THE DANGERS OF IGNORING STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

As Africa drags itself ever closer to the abyss, one would think that governments would be paying a lot more attention to strategic intelligence, and the current and developing strategic threats, along with strategic forecasting. This sadly appears not to be the case as it is evident that erroneous intelligence impacts greatly on current thinking and strategies—especially when the initiative has been lost and the tipping point is approaching.

If governments continue to base their strategic predications on thumb-sucking, misinformed media articles and ‘opinion pieces’, ill-informed advisors, and incorrect narrative-driven assumptions, instead of verified and credible strategic intelligence, tragedy awaits them as they place their national and vital interests at risk. The richer they are in resources, the greater the risk and the subsequent looming tragedy.

The rise of armed anti-government forces, radical religious terror groups, proxy forces, domestic and transnational organised crime, planned regime-change actions, mass perception shaping programmes via the mainstream media and so forth, is evident that intelligence failures at the strategic level are increasing. The continued lack of intelligence is costing—and will still cost—African governments dearly in the future as they will be unable to prepare and posture themselves correctly to meet the threats. Nor will they be able to develop a coherent strategic intent as the threat and its intentions will be unknown…let alone safeguard their interests.

The integrity and survival of the state along with the longevity of government requires a reliable, robust, and continuous strategic intelligence input. This is essential to enable the development and adjustment of the National Strategy. The National Strategy, in turn, must give the government direction and guidance on how it intends to position itself on the national, regional, continental, and international stages. It is also essential to give forewarning of real, potential and predicted violent and non-violent threats against the state—and the obstacles it will face along the way in countering the threats.

The National Security Strategy is similarly guided by strategic intelligence and strategic forecasting and/or predictions, and its impact is felt across all pillars of the state. However, threats against the state are not only of a military or armed nature. They include planned non-violent attacks such as economic sabotage, political blackmail, coercive diplomacy, perception manipulation, international criminal court threats, trade embargos, resource and state capture, and so forth. These threats are diverse, multi-dimensional and very seldom, if ever, appear as a singular threat. They develop over time and are never spontaneous.

Without strategic intelligence, the state will have no pre-warning of the approaching threats—or their intentions—that will attack it on numerous fronts. Nor will it understand—or be likely to withstand—foreign-backed and sponsored regime change actions through violent and non-violent means. These attacks all have only one aim: the installation, by any and all means possible, of a government that will be sympathetic to the regime change sponsors and that will surrender its resources as a token of thanks.

Countries such as Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Nigeria, Central African Republic, S Sudan, DRC, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Mali to name a few have all found themselves under sustained attack without having had any home-grown intelligence pre-warning. Despite several of the aforementioned countries being cautioned prior to the attacks, they chose instead to be blind and discard the dangers in the misguided belief that they may not be targeted or that the intelligence was wrong. In some instances, they were advised by ‘allies’ that the intelligence was false. Several other countries are also on the target list but are not currently viewed as priorities—yet. However, in every case, the developing intentions were and are—if anyone was or is willing to look—as clear as daylight, yet they were and are seemingly unable to connect the dots.

Reliance on the media, ill-intentioned ‘allies’, misinformed advisors, and public perceptions does not constitute intelligence at any dimension or level. The misguided belief that these sources will provide accurate and objective intelligence is a myth governments should dispel with absolute haste as these sources are usually coloured with disinformation. Instead, they must develop their own sources of intelligence and take responsibility for their own intelligence collection efforts and their intelligence failures.

Just because the intelligence does not match their ethnic, financial, racial, religious, or xenophobic narrative, it does not mean that it is wrong or false or even non-existent. 

Unless African governments realise the true value of strategic intelligence and critical role it plays in guiding and shaping their national and security strategies and defending their national and vital interests, they will continue to lead themselves—and their people—down the path of self-destruction.  

COMPOSITE WARFARE RELEASE

My book ‘Composite Warfare: The conduct of successful ground force operations in Africa’ has just been added to the publisher’s website. Please visit http://www.30degreessouth.co.za/composite_warfare.htm

Interested parties are urged to contact the publishers directly as I do not carry stock of the book. The publishers will, in turn, advise on points of sale, shipping and so forth.

My sincerest thanks to all for your patience and interest.

AN ‘ASSASSIN’S’ ALIBI

Every so often, somebody who calls him or herself a ‘researcher’ or a ‘journalist’ tries to link me to one or other unsolved political assassination.

Just yesterday again, I received communication from one such person—a Swedish aid worker nonetheless—who had been brought under the impression—or who had brought himself under the impression—that I held the answer, or had in-depth, secret knowledge of yet another such covert and dastardly deed. The reasoning appears to be that if anything happened in Africa, and I live and work in Africa, then I am either involved or have in-depth knowledge of whatever it is I am to be blamed for.

Still, that forced me to wrack my brains to recall my whereabouts on 18 September 1961, the day of the mysterious plane crash death of the Swedish diplomat Dag Hammarskjöld in Zambia—then Northern Rhodesia.

Luckily it was not too difficult. Since I was five years old at the time, I was in Botswana (then known as Bechuanaland) probably hunting birds with a pellet gun or playing in a pool of mud. Thus, I am fairly satisfied that—despite my tendency to wander about unsupervised by my parents—I would not have made it across the two different borders and shot his plane out of the sky without anybody noticing.

But somebody must think I have unresolved anger issues with Swedes as he is not the only Swede I have been accused of sending to his Maker prematurely.

Over the past 20 years, there have been persistent attempts to link me to the assassination of former Swedish Premier Olof Palme. That was in Stockholm on 28 February 1986.

My alibi for the above assassination is so boring that I will just pretend that I was at a top secret location in Switzerland having my fingerprints burnt-off after having been falsely accused of the 1983 suicide bombing of the US embassy in Beirut.

