When the political leadership commits the armed forces to a conflict or a war, one would assume that the “homework” was done ... and that the scope of the mission would not be misleading. Once the political commitment has been made, the military’s primary mission is to end the conflict or war as quickly as possible – not to change its mission before it has achieved its aim.
It is, therefore, with great interest that I have been reading numerous articles and blog postings on recent conflicts and wars, especially those relating to Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN Ops). What strikes me as odd is that there are some authors who regard these types of operations as “new” and who, in turn, are calling for a “new” approach and doctrine to combating an insurgency – an approach that assumes the primary role of the military is to “build the nation”.
Insurgencies are not a new military phenomenon and they are common-place in Africa. Revolt against the constituted authority is often encountered by people who wish to replace the government with one of their own and for reasons of their own.
Most of the African insurgencies are – or have been - associated with megalomaniacs who want nothing but total power ie, Savimbi, Kony, Mugabe, Sankoh, Taylor and others. These “leaders” will stop at nothing to achieve their aims and, once in power, will do everything possible to cling to power. Their primary weapon becomes terror against the local population in order to force their support – or subdue them. This can include murder, rape, torture, kidnapping of children, plunder and so forth.
Insurgencies are also launched by proxy forces to further the aims and ambitions of one government against another. This gives a level of deniability and ensures that political aims are furthered without committing government forces to the conflict or war. Africa has numerous examples of proxy forces – usually supported by foreign powers - engaged in such conflicts and wars.
Nation building and ceasefires will not end these conflicts. They never have and they never will. Nor will negotiation achieve anything much apart from gaining time, unless done from a position of complete strength.
The armed forces are there to conduct military operations, operations that will involve killing those that are trying to destabilise the government and terrorise the local population with armed force. Once committed to the conflict or war, the political leadership should do everything possible to support their armed forces – and accept that killing will take place. For politicians to change the military’s mission mid-stride shows a lack of certainty, poor political planning and a lack of honesty, political leadership and direction.
Ironically, when the troops accomplish their mission with aggression, they are condemned by the very politicians who sent them there and they are tried and found guilty in the media. Have those that are so quick to point fingers not realised that “war” is synonymous with death, killing and destruction?
Committing the armed forces to a conflict implies that there will be casualties. It implies that the armed forces must kill or capture the enemy and break its ability to continue the conflict or war. It also implies that there will be civilians caught up in the conflict. Whereas collateral damage is to be minimised at all costs at all times, the reality is that it is sometimes unavoidable.
The attempts by the political masters to develop new theories of war based mainly on a lack of understanding and experience results in poor strategies, fraught with political interference and unworkable RoE. This problem is amplified when these so-called plans are hatched with little or no intelligence or when the political masters hint that the enemy will be rapidly overcome once hostilities commence. It seems as though some senior officers are only too happy to accept the constraints placed on their forces – and exacerbate the misleading beliefs on the enemy - in order to protect their military careers and further their own political ambitions. The greatest danger to the armed forces is when the military leadership wants to play politics, build nations and call for ceasefires – and forget to give military leadership to their men.
Conversely, the enemy has one but one aim: take power by inflicting the maximum casualties to the armed forces and use the media to give them the publicity they need. The enemy knows this will, additionally, lead to a weakening of resolve and morale on the homefront.
The actions and tactics the insurgents carry out will be aimed at preventing direct contact with the military whilst ensuring maximum attrition of the armed forces – and coercing the local population. To achieve this, use will be made of sabotage actions, ambushes, raids, pseudo-operations, landmines, stand-off mortar bombardments, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), torture, kidnappings, terror and so forth.
The armed forces may recruit members of the local population to assist them in countering the insurgency and to act as not only soldiers but as guides, interpreters, trackers and so on. However, a lack of sophistication by the COIN forces’ approach to the local society and its culture, traditions, religion and so forth will present an ideal opportunity for exploitation by the insurgent forces. Furthermore, poor vetting practices will allow insurgents into the ranks of the COIN forces, biding their time to strike from within thus furthering effecting morale and increasing distrust.
If politicians lack the intelligence necessary to formulate their plans and the political will to see the end of what they have committed to, deny the troops the equipment needed to accomplish their mission(s) and continually interfere with military missions and military strategy, true military success will be a very difficult to achieve. But even this hard slog will have been in vain if the political backbone and integrity is missing.
Friday, July 23, 2010
Sunday, July 11, 2010
THE COUNTER TERRORIST MAGAZINE
Published by Security Solutions International (SSI), the Counter Terrorist magazine is the Official Journal of the Homeland Security Professional. SSI also publishes the Counter Terrorist Newsletter in addition to hosting Webinars, interactive learning and the annual Homeland Security Professionals Conference – the central event in the First Responder calendar.
Some months ago, I was approached by Chris Graham – the editor of the Counter Terrorist magazine - and asked if I would be willing to contribute an article or two to the magazine. I am honoured to have written two articles for this magazine. The first article, titled “UN Peacekeeping operations in Africa” appeared in the February/March issue of the magazine and the second article, titled “The Pirates of East Africa” is in this month’s issue (August/September 2010).
All credit must however go to Chris who guided me through the pieces and did an excellent job editing them.
