tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post3918803449678370505..comments2024-02-06T08:33:52.695+02:00Comments on Eeben Barlow's Military and Security Blog: THE PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTIONEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comBlogger40125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-782032916654466902009-08-18T19:34:50.013+02:002009-08-18T19:34:50.013+02:00Many thanks, Alan. I shall certainly check it out....Many thanks, Alan. I shall certainly check it out.<br /><br />Rgds,<br /><br />EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-15498691140637757402009-08-17T21:49:14.463+02:002009-08-17T21:49:14.463+02:00Colonel:
Thanks for forwarding Matt's excelle...Colonel:<br /><br />Thanks for forwarding Matt's excellent site. If you don't have it already, here's one for you.<br /><br />Alan<br /><br />http://www.michaelyon-online.com/the-kopp-etchells-effect.htmAlanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02155000096802114856noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-7845355660735736022009-08-17T14:23:56.935+02:002009-08-17T14:23:56.935+02:00I saw this on Matt’s blog (www.feraljundi.com) Ala...I saw this on Matt’s blog (www.feraljundi.com) Alan and also expressed my surprise at the suggestion. I am not sure the author of the report has an idea of what he is suggesting.<br /><br />Rgds,<br /><br />EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-77174619850991391522009-08-17T13:59:07.937+02:002009-08-17T13:59:07.937+02:00Eeben and friends:
No more evidence needed, Washi...Eeben and friends:<br /><br />No more evidence needed, Washington has indeed gone bloody MAD!<br /><br />From The Washington Post, 14 August 2009. Selected excerpts follow:<br /><br />U.S. Boots On Congo Ground<br />A New Kind of Force Could Provide Security<br /><br />By Michael O'Hanlon<br />Friday, August 14, 2009 <br /><br />When Hillary Clinton visited eastern Congo this week, she stepped into a land of fairy-tale beauty and incredible potential. I remember vividly the day in 1982 when my incoming "class" of Peace Corps volunteers made the same trip. Eastern Congo may be the most magical place on the planet; I remember thinking it did not even belong on this planet, so surreal were its mountains, lakes, volcanoes, and lush forests and farmland. <br /><br />The notion is this: Ask for volunteers to join a peace operations division for two years. They would begin their service with, say, 12 weeks of boot camp and 12 weeks of specialized training and then would be deployable. They would receive the same compensation and health benefits as regular troops, given their age and experience. Out of a division of 15,000 troops, one brigade, or about 3,000 to 4,000 soldiers, could be sustained in the field at a time. <br /><br />This type of training would be modeled after standard practices in today's Army and Marine Corps. To be sure, soldiers and Marines in regular units usually go beyond this regimen to have many months of additional practice and exercise before being deployed. But the peace operations units could be led by a cadre of experienced officers and NCOs -- perhaps some of whom would be drawn back to military service after leaving (or being booted out because of the obsolete "don't ask, don't tell" policy). <br /><br />http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/13/AR2009081302900.htmlAlanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02155000096802114856noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-54163942317357396942009-08-14T06:01:24.164+02:002009-08-14T06:01:24.164+02:00Well put, Hardnose. I believe that we have lost to...Well put, Hardnose. I believe that we have lost touch with the basics of soldiering in many ways and have become so technology reliant that we are moving backwards instead of forwards. Map reading is one issue I see being thrown out the window. Some troops have no clue what a bearing is, declination, how to plot a 6-figure grid and so forth. As you rightly point out, how on earth will they ever know where they are when the batteries on the GPS go down?<br /><br />Likewise, one sees that troops enter a hostile area – in soft-skinned vehicles. Whatever happened to basic drills at defiles, in urban areas, movement across open country? <br /><br />Many commanders lead from the TV monitor nowadays. Indeed a worrying state of affairs. <br /><br />Some of these tactics are fine for conventional actions but the types of conflicts we are witnessing require some out-of-the-box thinking. If the thinking does not change, the enemy will always have the vote. But we gave it to him.<br /><br />Intelligence becomes vital in these modern conflicts and without intelligence we will always be blind.