However, I must confess publicly, that unfortunately I do not have an alibi for the poisoning of Alexander the Great. But with the way the insinuations are flying, I shall have to make an urgent appointment with a hypnotherapist and have myself regressed to a previous life in 323 B.C. so that I can cobble together another defence.

Meanwhile, if any of you have any knowledge of my whereabouts at the time of any other unsolved assassinations or downing of aircraft, please forward the details to me. It will save me much time and effort.

PUBLICATION OF BOOK: COMPOSITE WARFARE

Firstly, many thanks to everyone who has shown such an interest in my book, ‘Composite Warfare: The conduct of successful ground force operations in Africa’.  

The many emails, LinkedIn, and Twitter messages as well as a few via the blog have all been very encouraging.

It has been a long arduous road—and wait—but the end is finally in sight.

The book (544 pages and several years of writing) has been through the final page proofing and cover design phases and I was told this morning (18 August 2016) that if all goes according to plan, the book will be available by end-September/early-October 2016.

I trust the book will prove educational to soldiers, scholars and military history enthusiasts across Africa and the world.

COMPOSITE WARFARE: AN UPDATE

My apologies to everyone who has tried to order my upcoming book titled ‘Composite Warfare: The conduct of successful ground force operations in Africa’.

Due to numerous technical issues I mentioned on a previous blog posting, the book is finally nearing publication. I can, however, not give an exact publication date at this stage.

Nevertheless, recent correspondence from the publisher indicated that once the typesetting and layout is complete it will be sent to me for final proofing i.e. for review and any corrections. Thereafter it will go to print.

If all goes well, the publisher is looking at releasing the book in August.

The cover of the book has also undergone a change to be in line with the aim of the book ie a book on how African armies can prepare themselves to counter armed threats by conventional and unconventional forces be they hostile armies, armed anti-government forces or proxy forces.

Again, please accept my sincerest apologies for the delay.

ARE AFRICAN SECURITY SERVICES ARE FAILING THE CONTINENT?

The numerous terror attacks, violent (and non-violent) protests and riots, along with armed uprisings Africa has— and is witnessing—are an indication that its security services—in particular the intelligence services—are failing their governments, the continent, and their people. Of course, these violent and non-violent actions are moreover an indication of much deeper issues that governments need to give attention to. 

But, it is also an indication that intelligence gained from open sources and allied intelligence liaison holds little to no value for African governments as it is neither actionable nor pre-emptive. In many instances this ‘allied intelligence’ is deceptive, misleading, false and purely historical in nature despite being piously referred to as ‘intelligence sharing’ aimed at ending conflicts and wars.

Instead, ‘intelligence’ is frequently used as a channel through which to disseminate fabricated information to create a false sense of security—or exaggerate a threat—with the hopes of eliciting and/or fermenting chaos or a heavy-handed government response. (It is also used to discredit business threats or cast a doubt over people and companies). In addition, the training given to African intelligence services by their so-called allied partners is shockingly sub-standard and in many instances, irrelevant and aimed at rendering them unable to fulfil even basic intelligence collection operations, thus purposely setting them up for failure.

The dangers and risks increase when false information is accepted as ‘intelligence’.

Even with the very best security measures and procedures in place, a government that lacks intelligence will be vulnerable to armed uprisings and/or terror threats.

In late-November 2015 sources reported to us that ‘a large terrorist action’ was going to happen ‘soon’ against a Western target/people somewhere in West Africa. We were, however, unaware of where and what the target was as we had long since left West Africa. But, if we were aware of a pending (terror) attack somewhere in West Africa, what were the intelligence services in West Africa and in particular the Burkina Faso intelligence service and its ‘partnership allies’ doing?

Such attacks are not spontaneous acts of violence carried out by a group of disaffected people who suddenly decide to commit an act of terror. These acts are planned over a period of time and in the process, these groups use a host of different agents, support agents, sympathisers, and radicals who are prepared—and sometimes willing to die—to carry their message(s) across.

Social media is frequently used to distribute instructions, issue warnings, pass on intelligence, and messages and to mobilise their assets and supporters. Sympathetic NGOs, so-called ‘humanitarian organisations’, and other ‘peace loving’ and ‘democratic and freedom seeking’ charities are occasionally used to move their weapons and equipment and assist with distributing the armed protesters and/or terror groups’ propaganda.

But these groups haemorrhage or leak information if only we are willing to make an effort to capture it. Oftentimes, this leakage is very obvious and serves as a perfect early warning of a pending attack.

This begs the question when considering, for example, the attack in Burkina Faso: Where was the intelligence that was supposed to identify that planned action or—at the very least—warn of the potential danger or predict it? Where were the agents and other sources that were supposed to identify such groups and their plans? Or is this another case where the intelligence services were taught how to tie their shoelaces instead of how to do their jobs?

The developing conflict in Burundi is another case in point. Armed violence, criminality and terrorist actions are planned in advance…and are NEVER spontaneous. Seldom are they launched without large-scale foreign backing and support—as Cote d’Ivore demonstrated.

The lack of actionable and predicted intelligence—or the inability and/or unwillingness of the intelligence services to collect it—places the government at a severe disadvantage and provides the enemy or threat with a multitude of advantages and options. At times, actionable intelligence is discarded when it does not match the perceived reality of the government or the recipient—or, as has happened in the past, the intelligence is rejected by a so-called Western ally as ‘nonsense’ and ‘rubbish’ only for it to come back and bite everyone. Blind acceptance of misconceived allied assessments is a grave folly. (Sadly for Africa, some of its so-called allies are silently working at destabelising governments whilst trying to act the ‘good guys’).

