BEFORE I GO...

I was pointed to the Wikipedia pages on Executive Outcomes and it seems rather odd that Sterling Corporate Services has now been placed on the EO pages with great fanfare along with the statement that a:

 “UN report from July 2012 criticised the South African security company Sterling Corporate Services for assembling a “private army” in defiance of international agreements and also of Somalian sanctions. The report was conducted by the UN’s Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (SEMG) and revealed strong links to Executive Outcomes”.

Whereas I knew that the UN is dumb, I never realised just how dumb they are. In case they are wondering about my comment, EO closed its doors in 1998. However, as I understand it, Sterling did a good job and would have continued doing a good job had the UN not felt so threatened and taken pity on the pirates. And no, I have nothing to do with Sterling - nor does EO as it closed its doors 14 years ago.

Apart from that, there was a very good article in the recent Foreign Policy on how the UN saved the Somali pirates from extinction (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/20/how_the_un_saved_the_somali_pirates?page=full). But, as EO severely embarrassed the UN in both Angola and Sierra Leone, it is no wonder they are still smarting. Their actions prove that they want conflict to continue – I hope African governments take note of the hidden aims behind the UN’s claims of “peacekeeping”.

Ironically, someone also removed the comment from the EO pages that the media apologised to both EO and myself. The truth must be suppressed at all costs and disinformation and lies must continue, regardless.

However, I never realised that Wikipedia now acts as a mouthpiece for the UN’s disinformation on EO. ...seems rather odd to me, but there you go

BLOG SLOW-DOWN

My apologies to all followers for taking so long to respond to your comments as well as my tardiness in posting something new.

I have been incredibly busy and will be unable to do much until approximately mid-October.

If all goes “according to plan” I will be back and writing again by mid-October. However, as you all know, a plan is a basis for change...and the only thing in life that does not change is change.

My best wishes to you all.

THE PERCEPTION PILLAR

I believe that the integrity of the state – as well as its legitimacy – rests on 7 pillars. I refer to these pillars as the Pillars of State. By eroding or neutralising two or more of these pillars, the state becomes weak and unstable and its influence is reduced to the point where it faces a serious threat that may lead to collapse.

Perceptions determine the view people have of the world, their region and their surroundings. This view is, by and large, developed and injected into society by and through the media either through objective reporting or through propaganda. As such, the influence of the media on the perceptions of the populace and by implication the perceptions of the populace on the state must not be underestimated.  

In its role as a perception-creator, the media can play either a positive role in supporting the state’s messages and policies or eroding its credibility and thereby negatively influence both foreign policy and investment. The media does, however, need to remain objective, report facts and not abuse its potential power of propaganda.

The mainstream audio, visual and written media can play an enormous role in shaping both national and international public opinion and perceptions and can wittingly or unwittingly erode the Pillars of State.  

Social media platforms such as blogs, instant messaging, social networking services and so forth can be used to rapidly reach millions of followers and incite ethnic, racial or religious tensions as well as instigate actions against a government and its various agencies or departments. Furthermore, these platforms can be used to effectively plan, coordinate and execute actions aimed at eroding the Pillars of State.

 

Failures by the government agencies and services along with government mismanagement and corruption will provide healthy pickings to the media - as will political infighting and bickering. Whereas these failings need to be exposed and brought into the public domain, there will be media-related articles that will subtly encourage the populace to protest and rise up against these factors. However, there will inevitably also be those in both the media and the populace who tacitly approve of - and incite - civil disobedience and whose sympathies will lay with violent protesters and insurgents. Within this climate of rapidly transmitted perceived political and other uncertainties, government messages will become blurred, ignored and even rejected by the populace.

An uncontrolled and hostile media can report on matters that may seriously disadvantage the government and in particular military, law enforcement and intelligence operations. Compromise of planned operations, force levels and deployments, equipment shortages and even planned policy decisions may impact negatively on the government and the country as a whole. Additionally, such reporting can provide hostile intelligence services and insurgent groups with important information as well as battle indications.

Government must however prevent irresponsible and irrational censorship of the media as a free media is considered to be a cornerstone of a modern democratic state. It should however consider methods and techniques of using the media to propagate its messages and policies in clearly understandable language without creating negative perceptions amongst the populace.  

Information that will not disadvantage government or impact on the National and Vital Interests must be shared with the populace on a daily basis in order to strengthen public perceptions on these matters. Press releases, press briefings and other methods of communicating with the populace must be used and exploited. Creating a sense of openness, self-criticism and honesty will foster better public perceptions.