<br /><br />Rgds,<br /><br />EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-11339310098069592952009-08-13T22:46:45.396+02:002009-08-13T22:46:45.396+02:00It certainly appears true, Eeben, that we have bec...It certainly appears true, Eeben, that we have become technology weighted. Very few troops in the field understand terrain anaylysis or how to apply that information to a topographic map, let alone how to plot grid coordinates with out a GPS ('anybody got any extra batteries?'). A buddy of mine who used to teach at West Point always had students place their High Speed/Low Drag satallite recievers in a bag until after the class was completed. There were so many complaints that he no longer teaches that course. It's easier to travel channeled lanes of approach and let the high tech wizbangs create a 'protective field' for all around security. Though if you listen to guys on the ground some of them want to move 'lighter' and 'faster', they seem to understand that 'everything new' and 'risk adverse' isn't really working, and they want to go back to taking the fight to the enemy in ways he least expects it. By the way I like my GPS as much as the next guy, but when the batteries fail I still know where I am and how to get where I'm going. Today, Commanding Officers view the battlefield through video screen imagery which loses something in the translation. Outside of passing in review how many Battalion or Company Commanders sit outside their tents and talk with their troops? There was a time when that was a learning experience for both the CO and the Pvt.<br /><br />Rgds,hardnosehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06665351843041365727noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-66614856059472204392009-08-13T08:36:53.666+02:002009-08-13T08:36:53.666+02:00I don’t think the enemy always get the vote, Hardn...I don’t think the enemy always get the vote, Hardnose. I think we give the enemy that chance by betraying so much of what we intend to do. <br /><br />Looking at current conflicts, I note that troops no longer debus their vehicles but want to drive right up to the objective. This gives the enemy the opportunity to see them coming – from far away. Apart from that, we don’t seem to apply positive vetting thus allowing enemy agents in our employ – who report back on what we are up to. All of this allows the enemy to plan what he will do and where he will do it. We, in turn, have become predictable and fall right into the trap. <br /><br />Whereas intelligence services need to focus on the enemy (and CI services on the enemy’s agents in our midst), we need to look at what makes the enemy “tick”, what he has at his disposal and how he will most likely use it. If we have that intelligence, commanders can do a thorough appreciation and determine the most likely and most dangerous enemy options. Taking that into account, we can modify plans and be more adaptable and unpredictable. <br /><br />But all of this requires a focussed collection effort utilising every possible source at our disposal. <br /><br />Rgds,<br /><br />EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-87730751181804534192009-08-13T06:17:35.580+02:002009-08-13T06:17:35.580+02:00Eeben,
Since the enemy always gets to 'vote&#...Eeben,<br /><br />Since the enemy always gets to 'vote' in any engagement could you better explain the application of these principles as a function of countering the enemy's intelligence.hardnosehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06665351843041365727noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-14788907268268793142009-08-13T05:45:53.677+02:002009-08-13T05:45:53.677+02:00I still live in Pretoria, Morné. I shall contact y...I still live in Pretoria, Morné. I shall contact you soon.<br /><br />Rgds,<br /><br />EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-54949220425640222902009-08-12T22:04:56.124+02:002009-08-12T22:04:56.124+02:00Good day Eeben,
Are you still residing in Pretori...Good day Eeben,<br /><br />Are you still residing in Pretoria East. I am not from a military background, Am an industrial psychologist (or aspiring to be one) but was wondering if you would grant me 20 minutes of your time?<br /><br />Kind Regards<br /><br />MornéUnknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17306643257667810601noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-15702340136960326782009-08-12T19:57:34.495+02:002009-08-12T19:57:34.495+02:00Yes, I suppose it all goes back to the first princ...Yes, I suppose it all goes back to the first principle of “Planning”, Robby. We simply assumed certain things and acceptance of assumptions can be deadly.