Neglecting the intelligence required to ensure the security of the nation and the longevity and stability of a government and the state is both irresponsible and costing Africa dearly. Instead, governments are increasingly faced with domestic and foreign-funded anti-government forces (AGFs) and proxy forces intent on sowing terror and creating chaos with the aim of destabelising entire countries and toppling governments to ensure foreign control over their interests.

But conflicts and wars in Africa are never ending—and indeed, will escalate over the coming years. As long as intelligence is neglected and/or ignored—these actions will continue to take governments by surprise. The collateral damage and humanitarian fallout from these conflicts and wars is incalculable.   

In early 2016, the United Nations (UN) called for an estimated US$ 40bn annually to assist and support the growing number of people requiring humanitarian aid. US Dollars Forty Billion. And apparently this is not enough….as there is a US$ 15bn funding gap. Indeed, with that amount of money annually and continually given over a 5-year period, most African conflicts and wars could be over and the national armies, law enforcement agencies, and intelligence services retrained and reequipped to be very effective security forces. It is, after all, the many conflicts and wars that have resulted in so many people requiring humanitarian aid. 

But, as many in Africa—especially those in the DRC, CAR,  Cote d’Ivore, Darfur, Burundi, South Sudan, and others—can testify, the UN is not exactly objective, trusted or able to live up to its promises to protect the innocent and keep the peace. The little trust there was in the UN is rapidly disappearing down a very deep hole. The perception that the UN peacekeepers are nothing other than ‘tourists in helicopters’ that commit crimes against the very people they need to protect will intensify over time.

But, as long as African governments continue to neglect their security structures and fail to collect and act on intelligence, they will fail the continent and these funds will go to organisations that exploit these tragedies to make money.

Ironically, these same organisations condemn those who actually do something to end conflicts and wars—probably because ending conflicts and wars is very bad for their business and their control over African governments.

THE END OF ANOTHER YEAR

2015 is now approaching its end.

As was to be expected, Africa remained a target of destabelisation hidden under the auspices of ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’, and ‘human rights’. Armed conflicts have remained on-going along with foreign covert and overt attempts to ensure they remain on-going.

It was a year in which the blood of innocents was again spilled by Daesh and its many affiliates and supporters. It was also a year in which we had to witness more lies and deception by foreign powers targeting African governments with the ever-present threat of regime change if they do not do as told. Deception, lies and political correctness are providing the threat networks with massive advantages in their quest to spread terror and chaos.  

It was, however, also a year filled with good memories and bad: STTEP’s men made a very positive difference in Nigeria until we were forced to leave but we also lost 3 of our men in Nigeria; we had adrenalin rushes, expectations, waiting, laughter, highs and lows, cheap airlines, rundown airports, meetings, proposals, headshaking, briefings, presentations, bad food, terrible water, long hours, little sleep and some blood, sweat and tears.

On a personal level, I was again privileged to be invited to lecture at the SA Military Academy as well as some other African defence institutions and colleges. I was likewise honoured to have been invited to lecture beyond our shores as well as partake in the workshop on the African Stand-By Force in Stellenbosch.

As for my book: I have become incredibly frustrated by the publishers and the amount of toing-and-froing that has taken place. Contracts have been changed and disputed, publishing dates moved, disagreements and/or threats between different publishers have taken place and so forth. To say I am sick of the lack of professionalism I have had to deal with would be an understatement.  IF this book will ever see the light of day early next year remains to be seen. All I can do is apologise to those who placed orders and who have yet to be advised what the status of publishing is—but I too am equally in the dark.

The last months of this year also saw me being rather ill and it has taken me some time to recover. Making it all the worse, I gave up smoking in late-November 2015 so I am still battling the nicotine withdrawal as well.

My thanks to everyone who read and contributed to the blog throughout the year. I appreciate your comments and views on matters related to security and defence in Africa even if we do not always agree. Your thoughts give me a new perspective, and allow me to broaden my own knowledge base.

To everyone who is far from home at this time, and to those who are deployed in the conflict zones around the world, beit as soldiers, sailors, airmen, law enforcement officers, spooks or private military and security contractors, keep your heads down, your eyes peeled, your weapons close at hand, stay safe and be ready to do what needs to be done.

Let us also remember those who will not be able to be share this time with those they hold dear as well as those who have lost friends and loved ones. They should never be forgotten. Nor should the sacrifices they have made ever be forgotten.

I would also like to wish each and every visitor to the blog a blessed festive season. To those who celebrate the meaning of Christmas, I wish you and your families a blessed, happy and joyous festive season.

To those who do not celebrate Christmas for whatever reason, I wish you all a time of happiness and peace with your families and friends.

I would also like to wish each and every one of you—and your loved ones—a great 2016. May the coming year be filled with good health, happiness and safety.

I look forward to sharing more thoughts with you all next year.

COMPOSITE WARFARE: THE CONDUCT OF SUCCESSFUL GROUND FORCES OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

As a continent, Africa presents her armies with a vast, dynamic and multidimensional operating environment. It has numerous complex and diverse ethnic, religious, cultural and tribal interests and loyalties, along with many multifaceted threat-drivers coupled to varied and infrastructure-poor terrain plus vast climatic variations. The continent is, furthermore, characterized by numerous half-won conflicts and wars fought by incorrectly structured, inadequately trained and ill-equipped armies. For many reasons, these forces have difficulty adapting to the complex, demanding and rapidly changing environments they do battle in. Similarly, the armies have difficulty in decisively defeating the various threats they face. Many of these problems stem from the fact that numerous modern-day African armies are merely clones of the armies established by their once-colonial masters, their Cold War allies or their new international allies. Many of the principles and tactics, techniques and procedures they were - and still are - being taught relate to fighting in Europe and not in Africa. Some of these concepts are not even relevant to Africa.
This book is intended as a guide and textbook for African soldiers and scholars who wish to understand the development of hostilities, strategy, operational design, doctrine and tactics. It also illustrates the importance of nonpartisanship and the mission and role of the armed forces. Officers, NCOs and their subordinates need to, furthermore, understand their role in defending and protecting the government and the people they serve. They additionally need to know how to successfully accomplish their numerous missions with aggression, audacity, boldness, speed and surprise. The book provides the reader with valuable information relating to conventional and unconventional maneuver. It also discusses how African armies can, with structured and balanced forces, achieve strategic, operational and tactical success. It covers the role of government along with operations related to war, operations other than war and intelligence operations and how these operations, operating in a coordinated and unified manner, can secure and strengthen a government.