The Counter Terrorist magazine strives to provide impartial and in-depth coverage of subject matter relating to terrorism and counter terrorism. This includes subjects and analysis on issues such as:
1. Catch and Release: Terrorist Recidivism
2. Profile of a Large, Violent, Hierarchical Trans-National Gang Operating Across the USA
3. Piracy and Counter Piracy Operations
4. Unmanned Surveillance Platforms for Domestic Use and so on.
To those who are interested in the so-called asymmetrical approach to warfare, this is an excellent magazine to subscribe to.
The Counter Terrorist magazine can be found on www.thecounterterroristmag.com
Those who are facebook users can also get a look at the August/September issue by visiting http://www.facebook.com/SSINEWS
Some months ago, I was approached by Chris Graham – the editor of the Counter Terrorist magazine - and asked if I would be willing to contribute an article or two to the magazine. I am honoured to have written two articles for this magazine. The first article, titled “UN Peacekeeping operations in Africa” appeared in the February/March issue of the magazine and the second article, titled “The Pirates of East Africa” is in this month’s issue (August/September 2010).
All credit must however go to Chris who guided me through the pieces and did an excellent job editing them.
The Counter Terrorist magazine strives to provide impartial and in-depth coverage of subject matter relating to terrorism and counter terrorism. This includes subjects and analysis on issues such as:
1. Catch and Release: Terrorist Recidivism
2. Profile of a Large, Violent, Hierarchical Trans-National Gang Operating Across the USA
3. Piracy and Counter Piracy Operations
4. Unmanned Surveillance Platforms for Domestic Use and so on.
To those who are interested in the so-called asymmetrical approach to warfare, this is an excellent magazine to subscribe to.
The Counter Terrorist magazine can be found on www.thecounterterroristmag.com
Those who are facebook users can also get a look at the August/September issue by visiting http://www.facebook.com/SSINEWS
Thursday, June 24, 2010
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
Whereas there can be no doubt that Rules of Engagement (RoE) are important in determining how, when, where and against who armed force shall be used, are we not sometimes restricting ourselves with RoE and in the result causing the deaths of our own soldiers?
In Operations Related to War (ORW), the RoE are really very straightforward, especially as one of the aims of war is the annihilation of the enemy force. However, care still needs to be exercised in order to prevent civilian casualties or causing unnecessary, excessive damage to private property. But even in well planned and executed ORW, it is not always possible to prevent civilian casualties or minimise damage to property, especially in and around urban environments.
It is, however, when we embark on Operations Other than War (OOTW) that these rules can become restrictive and, in many instances, counterproductive. “Don’t shoot until you are shot at” is difficult to accept when you know a sniper is tracking your movements.
RoE, and the approach to applying such rules, differ from culture to culture. Furthermore, OOTW are often applicable to hostile environments and an enemy that does not abide by any laws, be they local, regional or international.
Whereas it is commonly accepted that excessive force in OOTW will result in alienating the local population and cause resentment which may strengthen the cause of the rebels/terrorists/insurgents, the rules still need to be very carefully crafted.
Ultimately, the RoE are applicable to both military and law enforcement operations that take place within the scope of both ORW and OOTW and are aimed at:
1. Preventing own forces casualties
2. Increasing force legitimacy
3. Minimising collateral damage
4. Preventing unnecessary civilian casualties
5. Increasing operational legitimacy.
Any commander’s aim is to, apart from achieving mission success, prevent casualties amongst his own forces whilst increasing the casualties amongst the enemy’s forces. But sometimes the RoE appear to disregard this fact in favour of not upsetting the politicians, the enemy or the media.
When the RoE are so restrictive that a commander cannot perform his mission effectively, tension will inevitably develop between the political masters and the military commanders. When the restrictive RoE leads to own forces casualties, the tensions are bound to escalate.
As all military operations are politically driven, too restrictive rules place the commanders at a disadvantage. When the political masters decide to use military force to achieve their political or diplomatic ambitions or objectives, they ought to consider that the lives that may be lost due to their restrictions could lead to operational disasters and a drop in morale, both on the battlefield and on the home front.
But, military incompetence should not be hidden behind or blamed on restrictive RoE. Blunders such as the so-called peacekeeping missions in Africa are commonly blamed on too restrictive RoE. The lack of will, the inability to gather and act on intelligence or develop sound military strategies is usually ignored at best or simply never mentioned.
On the other hand, too loose RoE can lead to the indiscriminate use of armed force against whoever passes through the sights. Whereas it may appear that artillery and air strikes on densely populated urban areas may break the morale of the enemy and the civilian population, these actions also violate international law as they are construed as “excessive and indiscriminate force” – which they are.
When crafting RoE, we ought to remember that the world has become a tough neighbourhood. If we wish to play in this neighbourhood, we ought to show our toughness – not by allowing our troops to be killed by the enemy but by killing the enemy. We can only do this if we know “who” the enemy is.
Knowing “who” the enemy is requires intelligence that is verified. In ORW this is, again, relatively simple as a state of war exists between two nations. We know who we are fighting. In OOTW, a lack of intelligence allows us to either view the “enemy” as the local population or the local population as the “enemy”. This confusing view on the “enemy” results in RoE that restrict offensive action – one of the fundamental principles of land warfare. In turn, this gives the enemy the initiative.
The lack of intelligence and the loss of the initiative may result in the rebels/insurgents/terrorists resorting to criminal activities to fund their operations. This can result in extortion, kidnapping for ransom, armed robberies and other financially rewarding crimes.
