Apart from Northbridge Security Services, who have very falsely claimed to be the “reborn Executive Outcomes”, there are some more frauds out there claiming to be “closely” associated with and/or linked to me/Executive Outcomes, despite the fact that I had never even heard of them – until now. Like Northbridge, they seem to no longer know where their lie started or how it will end.
I have in no way been associated/involved with Saracen International since 1997 or indeed even had contact with the company since then. Perhaps the two South African journalists who perpetuated the recent claim (De Wet Potgieter and Ivor Powel) - or regurgitated it - would like to tell me why they chose to lie for a living. Better still, maybe they would like to ensure that I get paid by Saracen. I will give them a recovery fee for that, something that ought not to be too difficult for them as they apparently “know” that I am part of Saracen. If they represent the best in South African journalism, that trade is in big trouble.
It appears as though some foreign journalists are now following the Potgieter/Powel example by exposing history. Perhaps the next big story they work on will be disastrous charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava.
A crowd that has recently fallen out of the woodwork is Strategic Stability International (SSI), a few of its associated companies and some of the people associated with it. This includes:
1. Strategic Stability International
2. Provident Stability International
3. Consular Operations International
4. Recruiting Strategies
5. Cela Consult (Not to be confused with Cela Consulting)
6. CV Jobs Co
7. Mr Jonathan Constable
8. Mr Steven Mohadi
9. Mr Andrew Cohen
10. Mr Jean Oberholzer
11. Mr Lionel Britz
12. Mr Theo Mahlangu
13. Mr Lawrence Heron
It appears that the above companies and people were claiming to have contracts in a Middle Eastern and a Central American country and that I was involved in some manner or form “behind the scenes”. Apart from this blatant lie, there were apparently no contracts in either the Middle East or Central America.
Taking this apparent deception a step further, every person who applied for a position on these contracts, had to pay a fee of SA Rands 250, 00 (approx US$ 35) to have their applications processed. By their own admission – in writing - SSI and its associates “recruited” 1 200 men – making a tidy sum out of their efforts.
When these non-existent contracts started going pear-shaped, the blame was subsequently placed on my shoulders with implications that I was sabotaging their efforts, something I found amusing as I had no knowledge of these clowns or of their non-existent contracts. It was also explained that I had “gone into hiding” as “they were after me”. Dream on you Plonkers!
I am told that there is currently an investigation into SSI and its merry associates – and their strange business dealings.
This story does have a happy ending: Apparently Mr Jonathan Constable was recently arrested for human trafficking. Unfortunately, those who were conned into paying their fees will in all probability never see their money again.
Furthermore, I am in no manner or form associated with the many companies that have adopted the name or pose as Executive Outcomes. These include:
1. The Australian Executive Outcomes (www.executiveoutcomes.com.au)
2. The US-based Executive Outcomes (http://www.execoutcomes.com/)
3. The FaceBook crowd (http://www.facebook.com/pages/Executive-Outcomes/106052689424998)
4. The New Zealand crowd http://www.linkedin.com/companies/executive-outcomes-ltd
5. Executive Outcomes – Professional Adult Business Consulting - maybe Thor at th@executive-outcomes.com could enlighten us?...and the numerous other name-stealers and wannabees.
To say I am sick of these people would be an understatement of gigantic proportions.
The reality is that none of the above posers would be able to walk half-a-mile in the shoes of the men who served in the real Executive Outcomes.
I still have more information coming in on other companies claiming to represent me or posing as Executive Outcomes. This I shall post in due course.
Added on 24 January 2011: Another company forming part of this conglomerate is “International Intelligence Risk Management” – also run by Jonathan Constable. Constable also goes by the alias of “Derek Davies” – maybe his undercover name?
Added on 27 January 2011: Here is a link to the site of someone who has apparently suffered at the hands of this con: http://spiderman0000000.blog.com/. I hope they see justice served.
Saturday, January 22, 2011
Thursday, January 13, 2011
PSEUDO OPERATIONS - FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE
Considering the manner in which organised gangs and insurgents, be they political, criminal, religious or militant choose to conduct their terror and criminal actions, I believe that we need to adapt our operational approaches and begin laying greater emphasis on:
1. Intelligence, in particular HUMINT
2. Pseudo operations
3. Tactical ground and air support
Intelligence ought to act as the commander’s eyes and ears. If he has no current intelligence, he is both blind and deaf and a blind and deaf commander has no real value in today’s small wars and conflicts. Whereas it is good and well to have technical intelligence and satellite coverage, we also need to know “what” the enemy is thinking. We can only know what the enemy is thinking if we have someone within his ranks.