Composite Warfare draws on the author's experiences and lessons in Central, Southern, East, West and North Africa where he has served numerous African governments as a politico-military strategist, division commander, division adviser, battalion commander and special operations commander.

See http://www.amazon.com/Composite-Warfare-Conduct-Successful-Operations/dp/1910294993

 

THANK YOU RDDC!

It was a great honour and privilege to have been invited to Copenhagen, Denmark, to address interested parties and Masters-level students at the Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC) on “New Wars”.

Whereas my contribution to the seminar and the subsequent debate as well as the lectures on New Wars was miniscule at best, it was heartening to see the interest shown by those I engaged with regarding the many conflicts we experience – and will continue to experience – in Africa.

The visit to the RDDC also allowed us to discuss numerous issues such as politics in Africa, the development of conflict and war, why governments fail, the scourge of poaching and where they think Africa is possibly going wrong.

We also discussed issues such as the threats facing Africa, the role of foreign powers, the UN and PMCs and why many if not most of these interventions fail or deliver very little results – in many instances only escalating the already-existing tensions and conflicts. 

These discussions made me realize that the intent of those I spoke with at the RDDC have a genuine desire to see an improvement in Africa’s lot. To Africa, that can only be good.

My sincerest thanks to the Royal Danish Defence College as well as everyone who partook in our discussions and in particular to Professors Thomas Mandrup and Stig Jenson for the friendship and the opportunity given to me.

CARVING-UP THE CONTINENT

Several folks have asked why I have not updated the blog and what the status of my book on warfare is.

Unfortunately – or fortunately – I have been otherwise occupied but will start updating some of the blog comments shortly.

For those who asked, the book is now complete and the artwork is being finalised. Once the artwork has been inserted, the manuscript must be edited and then only will it go to the printers.

Hereunder follows an extract from the book which is now almost 18 months behind schedule. The book is intended to be a textbook that focuses on warfare in Africa. The extract is taken from Chapter 6 (unedited) of the book:

…………………………………………………………………………………………

As a continent, Africa remains under the constant threat of destabilisation along with numerous internal, intractable crises aimed at fuelling suspicion and exploiting differences amongst the populace. These threats are aimed at creating fractious states that will be ripe for foreign intervention and ultimately the division of countries.

As a general guideline, the development of tensions along with destabilisation and revolution follows a predictable pattern in resource-rich countries:

1.     The build-up of hostilities: The ethnic, religious, political and tribal differences along with clan rivalries within a country are exploited and fuelled to increase historical tensions, political anger, dissent, disunity and hostility. The approach adopted by the sponsor-governments will be to ostensible promote “democracy”, “liberate the oppressed” and “remove a dictatorship”. Non-violent and violent protests and strikes will be encouraged by the sponsors of the hostilities. The hostilities will increase as attacks and bombings on government and private buildings and facilities along with essential infrastructure take place. Educational, emotional and symbolic targets such as schools, buses, places of worship, large outdoor congregations, sports stadiums, tourist hotels and groups and so forth will be targeted. Kidnappings of HVI’s and large groups of innocent and/or vulnerable people will occur. Provocative statements will be made on both mainstream and social media platforms to further add to tensions and suspicions. Agitators, armed militias, insurgent and even terrorist groups will be given or promised support and encouraged to conduct armed attacks against the government. The pattern of armed destabilisation will aim to fuel radical actions and thereby force the intelligence services, the law enforcement agencies and the armed forces to either overreact – in which case they will be condemned - or to operate over a wide front thereby stretching their abilities and resources. Ultimately, this will render the country weak, endanger the population, create both fear and an uncontrollable refugee problem and economically drain the country, thus rendering it vulnerable to foreign intervention and manipulation.

2.     Internationalising the hostilities: The escalating violence between contrasting ethnic, religious and/or tribal groups will result in international calls for the situation to be contained. The government will be faced with a growing insurgency supported by acts of terrorism. Calls will be made by foreign governments, international bankers, the United Nations and advocacy groups and NGOs for sanctions, humanitarian aid and assistance and even for armed foreign intervention to establish “democracy” and “stability”. Limited air attacks will be aimed at damaging the economy and destroying the infrastructure. Covert support by the sponsors, including arms, finances and moral support will be channelled to one or more of the clashing factions to ensure a continuation and an escalation of hostilities. Agitators, insurgent leaders and warlords will be the prime beneficiaries of this covert assistance and support. International think-tanks and crisis-resolution groups will be established to mediate the “problem” and envoys will be despatched to negotiate settlements and assist with the establishment of “democracy” and “security” or the “removal of a dictatorship”. Every attempt to bring the problem under the international spotlight will be propagated and exploited. However, the powers that created the destabilisation will be planning on how best to divide the country and gain strategic and economic advantages from such a division.