I disagree that today’s wars are either won or lost at the political level. A lack of real progress on the battlefield or in the area of operations, coupled to increased casualty figures, increased defence spending vs lack of results, resentment from the local population, negative media coverage, a decline of morale on the home front and so forth may add to the political pressures to leave a conflict area. But, this is a direct result of the military action.
Without intelligence, we cannot craft sensible Rules of Engagement. The lack of sensible RoE gives the enemy an opportunity to exploit the perceived lack of “fighting spirit”. Not understanding the cultural environment we operate in amplifies this problem.
Whereas Rules of Engagement are important, they should be based on sound intelligence and an understanding of the operational environment and not sacrifice operational freedom or expose troops to unnecessary danger.
In Operations Related to War (ORW), the RoE are really very straightforward, especially as one of the aims of war is the annihilation of the enemy force. However, care still needs to be exercised in order to prevent civilian casualties or causing unnecessary, excessive damage to private property. But even in well planned and executed ORW, it is not always possible to prevent civilian casualties or minimise damage to property, especially in and around urban environments.
It is, however, when we embark on Operations Other than War (OOTW) that these rules can become restrictive and, in many instances, counterproductive. “Don’t shoot until you are shot at” is difficult to accept when you know a sniper is tracking your movements.
RoE, and the approach to applying such rules, differ from culture to culture. Furthermore, OOTW are often applicable to hostile environments and an enemy that does not abide by any laws, be they local, regional or international.
Whereas it is commonly accepted that excessive force in OOTW will result in alienating the local population and cause resentment which may strengthen the cause of the rebels/terrorists/insurgents, the rules still need to be very carefully crafted.
Ultimately, the RoE are applicable to both military and law enforcement operations that take place within the scope of both ORW and OOTW and are aimed at:
1. Preventing own forces casualties
2. Increasing force legitimacy
3. Minimising collateral damage
4. Preventing unnecessary civilian casualties
5. Increasing operational legitimacy.
Any commander’s aim is to, apart from achieving mission success, prevent casualties amongst his own forces whilst increasing the casualties amongst the enemy’s forces. But sometimes the RoE appear to disregard this fact in favour of not upsetting the politicians, the enemy or the media.
When the RoE are so restrictive that a commander cannot perform his mission effectively, tension will inevitably develop between the political masters and the military commanders. When the restrictive RoE leads to own forces casualties, the tensions are bound to escalate.
As all military operations are politically driven, too restrictive rules place the commanders at a disadvantage. When the political masters decide to use military force to achieve their political or diplomatic ambitions or objectives, they ought to consider that the lives that may be lost due to their restrictions could lead to operational disasters and a drop in morale, both on the battlefield and on the home front.
But, military incompetence should not be hidden behind or blamed on restrictive RoE. Blunders such as the so-called peacekeeping missions in Africa are commonly blamed on too restrictive RoE. The lack of will, the inability to gather and act on intelligence or develop sound military strategies is usually ignored at best or simply never mentioned.
On the other hand, too loose RoE can lead to the indiscriminate use of armed force against whoever passes through the sights. Whereas it may appear that artillery and air strikes on densely populated urban areas may break the morale of the enemy and the civilian population, these actions also violate international law as they are construed as “excessive and indiscriminate force” – which they are.
When crafting RoE, we ought to remember that the world has become a tough neighbourhood. If we wish to play in this neighbourhood, we ought to show our toughness – not by allowing our troops to be killed by the enemy but by killing the enemy. We can only do this if we know “who” the enemy is.
Knowing “who” the enemy is requires intelligence that is verified. In ORW this is, again, relatively simple as a state of war exists between two nations. We know who we are fighting. In OOTW, a lack of intelligence allows us to either view the “enemy” as the local population or the local population as the “enemy”. This confusing view on the “enemy” results in RoE that restrict offensive action – one of the fundamental principles of land warfare. In turn, this gives the enemy the initiative.
The lack of intelligence and the loss of the initiative may result in the rebels/insurgents/terrorists resorting to criminal activities to fund their operations. This can result in extortion, kidnapping for ransom, armed robberies and other financially rewarding crimes.
I disagree that today’s wars are either won or lost at the political level. A lack of real progress on the battlefield or in the area of operations, coupled to increased casualty figures, increased defence spending vs lack of results, resentment from the local population, negative media coverage, a decline of morale on the home front and so forth may add to the political pressures to leave a conflict area. But, this is a direct result of the military action.
Without intelligence, we cannot craft sensible Rules of Engagement. The lack of sensible RoE gives the enemy an opportunity to exploit the perceived lack of “fighting spirit”. Not understanding the cultural environment we operate in amplifies this problem.
Whereas Rules of Engagement are important, they should be based on sound intelligence and an understanding of the operational environment and not sacrifice operational freedom or expose troops to unnecessary danger.
Wednesday, June 23, 2010
NEW MODELS OF COOPERATION FOR THE MILITARY INDUSTRY
Many folks have written asking why I have been so slow in updating the blog. Being unable to update it on a daily basis has been a concern to me but I have been here, there and everywhere which has made it rather difficult to do daily updates. Hopefully, I shall be able to catch up on the blog and several other outstanding issues over the next couple of days.
