In the aftermath of 9/11, the bread and butter of the
defense industry shifted in many ways from focusing on big-ticket Cold War
items like tanks and fighter jets to the world of counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency. With this new paradigm came waves and waves of
self-appointed experts, clueless academics, and hucksters trying to sell crap
to the Department of Defense. This trend continues to this day, although it has
been shifting into the even more nebulous area of cybersecurity, which is even
better for contractors given that the 60-year-old men who run the Pentagon
don’t know anything about computers. The situation is so bad in the Department
of Defense that when you come across an “expert” who dubs themselves a
COINista, you should run, not walk, away. These folks are the
reason why we are fighting the same war today that we were fighting in
Afghanistan 16 years ago.
One person who I always appreciated for having an
actual track record of success is Eeben Barlow.
Having served in the South African Defense Forces as a sapper in the Infantry
and Special Operations, Barlow went on to found a private military company
called Executive Outcomes. EO beat back UNITA in Angola for the
democratically elected government before driving the barbarous
Revolutionary United Front to their knees in Sierra Leone. Today, Barlow
serves as the chairman of STTEP, a PMC that took the fight directly
to Boko Haram.
Oddly, the United States government puts pressure on the host governments to
remove Barlow’s people just as they begin experiencing success in
defeating anti-government forces.
Using his background in counterinsurgency and
irregular warfare, Barlow has recently written a book titled “Composite Warfare,” and it is the go-to manual for warfare in
Africa, written by a man who has experienced it. Barlow emphasizes
an Africa-centric approach that eschews the over-philosophizing of
political scientists, doctrine writers, and alleged COIN experts. Barlow wrote
the book to pertain specifically to war on the African continent, but in this
reader’s opinion, Barlow’s stripped-down language and no-nonsense approach to
what is a normally convoluted subject in military literature makes this
book worthwhile for any student of military history.
As Barlow writes in his book, “Part of the dilemma
African armies face is the continued creation of new words, terms, and phrases
to describe the same action or phenomena. This has led to a large amount of
confusion for commanders and leader in the field.” Using graphics, bullet
points, and written explanations, the author leads the reader to an
understanding about the boots-on-the-ground tactical approach, from movement
techniques and types of operations to the big picture that supports the pillars
of government. “Composite Warfare” ties them together and demonstrates how a
military campaign has to function as a mutually supporting effort that supports
the state rather than undermines it.
Comprehensive in nature, “Composite Warfare” examines
appropriate force structures, air power, reconnaissance, maneuvers, mobility,
air power, intelligence, retrograde operations, developing military strategies,
and plenty more. Barlow treats warfare in Africa with a cultural appreciation,
as opposed to a cookie-cutter, one-size-fits-all approach frequently employed
by U.S. Special Forces, who simply mirror our
own force structure in the host nation counterparts they train.
This is why the United States often trains foreign troops with tactics straight
out of the Ranger
Handbook, tactics that don’t work for indigenous forces.
In a past SOFREP interview with Barlow, he said that
“poor training, bad advice, a lack of strategy, vastly different tribal
affiliations, ethnicity, religion, languages, cultures, not understanding the
conflict and enemy,” were hallmarks of Western training provided to African
armies. “Much of this training is focused on window-dressing, but when you look
through the window, the room is empty,” he concluded.
“Composite Warfare” is recommended reading for
students of military history and strategy, including active-duty Special Forces
soldiers charged with conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID).
Although the book will prove especially helpful to those serving
in African militaries, “Composite Warfare” will no doubt became a seminal work
on modern warfare in Africa, one practitioners and academics alike will
reference well into the decades to come. Let us hope that Barlow’s lessons are
learned and internalized, lest we repeat the same mistakes in Africa for
another half-century.
11 comments:
A brilliant read and resource by Eben Barlow. I am utilising the trinity of gravity concept and items from MOOTW in my honours paper, which is focused on paramilitary capacity in conservation. All related to the poaching crisis in Rhino, Elephant and the illegal trade in Wildlife. This is a brilliant resource and not just a bible for Africa Warfare, but, also highly useful for paramilitary practitioners, conservation specialists and in the hybrid domain of law enforcement and conservation area integrity. Well done!
Thanks for your support Ashwell. I am pleased to learn that you have found it of value, especially insofar as your honours paper is concerned - good luck!
Rgds,
Eeben
Is there a means of communication i can use to message you directly and privately? I am a serving military officer currently working my way through staff college. I am keen to pick your brains on an issue if possible.
goldenslot
Saw this posted on Janes today and thought you would appreciate,
New-model African armies
Following their independence, most Sub-Saharan and East African militaries tended to use second-hand military equipment donated by former colonial powers, as well as the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Jeremy Binnie and Erwan de Cherisey report on how that trend is changing
http://www.janes.com/images/assets/520/71520/New-model_African_armies.pdf
Dear Mr Barlow
I’d like to get in touch with you, I have a book you might be interested in, I wondered if I could send you a copy?
Can you send me an email at Getwalker [@] gmail ? Best wishes
Andrew Walker
An interesting read Absalon L16. Thanks for sharing it.