As witnessed during the so-called Arab Spring, the alternative media can play an important role in generating, mobilising and coordinating counter-government actions. Blogs, Facebook, Twitter, internet forums and chat rooms as well as personal websites can play a significant part in either shaping public perceptions or attacking government policies and actions. They can, likewise, be used to transmit disinformation aimed at discrediting and gaining international sympathy for a particular cause and be used to mobilise disgruntled people or even criminals.

Appointed and trained government media spokesmen/women must be used to interface with the media and ensure that a good and trusted relationship exists between the media and the government. A trusted relationship with the media will usually lead to self-censorship by editors and publishers alike.

Similarly, the law enforcement and intelligence agencies should monitor and where necessary take action against blatantly subversive, propagandist and tension-inciting mainstream and social media sites.

Whereas governments must be prepared to accept criticism, they do not need to accept blatant hostile propaganda aimed at creating conflict, tension and violence.  This tension-inducing approach by the media must be identified, corrected and managed as rapidly as possible.   

ANOTHER SPECIAL FORCES/EO WANNABE SHOWS HIMSELF – WITH THE HELP OF A “JOURNALIST”

I have never been able to understand why some people feel the need to claim an association with a company or with people they have never met. I suppose it is either because they have a very low self-esteem or they believe they will never be caught out as no one will ever come to the fore and expose them for what they are – sad, pathetic people. The vast majority of these “self-confessed heroes” would not last a single day with the real men they boast they were part of.

If I were to spend my time exposing all of these conmen and wannabees (it seems there are thousands who claim to have been in EO), I would have to remain glued to my computer – something I have no intention of doing.

However, some of these pathetic wannabees simply need more exposing than others. Equally pathetic are the journalists who lap up the lies these fools tell them and then publish them as “the truth”.  

In this day and age, one would think that someone who has qualified at the London School of Journalism with Distinction in 2001 – who has access to the internet – and is an author, would at least have the drive and integrity to do some fact-checking before publishing an article, not so, Simon Tomlin? It seems to get worse when the said journalist is an ex-army man who suffers from what appears to be a very severe persecution complex.

Tomlin wrote a piece he posted on his News Alliance UK blog (http://newsallianceuk.wordpress.com/2012/08/10/murder-and-mayhem-tolerated-by-the-security-services-to-protect-a-mercenary/) in which he published several blatant lies disguised as “facts”. He did not even bother to check the outrageous and libellous claims he wrote – instead, he blamed it on the piece of garbage he was writing about. In a sense, that is simply proof that Tomlin does not waste time with fact checking. As he boasts of the 4 books he has written, I wouldn’t be surprised if they are likewise books with very little factual foundation.  

Enter Shaun Patrick Breach, a British subject who claims (falsely) that he served in the SA Special Forces (no one I spoke to in Special Forces had ever heard of him) as well as that he served in EO – he does not appear on any EO personnel lists nor is there a book number for anyone by the surname of Breach.

Breach happens to be Tomlin’s “source” – and he and Tomlin had a fall-out about a book Breach wanted Tomlin to write. He also happens to be the source that provided the drivel to Tomlin for his grossly inaccurate comments about EO.  Everything that Breach claimed was immediately assumed by Tomlin to be fact. In a sense, I can therefore say anything about Tomlin that I want to say and use the same lame excuse he has used – “so-and-so told me so”.

Tomlin it seems believes that EO still exists, is cooperating with the British security services and along with Breach are in some way out to “get him”. This fantasy no doubt has its origins with Breach who can at best be termed a piece of dirt. Breach made numerous claims/statements to Tomlin and despite the claims being able to be verified if the journalist really wanted to, they were simply assumed to be absolute fact. This also shows the incredible gullibility of Tomlin who swallowed this drivel hook, line and sinker.

Looking at some of the emails Tomlin sent to a genuine ex-EO man – I really have to shake my head. Poor man! Tomlin certainly doesn’t like anyone questioning him and his emails are indicative of someone with uncontained hysteria.

Breach on the other hand seems to be a real piece of work and most probably a danger to society. His claims that he was involved in murders and acted as some sort of hitman ought to be investigated.  

However, apart from Breach’s lies, I would like Tomlin to immediately provide the ICC with proof of EO’s “war crimes” so that the matter can be swiftly dealt with.

I suspect that both Breach and Tomlin live in a world of fantasy and deserve one another. 

EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES: FOUR BALL ONE TRACER

For many years, Executive Outcomes was – and still is - the target of a web of lies, deception and blatant disinformation by those who were deeply concerned that we might prevent countries in Africa from imploding and whose sole interest was the destruction of the continent for economical and other gain.

A quick Google search will reveal just how many lies are out there on the company.  Granted, the media did finally publish an apology for being the mouthpiece of a massive disinformation campaign but it was a little too late as far as I was concerned. Some of these despicable, lying, self-serving members of society who jumped on the bandwagon under the banner of “journalist” had, however, effectively played their role in ensuring the longevity of terrorist groups and insurgents – at the cost of many hundreds of thousands of lives. They also very successfully contributed to the bad name many true journalists have to endure.

When I finally wrote my account of Executive Outcomes (EO), it was primarily to give my version of events – a version which unlike the media’s and the intelligence services’, was based on company documents, interviews as well as video and audio recordings of many of the men who were part of EO or senior government officials who EO had worked for.

After my book was published, I continued to hope and wish that someone who was at the forefront of EO’s operations in the field would follow suit and document their version of events – the good and the bad. After all, as I was trying to run the company whilst fending off the liars, intelligence agents and BS artists who overnight had become “specialists” on EO, I could seldom even visit our AOs, let alone spend much time on the ground.

Rudolph van Heerden, known to many within EO as “Ruff” or “Roelf” finally put pen to paper and along with Andrew Hudson wrote a perspective on EO as seen through the eyes of one of the commanders who was on the ground. I was excited at the news as I believed that it would fill in many of the gaps my book may have left. And I believe the book will do just that.

I was keen to lay my hands on Ruff’s book and when I finally managed to get a copy, - its title is “Four Ball One Tracer” - I was enthralled. Roelf tells the story of EO from the day he signed up to join the company, the nightmare that was Soyo and until the end of the Sierra Leone campaign.

Roelf discusses a lot of things – the training, the tactics, the hardships and the laughs. He tells his story as he lived it – straight and to the point. He also pays tribute to the many good men who served in EO and used their skills and knowledge to bring about positive change in war torn countries.

I do not want to spoil anyone’s anticipation but I would recommend Roelf’s book to anyone who is interested in a lot more detail about EO’s operations.

It is a very good read.

Well done Roelf and thank you again for your service in EO.

THREAT PREDICTION

Threat prediction is a vital pre-requisite of strategy development. It can, however, be a difficult and problematic task if the intelligence analysts as well as the planners and strategists do not have accurate intelligence at hand, do not understand the historical trends that have manifested over time, and do not understand the political strategies of their own government and those of the target country or target grouping.

If the intelligence services do not utilise all available resources at their disposal, and cultivate new resources where intelligence gaps exist, they will directly contribute to intelligence failures. Intelligence failures can, in turn, lead to misjudging the enemy, doctrinal failures and faulty or disjointed threat predictions and subsequently poor, unrealistic or irrelevant strategies.

The value of threat prediction and its analysis is that it provides benchmarks and indicators that can be used to constantly assess and re-adjust the overall military strategy. The need for flexibility in the developing military strategy is vital in order to prevent a tunnel-vision view of the threats a government may be facing.

The nature of modern warfare and, more broadly, armed conflict has changed dramatically from the classical or historical perspective of war. The days of two opposing armies meeting one another on an open field to engage in a classical conventional battle are, for the time being, long gone.

Although the ever-present threat of a conventional land, sea and air battle will always remain very real, modern war and/or conflict may be characterised by many different concepts such as religious fanaticism, ethnic hatred, radical ideologies, resource grabbing, xenophobia, mass mobilisation of the disadvantaged, a breakdown of law and order, a perceived weakness of the opposition, a growth in power by armed organised crime syndicates and so forth. These factors, more than ever, require detailed investigation – something that can only be achieved by means of a strong, dedicated and aggressive intelligence gathering and analysis capability. 

Whereas modern military technology, if correctly applied, can prove to be a force- multiplier on the battlefield, strategists and planners cannot rely on technology alone, as technology is prone to failure, often at critical times. Over-reliance on technology may, therefore, present several serious disadvantages to the user. Correctly used as a battlefield support system, technology can play a valuable role in locating, confusing and even overcoming the enemy. Technology, however, needs to be balanced against the operating environment, the threat and the ability to maintain and apply the technology correctly. It remains a secondary weapon and not the primary weapon of an armed force.