A few weeks ago I was contacted via the blog asking if I would consider attending the St Petersburg International Economic Forum. I was very honoured to be invited as a panellist to the 14th St Petersburg International Economic Forum in Russia. My participation as a panellist was on the session related to “New Models of cooperation for the Military Industry”.
Once known as Petrograd and as Leningrad, St Petersburg is a beautiful city and is indeed a massive museum under the Russian sky. As I love history and art, there was no shortage of places to visit and sites to see.
The St. Petersburg International Economic Forum is held with the support and participation of the President of the Russian Federation. The aim of the Forum is to gather the world's leading decision makers from government, business and civil society to identify and deliberate the key challenges facing emerging markets and the world and engage communities to find common purpose and frameworks to forge solutions.
One thing that has always struck me on this type of travel is the kindness of strangers. Mr Sergey Nedoroslev, the Chairman of the Board of Kaskol, noting my confusion, stepped in to help me on numerous fronts. I was also privileged to meet some of his friends and associates which included Mr Nikolai Kovarsky, Mr Evgeny Tarlo and the son of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Mr Sergey also made sure that I knew where I had to be at what time.
The Forum was officially opened by President Dmitry Medvedev, the President of the Russian Federation on the 18 June and he was joined by French President Nicolas Sarkozy on the 19 June.
The panel session on New Models for Cooperation for the Military Industry was very ably moderated by Charles Grant, the Director for the Centre of European Reform. Fellow panellists were Vice Admiral Premvir Das (Indian Navy), Aleksei Alyoshin (First Deputy Director General, Russian Technologies State Corporation), Alexey Isaikin (President, Volga-Dnepr Group), Douglas Harned (Vice Pres, Senior Analyst – Aerospace and Defence, Sanford C Bernstein and Co) and Emeric d’Arcimoles (Senior Exec Vice Pres and Chairman of SAFRAN USA, Inc).
Although my small input was focussed on Africa in the main, I thought the comments by my fellow panellists were very interesting and enlightening. However, I still believe that too much emphasis is being placed on technology and terminology changes – and too little on really preparing soldiers for their missions.
A few weeks ago I was contacted via the blog asking if I would consider attending the St Petersburg International Economic Forum. I was very honoured to be invited as a panellist to the 14th St Petersburg International Economic Forum in Russia. My participation as a panellist was on the session related to “New Models of cooperation for the Military Industry”.
Once known as Petrograd and as Leningrad, St Petersburg is a beautiful city and is indeed a massive museum under the Russian sky. As I love history and art, there was no shortage of places to visit and sites to see.
The St. Petersburg International Economic Forum is held with the support and participation of the President of the Russian Federation. The aim of the Forum is to gather the world's leading decision makers from government, business and civil society to identify and deliberate the key challenges facing emerging markets and the world and engage communities to find common purpose and frameworks to forge solutions.
One thing that has always struck me on this type of travel is the kindness of strangers. Mr Sergey Nedoroslev, the Chairman of the Board of Kaskol, noting my confusion, stepped in to help me on numerous fronts. I was also privileged to meet some of his friends and associates which included Mr Nikolai Kovarsky, Mr Evgeny Tarlo and the son of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Mr Sergey also made sure that I knew where I had to be at what time.
The Forum was officially opened by President Dmitry Medvedev, the President of the Russian Federation on the 18 June and he was joined by French President Nicolas Sarkozy on the 19 June.The panel session on New Models for Cooperation for the Military Industry was very ably moderated by Charles Grant, the Director for the Centre of European Reform. Fellow panellists were Vice Admiral Premvir Das (Indian Navy), Aleksei Alyoshin (First Deputy Director General, Russian Technologies State Corporation), Alexey Isaikin (President, Volga-Dnepr Group), Douglas Harned (Vice Pres, Senior Analyst – Aerospace and Defence, Sanford C Bernstein and Co) and Emeric d’Arcimoles (Senior Exec Vice Pres and Chairman of SAFRAN USA, Inc).
Although my small input was focussed on Africa in the main, I thought the comments by my fellow panellists were very interesting and enlightening. However, I still believe that too much emphasis is being placed on technology and terminology changes – and too little on really preparing soldiers for their missions.
Tuesday, June 1, 2010
SO WHO EXACTLY ARE NORTHBRIDGE SERVICES GROUP?
Several people have, over the years, alerted me to the fact that a company known as Northbridge Services Group (NSG) are either claiming or posing to be a “reborn” Executive Outcomes. Not only is this a blatant lie, it is a seriously fraudulent manner of trying to attract clients by deception.
I am well aware of the fact that NSG enabled enquiries to a website www.executiveoutcomes.com (this was not EO’s true web address) to redirect to their site, trying to give credence to their deception. For the life of me, I fail to understand how a company can act in such a deceptive manner yet expect clients to trust them.
A certain Mr Pasquale DiPofi was one of the scoundrels involved in NSG. DiPofi also ran his own “Executive Outcomes” based out of Michigan, USA. This is what another site had to say about this person:
"When the classic Executive Outcomes left the civil war in Sierra Leone, they never received payment for $23 million worth of services. In the pursuit of the debt, an English company, Audax Trading, approached the same named company from Michigan in February 2002 about collecting the debt. Knowing full well they were not the intended Executive Outcomes, DiPofi and his partner, Eastpointe police officer Christopher Belan, produced fraudulent documents and claims to the government of Sierra Leone via Audax for the $23 million".