3.     Intervention and division: Resultant from the internationalisation of the destabilisation and the subsequent chaos and carnage, an increase in international debates will take place and methods devised on how best to contain and resolve the situation. The conflict will become commercialised and agreements made in lieu of assistance. Weapons, ammunition, vehicles and training will be given or sold to the side that can pay for them – and sometimes to both sides. Calls will be made for international peacekeeping forces to be deployed under the auspices of the UN or the AU to separate the warring factions. Foreign governments will despatch military advisors to “monitor” the situation and provide advice. Often, the advice will be aimed at increasing the problem as opposed to resolving the problem. Where training is given, it will be sub-standard and/or irrelevant as the government forces are set-up for failure. If necessary, air attacks will be intensified in order to destroy as much of the essential infrastructure as possible. Calls will be made for the country to be divided into two or more “new states” to bring about peace and stability and ensure “democracy” and “freedom” for the populace caught between the warring parties or factions. By engineering the division of countries and installing puppet or proxy governments that serve the interests of the sponsoring governments, the beneficiaries of the natural resources ie energy and minerals will be the powers that instigated the destabilisation. The newly-found pseudo-states will now (hopefully) serve the interests of their benefactors.

It is therefore important that governments do not merely label threats by the actions or the tactics they apply but instead determine the root cause of the problem and understand the aim and/or purpose of the threat’s actions and deeds along with its support.  

TELLING IT LIKE IT IS

Several “experts” on Executive Outcomes (EO) have again recently surfaced and are working hard at continuing their disinformation campaign against the company – despite the company having closed its doors many years ago.

I am still amazed at how those who call so loudly for peace work so hard at trying to prevent it. But I also know the aim is a feeble attempt to discredit me in the hopes that African governments will cease talking to me. As mentioned before, war is bad for business and the longer the flames can be fuelled in Africa, the more money is to be made by some who claim they want a “peaceful Africa”. Their way of achieving this “peaceful Africa” is by dispensing bad advice, selling obsolete and/or irrelevant equipment and by supporting both sides of a conflict.

When it became known that STTEP had been contracted to train a Special Operations Group (SOG) for the Ugandan armed forces (UPDF), all hell seemed to break loose again. Back were those who felt that I and whatever company I was now part of had to be stopped. To achieve this, the lines had to be blurred between EO and STTEP and create the perception that it is the same company.

Tweets were generated and sent forth, articles appeared condemning both the Texas philanthropist and the UPDF along with the journalist who wrote the story. Shock and horror was expressed that the truth was written and those who wanted to stop the LRA’s slaughter were visited by the FBI. STTEP and myself became the ”bad guys” and again it seemed a repeat of EO days. STTEP must be stopped and it appears the instructions went forth: do not let the truth get in the way of a good lie.

So it was that a blog posting penned by Assistant Professor Chris Blattman appeared condemning efforts to stop the LRA. (See my postings on this matter as well as his posting http://chrisblattman.com/2013/10/30/is-the-newyorker-publishing-puff-profiles-of-mercenaries-executive-outcomes-now-its-joseph-kony-related) I entered into correspondence with Blattman who admitted he did not do any research. We agreed to disagree on stopping conflicts and the senseless slaughter of civilians in African war zones. 

Those we trained in the SOG went on to prove beyond any doubt that they were stopping the LRA. This was, however, to be short-lived as soon after STTEP was forced to leave Uganda, the SOG was sent to Mogadishu. What an absolute waste of money: Men trained in jungle warfare with donor funds were sent to conduct urban operations!

Then, one of the blog readers (Mike Da Silva) pointed me back to Blattman’s blog and in particular to a response on his condemnation of EO/STTEP/the philanthropist and the journalist.

The comment to Blattman’s post by Kambale Mawa reads as follows:

You sir, have no idea what you are talking about.

For goodness sake,  ….. You have as much life experience as a potatoe. You have seen nothing of the world but HBO and MTV, and heard of your cohort’s accolade.

You sir killed my family. You came and cut my father’s hands off, smashed his foot with a truck, and laughed about it. Then while he we were tied to posts my sisters and mother was raped repeated till they bled to death. Then they were burned alive.

You did that sir. I was there and watched you do it. Maybe you had a different face, and skin color – but might as well been you. It was your and your buddies’ words that let the beasts loose. You think you know better.

I will never forget those years I spent in slavery because of you and your ilk. Every day I wake up and do not look into the mirror. I scare little children on the street. You did that to me.

When EO was here, we were safe. They came through; they were real *gentlemen*. You sir, do not have the right to even mention their names without prostrating. Narcissism is an illness. You should have that looked at as it spreads.

I recall many letters written to me/EO in days past by the victims caught in the conflicts thanking us and writing about their plight, the torture they had to endure, the hunger, the constant smell of death and fear, the boiling and eating of new-born babies and the many, many harrowing experiences they had to live through. I shall never forget when I showed this to some local and foreign journalists how they told me that such letters were “not in the public interest”! The truth was of no consequence – their lies, however, were.

Despite Kambale Mawa’s comment being written years after the fact, it is encouraging to know that people we tried to help still remember those few who turned the tide in Angola and Sierra Leone. Many countries I travel to have heard about EO and STTEP. I am warmly welcomed and constantly thanked for the work the men of EO did – and what STTEP is doing - for Africa.

Those who are so keen to condemn EO, STTEP and myself ought to visit the areas we have worked in and discover the truth for themselves – not make it up to suit the agendas of those who pay them.

Maybe then they will tell it like it is. 

THE ART OF LYING (VERY) BADLY

I was hoping to start 2014 with a posting on conflict and the dangers of a blinkered approach to counter-insurgency. Instead, I have to waste my time and focus on another liar posing as a journalist.

My thanks to Jana for pointing me to this new “exposé” on Executive Outcomes by Pauli Poisuo. See http://iissonline.net/10-frightening-facts-about-private-military-companies/

Whereas I have great respect for David Isenberg, I was rather disappointed that he allowed his blog to be used as a disinformation vehicle by an apparent under-control “free-lance writer” to blatantly lie his way onto his blog. But, it is a truism that the more a lie gets spun, the more believable it becomes.

