian aid. 

But, as many in Africa—especially those in the DRC, CAR,  Cote d’Ivore, Darfur, Burundi, South Sudan, and others—can testify, the UN is not exactly objective, trusted or able to live up to its promises to protect the innocent and keep the peace. The little trust there was in the UN is rapidly disappearing down a very deep hole. The perception that the UN peacekeepers are nothing other than ‘tourists in helicopters’ that commit crimes against the very people they need to protect will intensify over time.

But, as long as African governments continue to neglect their security structures and fail to collect and act on intelligence, they will fail the continent and these funds will go to organisations that exploit these tragedies to make money.

Ironically, these same organisations condemn those who actually do something to end conflicts and wars—probably because ending conflicts and wars is very bad for their business and their control over African governments.

MALI – ANOTHER INTELLIGENCE FAILURE

The unseating of the government in Mali was nothing other than an intelligence failure of epic proportions, not only by the Malian intelligence services but also by the member-states of the AU.

The aim of any intelligence service is to identify potential and real threats to the national interests and vital interests of the state. These threats are then targeted for intelligence collection, interpreted and disseminated. Furthermore, these agencies need to be able to make intelligence predictions based on the database of knowledge they have built up over time. It is apparent that if this was done, it was done very poorly.

In early March 2012, it was already evident that the Malian forces had lost the initiative in the north of the country. The garrison at Tessalit was under siege by the Tuareg-led separatist movement known as the National Movement for the Liberation of Awawid (NMLA). The NMLA claimed it is fighting for “independence” from Mali. Reinforcements were unable to break through to the garrison.

The NMLA had apparently been boosted by “freedom fighters” from Algeria, Chad and Nigeria. Additionally, the Malian government claimed that the MNLA had been boosted by “drug dealers, Al Qaeda factions and other Islamists” – a claim no doubt made with the hopes of getting increased foreign (US and French) support as these are matters that lie close to the heart of the US government – and Mali was a French colony.

Cut-off from reinforcements, outgunned and ultimately defeated by the NMLA in Tessalit, morale in the Malian forces was bound to take a downward turn as soldiers began deserting.

On 20 March 2012, the AU’s Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) met in the capital of Mali to discuss the ever deteriorating security situation in the Sahel region. On 21 March, the demoralised Mali forces toppled the government of Pres Amadou Toure – in the capital – by means of a coup. How the unfolding dissatisfaction in Mali military ranks was something the AU – and its numerous member-state intelligence services – had not foreseen defies belief.

For some time the Malian army has been fighting the NMLA. They have, also on numerous occasions voiced their concern at the lack of equipment, arms and ammunition with which they are supposed to fight the NMLA with. They also voiced their concern that Pres Toure had adopted a too soft approach towards the NMLA.  

Pres Toure, however well intentioned he may have been, forgot that one cannot negotiate from a position of weakness – a situation that was very evident in the north of Mali. Ironically, the leader of the coup, Capt. Amadou Sanogo, is now voicing his desire to negotiate with the NMLA separatists. The coup has however created a power vacuum and presented the NMLA the initiative in their fight against the Malian forces and it can be expected that their determination has been increased.

Given the fragility of the Sahel region with its famine, poverty, Islamic terrorism, porous borders, droughts, uncontrolled flow of weapons, along with the NMLA insurgency in the north, it is surprising that this situation was not viewed by intelligence services as a threat to both the national and vital interests of the state.

The deposed president’s seat had hardly gone cold when the fingers began pointing.

Some African government officials were quick to lay the blame for the NMLA’s insurgency the subsequent coup at the door of NATO and its allies for their involvement in Libya.

Whereas it is true that the NMLA insurgency intensified after the collapse of Gadaffi’s Libya – many of the Tuaregs fought against Gadaffi’s forces and returned to Mali after the “regime change” - it is somewhat disingenuous to blame NATO for such an intelligence failure. It will be interesting to see how the new Libyan government views this situation as the Touregs can rightly be seen as their allies.

The fact that the Malian intelligence services (if they were not part of the planned coup) along with the AU member-states’ intelligence services were unable to identify the dangers of a pending coup or anticipate a coup, shows that there was a massive intelligence failure. No amount of finger pointing can and will dispel that fact. Nor will it dispel the threat the Mali coup poses to regional stability.

The domino effect of the “Arab Spring” poses a very real danger to African governments. They need to take note of what happened – and what is happening in their own countries. But, as long as they remain complacent and ignore the dangers developing in their own countries the danger will keep growing.