Intelligence analysts, along with military planners and strategists furthermore need to consider a host of different and varying factors that may lead to political tension and thus negatively influence the security of the state, its citizens and the operating environment.   

Political tension, on the other hand, may be the result of economic tension, natural resource distribution, border disputes, perceived political sabotage, ethnicity, religious differences and so forth.

Therefore, from a strategic planning point-of-view, several factors need to be closely assessed in terms of how they can be used to the advantage of the armed forces and how they can be successfully exploited thus denying the enemy from gaining an advantage.

Additionally, these factors need to be viewed in terms of the disadvantage they may hold for the political- and the military machinery. Of equal importance is the fact that the opposing forces will be assessing the same factors of the state or grouping they view as an aggressor.

The advantage will thus lie with the strategists and planners who are able to accurately predict the threats facing the state and identify the weaknesses and exploitation possibilities in order to develop realistic options that can be implemented.

PS: I have been travelling as well as ill and have therefore been unable to regularly update the blog. My apologies...

WHY THE ARMED FORCES FAIL AT COIN

In my previous posting I listed the reasons why I believe governments fail at COIN. Most insurgencies start either as a result of a perceived lack of – or poor - governance or to resist an invader when the government and the armed forces have been overrun.

Governments, despite often being the prime reason why an insurgency starts, are often only too keen to make the armed forces responsible for establishing workable governance in areas that have become positively disposed towards the insurgency.

As it is an internal problem, countering the insurgency is essentially a law enforcement responsibility. The problem is that often the law enforcement agencies do not realise that an insurgency is developing and through ignorance and denial, mislead government – and the nation - on the seriousness of the situation. This provides the insurgents with numerous advantages, most crucial being time to organise, train and escalate the insurgency.

The end goal of the insurgency is political in nature and therefore, the main effort aimed at countering it ought to be political and not militarily. This “passing the buck” approach places the armed forces in a position they can seldom if ever win as the military’s role is not to govern but to ensure an environment in which governance can take place.  

An insurgency is neither a strategy nor a war. It is a condition based on the perception(s) of a part of the populace that poor governance exists, that government only governs for its own benefit and that they – the populace - are being marginalised or politically suppressed. In reality, an insurgency is an internal emergency that, left unchecked, can develop into a civil war. The insurgency itself is a means to an end and it is an approach aimed at either weakening or collapsing a government’s control and forcing a negotiation in the favour of the insurgents.   

The role of the armed forces, once it has been mandated by government to take control when the law enforcement agencies are unable to contain the insurgency, is to create an environment that will allow government to negotiate from a position of strength – and govern. To achieve this, the armed forces must destroy the armed elements of the insurgency and “out-guerrilla the guerrillas”.

The armed forces can, despite their relative strengths in terms of manpower, firepower and other resources, fail at effectively neutralising and destroying an insurgency. There are many reasons for this failure but not all of the reasons can be laid before the door of the armed forces.

Intelligence failures, poor strategies and a lack of training, equipment and preparation as well as a lack of understanding of the Operating Environment (OE) are major contributing factors. So too are attempts at utilising conventional TTPs to fight an unconventional enemy. Being unable to apply relentless pursuit and locate and destroy the insurgents with ruthless aggression add to the reasons for failure.

However, all the firepower in the world will not end or contain the insurgency if government fails at its responsibilities. The armed forces cannot build national cohesion nor can they be expected to govern in the absence of government.

I suspect that what I was taught many years ago still holds true; countering an insurgency requires an 80% effort by government and a 20% effort by the armed forces. However, in executing their 20% responsibility, the armed forces must give 100% of their effort to succeed in creating the climate government requires to fulfil its duties. This climate is characterised by safety and security.

In the execution of their mission, the armed forces must continuously guard against:

1.    Unnecessary collateral damage – this will alienate the populace towards them

2.    Disrespect and maltreatment of the populace

3.    A lack of operational flexibility

4.    Imposing unnecessary restraints on the troops

5.    Believing the enemy to be inferior
Inability to adapt

6.    Poor discipline

7.    Routine
Foreign interference 

8.    Neglecting the principles of COIN.

Misleading, emotional mainstream and social media in favour of the insurgency can weaken the national resolve and demotivate the armed forces.  Furthermore, this type of reporting will give credibility to the insurgents and add impetus to the insurgency.

It is furthermore crucial that the armed forces know when to stop and when government must take over and govern and the law enforcement agencies enforce the law.