THE FARCE OF “PEACEKEEPING”

I continue to be amazed at the amount of time, energy and money expended on the theory and practice of “peacekeeping” in conflict zones on the African continent. Conferences are held to debate the value and role of peacekeeping operations. Academic papers are penned extolling the virtues and successes of peacekeeping operations - truth be told there aren’t any to boast about. Committees are formed to monitor the players in the peacekeeping process. New NGOs spring up to play their new-found role in this on-going, lucrative farce.

Whereas keeping the peace is a very noble idea, does it really work in practise? Do those innocent people who are caught up in the conflict gain anything from the peacekeeping operations? Does fleeing their homes in terror in the middle of the night and becoming refugees something they must supposedly look forward to? Does having their hands and ears hacked off, their wives and daughters raped, their families murdered and so on give them hope? Does watching their crops and meagre possessions being destroyed while the peacekeeping forces look on helplessly, continually switch sides or turn away something they should be happy about? I doubt it.

It appears that the true winners are those who partake in these so-called peacekeeping operations and judging by their results, they really couldn’t care less about “peace” and the civilians they are supposedly there to protect. Poorly-trained and inadequately-led peacekeeping troops lead to more instability. Continued instability and conflict equates to continued income for the peacekeepers and those followers of peacekeeping missions that exploit the conflict situation.

Africa is a dangerous place and it is kept that way by wars, coups, crime and violence – often purposely – and often by very powerful behind-the-scenes players. Some of the players are foreign governments and others are multi-national corporations. But conflicts fuel the arms trade and make resources cheaper to buy. Other avenues for business are also opened up. But, the roles of these behind-the-scenes players are seldom if ever investigated. Instead, their political influence and profit margins continue to grow – as does their influence.

I have made my thoughts known on the utter and dismal failures of the UN’s so-called “peacekeeping” missions in Africa and the misery these missions have brought – and still bring - with them. Angola, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Ivory Coast, Sudan and Somalia are but some of the missions that have simply prolonged the state of conflict. True, at times a stalemate is achieved – but what then? However, more often than not, the rebels or terrorists (as that is what they usually are) continue to maintain the initiative.

But a question no one has ever answered is “how can you keep peace when there is no peace?”

Surely, that is a pretty simple question to answer?

When an internationally recognised government comes under the attack of so-called rebels, guerrillas or a dissatisfied political opponent and the antagonists resort to murder, terrorism, destruction, crime and chaos, what purpose do those who rush to “keep the peace” really serve? Would their noble mission not be better served if they hunted down those who committed the atrocities and brought them to book? If the peacekeeping forces are too useless to do their jobs, then perhaps the UN and those who claim to wish for peace should rather contract PMCs that have a desire – and a track record - to end the conflicts. Besides, elections, democracy and peace remain a pipe-dream as long as there is instability.

All conflicts involve players with their own aims and objectives. If an under-siege government asks for foreign forces to assist it in ending the conflict, isn’t that exactly what should be done? If foreign forces are despatched to help a government achieve some stability, isn’t the logical step to first end the conflict and then to maintain the peace?

Shouldn’t the peacekeeping forces only arrive once there has been a cessation of hostilities and a declaration of peace? Trying to do this about-face is somewhat senseless as one cannot enter a conflict zone and simply claim to be “keeping peace” thinking that it will suddenly end the conflict.

Peacekeeping missions seem to be driven by achieving a “ceasefire”, a method for rebels to simply gain time, re-arm and continue with the conflict. There is nothing noble or humanitarian about this apart from allowing the civilians caught up in the conflict a few days or months respite – and often in total misery.

If the UN is so concerned at keeping peace, why doesn’t it dispatch its “peacekeeping forces” to Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the countless other conflicts and bring with them the peace they boast about? I never saw them rush off to Georgia to “keep peace” during the brief conflict that took place there. Or are these conflicts too dangerous for them?

Unless drastic action is taken to end conflicts, they will simply continue - and “peacekeeping” will continue to remain the profitable farce it is.

THE “TROOP SURGE” STRATEGY

Ban-Ki Moon and his UN peacekeeping cohorts have (hopefully) come to realise that upping the force levels in a conflict area is no guarantee for success. The UN’s poorly thought-out strategies for so-called peacekeeping forces in conflict zones cannot be rectified by troop surges. Whereas the UN may think it can lie and bluster about its claims to success and that everyone will believe them, they are wrong. So, by committing more troops to resolve a problem does not make Ban-Ki Moon a strategic genius. Indeed, quite the opposite.

