REVISITING THE PHASES OF WAR DURING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Whether we like to admit it or not, Africa is in a state of perpetual war.

Most countries view their neighbours as either threats or potential threats. The political situation is fluid and subject to dramatic changes that have the potential to erupt into armed conflict. Foreign policy is viewed through the lens of power and this may entail supporting – or being part of - proxy or insurgent forces to destabilise a neighbouring country and gain a position of “one-upmanship” in the region.

Governments are forced to choose regional and international allies often at great cost to the political, social, military and economical well-being of the country.

The military strategies are often flawed and based on optimistic assessments and an over-estimation of the abilities of the armed forces. Intelligence collection plans are not always carefully thought out, nor are they correctly executed. This results, in part, to flawed military strategies. The armed forces are required to conduct tasks and missions they are not always trained, equipped and prepared for.

Planning for war and conflict is, for many reasons, not always done with vision and the resultant effect is often being caught by surprise when a potential threat suddenly becomes reality.

To overcome this disadvantage, African countries need to revisit the phases of war and understand that those of Western and Eastern powers cannot simply be used as templates with which to conduct offensive operations. African governments should reassess their entire approach to both the offense and the defence and in doing so they will create a situation where they are not caught off-guard by an “unexpected” threat.

As Africa remains in a state of perpetual war, I believe that the phases of conventional offensive war need to be readjusted as follows:

Intelligence Gathering: All strategies are intelligence driven. Without this critical prerequisite, it will be impossible to know and understand the potential threat(s), where, when and how the enemy will react to an attack, strike or incursion, what weapons and weapon systems the enemy will deploy and how, and so forth. This activity or phase remains ongoing throughout the duration of all offensive and defensive operations. Without this intelligence, it will not be possible to develop a viable military strategy.

Sound intelligence will, furthermore, give commanders an indication of how the enemy will react to an offensive operation. Knowledge of these enemy operational counter-plans are imperative to enable own forces to devise operational plans that will surprise and overwhelm the enemy’s forces and reduce the enemy’s reactions.

Simultaneously with the gathering of intelligence is the screening of own intentions to prevent the enemy from knowing what is being planned, how, where and when. This is achieved by applying Operational Security (OPSEC), deception, ruses, counter espionage actions and so forth to confuse the enemy.

Reconnaissance: Intelligence can change dramatically and within a short space of time. To allow commanders to rapidly readjust plans and thereby maintain the initiative, the deployment of reconnaissance teams is imperative.

Whereas the initial aim of the reconnaissance teams will be to verify the intelligence on the ground, these teams can be deployed in several different ways.

It is possible that within a single theatre of operations, different types of reconnaissance teams and units can be deployed simultaneously or in conjunction with one another.

Although reconnaissance teams and units deploy with stealth and guile, they must nevertheless able to fight if necessary.

Advance: With the necessary intelligence and the associated ground truths gleaned from reconnaissance, the advance can be planned in detail and executed to best achieve the aim – the aim being to move into enemy-held territory or to make contact with the enemy or to follow up a retreating enemy force.

The advance is an offensive manoeuvre aimed at moving the advancing forces to just beyond the range of enemy fire or to follow up a deliberate enemy withdrawal.

During the advance, continued reconnaissance of the front and flanks is maintained to provide early warning of unexpected enemy movements or actions.

Air superiority is critical to ensure the advance maintains momentum and speed.

Advance to contact: Beyond the range of enemy indirect fire systems such as artillery, mortars and heavy machine guns, the units manoeuvre into an attack formation in order to be correctly postured to follow through with an attack or counter an enemy attack. These positions will have been identified by the reconnaissance teams/units.

Utilising momentum and speed, the advance to contact is used as a method of establishing final contact with the enemy or re-establishing lost contact with the enemy.

Control of air space remains critical to provide aerial reconnaissance and provide close air support to ensure momentum and speed.

Contact/Attack: Contact, by means of fire-and-manoeuvre/movement, is made with the enemy positions that are to be attacked.