Rgds,
Eeben
Thanks for your message Phann Son. This is the best way to contact me - or via Facebook. However, given a time constraint I live under, I might not always be able to respond quickly.
Rgds,
Eeben
COMPOSITE WARFARE
This interesting book is ambitious in its scope as it represents a combination of a ‘how to’ military guide with a conceptual analysis of broader issues related to maintaining the stability and integrity of African states or elsewhere in 3rd world war torn strifes.
The ‘military’ part covers a very broad range of topics from useful tips for small patrols, through to guidance on the deployment and operational use of complete divisions. Some of the advice offered is broad brush and hypothetical: some is usefully specific, and I suspect often reflects the author’s personal military experience which I feel deserves much respect. Overall, nothing on the military side struck me as very surprising or clearly unsound.
The conceptual part of the book centres on likening the integrity and stability of a state to an ancient edifice supported by solid pillars. These ‘Seven Pillars of State’ are: Intelligence; Law Enforcement; Armed Forces; Governance (in ways which do not antagonise the populace); the Economy; the Populace (which must be accepting of government rule) and Perceptions (which is about ways to create positive perceptions of the government both internally and externally).
It explains that those who threaten the state may be internal seekers after power, or be based in adjacent states. They may also be international players acting for political or economic reasons, which are often related to gaining greater control of the target country’s natural resources. The attackers may use many approaches including: conventional warfare; guerrilla warfare; cyberwarfare; terrorism; assassination or pseudo gangs. Internal and external propaganda, which increasingly involves social media, can be used to undermine and discredit the target government internally and externally. Clever exploitation of tribal and religious differences as well as injections of ideology can be used to promote dissatisfaction and public unrest. Non Government Organisations with supposedly worthy objectives frequently provide a front for dark and devious activity.
Composite Warfare is very much about the contest between those seeking to protect the stability of the state and those seeking to undermine it. The arena in which this is played out is very different from that in long-established 'liberal' democracies. Values and social norms tend to be very different, and top level control is often exercised by a small group of mutually dependent people who gain massive financial and other rewards from their exercise of power. Such people have everything to lose from a breakdown of the integrity and stability of their state.
The book explains that the counter to any identified threat should start with a ruthless and systematic search for intelligence aimed at discovering who is trying to attack the state, and how they intend to go about it. Once the nature of the problem has been discerned a counter-strategy is required which involves reviewing each of the Pillars of State in order to come up with a coherent an coordinated plan which seeks to strengthen them all in a mutually beneficial way. Inept use of military force can be highly counterproductive, so the military plan must be driven by the overall strategy
A drawback of the book is that it is sometimes repetitive and not an easy read. This is a pity because if the ideas in the book were condensed and explained by someone with a ‘silver pen’ it would have the greater impact it deserves.
It offers potentially vital and important insights to those who see the world through the prism of their experience of liberal democracy whilst seeking to intervene in societies in Africa and elsewhere whose very different internal dynamics they little understand.
Richard Peregrine
(Former National Service Rifleman in the South African Infantry, and retired British Army Colonel 8 Feb 2018)
I promised Cmdt BARLOW a review of his book, however I felt wholly inadequate to do so, not having enough experience, therefore I asked Col. Richard Peregrine (rtd) to do so. The Colonel was born, raised and educated in South Africa and also completed his National Service to RSA,
COMPOSITE WARFARE
This interesting book is ambitious in its scope as it represents a combination of a ‘how to’ military guide with a conceptual analysis of the broader issues related to maintaining the stability and integrity of African states.
The military guide covers a very broad range of topics from useful tips for small patrols through to guidance on the deployment and operational use of complete divisions. The advice offered reflects the very considerable practical military experience of the author, and although the coverage of some topics was limited, I came across nothing which made me raise eyebrows in disagreement.
The conceptual analysis looks at the broad problem of maintaining the stability and integrity of an African state under internal or external attack. It analyses the ‘Pillars of State’ (Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Armed Forces, Governance, the Economy, the Populace and Perceptions) which underpin this. It emphasises the importance of starting with ruthless and structured intelligence-gathering to identify those who intend to attack the state and find out how they intend to do so. This needs to be followed by counter-planning which reviews all the ‘Pillars of State’ and results in a coherent integrated plan to counter the threat. Military capability is often a key enabler, but its use should be tailored to fit the overall plan. Military force which is ineptly applied often proves strategically counterproductive in long run.
The book is not an easy read, which is a pity because it offers important insights into ways in which countries tend to function in Africa and elsewhere when they do not have a history of liberal democracy. The insights are potentially of great value to those who seek to intervene in countries whose internal dynamics they may easily misunderstand because they are so different from those they are familiar with in their own environments.
Richard Peregrine
(Former National Service Rifleman in the South African Infantry, and retired British Army Colonel 8 Feb 2018)
Many thanks for your comment as well as the review by Richard.
I shall pass this on to Piet Fourie (Bush War Books) to post it on his site where it feautres my book.
Thanks again for the trouble and effort you made to have someone look at it.
Rgds,
Eeben
Apologies for missing your comment Andrew. I will be in touch.
Rgds,
Eeben
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