Infiltrating or penetrating the enemy’s ranks requires the ability to make intelligence predictions insofar as which organisations should be targeted. These predictions, although not always correct, do however given an indication of what to expect and where. It is better to have someone in a potential or real enemy’s ranks and not need him than to have no one in the enemy’s ranks and need him.
Intelligence is a critical essential but we often fail to recognise its value. Strategies are intelligence driven and the strategy can only fail if it is developed with no intelligence. At the tactical level, it is intelligence that enables us to locate, bind, strike, exploit and disrupt any threat. Indeed, it has an influence on the tactics, techniques and procedures we apply.
Well trained and led pseudo teams, operating off current intelligence can wreak havoc amongst the enemy and decimate its ranks. But to do that, we need to adjust our thinking and our approach. But it bears remembering that pseudo teams are not “special forces” – instead they are irregular troops operating under normal command and control.
The strategy of attrition applied by these gangs gives them an almost mythical status of invincibility. Added to that is the publicity they enjoy from their deeds in the mass media. Using low-tech equipment and improvisation, they are able to achieve high-value results and attain the initiative.
Pseudo teams, recruited from the areas they originate from are ideal trackers, interpreters and in most instances, know the terrain they operate in like the back of their hand. They are able to detect changes in the human environment incoming units cannot see. Furthermore, they are often highly-motivated as they have been the prime beneficiaries of the violence against them and they are driven by a desire for justice and revenge.
I do not advocate doing away with the traditional battalion, company and platoon formations when fighting these wars. I do, however, believe that especially in Africa, these formations do not always give the dividends one would expect. I furthermore believe that the time has come to incorporate a pseudo element into the motorised infantry battalion.
Once deployed into an area, this pseudo element should begin working with the local population, identifying potential candidates for pseudo work and training and equipping them to take the fight to the enemy. Such sub-units and sub-sub-units will enhance the reconnaissance and intelligence gathering capabilities of the motorised infantry battalion, be able to conduct snatch operations, disrupt enemy plans and actions and so forth.
A good pseudo team is able to sustain itself in the field although a system of caches to replenish food and ammunition is essential. But their true value lies in being able to fight the enemy with its own tactics and techniques and when necessary, call in tactical air support or heliborne combat troops to take over the engagement and exploit the fire-fight. This ground and air support is essential and adds a great degree of flexibility to pseudo operations.
To avoid “friendly fire”, areas where these teams operate need to be classified as restricted operations areas. Targeted tactical air support needs to be on call.
Fighting the enemy with overwhelming firepower does not always achieve the results we seek. Additionally, this mass of fire inevitable leads to collateral damage (people and infrastructure) thus driving the locals into the ranks of the enemy and reducing our chances of recruiting locals for our pseudo teams.
When we change our mindset and think outside of the box, we will be able to train, deploy and exploit pseudo teams, regain the initiative and reap the benefits of fighting fire with fire.
1. Intelligence, in particular HUMINT
2. Pseudo operations
3. Tactical ground and air support
Intelligence ought to act as the commander’s eyes and ears. If he has no current intelligence, he is both blind and deaf and a blind and deaf commander has no real value in today’s small wars and conflicts. Whereas it is good and well to have technical intelligence and satellite coverage, we also need to know “what” the enemy is thinking. We can only know what the enemy is thinking if we have someone within his ranks.
Infiltrating or penetrating the enemy’s ranks requires the ability to make intelligence predictions insofar as which organisations should be targeted. These predictions, although not always correct, do however given an indication of what to expect and where. It is better to have someone in a potential or real enemy’s ranks and not need him than to have no one in the enemy’s ranks and need him.
Intelligence is a critical essential but we often fail to recognise its value. Strategies are intelligence driven and the strategy can only fail if it is developed with no intelligence. At the tactical level, it is intelligence that enables us to locate, bind, strike, exploit and disrupt any threat. Indeed, it has an influence on the tactics, techniques and procedures we apply.
Well trained and led pseudo teams, operating off current intelligence can wreak havoc amongst the enemy and decimate its ranks. But to do that, we need to adjust our thinking and our approach. But it bears remembering that pseudo teams are not “special forces” – instead they are irregular troops operating under normal command and control.