For his failed efforts to boost the coffers of “Executive Outcomes” and NSG’s, DiPofi pleaded guilty to charges of fraud in 2006. He was sentenced to 40 months in prison at the end of March 2007.
Having had a look at NSGs website (http://northbridgeservices.org) I am rather surprised that they can claim to offer “... a highly discrete, totally reliable yet cost effective service...” (I somehow suspect they meant “discreet” as opposed to “discrete”).
I am not sure if Northbridge Services Group still exists, but if they do, lies and deceit seem to be part and parcel of their modus operandi – as if the industry doesn’t have enough bulldust artists posing out there.
Although Northbridge Services Group was NEVER part of, associated with or linked to Executive Outcomes in any manner or form, this still begs the question: Who exactly are these buffoons?
Whereas I do not doubt the numerous qualifications of the NSG president (He has served in numerous leadership and command positions in the light infantry, mechanized infantry, cavalry and tank units. He has commanded six platoons, three companies and two battalions. He has been a tactics instructor and doctrine writer in both the US Army Armor and Engineer schools. He is an Airborne Ranger and is Jungle Expert qualified and has earned the Combat Infantryman's badge), I certainly doubt their integrity.
Perhaps their president, Lt Col (R) Robert W. Kovacic can answer this for me as I am quite anxious to know.
I am well aware of the fact that NSG enabled enquiries to a website www.executiveoutcomes.com (this was not EO’s true web address) to redirect to their site, trying to give credence to their deception. For the life of me, I fail to understand how a company can act in such a deceptive manner yet expect clients to trust them.
A certain Mr Pasquale DiPofi was one of the scoundrels involved in NSG. DiPofi also ran his own “Executive Outcomes” based out of Michigan, USA. This is what another site had to say about this person:
"When the classic Executive Outcomes left the civil war in Sierra Leone, they never received payment for $23 million worth of services. In the pursuit of the debt, an English company, Audax Trading, approached the same named company from Michigan in February 2002 about collecting the debt. Knowing full well they were not the intended Executive Outcomes, DiPofi and his partner, Eastpointe police officer Christopher Belan, produced fraudulent documents and claims to the government of Sierra Leone via Audax for the $23 million".
For his failed efforts to boost the coffers of “Executive Outcomes” and NSG’s, DiPofi pleaded guilty to charges of fraud in 2006. He was sentenced to 40 months in prison at the end of March 2007.
Having had a look at NSGs website (http://northbridgeservices.org) I am rather surprised that they can claim to offer “... a highly discrete, totally reliable yet cost effective service...” (I somehow suspect they meant “discreet” as opposed to “discrete”).
I am not sure if Northbridge Services Group still exists, but if they do, lies and deceit seem to be part and parcel of their modus operandi – as if the industry doesn’t have enough bulldust artists posing out there.
Although Northbridge Services Group was NEVER part of, associated with or linked to Executive Outcomes in any manner or form, this still begs the question: Who exactly are these buffoons?
Whereas I do not doubt the numerous qualifications of the NSG president (He has served in numerous leadership and command positions in the light infantry, mechanized infantry, cavalry and tank units. He has commanded six platoons, three companies and two battalions. He has been a tactics instructor and doctrine writer in both the US Army Armor and Engineer schools. He is an Airborne Ranger and is Jungle Expert qualified and has earned the Combat Infantryman's badge), I certainly doubt their integrity.
Perhaps their president, Lt Col (R) Robert W. Kovacic can answer this for me as I am quite anxious to know.
Tuesday, May 18, 2010
JUST HOW EFFECTIVE ARE COMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS?
Communications operations are conducted at two distinct yet inter-related levels: The strategic level and the tactical level.
At the strategic level, Strategic Communications Operations (SCOs) or STRATCOM, also referred to as Strategic Information Operations, is nothing new in the “war of words” to discredit, demoralise and/or disrupt an opponent and boost the morale of the citizens and own forces. It can even be used to turn a legitimate organisation into an illegitimate organisation. But, the converse is also true: it can turn an illegitimate action into a legitimate action.
At this level, these operations entail more than simple rumour-mongering. They are used to give a government or a force an advantage in their fight against a real or perceived enemy. But they ought to include white, grey and black propaganda in such a manner that the receiver (reader, listener or watcher) at a minimum becomes aware of the message and at best, believes it.
In South Africa, and indeed in Africa, we witness the use of SCOs or propaganda warfare on a daily basis – as well as its effects. Some of it is actually quite good. Some of it is rather pathetic. But, despite my opinion of it, it still reaches many people out there and ultimately, it is the people who decide on how this will influence their lives – or react to it.
The result of all of this is, when comparing the West to the East, is that the US’s AFRICOM is now seen by many in Africa as a wolf in a sheep’s clothing and the Chinese as a sheep in a wolf’s clothing. That in itself shows the effect of these types of operations. It also shows how these types of operations can backfire on the originators.
Truth be told, these operations are financially very expensive. As an example, the US military has spent in excess of US$ 1 billion the past three years in Iraq and Afghanistan alone in trying to counter its enemies there. The result of these operations remains debateable.
Just as warfare has certain primary and dynamic principles, so too do SCO’s have primary and dynamic principles.