The attack is the most important phase of offensive warfare as it is this action that will bring about the defeat of the enemy – or the failure of the commander’s plans. It furthermore requires the skilful application of fire and movement – and coordination - of all direct and indirect weapons onto the enemy and his positions. It also requires commanders to act with audacity.

Consolidate: As each objective is overrun, seized or captured, the commanders will immediately alter the attacking forces’ posture in order to defeat an enemy counter attack.

Exploit: An attack does not end on the objective. The enemy is kept under fire, even in the withdrawal or retreat and must be pursued in order to inflict maximum casualties and loss of equipment.

Known as the exploitation forces or the follow-up forces, these forces are assembled and deployed prior to the attack and are tasked to maintain contact with the enemy and drive home the attack. Mobile reserve forces are particularly well suited as exploitation forces.

The limit of exploitation, determined prior to the attack, is usually conducted to a tactical bound beyond the objective.

Defend, hold and dominate: Upon the follow-up forces reaching the laid down limit of exploitation, the attacking forces move forward to take possession of this position. The aim is to occupy, defend, hold and dominate the ground that has been gained from the preceding actions or phases.

During this phase, reconnaissance elements are redeployed to the front in order to obtain ground truths, thus allowing the commander to readjust his plans where necessary and continue the advance.

The above phases of war presuppose that the armed forces are correctly trained, correctly equipped, correctly postured and correctly sustained during operations.

I shall soon be giving my thoughts on the phases of defensive warfare and unconventional warfare.

THE NEW YORK TIMES “CORRECTION” AND OTHER THINGS

Having been away for a couple of days, Matt (www.feraljundi.com) alerted me to the fact that the New York Times had finally responded to my letter accusing them of lying about Executive Outcomes in an article they had published.

The New York Times printed a correction on 18 May and although not apologising for the deception, wrote the following:

An article on Sunday about the creation of a mercenary battalion in the United Arab Emirates misstated the past work of Executive Outcomes, a former South African mercenary firm whose veterans have been recruited for the new battalion. Executive Outcomes was hired by several African governments during the 1990s to put down rebellions and protect oil and diamond reserves; it did not stage coup attempts. (Some former Executive Outcomes employees participated in a 2004 coup attempt against the government of Equatorial Guinea, several years after the company itself shut down.)

Ironically, it seems that the New York Times considers the murder, rape and mutilation of innocent civilians by foreign-backed insurgents as mere “rebellions”. Of course, they also felt it very necessary to, in their correction, mention that some ex-EO men were involved in Simon Mann’s poorly planned coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea whilst not mentioning any other company’s ex-employees. But it appears as though every time a South African is involved, it should be blamed on EO.

Whereas I am not entirely satisfied with the correction without an apology, I shall be discussing the matter with my legal council before deciding what action to take next.

I note that there are several comments pending approval on my blog. I apologise for not yet publishing and responding to them – I shall do so as soon as I have caught up on my backlog of administration.

On request of several readers of the blog, I have finally opened a Twitter account. I am still trying to master this new element of social media but until such time as I can, I shall remain a twit.

NEW YORK TIMES PEDDLES LIES IN ARTICLE

They say if you tell a lie enough times, it eventually becomes “the truth”.

The New York Times have certainly tried to keep up with that adage, prompting me to write to them a few minutes ago.

My letter read as follows:

Pretoria,

South Africa

15^th May 2011

Dear Editor,

It was with interest that I read your article headlined Secret Desert Force Set Up by Blackwater’s Founder dated 14 May 2011 by your journalists Mark Mazzetti and Emily B Hager.

As the founder and chairman of the now defunct Executive Outcomes, I found it of even greater interest that they state in their article as fact that Executive Outcomes was “a South African company notorious for staging coup attempts...in Africa”.

Indeed, the only fact in their reference to Executive Outcomes is that it was a South African company.

Had your journalists done even the most basic of research, they would have discovered that:

1. Executive Outcomes was intimately involved in drafting the South African government’s legislation on foreign military companies

2. Executive Outcomes had a licence from the South African government to conduct its business

3. Executive Outcomes only accepted contracts from legitimate, internationally recognised governments. This included South Africa, Angola, Botswana, Sierra Leone and Indonesia to name a few

4. The South African media apologised to me for allowing themselves to be used to perpetuate disinformation on both myself and my company.