The strategy of attrition applied by these gangs gives them an almost mythical status of invincibility. Added to that is the publicity they enjoy from their deeds in the mass media. Using low-tech equipment and improvisation, they are able to achieve high-value results and attain the initiative.
Pseudo teams, recruited from the areas they originate from are ideal trackers, interpreters and in most instances, know the terrain they operate in like the back of their hand. They are able to detect changes in the human environment incoming units cannot see. Furthermore, they are often highly-motivated as they have been the prime beneficiaries of the violence against them and they are driven by a desire for justice and revenge.
I do not advocate doing away with the traditional battalion, company and platoon formations when fighting these wars. I do, however, believe that especially in Africa, these formations do not always give the dividends one would expect. I furthermore believe that the time has come to incorporate a pseudo element into the motorised infantry battalion.
Once deployed into an area, this pseudo element should begin working with the local population, identifying potential candidates for pseudo work and training and equipping them to take the fight to the enemy. Such sub-units and sub-sub-units will enhance the reconnaissance and intelligence gathering capabilities of the motorised infantry battalion, be able to conduct snatch operations, disrupt enemy plans and actions and so forth.
A good pseudo team is able to sustain itself in the field although a system of caches to replenish food and ammunition is essential. But their true value lies in being able to fight the enemy with its own tactics and techniques and when necessary, call in tactical air support or heliborne combat troops to take over the engagement and exploit the fire-fight. This ground and air support is essential and adds a great degree of flexibility to pseudo operations.
To avoid “friendly fire”, areas where these teams operate need to be classified as restricted operations areas. Targeted tactical air support needs to be on call.
Fighting the enemy with overwhelming firepower does not always achieve the results we seek. Additionally, this mass of fire inevitable leads to collateral damage (people and infrastructure) thus driving the locals into the ranks of the enemy and reducing our chances of recruiting locals for our pseudo teams.
When we change our mindset and think outside of the box, we will be able to train, deploy and exploit pseudo teams, regain the initiative and reap the benefits of fighting fire with fire.
Monday, January 10, 2011
LYING FOR CONTRACTS AND FUNDING
It has come to my attention that are there some people and even companies that are claiming to either represent me or stating that they are “very closely associated” with me in order to get business and even raise funding for projects by stating that I am working with them “behind the scenes”.
Whereas this is not only distressing, it is also both fraudulent and criminal.
I am planning to compile a list of persons/companies that are masquerading under this cover – and who I am not in any manner or form associated with/part of or even remotely linked to.
Added to this are recent reports in the South African media by a disgraced journalist who was once in the employ of a law-enforcement agency and his ex-MI agent-accomplice – who also happens to be a failed newspaper editor, alluding to my so-called involvement in certain activities and contracts which I am not even part of. It seems as though they cannot live a life without writing disinformation. It makes me wonder who their new paymasters are.
The onus is on the prospective client to investigate any person or company who is trying to get a contract.
I would therefore encourage any person, institution, company or government (including intelligence agencies) that is approached by anyone claiming to either know me or represent me to contact me for confirmation. I will gladly assist in exposing those who are masquerading under my name and lying to get contracts or funding.
Whereas this is not only distressing, it is also both fraudulent and criminal.
I am planning to compile a list of persons/companies that are masquerading under this cover – and who I am not in any manner or form associated with/part of or even remotely linked to.
Added to this are recent reports in the South African media by a disgraced journalist who was once in the employ of a law-enforcement agency and his ex-MI agent-accomplice – who also happens to be a failed newspaper editor, alluding to my so-called involvement in certain activities and contracts which I am not even part of. It seems as though they cannot live a life without writing disinformation. It makes me wonder who their new paymasters are.
The onus is on the prospective client to investigate any person or company who is trying to get a contract.
I would therefore encourage any person, institution, company or government (including intelligence agencies) that is approached by anyone claiming to either know me or represent me to contact me for confirmation. I will gladly assist in exposing those who are masquerading under my name and lying to get contracts or funding.
Friday, December 17, 2010
A BLESSED AND SAFE FESTIVE SEASON TO ALL
Another year is winding down and for many, this has been a hectic year filled with adrenalin rushes, waiting, laughter, happiness, satisfaction, blood, sweat and tears. Whereas we can celebrate an end to the year with those we hold dear, there are many who will not or cannot – and they should never be forgotten. Nor should the sacrifices they have made ever be forgotten.