If other African intelligence services remain reliant on open source information (OSINFO) and believe that just because they are not seeing things and accept that all is well in their countries, they too can look forward to their own intelligence failures in the future.  

THE MEDIA AND THE PMC

The Private Military Company (PMC) will always find itself under attack from certain segments of the media. Whereas some of the attacks will be focussed on the fact that an under-siege government dared to use a PMC to assist them - instead of another agenda-driven government’s armed forces - a large amount of the attacks will be launched simply to discredit the PMC. But sadly, some of the media reports will be justified.

The fact of the matter is that some journalists are unable to cope with their responsibility of informing the public on what is happening. Instead, they prefer to focus on misinforming the public and thereby boost their own fragile egos. Fortunately, these journalists are in the minority but they taint everyone’s view of the PMC, regardless if it is deserved or not. Their actions overshadow those of the hard-working, ethical reporters of news. Furthermore, as they are quite prepared to accept money to write their false reports, they are the true mercenaries of the world.

From my own experience with a segment of the media that made it their mission to falsely discredit Executive Outcomes and myself on behalf of other paymasters, I discovered that to these “journalists” false reporting was, in essence, what gave them their raison d’être. Astonishingly, some were so-called intellectuals who wrote opinion pieces for which they were paid handsomely. In my mind, that constitutes fraud to the extreme.

Reading comments such as an “ex-apartheid soldier” or “ex-EO operative” or “ex-soldier” or “ex-policeman” simply entrenches my belief that some journalists cannot report objectively on matters that are of public interest. Yet, for some strange reason, they do not refer to “ex-Bush soldiers” or “ex-Blair” soldiers. Could this be part of their hypocritical make-up as far as South Africa is concerned?

These are the very people that give the media its bad name – something the hard-working, honest and ethical journalists ought to take action on – and take responsibility for. If not, the media will continue its slide into subjective reporting and promotion of agendas.

This does, however, not exonerate the PMC from any blame or make the PMC’s efforts any easier. These types of companies will always come under attack by misguided and irresponsible journalists and it remains the duty of the companies to keep their noses clean. But it remains a problem when journalists use insinuations and innuendo in their reporting – these grey areas are almost impossible to counter or even defend.

It is also the responsibility of the PMCs to ensure that the industry cleans up its act and gets rid of the wannabe-Rambos and their irresponsible actions. The military and law enforcement contracting industry has no place for ill-disciplined, alcohol and steroid-fuelled, untrained, disrespectful and poorly led men wearing too tight T-shirts and dark glasses. It is time that PMCs realise that they are guests in the contracting country and ought to behave in accordance to the laws of that country where they may be working. These companies should furthermore realise that the conduct of one can influence the entire company and even jeopardise a contract.

But, just like death and taxes, the media and the PMCs are here to stay. Both the media and these companies ought to accept that fact.

Whereas the relationship between the media and the PMC will always be a rocky one, there are some things that the PMC can do to smooth the road or at least ensure that it gets a fair press.

1. Appoint a designated media spokesperson who understands the media
2. Do not let other employees speak to the media
3. Find and work with ethical, responsible journalists – they do exist
4. When journalists colour their reporting with insinuations and innuendo, make every effort to determine who is paying them to do this – and expose them publicly – even if they are working for an intelligence service
5. Be pre-emptive with press releases
6. Do not employ people who will cause embarrassment to the company and whose past actions will continue to be used against the company
7. Strictly vet every employee, prior to employing him/her
8. Be as transparent as possible without divulging any client-sensitive information
9. When the media gets it wrong, make every effort to rectify the false perceptions that may be caused
10. Don’t lie or try to white-wash over serious events
11. Make sure all press releases are distributed to all media outlets
12. Do not give unnecessary interviews
13. When giving interviews, refrain from boasting
14. Be prepared for every interview – know as much as you can about the journalist who is about to interview you – even those things he/she does not want anyone to know about
15. Stick to the facts.

But, many of the “stories” fed to the media originate from within the intelligence services. It would serve the PMCs well to develop their contacts within the intelligence services to determine planned agendas and disinformation operations against them – and then to act pre-emptively. If necessary, these players within the intelligence services should also be exposed publicly. Whereas there exists an official secrets act in all nations, the acts are to safeguard the secrets of the state and not hide the nefarious actions of some of its members.