The book Executive Outcomes: Against all Odds, was written by myself and published in 2007 by Galago Publishing, detailing the company’s origins, contracts and activities. To date, no information I gave in the book has been refuted by any party.

I personally remain opposed to coups and I also run a blog where I have written, warned against and prevented coups in Africa (http://eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecurityblog.blogspot.com/2011/02/warning-against-joining-planned-coup.html)

However, as your paper accepted and published a factually incorrect comment on Executive Outcomes, despite it being libellous, I reserve the right to take legal action. Meanwhile I demand that your journalists furnish me with proof of any coup attempts planned or staged by the defunct Executive Outcomes. Should your journalists argue that the failed coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea is an example of such an action, may I point out that Executive Outcomes closed its doors in January 1998. It therefore cannot, in any way, be linked to a coup attempt several years later. If any ex-Executive Outcomes men were recruited by the planners of such a coup, Executive Outcomes can still not be linked to the attempt.

I look forward to your comments.

Sincerely,

EEBEN BARLOW

(Signed)

I received a reply back that read:

THANK YOU for writing The New York Times. We are grateful to readers who take the time to help us report thoroughly and accurately. Your message will reach the appropriate editor or reporter promptly.

I will keep you all informed of their actions and responses as I in particular want to know when EO acted in the manner they claim it did.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

Many have written asking on the progress of my planned book and exactly what it will cover in terms of military operations in Africa.

To date, I have completed 20 chapters. They are as follows:

Chapter 1: Understanding war and conflict in Africa

Chapter 2: The relationship between political strategy and military strategy

Chapter 3: Understanding strategic warfare

Chapter 4: Developing an African art of war

Chapter 5: Land warfare principles in Africa

Chapter 6: Military operations related to war

Chapter 7: Operations other than war

Chapter 8: Intelligence operations

Chapter 9: The development of doctrine

Chapter 10: The phases of war

Chapter 11: Reconnaissance

Chapter 12: The advance

Chapter 13: The attack

Chapter 14: Consolidation

Chapter 15: Exploitation

Chapter 16: Defence

Chapter 17: A concept force for manoeuvre

Chapter 18: A concept force for counter insurgency

Chapter 19: A concept force for semi-conventional warfare

Chapter 20: Pseudo Operations

Chapter 21: Night operations

There will probably be an additional 5 chapters (I have not yet named them) added to the above.

To date, chapters 1 to 8 have been edited and I am still working on bits and pieces in chapters 9 to 21 before I submit them to my editor, Dr Deane-Peter Baker, a lecturer at the US Naval Academy. Deane has done a great job on the chapters he has had under pen and I am really happy at the guidance he has given me.

Unfortunately, time has been a constant threat to my efforts and I write when I can.

The reaction I have had from the blog readership as well as several African armies has been very encouraging so I continue to slog away when I have time.

My hope is that once the book has seen the light of day, those who read it will be able to have a better understanding of this very demanding and different theatre of conflict and war and if called upon, will be able to make a positive contribution to ending that which has and continues to devastate Africa.

A HUMOROUS BLOG ON SOUTH AFRICA

This is totally off-topic but given the concern of many people both within and outside of South Africa on the situation here, my wife decided to write a blog with the hopes of making people see things differently.

It is a more humorous view of life here and if you are easily offended, take yourself too seriously, have a chip on your shoulder, find it impossible to laugh at yourself or your fellow beings, then do not visit it.

However, if you are someone who can see the funny side of things – even of tragically funny things – then you may enjoy the blog and have a few good laughs as well.

There are perhaps many South African colloquialisms and phrases that my foreign readers may not fully understand but I am sure that you will get the picture.

If we South Africans cannot laugh at ourselves and see the funny side of things, then we will be doomed forever.

Her blog can be found at http://southafricansociety.wordpress.com/

CONTROLLING THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

We cannot dominate the battlefield if we cannot control it.