I would like to wish all followers and visitors to my blog a very blessed Christmas season. To those who do not celebrate Christmas for whatever reason, I wish you a peaceful festive period. To those who are trapped in the numerous conflicts around the world, I hope that you will know some peace during these times and be kept safe.
Again I wish to thank everyone who took time to read and contribute to this blog throughout the year. Your comments continue to be appreciated and highly valued and continue to allow me to broaden my own knowledge base. I am also grateful that, through the blog, I have been able to get to know some really good people.
Due to numerous factors, I have not been able to stand on my soapbox as much as I would have wanted to. Although I am fortunate in that I have been able have able to be otherwise engaged, I apologise for what may appear to some as a lack of response to the comments sent to me.
To everyone who wrote letters of encouragement re this blog – my thanks to you. To those who continue write “private” mails to me, I hope that you will be able to get rid of the ghosts that haunt your lives. To the many students, I hope that the blog has been able to give you some positive input re your studies.
To all who are deployed in the conflict zones around the world, beit as soldiers, sailors, airmen, law enforcement officers, spooks or PMC contractors, keep your heads down, your eyes peeled and be ready at all times to do what needs to be done.
Finally, I would also like to wish each and every one of you – and your loved ones - a great 2011. May the coming year be filled with good health, happiness and safety.
I would like to wish all followers and visitors to my blog a very blessed Christmas season. To those who do not celebrate Christmas for whatever reason, I wish you a peaceful festive period. To those who are trapped in the numerous conflicts around the world, I hope that you will know some peace during these times and be kept safe.
Again I wish to thank everyone who took time to read and contribute to this blog throughout the year. Your comments continue to be appreciated and highly valued and continue to allow me to broaden my own knowledge base. I am also grateful that, through the blog, I have been able to get to know some really good people.
Due to numerous factors, I have not been able to stand on my soapbox as much as I would have wanted to. Although I am fortunate in that I have been able have able to be otherwise engaged, I apologise for what may appear to some as a lack of response to the comments sent to me.
To everyone who wrote letters of encouragement re this blog – my thanks to you. To those who continue write “private” mails to me, I hope that you will be able to get rid of the ghosts that haunt your lives. To the many students, I hope that the blog has been able to give you some positive input re your studies.
To all who are deployed in the conflict zones around the world, beit as soldiers, sailors, airmen, law enforcement officers, spooks or PMC contractors, keep your heads down, your eyes peeled and be ready at all times to do what needs to be done.
Finally, I would also like to wish each and every one of you – and your loved ones - a great 2011. May the coming year be filled with good health, happiness and safety.
Monday, November 22, 2010
THE MRAP DEBATE CONTINUES
Someone recently sent me a link to a discussion being held on the pros and cons of MRAPs in combat theatres.
Whereas everyone partaking contributed valuable input into the mentioned debate, it seems to me that we may have lost the plot along the way.
The MRAP (along with the older MPV) was designed and built to deliver troops to an area in relative safety from landmines and IEDs. This required the MRAPs/MPVs to have a very good cross-country ability and thereby prevent the troops from being road-bound at all times. Additionally, sappers were used to clear the roads of mines/IEDs.
The MRAP/MPV was not developed as a wheeled safety cocoon from which the troops had to fight. It was meant to be a method of delivery to a starting point for aggressive combat patrolling but it gave some protection to the troops enroute to the starting point. The standard ambush drills were very effective if coming under fire enroute to the delivery point as they allowed the troops to immediately retaliate with fire – and debus as soon as possible and fight from the ground.
The MPVs were armed with 7, 62 mm Browning MGs in order to give fire support to the dismounted infantry – not to lead the fight or hold ground. This basic principle of deployment remains as applicable today as it was in years gone by.
Wars and conflicts are won by men on the ground, implementing sound strategies with good tactics and taking the fight to the enemy. Wars have not, and will never been won by “dominating” the roads and ignoring the rest of the terrain.
Given the firepower we have allowed the enemy to amass, and the lessons we have taught him (I think it was Napoleon who said: Never fight a single enemy for too long as you will teach him all you know) we need to be able to deliver troops relatively safely and fresh to a starting point for operations.