<br /><br />Rgds,<br /><br />EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-76672161989058672792009-08-12T18:40:28.038+02:002009-08-12T18:40:28.038+02:00Yes hind sight is a wonderful thing looking back K...Yes hind sight is a wonderful thing looking back Kissinger did the same thing to Rhodesia that should of raised all kinds of red flags for SA....as for America today it's coming apart at the seams recent town halls concerning national health care has exposed a growing discontent between the people and it's government...almost feel I'm living behind enemy lines :-)Robbyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11931478965831757376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-6256947814758161132009-08-12T18:26:03.708+02:002009-08-12T18:26:03.708+02:00I must qualify what I said previously, Robby, and ...I must qualify what I said previously, Robby, and that is by referring to the US I am referring to the various administrations and not the common citizens. Whereas we all make our own beds and are expected to lie in them, I do not regret having been a soldier. Even if I know then what I know now I would still have served my country as best as I could. To me, it had nothing to do with politics and everything to do with being a soldier. <br /><br />But given the manner in which the US treated SA, I must confess that if an American government were to say it is raining, I would need to look out of the window. <br /><br />Going back to the initial post, this was most probably one of SA’s greatest intelligence failures – not knowing what was to come, we never prepared for it.<br /><br />Rgds,<br /><br />EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-55064858252575169372009-08-12T17:55:43.627+02:002009-08-12T17:55:43.627+02:00I have noticed over the past few years I have beco...I have noticed over the past few years I have become very anti-American very tough to do while living here :-)Robbyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11931478965831757376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-64679110909052836392009-08-12T17:36:02.295+02:002009-08-12T17:36:02.295+02:00Jan and his few helpers slave to keep that site cu...Jan and his few helpers slave to keep that site current, Robby. I have nothing but admiration for someone who works so tirelessly to keep people informed. And yes, I believe he connected the dots correctly as it is well known that South Africa went to war in Angola at the request of the US. <br /><br />What the politics were behind it I do not know but one thing is for sure: the US asked us, we complied and then the US threatened us if we did not pull out. Of course, Jan’s take makes sense to an extent. But, there was a lot more behind that war. As a proxy force (initially) the situation got out of control and we ended up fighting Cubans, Russians, East Germans plus the Angolan Armed Forces, SWAPO and whoever else wanted to join in. That was on the military front. Beyond that was the political front driven by the US and the UK. <br /><br />Where I think Jan got it wrong was that although the US initially promised to fund the war, they didn’t. The SA taxpayer carried the majority of the burden. <br /><br />And people wonder why we don’t trust the US?<br /><br />Rgds,<br /><br />EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-23965467181544029262009-08-12T17:23:43.184+02:002009-08-12T17:23:43.184+02:00Thank you for visiting the blog, Lt.
You are very...Thank you for visiting the blog, Lt.<br /><br />You are very welcome to use whatever you wish from the book. All you need to do is give credit to the source. <br /><br />I would love to get a copy of your work and I look forward to reading it. Good luck with your research.<br /><br />Rgds,<br /><br />EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-6111394372323624692009-08-12T13:32:56.402+02:002009-08-12T13:32:56.402+02:00Off topic sort of...what's new :-)...every now...Off topic sort of...what's new :-)...every now then Jan over at AfricanCrises connects the dots ...what's your take?<br /><br />Did Henry Kissinger & the CIA trick Apartheid South Africa into the war in Angola?<br /><br />Date Posted: Wednesday 12-Aug-2009<br /><br />[There is a thought that occurred to me some weeks ago that I've kept to myself until now. I received an email from a flight engineer who bought THE COVERT WAR from my website and who was mentioning his experiences. Then in an email to him I mentioned something that I've been thinking about quietly. It is something that makes me EXTREMELY ANGRY when I think about it, but I think it is well within the realm of possibility.<br /><br />Let me explain something: A friend of mine in the Middle East some years back awakened me. He said to me: "The Americans/CIA do not wage wars - they MANAGE WARS". Often they aren't participants... they are managers... funders...<br /><br />http://www.africancrisis.co.za/Article.php?ID=56964&Robbyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11931478965831757376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-41139506091713587152009-08-12T05:32:07.681+02:002009-08-12T05:32:07.681+02:00Well put, Ken. However, we first need to find the ...Well put, Ken. However, we first need to find the hammer before we can use it. <br /><br />Rgds,<br /><br />EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-25680994989750926132009-08-11T22:00:49.270+02:002009-08-11T22:00:49.270+02:00So, the bottom line is, intelligence is like a ham...So, the bottom line is, intelligence is like a hammer and<br />hammers are used to drive nails or<br />or smash thumbs.<br /><br />regards,<br />kenken borrhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11468394163502457653noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-7783085693216842772009-08-11T21:41:14.730+02:002009-08-11T21:41:14.730+02:00Sir,