The Area of Operations (AO) is greatly influenced by the terrain and the prevailing climatic conditions in which the operations take place. Exploiting and gaining control over the Area of Operations with surprise, speed and firepower ought to be a priority for own forces commanders.

The Operating Environment, also referred to as the Operational Environment (OE), is a combination of circumstances and influences that impact greatly AO and, in turn, on the decisions of commanders and subsequently, the deployment of forces and assets.

As Own Forces control over the AO/OE will place the enemy at a disadvantage and allow commanders to dictate the flow and tempo of battle or operations, the enemy will use every means possible to prevent this control and thereby attempt to impede Own Forces’ momentum and deny Own Forces the initiative.

To gain and maintain control over both the AO, the enemy or insurgent forces must be denied the ability to:

1. Prevent Own Forces access to the AO: The enemy will achieve this by denying, delaying and disrupting own forces that wish to enter the AO. These actions will be strengthened by propaganda, mines, IEDs, ambushes, stand-off bombardments, selective demolitions or a combination of these actions. Access routes and logistical lines will become prime targets to prevent effective deployment and sustainment of own forces within the Area of Operations.

2. Influence the local population: Regardless of the type of operation, the enemy will make maximum use of influencing the local population to his advantage. This advantage can include the gathering of intelligence on Own Forces entering or in the AO, assist the enemy in channelling forces into preplanned killing grounds (this can be done with simple methods such as using children or even livestock to block a specific route) and so forth. If the local population realise that Own Forces will withdraw soon after the operation, they will support the enemy to prevent retaliation after these forces have withdrawn.

3. Disperse forces: The enemy will attempt to divert the focus of Own Forces commanders in order to preserve his combat forces. This will be achieved by deploying his forces over a wide area/front whilst exploiting terrain of strategic and tactical importance to stage smaller actions aimed at inflicting casualties and confusing commanders. These actions may induce commanders to attack enemy forces at a time and place favourable to the enemy, thus causing casualties amongst the local population and unnecessary collateral damage. This will turn the local population against the attacking forces. Dispersion will, furthermore, prevent Own Forces commanders from accurately determining the enemy’s Trinity of Gravity

4. Impede momentum: The enemy will exploit every weakness in the advancing or attacking forces thrust in order to slow down the momentum. Ambushes, nuisance minefields, IEDs and such will prolong the conflict whilst drawing forces into terrain that is favourable to the enemy. By impeding momentum and thus prolonging the conflict, the enemy will attempt to survive tactically in order to achieve a strategic victory over the advancing or attacking forces. Logistical supply lines - along with static forward bases - will become prime enemy targets, being subject to assaults, raids, stand-off bombardments and even suicide bombers. These actions do not only lead to Own Forces casualties but may deprive commanders of the initiative.

5. Neutralise strengths: The enemy will attempt to neutralise the attacking forces by occupying villages, towns and other complex areas in order to divide the forces and attack them at a time and place of their choosing. Using villages to shield their actions, the enemy will be able to inflict casualties and even achieve small tactical successes. As the enemy will often know the AO better than the attacking forces, he will use the terrain to his advantage and strike high-visibility targets to gain a propaganda and psychological advantage. Retaliation by the armed forces may result in excessive collateral damage, resulting in increased local support to the enemy and the resultant propaganda proclaiming the enemy is “everywhere”

6. Deny safe areas: The enemy will make every attempt to deny safe and secure areas to the attacking forces during all phases of the operation. Using indirect and direct fire, landmines, IEDs and so forth, the enemy will target laager areas, temporary bases from positions that prevent Own Forces retaliation, such as villages, towns and so forth

7. Achieve surprise: As the enemy will in many instances be more familiar with the AO than the attacking forces, he will use every advantage he has in order to gain a strategic or tactical surprise. This may include the use of deception, feints, raids, stand-off bombardments and other actions to confuse the Own Forces commanders.

8. Gather intelligence: Good OPSEC measures as well as counter intelligence techniques must be used to prevent the enemy from gaining a clear understanding of Own Forces’ strengths, weaknesses and TTPs. Avoiding routine, alternating routes, night operations and so forth can be used effectively to confuse the enemy and deny his understanding of how Own Forces operate.