I recall that in the old-SADF we never had the air mobility we needed to deliver a large number of troops to a specific point to commence with area operations – hence our reliance on vehicles. In this process we learnt the following:
1. MPVs/MRAPs must be standardised to allow for ease of logistical support
2. MPVs/MRAPs must be simple to maintain and operate
3. Stay off the roads where possible
4. When bound to roads, clear the roads ahead of the vehicles
5. Dismounted infantry protection teams for the sappers are responsible for locating enemy ambush positions, trip wires, electrical cables, indications of enemy movement and so forth
6. The MPV/MRAP is a delivery system and not a fighting vehicle
7. Dismount and clear defiles before passing through them
8. Avoid routine
9. Follow immediate actions drills immediately and correctly
10. Good drivers are essential
A sound doctrine for the role of the MPVs/MRAPs is essential. There are immediate action drills in case of a landmine or IED and when coming into contact with the enemy. It was these very basic drills that saved my sappers and I when we got hit by a hefty landmine in 1980. Had we not been in an MPV, we would have all been killed. Had we not followed our drills, the casualties could have been rather heavy.
The MPVs/MRAPs were never designed to be infantry fighting vehicles. They were not built to dominate terrain – that is the task of infantry – on foot. Nor were they designed as a substitute for mechanised infantry fighting vehicles. That was not their role then and it is still not their role.
Personally, I believe that most modern MRAPs are over-designed, too heavy, too complicated to maintain and have lost the edge they ought to give the infantry. Likewise, the infantry are to blame for using these vehicles for roles they were never designed for.
I also believe that the MPV/MRAP is an ideal vehicle for motorised infantry, especially in COIN operations. However, its role in conventional warfare operations can, if used correctly and within the doctrine, prove to be invaluable.
A good driver can “idle” the vehicle cross-country and get to within 15 meters of the enemy before they are even aware that it is there. By then, the infantry have long debussed and formed into an assault line with the MPV acting as a mobile fire support base. If we could do that in the 1980s, there is no reason why it cannot be done today.
I am sure the debate about MPVs/MRAPs will continue for years to come but we need to define its role, develop the doctrine for operational deployment and make sure we abide by it. If we do this, the MPV/MRAP will do what it was meant to do: save lives and reduce casualties. Furthermore, it will remain an essential vehicle able to save lives especially in areas where landmines and IEDs are used.
However, if we continue to view the MPV/MRAP as an infantry fighting vehicle and keep to the roads with a predictable routine, we surrender any advantage it can give us.
Whereas everyone partaking contributed valuable input into the mentioned debate, it seems to me that we may have lost the plot along the way.
The MRAP (along with the older MPV) was designed and built to deliver troops to an area in relative safety from landmines and IEDs. This required the MRAPs/MPVs to have a very good cross-country ability and thereby prevent the troops from being road-bound at all times. Additionally, sappers were used to clear the roads of mines/IEDs.
The MRAP/MPV was not developed as a wheeled safety cocoon from which the troops had to fight. It was meant to be a method of delivery to a starting point for aggressive combat patrolling but it gave some protection to the troops enroute to the starting point. The standard ambush drills were very effective if coming under fire enroute to the delivery point as they allowed the troops to immediately retaliate with fire – and debus as soon as possible and fight from the ground.
The MPVs were armed with 7, 62 mm Browning MGs in order to give fire support to the dismounted infantry – not to lead the fight or hold ground. This basic principle of deployment remains as applicable today as it was in years gone by.
Wars and conflicts are won by men on the ground, implementing sound strategies with good tactics and taking the fight to the enemy. Wars have not, and will never been won by “dominating” the roads and ignoring the rest of the terrain.
Given the firepower we have allowed the enemy to amass, and the lessons we have taught him (I think it was Napoleon who said: Never fight a single enemy for too long as you will teach him all you know) we need to be able to deliver troops relatively safely and fresh to a starting point for operations.