The first principle is, in fact, something Sun Tzu penned more than two and a half thousand years ago:
“Know your enemy, know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”
To succeed with any SCO, an intimate knowledge of the enemy or target group is required. If this is knowledge is not present, any hoped for success will remain that – hoped for.
Knowing the “enemy” – or the target audience – will determine such basics as what language the message needs to be transmitted in. Paid-for news articles, advertisements, billboards, radio and television programmes, and even polls and pressure groups need to promote their messages in a language that everyone (or at least the vast majority) will understand. But, language is not the only criterion that is of great importance: culture, beliefs, level of education and so forth all determine how the message should be packaged in order to achieve maximum success.
I am reminded of a foreign company that wrote to me claiming they had a contract to “do Africa” and asked if I could recommend someone who spoke “African”. This is a basic example of how misinformed many are. When these companies get involved in SCOs, the end-result can only be terrifying at best.
The second principle of these types of operations is centralised control. Without centralised control, everyone will be developing and preparing their own uncoordinated messages and subsequently, these messages will clash with one another and render the entire operation a waste of time and money. They will also show that they are simply part of a (poorly) planned operation and therefore lose any potential value they may have had.
How the information will be packaged is likewise very important. The best message, poorly packaged will be poorly received. Incorrect packaging of the message serves no purpose if it will never reach the intended audience or target, let alone achieve the desired effect.
Furthermore, pro-active planning is critical in achieving success. In order to gain the initiative and maintain it, plans need to be formulated well in advance and those plans must be based on intelligence (reality) and not on perceived reality.
SCOs can also used to negate High-Value Targets (HVTs) or turn their followers against them. Again, detailed intelligence, coordination of effort, packaging and pro-active planning is critical to success.
At the tactical level, these operations used to be known as Communications Operations or COMOPS. At this level, the aim is to meet and discuss issues of mutual importance with the village elders and provide much needed assistance and support to the villagers in the Area of Responsibility. In essence, this is the “hearts-and-minds” war and many a young South African soldier can testify in having partaken in such operations.
It is here that, should any semblance of success be wished for, the tribal customs, beliefs and traditions be known, understood and applied by those conducting the COMOPS. It is at this level that vital information and intelligence is gathered and the support of the local population is either won or lost. If the battle is lost at this level, the gunfights that follow will bring about nothing but a hollow victory.
Those that plan these operations, especially at the strategic level, have so much technology at hand – mobile phones, blogs, social networks and so forth – that they have no excuse for their poor performance.
But looking at what is going on around me, I have to ask if these operations are successful. They present a golden opportunity to the user if correctly planned, packaged and executed but when they are haphazardly implemented, they cause more damage than good.
At the strategic level, Strategic Communications Operations (SCOs) or STRATCOM, also referred to as Strategic Information Operations, is nothing new in the “war of words” to discredit, demoralise and/or disrupt an opponent and boost the morale of the citizens and own forces. It can even be used to turn a legitimate organisation into an illegitimate organisation. But, the converse is also true: it can turn an illegitimate action into a legitimate action.
At this level, these operations entail more than simple rumour-mongering. They are used to give a government or a force an advantage in their fight against a real or perceived enemy. But they ought to include white, grey and black propaganda in such a manner that the receiver (reader, listener or watcher) at a minimum becomes aware of the message and at best, believes it.
In South Africa, and indeed in Africa, we witness the use of SCOs or propaganda warfare on a daily basis – as well as its effects. Some of it is actually quite good. Some of it is rather pathetic. But, despite my opinion of it, it still reaches many people out there and ultimately, it is the people who decide on how this will influence their lives – or react to it.
The result of all of this is, when comparing the West to the East, is that the US’s AFRICOM is now seen by many in Africa as a wolf in a sheep’s clothing and the Chinese as a sheep in a wolf’s clothing. That in itself shows the effect of these types of operations. It also shows how these types of operations can backfire on the originators.
Truth be told, these operations are financially very expensive. As an example, the US military has spent in excess of US$ 1 billion the past three years in Iraq and Afghanistan alone in trying to counter its enemies there. The result of these operations remains debateable.
Just as warfare has certain primary and dynamic principles, so too do SCO’s have primary and dynamic principles.
The first principle is, in fact, something Sun Tzu penned more than two and a half thousand years ago:
“Know your enemy, know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”
To succeed with any SCO, an intimate knowledge of the enemy or target group is required. If this is knowledge is not present, any hoped for success will remain that – hoped for.
Knowing the “enemy” – or the target audience – will determine such basics as what language the message needs to be transmitted in. Paid-for news articles, advertisements, billboards, radio and television programmes, and even polls and pressure groups need to promote their messages in a language that everyone (or at least the vast majority) will understand. But, language is not the only criterion that is of great importance: culture, beliefs, level of education and so forth all determine how the message should be packaged in order to achieve maximum success.
I am reminded of a foreign company that wrote to me claiming they had a contract to “do Africa” and asked if I could recommend someone who spoke “African”. This is a basic example of how misinformed many are. When these companies get involved in SCOs, the end-result can only be terrifying at best.
The second principle of these types of operations is centralised control. Without centralised control, everyone will be developing and preparing their own uncoordinated messages and subsequently, these messages will clash with one another and render the entire operation a waste of time and money. They will also show that they are simply part of a (poorly) planned operation and therefore lose any potential value they may have had.