Climatic variations, although having a significant impact on operations within the AO, are beyond the control of both Own Forces and the enemy. Like terrain, it favours the one who “reads” it correctly, and uses and exploits it.

Whereas air power is crucial to achieving air superiority, conducting aerial reconnaissance and providing Close Air Support, air power loses much of its utility when the enemy make use of towns and villages to shield his activities.

Controlling the AO should therefore not rely exclusively on air power but rather rely on soldiers who are correctly trained, equipped and deployed to ensure domination of the area.

THE UN DOES IT AGAIN...

Many folks have written to me asking what my thoughts on the UN’s actions in Ivory Coast (Cote d’Ivoire) are. I am no specialist on that country but what I read in the media is apparently very skewed to say the least.

A few days ago I was referred to an article written by South Africa’s former deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Aziz Pahad. Pahad held that post from 1994 to 2008. This article was published on http://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/Analyses_12/What-is-the-Truth-about-the-Ivorian-Crisis.shtml, a site edited by Dr Gary Busch. Much of what Pahad wrote I had long suspected.

Then came other shocking rumours of the UN’s activities in Cote d’Ivoire. Whereas I did not doubt the content-authenticity of the rumours, I did not have any confirmation of these alleged actions. But, I thought that had PMC had acted in such a manner, the UN would have called for their immediate suspension and would have wanted them charged with war crimes. It was, after all, the UN that had fabricated it fair share of lies about EO and tried every trick in its large book to close the company.

The UN, it appears, is apparently above the law and entitled to break it whenever they wish without any action ever being taken against them.

It also seems to me that the UN works tirelessly to ensure that conflicts are kept alive and in the process, will do whatever it takes to ensure that chaos reigns, including deceit and murder. It is therefore no small wonder that this gigantic organisation feels threatened when a PMC is about to end a conflict. Should that happen, what would their function be? The ending of conflicts will make the UN redundant – something those in the organisation cannot afford.

One merely needs to travel to conflict areas in Africa to witness who drives the new 4 x 4s, who lives in the best hotels and who dines in the best restaurants. The answer: the UN and their parasitic NGOs.

Hot on the heels of my shock at new rumours of alleged UN activities in the Cote d’Ivoire, I was sent another article published on www.ocnus.net, titled “The End Game in the Ivory Coast”.

Reading this article I hoped that many African governments who are being held to ransom by the UN will finally come to realise that whereas there may be some good people in the UN, the organisation holds no good for them or their countries.

Dr Busch wrote the following:

The long political impasse of the Ivory Coast is coming to an end. The forces of the rebel leader, Alassane Ouattara have failed to get others to remove the elected President of the country, Gbagbo by force, sanction or military provocation. Now, electricity, water and most communications networks are shut off in the Northern rebel areas. Since 28 February the switch has been turned off.

The ONUCI (the United Nations occupying force) in Abidjan have found that they are being denied fuel supplies so have taken to theft and murder to keep their supplies available. (See http://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/Dysfunctions_2/Caught-Robbing-Gas-Stataion-UN-Forces-Kill-3-Civilians.shtml) The rebel cause is unable to deliver any services to its captive populations on its own. During the nine years of occupation of the North they have built no institutions for public service or administration nor for the supply of water, electricity and fuel but have relied on the good will of the Gbagbo Government to supply these to them. Moreover they have not paid any taxes to the legitimate government during this period. They have not paid income taxes, customs duties, excise taxes or rents for the properties these tin pot warlords occupy or the services provided for them. There have been no contributions for social services (schools, hospitals, roads, etc.) during these nine years. All the costs of running the country and maintaining its position in the world through diplomacy, economic treaties, participation in international organisations, bank transfers to the French Treasury through the BCEAO and support for the CFA franc have been done by Gbagbo’s government.