I recall that in the old-SADF we never had the air mobility we needed to deliver a large number of troops to a specific point to commence with area operations – hence our reliance on vehicles. In this process we learnt the following:
1. MPVs/MRAPs must be standardised to allow for ease of logistical support
2. MPVs/MRAPs must be simple to maintain and operate
3. Stay off the roads where possible
4. When bound to roads, clear the roads ahead of the vehicles
5. Dismounted infantry protection teams for the sappers are responsible for locating enemy ambush positions, trip wires, electrical cables, indications of enemy movement and so forth
6. The MPV/MRAP is a delivery system and not a fighting vehicle
7. Dismount and clear defiles before passing through them
8. Avoid routine
9. Follow immediate actions drills immediately and correctly
10. Good drivers are essential
A sound doctrine for the role of the MPVs/MRAPs is essential. There are immediate action drills in case of a landmine or IED and when coming into contact with the enemy. It was these very basic drills that saved my sappers and I when we got hit by a hefty landmine in 1980. Had we not been in an MPV, we would have all been killed. Had we not followed our drills, the casualties could have been rather heavy.
The MPVs/MRAPs were never designed to be infantry fighting vehicles. They were not built to dominate terrain – that is the task of infantry – on foot. Nor were they designed as a substitute for mechanised infantry fighting vehicles. That was not their role then and it is still not their role.
Personally, I believe that most modern MRAPs are over-designed, too heavy, too complicated to maintain and have lost the edge they ought to give the infantry. Likewise, the infantry are to blame for using these vehicles for roles they were never designed for.
I also believe that the MPV/MRAP is an ideal vehicle for motorised infantry, especially in COIN operations. However, its role in conventional warfare operations can, if used correctly and within the doctrine, prove to be invaluable.
A good driver can “idle” the vehicle cross-country and get to within 15 meters of the enemy before they are even aware that it is there. By then, the infantry have long debussed and formed into an assault line with the MPV acting as a mobile fire support base. If we could do that in the 1980s, there is no reason why it cannot be done today.
I am sure the debate about MPVs/MRAPs will continue for years to come but we need to define its role, develop the doctrine for operational deployment and make sure we abide by it. If we do this, the MPV/MRAP will do what it was meant to do: save lives and reduce casualties. Furthermore, it will remain an essential vehicle able to save lives especially in areas where landmines and IEDs are used.
However, if we continue to view the MPV/MRAP as an infantry fighting vehicle and keep to the roads with a predictable routine, we surrender any advantage it can give us.
Sunday, November 21, 2010
MANOEUVRE WARFARE
There are many who want argue that warfare consists of either attrition or manoeuvre.
The ultimate aim of any war is to locate, identify and overwhelm the enemy with fire or to annihilate the enemy in order to force an end to hostilities and/or to restore the political balance. When an enemy’s armed forces are destroyed, his political machine is not left with too many options.
The more casualties the enemy sustains (attrition), the lower his morale and the less likely he is to want to oppose the forces pitted against him. This reality is not only applicable to countering an insurgency but also to large-scale conflicts where home support wanes when the casualties – along with the economical and political costs - become simply too high to accept.
In brief, war by attrition implies massing men and equipment against enemy positions with the aim of destroying the enemy’s forces. Success is measured by territory gained, enemy killed, wounded or captured, equipment captured and destroyed and the damage inflicted to the enemy’s infrastructure.
Attrition warfare can be used very effectively when a smaller force takes on a larger enemy and conducts guerrilla operations against the larger force. This type of attrition has been witnessed in numerous modern conflicts and wars. World War 1 is an example of 20th century attrition warfare at its most brutal by sides almost equally matched.
Manoeuvre warfare, on the other hand, is aimed at isolating the enemy’s decision-making capabilities, thus rendering him unable to continue with viable military operations or paralysing his abilities to wage war. But, it is not a form of warfare based on a humanitarian approach aimed at reducing enemy casualties. Indeed, it is the opposite.
Whereas manoeuvre warfare appears to have become a mantra to many, it is as old as warfare itself. When man decided to move to a more advantageous position with his legs, on a horse, with a chariot or whatever in order to overcome and destroy the enemy, he was applying manoeuvre. This led to flanking movements, pincer movements, encirclements and numerous different envelopments.
Today, there are those who view manoeuvre warfare purely as a concept and not as an acknowledged approach to warfare. However, one cannot conduct effective manoeuvre without attrition nor can one conduct effective attrition without manoeuvre.
Manoeuvre warfare is not restricted to mechanised forces although many view it as an approach solely reserved for mechanised forces. Motorised forces, airborne forces and marine forces are all capable of conducting very effective manoeuvre warfare operations.
In the COIN environment, Light Infantry can be very effectively used to conduct manoeuvre warfare operations to strike the enemy’s bases and rear areas. Stopper groups or cut-off groups can be seen as a form of manoeuvre albeit at the tactical level. Likewise, the leap-frogging of forces can be viewed as a form of manoeuvre. But, these movements require mobility, a pre-requisite to effective manoeuvre warfare.
