The future conflicts and wars in Africa will seldom, if ever comprise
large conventional forces pitted against one another.
Whereas conventional engagements will occur in primarily government-versus-government
actions, they will be on a much smaller scale than witnessed in the past
decades. Mobility, manoeuvre, surprise, speed and firepower will still remain
of critical importance yet these operations will be hampered by a lack of intelligence,
unreliable air support and inadequate logistics coupled to challenging terrain
and varying climatic conditions.
The presence of the local population and other non-combatants has always
– and will always – add a very real and unavoidable complexity to the
battlefield. Whereas the government forces will attempt to co-opt and win over
the support of the population, the enemy will attempt to take control over the
population to force and maintain their support.
However, when the populace believe and feel they have been forgotten,
failed and neglected or oppressed by their government, their support for an
insurgency or an invading enemy will be more energised. This in itself ought to
be cause for alarm to African governments.
In the early stages of an internal uprising or revolution, there is
often a common popular belief that the coming conflict will provide the
populace with “freedom” and “a better life”, hence their tentative support for the
insurgency or revolution. As the conflict escalates, the enemy will take steps
to protect their gains by tightening their control over the populace. This can
result in the populace being subject to physical abuse, torture, executions, forced
labour and recruitment. Any attempt by the populace to rid themselves of this
yoke of control will result in vicious and swift retribution from the enemy.
Regardless, the populace – along with refugees - will form an integral
part of the battlefield and will play a large role in the plans of both the government
and the enemy as they will become both the prize and the victim of the opposing
forces.
The future conflicts and wars in Africa will comprise a host of
different threats, groups and forces utilising both urban and rural terrain.
They will be driven by different actions and motivators employing both unconventional
and limited conventional methods. These actions and motivators will cover the
spectrum of general civil disobedience, violent and non-violent protests,
political anxiety and isolation, violent criminal activities, insurgencies,
proxy wars, state-sponsored cross-border actions, religious differences, terrorism,
tribal and ethnic anger and xenophobia, territorial and resource greed along
with poverty and hunger and so forth.
Attacks on tourist areas, shopping malls, business enterprises, hotels,
resource mining and production areas, industrial areas, airports and harbours, isolated
farms and villages, energy-supply systems, transport networks, government
buildings and communication systems will become prime enemy targets. These
attacks will be aimed at eroding the economy, over-stretching the security
forces, creating negative national and international perceptions and sapping
the will of the populace whilst creating a sense of panic.
Enemy successes will be widely proclaimed using the mainstream and
social media networks to market their successes, however limited, and instil a
sense of despondency and fear in the populace. Marketing of successes will also
be aimed at showing the inability of the government forces to successfully
counter or stop the enemy.
When unconventional enemy forces sense defeat, they will withdraw and
call for a “cease fire” and “negotiations” – a tactic aimed at gaining time,
replenishing losses and creating the impression that they want peace. This
tactic was and has been used in Angola, Sierra Leone, DRC, CAR, Nigeria, Mali,
Ivory Coast, Sudan, Mozambique and so forth. However, peace is the very last objective
they have in mind, especially when the enemy forces are acting as proxy forces
on behalf of foreign sponsors to secure foreign interests. Governments will
heed these calls for negotiations and unconditional ceasefires at their own
peril.
Whereas both the armed forces and the law enforcement agencies will play
a significant role in defeating these groups and forces in the field, they will
need to be correctly trained and equipped and have access to actionable
intelligence. Without intelligence, the enemy will always retain the initiative
and government forces will remain unbalanced and blind to enemy plans, trends
and shifts and thus remain reactive as opposed to proactive.
To ensure success, government forces will require political, military
and populace will along with resolute leadership to defeat the enemy. Furthermore,
African armies will need to break-away from their current organisational
structures and reshape themselves to take the battle to the enemy and rapidly
respond to enemy plans, actions and threats. Current structures prohibit rapid,
proactive actions.
African governments will, additionally, need to reassess the manner in
which governance is applied and maximise their use of the Pillars of State to identify,
locate and neutralise these threats. It is at the political level that serious
actions will need to be coordinated and integrated with the other Pillars.
Unless governments begin serious preparations to protect and defend themselves,
their territory and the populace, they will be ill-prepared to face the coming
conflicts and wars – and they are coming.