The imposition of rebel warlords as members of the Cabinet of a joint government imposed by the French and the UN added nothing to their contributions to the State but cost the Ivoirian taxpayers a small fortune as each rebel minister demanded cabinet rank wages, fancy cars, and jobs for their families. It was a major cost to the government and the people of the Ivory Coast to keep these rebels in the styles in which they chose to live. This was tolerated and accepted by the people as it was part of an agreed process of disarmament and disengagement by the rebels. It was agreed that no elections should take place before the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of all the armed forces was completed and the unification of the country achieved. Indeed, the UN specifically extended the term of Gbagbo as President through United Nations Resolution 1633 (2005) which extended Gbagbo’s term of office until this was achieved. This resolution demanded that all the parties signatories to the Linas-Marcoussis, Accra III and Pretoria Agreements, as well as all the Ivorian parties concerned, implement it fully and without delay...” [emphasis added] That is, the rebels must disarm before new elections could be held. That was part of every agreement. This was largely the agreement created by Thabo Mbeki who was the UN-appointed mediator. Nothing has changed in the legal requirements since.

What has changed is that the French were able to persuade the UN and President Gbagbo (but not his party, the FPI) that it was possible to hold elections in a divided country with armed rebels in charge of the North of the country and on the basis of a rigged electoral role provided by the French military company SAGEM. The presidential election in Ivory Coast was held on October 31st, 2010, with a second round on November 28th, 2010. The results of the election are disputed and the position of the Electoral Commission wholly discredited, even by members of that commission. The French and American ambassadors showed up at the campaign headquarters of Ouattara with one of his key electoral advisors. Without any authority the ambassadors and the Ouattara campaign manager announced that Ouattara had won the election. The next day the Constitutional Court said that Gbagbo had won the election. Since then the ‘international community’ has said that Ouattara was the legitimate president but the constitutional authorities of the country have said Gbagbo was the President.

None of this really matters any more. The ‘international community’ has introduced sanctions on the Ivory Coast and a ban on the country’s ability to deploy its assets retained by the French Treasury, It brags that it will starve Gbagbo out by stopping his financial ability to pay the army and the state employees. This has failed abysmally. Yesterday, 4 March 2011 Laurent Gbagbo paid over 60 per cent of civil servant salaries, suggesting Western sanctions meant to starve him of funds and force him to leave have not had full effect. The balance will be paid in three days.

Gbagbo has had great support from other African countries (except for the colonial satrapies of France). The UN and the French have been demanding that the ECOWAS and other African states invade the Ivory Coast to oust Gbagbo. They have refused, or offered such a feeble response, that any deployment of their forces in a hostile climate would quickly end with their soldiers being sent home in body bags. Two of the countries with the strongest armed forces on the continent, Angola and South Africa have been openly opposed to any military initiative to oust Gbagbo. These are two armies which have spent years in real battles and have plenty of equipment and battle-hardened soldiers who have experience in African wars. The supporters of Ouattara are raggedy irregulars who call themselves the New Forces and incompetent and inexperienced conscripts from Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger who have only ever fought over cattle, water and civil disputes. The Nigerian Army is sitting this out as they have their own battles to fight against a Muslim fundamentalist uprising in the North and an election to supervise. The presence offshore of the South African frigate Drakensberg has had a laxative effect on UN planners.

Being unable to starve Gbagbo out and without the military resources need to take on the regular Army (FANCI) and the FDS and CECOS units the irregular rebel force which has been concentrated on the Golf Hotel where Ouattara and his colleagues have hunkered down have relied on surreptitious acts of brutality against the civil population and the gendarmerie to try to provoke a response from Gbagbo’s forces. They have formed “the invisible commando” force which shoots at soldiers and policemen whenever a protest march is formed. They shoot, and often kill, policemen and then melt away into the arms of the UN emplacements and wait for a response from those who have been shot. They then call this response ‘genocide’ or an illegal use of force against civilians. The government forces have shown great restraint in their retaliation and the Ouattara people are growing ever more desperate. Two days ago they killed seven women and blamed this on Gbagbo’s forces, despite the fact that the presence of the ‘invisible commando’ force was filmed. Their crocodile tears have been reported as real by the UN and the US and have been echoed around the world as if they were true.