I cannot comment on what was written about the other PMCs but I believe I am somewhat informed to comment on his piece about EO.

Ironically, ever since myself/STTEP were blacklisted by the US DoS, a flurry of “new” stories on EO have surfaced. These “stories” are all rehashed and regurgitated elements of the disinformation campaign that was run against EO by numerous governments. Some of these articles were written by intellectuals and others by liars who obviously find their pockets swelling with someone else’s money.

Is this mere coincidence – or not? Could it be that some folks are very concerned that there may be a positive intervention in some conflicts and that it will ruin their foreign policies and deny them the resources that do not belong to them? Could it also be coincidence that an African government was “warned” we are planning a coup against them? I suspect not. Possibly the revival of the EO disinformation campaign is to lend credence to STTEP being blacklisted. Who knows?

Whereas I will not take Poisuo’s article to pieces, sentence by sentence, I will (again) state the following:

1    1.  EO had – and still has – more friends in Africa than many foreign governments as Africans governments know we never lied to them and we earned their trust. They also know that we had no hidden agendas. (Of note is that Poisuo contradicts himself by stating that EO “has been sighted in most African war zones, where it is said to hold high influence”). Besides, EO has been closed for almost two decades – a fact that appears to have escaped Poisuo in totality

2   2. EO never invaded an African country and injected itself as part of an occupation force. Instead, it was invited into countries by those governments that found themselves abandoned by their so-called friends and under siege. When the insurgents and rebels were destroyed and defeated, EO left as contractually agreed to prior to it entering the country.

   3. Poisuo uses the disingenuous comment of “shady dealings”. Why not list these “shady dealings” or does he too believe in the power of innuendo?

4   4. Any military strategist with two brain cells knows that to end an insurgency, the insurgents must be denied access to funding – funding that is used to purchase weapons and ammunition. This is part of the concept known as the Trinity of Gravity. To deny insurgents internal funding, they need to be removed from those areas where they get their funding – illegally I may add -  ie diamond fields, drug crops, etc. That is not rocket science but common sense.

Even more disingenuous are Poisuo’s comments: “The company is notorious for targeting the client country’s mineral-rich regions, often regaining and securing control of gold, oil and diamond regions before paying attention to other matters. Some whisper they don’t always get around to returning these possessions to the country”.

It would do him well to do some research on Africa. He may possibly then discover that many African countries have immense mineral resources and that these resources are one of the primary reasons for conflict. It would also do his credibility well to list – and not hint at - where EO holds all these mines he writes about. I for one would be happy to know where they are as I would love to know why I am not receiving any profits. Then of course, he could list examples of when the company failed to pay “attention to other matters”.

Also, why does he not tell everyone who reads his piece on just “who” is whispering that “they don’t always get around to returning these possessions to the country”. Surely, if a private company took possession of a country’s natural resources, the government would not merely whisper about it – instead they would shout it out to the world and do something about it.

The reality of it all is (I have mentioned this ad nauseum)  that EO was the only PMC that ended conflicts, never involved itself in the internal politics of its clients, never involved itself in crime of any nature, never raped and murdered civilians, never committed acts against its clients, never attempted to steal the resources of a client, never betrayed its clients despite massive pressure to do so and never backed both sides of the conflicts. Apparently, ending conflicts in Africa was definitely not a positive move as far as some governments were concerned.

It is also well known that I turned down a US$ 20 million bribe to close EO and leave Angola in 1993 to enable the rebels to win the war. I refused despite being threatened that it would be to my disadvantage to not accept the bribe and that I would live to regret it.

Unfortunately, people such as Poisuo are too lazy to do any research. Instead they feed off the lies of others and then use someone else’s blog to do their dirty work. This is one reason why so many journalists are not trusted. Research integrity is something they know very little about – or have any interest in.  

African governments have come to realise that there is a reason why a defunct company is still being targeted and STTEP blacklisted: Peace in Africa is bad for business and foreign policies…

In short, Pauli Poisuo is nothing but a liar – and a bad one at that. 

FUTURE CONFLICTS AND WARS IN AFRICA

The future conflicts and wars in Africa will seldom, if ever comprise large conventional forces pitted against one another.

Whereas conventional engagements will occur in primarily government-versus-government actions, they will be on a much smaller scale than witnessed in the past decades. Mobility, manoeuvre, surprise, speed and firepower will still remain of critical importance yet these operations will be hampered by a lack of intelligence, unreliable air support and inadequate logistics coupled to challenging terrain and varying climatic conditions.

The presence of the local population and other non-combatants has always – and will always – add a very real and unavoidable complexity to the battlefield. Whereas the government forces will attempt to co-opt and win over the support of the population, the enemy will attempt to take control over the population to force and maintain their support.

However, when the populace believe and feel they have been forgotten, failed and neglected or oppressed by their government, their support for an insurgency or an invading enemy will be more energised. This in itself ought to be cause for alarm to African governments.

In the early stages of an internal uprising or revolution, there is often a common popular belief that the coming conflict will provide the populace with “freedom” and “a better life”, hence their tentative support for the insurgency or revolution. As the conflict escalates, the enemy will take steps to protect their gains by tightening their control over the populace. This can result in the populace being subject to physical abuse, torture, executions, forced labour and recruitment. Any attempt by the populace to rid themselves of this yoke of control will result in vicious and swift retribution from the enemy.

Regardless, the populace – along with refugees - will form an integral part of the battlefield and will play a large role in the plans of both the government and the enemy as they will become both the prize and the victim of the opposing forces.

The future conflicts and wars in Africa will comprise a host of different threats, groups and forces utilising both urban and rural terrain. They will be driven by different actions and motivators employing both unconventional and limited conventional methods. These actions and motivators will cover the spectrum of general civil disobedience, violent and non-violent protests, political anxiety and isolation, violent criminal activities, insurgencies, proxy wars, state-sponsored cross-border actions, religious differences, terrorism, tribal and ethnic anger and xenophobia, territorial and resource greed along with poverty and hunger and so forth.