How the information will be packaged is likewise very important. The best message, poorly packaged will be poorly received. Incorrect packaging of the message serves no purpose if it will never reach the intended audience or target, let alone achieve the desired effect.
Furthermore, pro-active planning is critical in achieving success. In order to gain the initiative and maintain it, plans need to be formulated well in advance and those plans must be based on intelligence (reality) and not on perceived reality.
SCOs can also used to negate High-Value Targets (HVTs) or turn their followers against them. Again, detailed intelligence, coordination of effort, packaging and pro-active planning is critical to success.
At the tactical level, these operations used to be known as Communications Operations or COMOPS. At this level, the aim is to meet and discuss issues of mutual importance with the village elders and provide much needed assistance and support to the villagers in the Area of Responsibility. In essence, this is the “hearts-and-minds” war and many a young South African soldier can testify in having partaken in such operations.
It is here that, should any semblance of success be wished for, the tribal customs, beliefs and traditions be known, understood and applied by those conducting the COMOPS. It is at this level that vital information and intelligence is gathered and the support of the local population is either won or lost. If the battle is lost at this level, the gunfights that follow will bring about nothing but a hollow victory.
Those that plan these operations, especially at the strategic level, have so much technology at hand – mobile phones, blogs, social networks and so forth – that they have no excuse for their poor performance.
But looking at what is going on around me, I have to ask if these operations are successful. They present a golden opportunity to the user if correctly planned, packaged and executed but when they are haphazardly implemented, they cause more damage than good.
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
THE NEUTRALISATION OF HIGH-VALUE TARGETS
When Sun Tzu wrote “The supreme act of war is to subdue the enemy without a fight” approximately 25 centuries ago, did he see the neutralisation or targeted killings of key enemy personnel as part of the subduing process?
Then again, I have always wondered why is it that when a politician or a prominent person (read “High-Value Target” or HVT) is the subject of a targeted killing, it is known as an “assassination”? Yet, when some lesser mortal meets his or her end, it is a murder. Unless of course, it happens on the battlefield – then he or she is simply “killed”.
The January 2010 targeted killing of a senior Hamas military commander in Dubai has certainly brought the debate on assassinations to the fore. This action to neutralise an enemy of a state is nothing new. In fact, governments through their intelligence agencies the world over have made use of - and still make use of - targeted killings as a method of eliminating enemies of supposed high-value. (Personally, I believe the intelligence agencies ought to be confined purely to the collection of the critical information and not the actual neutralisation if it involves a targeted killing).
Assassination of enemy leaders and commanders is not the only method of eliminating them. It is however the one method that causes the most media interest and speculation. If correctly planned and executed, it remains a highly effective action. When these targeted killings disrupt or impact in part on the enemy’s Centre of Gravity (CoG) they become even more effective.
But, ought these direct-action, covert or clandestine actions to be used purely for military and political purposes or do they also hold value in countering serious and violent organised crime? I believe they do. But as long as we attribute “rights” to these organised crime syndicates – who attribute no rights to their victims – this will probably never happen.
There are essentially two methods of neutralising a high-value target. These are:
1. Removing the target from society
2. Getting society to remove the target.
The first method includes actions such as assassinations, target-specific drone attacks, snatch operations with the aim of interrogating and imprisoning and so forth. This direct approach against the target requires a high level of intelligence gathering and planning. There are many instances where intelligence and planning has failed miserably but there are numerous other instances where it has succeeded. It is, however, the actions that fail that evoke the most interest and speculation. Those that are successful pass almost unnoticed.
The second method utilises an indirect approach and includes grey and black propaganda aimed at discrediting the target or arousing suspicions against him or her. These suspicions, managed correctly, can lead to society taking the desired action and thereby neutralising the target. Here too intelligence and planning play a critical role in order to allow society to be manipulated to take the desired action(s) against the target.
These actions should be conducted in support of national strategic and military operational objectives. By implication they are intelligence driven but are determined at political level and executed at operator level. It is at the level of policy that problems such as inter-service delineation and medium to long-term consequences are assessed and confirmed.
Failure can also be attributed to undue political pressure and the failure to anticipate the consequences when things go wrong, poor inter-service relations and poor operational execution. Compromise – the result of poor or non-existent security - which leads to failure, can have far-reaching political implications thus rendering the ultimate outcome a failure – despite the fact that operationally, the action may have succeeded. Likewise, unnecessary collateral damage can render an operationally successful operation a strategic failure.
Many questions arise when a targeted killing is conducted. There are those who question the morality of such actions and others who call on international legal matters to be instituted against the country perpetrating the deed. For some reason, these same voices never seem to be raised when the enemy conducts these actions.
Numerous considerations ought to be appreciated when planning a neutralisation of a specific target. Apart from the “who”, “by when”, “how” and “where”, the following are but some of the critical considerations:
1. Will he or she become a martyr and result in his/her memory being used as a rallying point?
2. Will the person who will take the target’s place be a moderate or a hard-liner?
3. What are the medium and long-term consequences of success/failure?
4. Will the resultant fall-out (political, economical, militarily, etc) be acceptable?
5. What level of collateral damage will be acceptable?
6. To what extent will a non-violent neutralisation allow the political and operational objectives to be met?
The fact of the matter is that neutralisation must take place at an early stage of the threat being identified. If the target is allowed to establish his/her authority and leadership to such an extent that they are seen as the “father” or rallying point of a movement or force, their neutralisation may increase the motivation of the movement or force. To prevent this, it is necessary for:
1. Sound intelligence at early stages of identification to answer the above considerations
2. Decisive government decision-making to respond rapidly and significantly to a developing threat
3. Rapid and decisive action to prevent future manpower, economical and political costs to escalate in order to neutralise or eliminate the target.