The UN knows it is a lie and only compounds this with additional lies. The UN Secretary-General just announced that Gbagbo had acquired three Mi-24 helicopters from Belarus in defiance of the UN sanctions. This was not only a deliberate lie but served to mask the fact that the UN had indeed brought in three Mi-24 helicopters for its own use. This was not admitted until three days later.

There is a mysterious aura which surrounds the UN and NGO personnel when it comes to facing reality. It is a special mind set which allows their personal prejudices and egos to be seen by them as facts even when confronted by the opposite. During the First Afghan war we were contacted by the UN, the NGOS and the journalists to see if we would fly them into the northern territories (then controlled in part by Massoud). We agreed and arranged for them to be picked up from Dushanbe where we had two helicopters. The UN, NGOs and journos arrived in Dushanbe and said, in great horror, “But these helicopters are armed.” I said “Of course they are armed”. We had two MI-24 gunships, fully armed with six Spetsnaz troops on board with long Afghan experience. They said “It is inappropriate for us to fly in armed helicopters. We are neutrals. We do not judge. We only want to help and report. Why are the helicopters armed?” I said they were armed because we wanted to be able to return. One helicopter would hover to provide ground cover and the other would deliver passengers. I explained that the people on the ground could not distinguish the fact that the plane was full of unarmed humanitarians until we landed and they introduced themselves. Therefore we would take all precautions. They flew but we started to get all sorts of calls from editors and assorted NGO luminaries asking us to use unarmed helicopters. After a week I told them to walk. I sent them a map of the Khyber Pass and told them where to go. It was a good lesson about these humanitarians. If they couldn’t see about their own safety what kind of judgements could they be making about other people’s problems. They are a special breed with a special kind of arrogance. As a rule they should not be believed or trusted.

So, despite the fact that the UN is continually lying to the rest of the world about the situation in the Ivory Coast and relying on their coterie of morally challenged NGOs and journalists to back up their specious claims, the UN presence is deteriorating badly. Gbagbo has ordered them out of the country but they refuse to go. Instead of supervising the disarmament of the rebels, which is their primary role in the mandate they were given for the Ivory Coast, they continue to rearm and supply the rebels with newer and more lethal equipment. Now they have helicopter gunships. Unfortunately for them Gbagbo’s troops do not rise to the bait. They have refused to engage in open warfare with the UN. The UN is opposed by unarmed civilians and they cannot deal with this.

There is a lot of rubbish being spoken about the civil war breaking out. There never was a civil war. The French stopped the Ivory Coast Army from wiping out the last holdouts of the rebellion in Bouake in 2002. Without the French and the UN forces there would be a civil war which would last for about three days. The 8,000 well-trained and armed forces of the legitimate government would wipe out the Forces Nouvelles even if the rebels actually decided to fight. It is only the French and the UN which are credible enemies. The problem for the UN and the French is that there are thousands, if not tens of thousands, of French and other foreign nationals in the Ivory Coast who will be targets the moment the ‘international community’ attacks. It takes only a glance at Libya to see what happens when ‘African mercenaries’ are caught, lynched and burned by Libyan democrats to envision what might happen if the French or others start killing Ivoirians.

So, the UN can push it but not too far. They can’t risk a full-fledged conflict without serious risk to themselves and to the civilian hostages. As long as Gbagbo’s forces refuse to retaliate the UN is powerless. It is the rebels who are growing weaker every day. They have no legitimacy in the lands they have occupied over nine years and now, with no water, electricity, hospitals; schools and transport the local population are likely to rise against them. They have nothing to offer. Ouattara demanded an end to cocoa sales. This affected only his own people. The rebels are finished. It is only a matter of time before the people of the North throw them out. Gbagbo needs to do nothing. The men trapped in the Golf Hotel realise this and they are growing desperate.

Soon the ‘international’ community will see that their hypocrisy and deceit in the Ivory Coast will be exposed for the whole world to see. They are talking about a military response to the crisis of North Africa but doing nothing. They want ’democracy’ but apparently only for Muslims. What a shambles.