Attacks on tourist areas, shopping malls, business enterprises, hotels, resource mining and production areas, industrial areas, airports and harbours, isolated farms and villages, energy-supply systems, transport networks, government buildings and communication systems will become prime enemy targets. These attacks will be aimed at eroding the economy, over-stretching the security forces, creating negative national and international perceptions and sapping the will of the populace whilst creating a sense of panic.

Enemy successes will be widely proclaimed using the mainstream and social media networks to market their successes, however limited, and instil a sense of despondency and fear in the populace. Marketing of successes will also be aimed at showing the inability of the government forces to successfully counter or stop the enemy.  

When unconventional enemy forces sense defeat, they will withdraw and call for a “cease fire” and “negotiations” – a tactic aimed at gaining time, replenishing losses and creating the impression that they want peace. This tactic was and has been used in Angola, Sierra Leone, DRC, CAR, Nigeria, Mali, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Mozambique and so forth. However, peace is the very last objective they have in mind, especially when the enemy forces are acting as proxy forces on behalf of foreign sponsors to secure foreign interests. Governments will heed these calls for negotiations and unconditional ceasefires at their own peril.

Whereas both the armed forces and the law enforcement agencies will play a significant role in defeating these groups and forces in the field, they will need to be correctly trained and equipped and have access to actionable intelligence. Without intelligence, the enemy will always retain the initiative and government forces will remain unbalanced and blind to enemy plans, trends and shifts and thus remain reactive as opposed to proactive.

To ensure success, government forces will require political, military and populace will along with resolute leadership to defeat the enemy. Furthermore, African armies will need to break-away from their current organisational structures and reshape themselves to take the battle to the enemy and rapidly respond to enemy plans, actions and threats. Current structures prohibit rapid, proactive actions.

African governments will, additionally, need to reassess the manner in which governance is applied and maximise their use of the Pillars of State to identify, locate and neutralise these threats. It is at the political level that serious actions will need to be coordinated and integrated with the other Pillars.

Unless governments begin serious preparations to protect and defend themselves, their territory and the populace, they will be ill-prepared to face the coming conflicts and wars – and they are coming.

(RE)STRUCTURING AFRICAN ARMIES

The age of colonialism and the subsequent decolonisation of Africa along with the Cold War has long past and despite the geographical tragedies that occurred in terms of arbitrary borders, the continent needs to come to terms with itself. It also needs to take responsibility for both its internal and external security.

Africa can no longer afford to lay the blame for its woes outside of the continent. Whereas several of Africa’s problems may indeed originate from beyond its shores, countries need to review their national security strategies and act accordingly. Failure to do so simply renders them more vulnerable to the numerous threats and threat networks that are able to penetrate and exploit the numerous security lapses that exist.

Cooperation between the threats operating in Africa is increasing as criminal, insurgent and terrorist networks cross and even join paths. Indeed, in several places across Africa, criminal networks support insurgent and terror networks and visa versa and on occasion, they are part of the same threat network. In parts of Africa, they have morphed into proxy forces under the control of foreign governments. On occasion, foreign interests coincide with the aims of the threats and/or threat networks and either wittingly or unwittingly support these networks.

As the threats and the threat networks across the continent have increased, so too has Africa’s military capacity to deal with them been gradually reduced – due in part to a lack of focussed intelligence and foresight, incoherent strategies, incorrect structures, inadequate doctrine, substandard training and obsolete equipment. This slow decay becomes very difficult, costly and time consuming to reverse – time that is often not available.  Added to this has been the rise of ethnic and political tensions infused with religious extremism.

African countries need to strengthen their defensive and offensive intelligence gathering capabilities in order to provide early warning to strategists and planners. A strong intelligence capability will furthermore allow predictions to be made in terms of real or potential threats that may or will manifest themselves. This ought to act as a guideline in terms of organisational structures, training and equipment.

To enter into a conflict or a war implies a progressive move towards economic, political and populace exhaustion. This exhaustion becomes even more evident when the conflict or the war is allowed to drag on indefinitely due to a lack of actionable intelligence along with an inability of the armed forces to contain/destroy the threat and both military and civilian casualties increase and infrastructure and equipment is either damaged or destroyed. This damages the economy which is needed to sustain the efforts of the armed forces.

However, without wide intelligence coverage and a coherent strategy, the exhaustion is multiplied – especially if the means to achieve the ends are not present or the means are lacking in ability, equipment and the political and national will is eroded or non-existent.

The primary problem however lays with the means: most African armies are organisational clones of their once colonial masters or their later East Bloc allies. This has resulted in incorrect organisational structures, incorrect training, inadequate doctrine, terrain and enemy-irrelevant TTPs and incorrect – often obsolete - equipment and so forth.

An incorrect organisational structure that is poorly prepared and postured prohibits rapid deployment and response and is usually accompanied by cumbersome command and control lines, inadequate logistics, inadequate personnel administration and that, in turn, impacts on morale and forces armies to become reactive as opposed to proactive.

The current structures most African armies follow are not conducive to rapid deployment or focussed effort. We have proven the concept that smaller, more agile units, correctly structured and trained and well-led are able to manoeuvre at speed – if they have the necessary assets at their disposal. These forces are able to operate independently and yet rapidly regroup to form a larger, very aggressive, efficient and potent fighting force.

Whether mechanised, motorised, riverine or air delivered, these forces are able to conduct numerous offensive tasks from a single large-scale conventional attack to smaller swarm attacks, COIN operations, raids and ambushes and so forth. It is this very concept that allows for the relentless pursuit of an enemy force.