Mobility does, however, not imply wheels, tracks, boats or airlift capabilities – it also includes the ability to infiltrate and/or position forces on foot – such as Light Infantry - into positions that can gain an advantage over the enemy.
Effective manoeuvre warfare requires, amongst others:
1. Decentralised command and control
2. Up-to-date intelligence
3. High tempo operations
4. Surprise coupled to speed of action and exploitation
5. Flexibility
6. The ability to rapidly deploy or redeploy forces
7. Effective logistical supply lines
8. Balanced forces such as independent and self-contained Combat Teams and Battle Groups
9. Deception
10. Adequate air support and air superiority
11. The concentration of effort and force at the correct place and time
In the African context, manoeuvre warfare can be used very successfully to isolate and/or attack an enemy’s trinity of gravity. However, it requires that careful consideration is given to protecting the logistical supply lines and preventing them from becoming vulnerable to enemy attack as well as denying the enemy the ability to exploit the local population for own purposes. It is especially here that COIN forces can play a significant role is assisting and supporting manoeuvre forces.
All strategies are – or ought to be - intelligence driven. Intelligence during manoeuvre warfare operations should not only rely on manned and unmanned aerial reconnaissance and POWs. Small-team reconnaissance elements and/or pseudo-teams are essential in gathering intelligence ahead of the manoeuvre forces, ambushing enemy patrols, calling in fire-force teams and attacking enemy infrastructure such as roads and bridges. Successes must be exploited as rapidly as possible in order to maintain momentum and keep the enemy off balance.
A danger lies in over-extending the manoeuvre forces and thus becoming a victim of one’s own success. To prevent this, commanders need to ensure that the logistical chain functions smoothly and efficiently and that operations do not out-run the logistical abilities of the force.
The African theatre of operations provides numerous opportunities to conduct effective manoeuvre warfare operations in order to destroy the opposing forces and break the will of an enemy. If these opportunities are not exploited, the enemy will live to fight another day.
The ultimate aim of any war is to locate, identify and overwhelm the enemy with fire or to annihilate the enemy in order to force an end to hostilities and/or to restore the political balance. When an enemy’s armed forces are destroyed, his political machine is not left with too many options.
The more casualties the enemy sustains (attrition), the lower his morale and the less likely he is to want to oppose the forces pitted against him. This reality is not only applicable to countering an insurgency but also to large-scale conflicts where home support wanes when the casualties – along with the economical and political costs - become simply too high to accept.
In brief, war by attrition implies massing men and equipment against enemy positions with the aim of destroying the enemy’s forces. Success is measured by territory gained, enemy killed, wounded or captured, equipment captured and destroyed and the damage inflicted to the enemy’s infrastructure.
Attrition warfare can be used very effectively when a smaller force takes on a larger enemy and conducts guerrilla operations against the larger force. This type of attrition has been witnessed in numerous modern conflicts and wars. World War 1 is an example of 20th century attrition warfare at its most brutal by sides almost equally matched.
Manoeuvre warfare, on the other hand, is aimed at isolating the enemy’s decision-making capabilities, thus rendering him unable to continue with viable military operations or paralysing his abilities to wage war. But, it is not a form of warfare based on a humanitarian approach aimed at reducing enemy casualties. Indeed, it is the opposite.
Whereas manoeuvre warfare appears to have become a mantra to many, it is as old as warfare itself. When man decided to move to a more advantageous position with his legs, on a horse, with a chariot or whatever in order to overcome and destroy the enemy, he was applying manoeuvre. This led to flanking movements, pincer movements, encirclements and numerous different envelopments.
Today, there are those who view manoeuvre warfare purely as a concept and not as an acknowledged approach to warfare. However, one cannot conduct effective manoeuvre without attrition nor can one conduct effective attrition without manoeuvre.
Manoeuvre warfare is not restricted to mechanised forces although many view it as an approach solely reserved for mechanised forces. Motorised forces, airborne forces and marine forces are all capable of conducting very effective manoeuvre warfare operations.
In the COIN environment, Light Infantry can be very effectively used to conduct manoeuvre warfare operations to strike the enemy’s bases and rear areas. Stopper groups or cut-off groups can be seen as a form of manoeuvre albeit at the tactical level. Likewise, the leap-frogging of forces can be viewed as a form of manoeuvre. But, these movements require mobility, a pre-requisite to effective manoeuvre warfare.