The neutralisation of HVTs has a definite place in the modern combat area, especially when it comes to combating insurgencies and organised crime syndicates/cartels. But a lack of decision making at the political level and inter-service bickering often result in no action. It is the lack of action, both direct and indirect, that allows the target to become a HVT, especially when the media manipulates the truth and gives media coverage thus adding to the supposed credibility of the target – and by then any action is often too little, too late.
Then again, I have always wondered why is it that when a politician or a prominent person (read “High-Value Target” or HVT) is the subject of a targeted killing, it is known as an “assassination”? Yet, when some lesser mortal meets his or her end, it is a murder. Unless of course, it happens on the battlefield – then he or she is simply “killed”.
The January 2010 targeted killing of a senior Hamas military commander in Dubai has certainly brought the debate on assassinations to the fore. This action to neutralise an enemy of a state is nothing new. In fact, governments through their intelligence agencies the world over have made use of - and still make use of - targeted killings as a method of eliminating enemies of supposed high-value. (Personally, I believe the intelligence agencies ought to be confined purely to the collection of the critical information and not the actual neutralisation if it involves a targeted killing).
Assassination of enemy leaders and commanders is not the only method of eliminating them. It is however the one method that causes the most media interest and speculation. If correctly planned and executed, it remains a highly effective action. When these targeted killings disrupt or impact in part on the enemy’s Centre of Gravity (CoG) they become even more effective.
But, ought these direct-action, covert or clandestine actions to be used purely for military and political purposes or do they also hold value in countering serious and violent organised crime? I believe they do. But as long as we attribute “rights” to these organised crime syndicates – who attribute no rights to their victims – this will probably never happen.
There are essentially two methods of neutralising a high-value target. These are:
1. Removing the target from society
2. Getting society to remove the target.
The first method includes actions such as assassinations, target-specific drone attacks, snatch operations with the aim of interrogating and imprisoning and so forth. This direct approach against the target requires a high level of intelligence gathering and planning. There are many instances where intelligence and planning has failed miserably but there are numerous other instances where it has succeeded. It is, however, the actions that fail that evoke the most interest and speculation. Those that are successful pass almost unnoticed.
The second method utilises an indirect approach and includes grey and black propaganda aimed at discrediting the target or arousing suspicions against him or her. These suspicions, managed correctly, can lead to society taking the desired action and thereby neutralising the target. Here too intelligence and planning play a critical role in order to allow society to be manipulated to take the desired action(s) against the target.
These actions should be conducted in support of national strategic and military operational objectives. By implication they are intelligence driven but are determined at political level and executed at operator level. It is at the level of policy that problems such as inter-service delineation and medium to long-term consequences are assessed and confirmed.
Failure can also be attributed to undue political pressure and the failure to anticipate the consequences when things go wrong, poor inter-service relations and poor operational execution. Compromise – the result of poor or non-existent security - which leads to failure, can have far-reaching political implications thus rendering the ultimate outcome a failure – despite the fact that operationally, the action may have succeeded. Likewise, unnecessary collateral damage can render an operationally successful operation a strategic failure.
Many questions arise when a targeted killing is conducted. There are those who question the morality of such actions and others who call on international legal matters to be instituted against the country perpetrating the deed. For some reason, these same voices never seem to be raised when the enemy conducts these actions.
Numerous considerations ought to be appreciated when planning a neutralisation of a specific target. Apart from the “who”, “by when”, “how” and “where”, the following are but some of the critical considerations:
1. Will he or she become a martyr and result in his/her memory being used as a rallying point?
2. Will the person who will take the target’s place be a moderate or a hard-liner?
3. What are the medium and long-term consequences of success/failure?
4. Will the resultant fall-out (political, economical, militarily, etc) be acceptable?
5. What level of collateral damage will be acceptable?
6. To what extent will a non-violent neutralisation allow the political and operational objectives to be met?
The fact of the matter is that neutralisation must take place at an early stage of the threat being identified. If the target is allowed to establish his/her authority and leadership to such an extent that they are seen as the “father” or rallying point of a movement or force, their neutralisation may increase the motivation of the movement or force. To prevent this, it is necessary for:
1. Sound intelligence at early stages of identification to answer the above considerations
2. Decisive government decision-making to respond rapidly and significantly to a developing threat
3. Rapid and decisive action to prevent future manpower, economical and political costs to escalate in order to neutralise or eliminate the target.
The neutralisation of HVTs has a definite place in the modern combat area, especially when it comes to combating insurgencies and organised crime syndicates/cartels. But a lack of decision making at the political level and inter-service bickering often result in no action. It is the lack of action, both direct and indirect, that allows the target to become a HVT, especially when the media manipulates the truth and gives media coverage thus adding to the supposed credibility of the target – and by then any action is often too little, too late.
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