This strategy, initiated by Field Marshal Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig, KT, GCB, OM, GCVO, KCIE, ADC (19 June, 1861 - 29 January 1928) during the Battle of the Somme, proved to be ill-conceived at best. Whereas supporters of this strategy may argue that it finally led to the defeat of Germany, it was at a terrible cost of men, equipment and money – and over several years. Even then, its success remains debatable.

The US strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan was initially nothing other than a re-hashed Haig-like strategy – a strategy that required committing more and more soldiers to combat. The danger existed that this would lead to more casualties, more antagonism and more anti-US sentiments. The reality of this approach was that the US soldier has had to shoulder the blame for the failure of, at best, a poorly-conceived strategy. Eventually, a troop surge strategy may carry the day but only because of its overwhelming numbers.

A troop surge strategy not only strains the logistical supply chain and the associated costs of war, it will, additionally, place an even greater strain on the troops and junior officers to perform according to the new expectations that will be placed on them. A strained logistical supply line is also an ideal target for an insurgent to attack. Those of us who have been deployed to disrupt long logistical lines will testify to how easy it really is. Plus, that logistical supply line – when vulnerable – serves the enemy as well.

There appears to be a misguided belief that an insurgency can be quelled by throwing troops, gadgets, money and firepower at the problem. This argument is a fallacy. The pending deployment of two US army brigades into Afghanistan will show that this will not lead to an end of the conflict. If anything, it will most probably lead to an escalation of hostilities. The real victims of the troop surge strategy will be the soldiers and the civilians.

Soldiers do not choose who their enemies are or where they are required to do battle – the politicians do that. By having no control over where the wars are to be fought, commanders should make every effort to ensure that it is easier for their troops. This requires well-thought out strategies to win local population support. The local population, on the other hand, can be an asset, a threat or neutral. At worst case, they should be influenced to become neutral in the war that is fought on their terrain and in their towns.

Counter-insurgency operations are best fought with light, highly mobile forces who can act on sound intelligence. They are fought with aggressive search-and-destroy missions. Small-team deployments, using small-team tactics can wreak more havoc and destruction on an enemy than a heavy force which advertises its presence. A massive operation to ally the local population works in tandem with this approach. Aggressive intelligence gathering operations add to the success of the ground forces. These operations are aimed at throwing the enemy off balance and forcing him to surrender the initiative. These missions are all aimed at forcing the insurgents into terrain they would prefer NOT to fight in and then dealing them a crushing blow.

Fighting insurgents is not a war for heavy armour. Road usage by mechanised and motorised forces should be avoided at all times. Realistic military objectives need to be appreciated and achieved. The insurgents need to be isolated from the local population and the terrain they prefer to fight in. Soldiers need to dominate and rule the terrain both night and day. Soldiers need to become thinking-soldiers and realise that the indiscriminate use of uncontrolled firepower does not lead to winning the fire fight. Ensuring the well-being and security of the local population will become a force-multiplier to the ground forces. Cultural differences need to be identified and respected.

The adage “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” can be a valuable tool in any counter-insurgency operation but it needs to be handled with extreme care and caution. In making this decision, the short-, medium- and long-term political and military implications of this strategy need to be very carefully considered. Once this road has been chosen, there can be no turning back and switching of sides.

The average American soldier is a lion but, sadly, he is led by donkeys that are unable to strategise a war. Whereas his equipment is superior, he is let down by the lack of generalship displayed by his generals. But, the generals don’t seem to care as it is the common soldier who will bleed. Or, do the American generals, like General Haig, believe that America has enough young men to die for their inability to develop workable military strategies?

There are several very good examples of successful counter-insurgency campaigns - Malaya, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), South West Africa (now Namibia), Angola, Sierra Leone immediately spring to mind. Each of these campaigns led to the development of new strategies, doctrines and tactics. Each of these campaigns had great successes but were failed by the politicians.

One of the most pertinent lessons to emerge from those campaigns is that they were not won with troop surges but with brain surges. They were won by out-thinking and out-smarting the enemy.

My next posting will take a look at countering organised crime in the private sector.