Mobility does, however, not imply wheels, tracks, boats or airlift capabilities – it also includes the ability to infiltrate and/or position forces on foot – such as Light Infantry - into positions that can gain an advantage over the enemy.
Effective manoeuvre warfare requires, amongst others:
1. Decentralised command and control
2. Up-to-date intelligence
3. High tempo operations
4. Surprise coupled to speed of action and exploitation
5. Flexibility
6. The ability to rapidly deploy or redeploy forces
7. Effective logistical supply lines
8. Balanced forces such as independent and self-contained Combat Teams and Battle Groups
9. Deception
10. Adequate air support and air superiority
11. The concentration of effort and force at the correct place and time
In the African context, manoeuvre warfare can be used very successfully to isolate and/or attack an enemy’s trinity of gravity. However, it requires that careful consideration is given to protecting the logistical supply lines and preventing them from becoming vulnerable to enemy attack as well as denying the enemy the ability to exploit the local population for own purposes. It is especially here that COIN forces can play a significant role is assisting and supporting manoeuvre forces.
All strategies are – or ought to be - intelligence driven. Intelligence during manoeuvre warfare operations should not only rely on manned and unmanned aerial reconnaissance and POWs. Small-team reconnaissance elements and/or pseudo-teams are essential in gathering intelligence ahead of the manoeuvre forces, ambushing enemy patrols, calling in fire-force teams and attacking enemy infrastructure such as roads and bridges. Successes must be exploited as rapidly as possible in order to maintain momentum and keep the enemy off balance.
A danger lies in over-extending the manoeuvre forces and thus becoming a victim of one’s own success. To prevent this, commanders need to ensure that the logistical chain functions smoothly and efficiently and that operations do not out-run the logistical abilities of the force.
The African theatre of operations provides numerous opportunities to conduct effective manoeuvre warfare operations in order to destroy the opposing forces and break the will of an enemy. If these opportunities are not exploited, the enemy will live to fight another day.
Monday, November 8, 2010
TRYING TO HELP OUT
I am very pleased to have contact with so many students who, as part of their studies, are (hopefully) looking at positive PMC involvement in conflict areas with different eyes, especially given the spectacular failures of the UN – an organisation I have made my thoughts and feelings very clear on.
However, due to travel and work-related issues, I am not able to always respond immediately as some expect and want me to do. When I am engaged to assist a client, that engagement takes precedence over everything else I do. It is, after all, very unethical to use time that has been paid for by a client to do something else. That does, in my simple way of thinking, amount to both fraud and theft.
Added to this, I am sometimes in places where I do not have internet access and only receive the requests several days after they were sent to me.
I appreciate how important the studies and research papers are but it is very frustrating to have students ask me to repeat what I wrote about in my book because they “don’t have the time” to read it. It is equally frustrating – and time consuming – to have students ask me to respond as quickly as possible to their questions as they are facing a deadline re their research papers.
Whereas I am happy to help out wherever I can, I cannot drop everything to accommodate the many students who are busy with their research and studies – at last count, there were more than 100 students asking for my assistance.
I will continue trying to help out where I can but it is not always possible to do so as quickly as expected. After all, I too have other obligations to attend to – and those obligations will always receive priority.
However, due to travel and work-related issues, I am not able to always respond immediately as some expect and want me to do. When I am engaged to assist a client, that engagement takes precedence over everything else I do. It is, after all, very unethical to use time that has been paid for by a client to do something else. That does, in my simple way of thinking, amount to both fraud and theft.
Added to this, I am sometimes in places where I do not have internet access and only receive the requests several days after they were sent to me.
I appreciate how important the studies and research papers are but it is very frustrating to have students ask me to repeat what I wrote about in my book because they “don’t have the time” to read it. It is equally frustrating – and time consuming – to have students ask me to respond as quickly as possible to their questions as they are facing a deadline re their research papers.
Whereas I am happy to help out wherever I can, I cannot drop everything to accommodate the many students who are busy with their research and studies – at last count, there were more than 100 students asking for my assistance.
I will continue trying to help out where I can but it is not always possible to do so as quickly as expected. After all, I too have other obligations to attend to – and those obligations will always receive priority.
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