This structure furthermore enables dispersed defence, forcing any enemy to attack over a very wide front whilst simultaneously dispersing his forces and exposing them to numerous flank and swarm attacks.

Unfortunately, many African armies have tried to clone foreign armies or have been ill-advised and misled in terms of intelligence, strategy, organisational structure, training, equipment and other related defence and security issues. Additionally, African armies have become very political in terms of appointments and missions. In turn, this has allowed numerous threats to be ignored, misjudged and subsequently not taken seriously until it has become almost too late. It has also resulted in a hesitancy to adapt their forces to deal with the current and future threat networks.

However, these remain mere factors that are often overlooked but that impact negatively on the abilities of African armies to achieve mission success.

For African armed forces to engage a threat or a threat network efficiently, rapidly and with economy of force, serious consideration needs to be given to restructuring the armies and training and equipping them accordingly.

BLACKLISTED? WHY AM I NOT SURPRISED??

Several senior African government representatives who have recently come through my door have told me that they have been “instructed” and “warned” not to meet or talk with me/STTEP by the “US Government”. But, they also tell me that for too long they have been misled and will now meet with whomever they wish to meet. Like me, they too believe that African governments have a rightful say in terms of who they want to talk to and get advice from and not be dictated to whom - and who not - they may talk to. (See my previous posting titled “HYPOCRISY AND THE POWER OF PERCEPTION”).

Then I recalled that several years ago, a senior US officer said to me: “If you are not with us, you are against us – if you’re against us, then you are the enemy. It is as simple as that”. I shrugged off this comment as it merely smacked of playground bullying. Little did I realise just how prophetic his words would become. By implication, no one is allowed to criticise anything the US does in Africa – even when it fails dismally - as it seems criticism is now construed as “terrorism”.

Earlier this week, I had a conversation with someone in the US who told me that during a discussion with a congressman it had been emphatically stated that STTEP has been blacklisted by the US Department of State (DoS). We are now “persons of interest”. We are now placed in the same category as subversive groups. Was I surprised? No, not really.

But, I suppose that makes anyone who speaks to us or is in any manner or form associated with us also “persons of interest” and therefore attempts will be made to blacklist them as well. 

I was aware of the fact that the FBI had spent time, money and effort investigating a totally legitimate contract a US company had with STTEP so I knew that for some reason we were considered as “unsavoury” in their eyes. We also know the US company was threatened if they did not terminate the contract with us. Was the US concerned that we were about to succeed and that questions would then be asked and which they would not be able to answer?

One does not have to be a rocket scientist to see certain indications and footprints on the ground and then be able to make a fairly accurate prediction of what is coming. These predictions are usually correct – and they hold no good for Africa. The examples are there to see for anyone who follows happenings in Africa.

As I was told earlier this week: “In times of universal deceit, the truth is a revolutionary act”. We have been there, done that and patiently waited for the truth to surface – which it now finally seems to be doing.

I often wonder if US citizens are aware of the duplicitous nature of US foreign policy in Africa? I am sure that many would disapprove if they really knew and understood what was happening. I know that many US servicemen are equally alarmed at what is happening but they go where their government orders them to go. We understand that as we too have walked that path. We also know that many fine US citizens are really keen and willing to invest more than just talk to make Africa work and conflicts end. Conversely, we are also aware of the immense anger, distrust and dislike that is gradually building up against the US from numerous quarters in Africa. We are privy to that on an almost daily basis. When I mentioned our being blacklisted to an ambassador this morning, his response was “Then it proves you are doing something right - don’t stop!”

One would therefore think that as the US is trying to win friends they would not make such an effort to alienate people who simply disagree with them.

Recently, one of our directors was apprehended on arrival in the US after “babysitting” a US NGO in a conflict zone. He was subject to a lengthy interrogation and his laptop was confiscated and sucked dry. If they were so keen to know what was on his laptop, all they had to do was ask but instead, he was treated like a criminal. Two subsequent “interviews” have since followed. Since the return of his laptop, it has never been the same. It appears the DoS even regards Africans who assist US citizens and NGOs as threats to US national security.

We have again become the “bad guys” despite the fact that neither EO (1989 – 1996) and later STTEP (2006 -) had and have never acted illegally – although we were constantly subject to such untrue claims by those who wanted the conflicts to continue - never invaded countries but were always invited there by the governments, worked alongside government forces, were/are always accountable to the contracting government, never attempted to depose governments, always fulfilled our contracts, never raped women and children, never smuggled opium or any other drugs, never lied to and/or cheated a government, never murdered civilians, never bribed or blackmailed government officials into giving us a contract, actually ended long-running conflicts rapidly, always been honest with African governments, never engaged in criminal behaviour, never engaged in acts of terrorism against the US or any other government and so forth. This appears to be simply a continuation of trying to prevent an African company that has a record of success of working in Africa and solving African problems. That right is apparently solely reserved for the US DoS despite the fact that success remains sadly elusive for them and that destruction and destabilisation in Africa will continue to be their legacy.

This may also explain the reason my blog’s comments are being tampered with and on occasion blocked or deleted before I can post and respond to them.

Be that as it may – STTEP and I will never give up on Africa as we were born here and will die here. We love our Continent despite its many problems which we are very well aware of. I believe we understand those problems better than most who live beyond our shores.

If it is the desire of US DoS or any other foreign government to promote conflict in Africa, we will criticise that approach and when we are asked by the targeted African governments, we will work at ending conflicts and trying to see this wealthy continent flourish.

If our desire to see a peaceful, prosperous and successful Africa has resulted in us being blacklisted by the US, then so be it. At least, we now know where we stand.

But, if we stand for nothing, we will fall for anything.

We are not prepared to do that.

We will leave that to the so-called superpower which is now fast losing its power in Africa.