I am working on the counter-insurgency and s...Sir,<br /><br />I am working on the counter-insurgency and specially on the French experiency in Indochina and Algeria and on the South-African one. I read carefully your blog and your book "Executive Outcome, Against all Odds" (a part of my paper is about the Private Military Companies too). I would be very interested in publishing the appendixes of your book (Galago editions) about the costs of the operations of EO. Can you give me the authorization to use them with mention of the source ? I would be very grace with mailing you a summary of my current work if you are interested in. <br /><br />Respectfully,<br /><br />Lieutenant Pierre-Marie Léoutre<br />Entry COL Clostermann of the French Air Force AcademyGilleshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11505458281001449476noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-51536741820423832962009-08-11T05:44:21.806+02:002009-08-11T05:44:21.806+02:00Well pointed out, Hardnose. Intelligence can at ti...Well pointed out, Hardnose. Intelligence can at times be delightfully vague and this vagueness can lead to the incorrect application of the intelligence. As you correctly point out, this in turn can lead to tactical failures.<br /><br />Ultimately, we aim to get “inside the head” of the enemy commander to be able to read and predict his intentions. As such, the intelligence is intangible. That is why we ought to identify key EEIs and the collection cycle is never-ending, allowing us to make adjustments to the plan, in turn, giving us flexibility. <br /><br />Tactical failures, despite having good intelligence, can occur. Usually however, these failures are the result of bad planning and a lack of flexibility.<br /><br />Rgds,<br /><br />EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-61921887424668083132009-08-10T22:59:06.460+02:002009-08-10T22:59:06.460+02:00Eeben,
It would seem that,
'Intellegence' ...Eeben,<br />It would seem that,<br />'Intellegence' is not just the collection of information or data, but rather the synthesis of key elements of that information into knowledge, a 'knowledge' of the 'mind' of our opponent, and so by it's nature an intangible. Through the 'product' of intellegence we attempt to assess the enemies courses of action, but intellegence is always an uncertain product, and dependent on interpretation of the end user. Hence the failure of tactical operations even when good information is available.hardnosehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06665351843041365727noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-78998243202947197062009-08-10T07:20:44.064+02:002009-08-10T07:20:44.064+02:00A good observation WCH Miller.
In much the same ...A good observation WCH Miller. <br /><br />In much the same way as “gadgetry” has become “strategy”, TECH/SAT/SIGINT have become the primary sources of collection. Whereas their value is undisputed, especially on the battlefield, we cannot rely purely on these sources from a strategic point of view. HUMINT has a definite role to play in collection but for some reason it is neglected. <br /><br />The restraints imposed by governments and advocacy groups is a very valid point in all military spheres, not only in intelligence collection. Unqualified or limited experience of bureaucrats can be disastrous. Yet this cronyism in appointments seems to be a trend that has become unstoppable as governments seem to want “their man” controlling matters and not a specialist. <br /><br />I believe that it is due to these very appointments that things have gone so horribly wrong – and will continue to go wrong. It is these disasters that cause concern to the public especially when they are advertised in the media, leading to people to questioning the methodology of the military and intelligence services. When this happens, the unqualified bureaucrats in charge are quick to blame those under their leadership and cast doubt upon their competence. <br /><br />Ultimately, “covert” operations are exactly that – covert. To conduct true covert operations, training and leadership are essential – both of which seem to be in short supply.<br /><br />Rgds,<br /><br />EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-49074220393062933612009-08-10T03:47:42.972+02:002009-08-10T03:47:42.972+02:00This is my first comment, so please bear with me.
...This is my first comment, so please bear with me.<br /><br />I cannot agree more regarding the use of TECHINT, SATINT, SIGINT, and that while helpful, cannot be taken as gospel. In my reading regarding the history of modern espionage/intelligence, the emphasis on HUMINT appears to have become watered down.<br /><br />The one point that I would bring up is the restraints governments, bureaucracy, and advocacy groups have put on agencies. It appears that intelligence can no longer be conducted unfettered. Bureaucrats in some instances with limited or no field experience hold positions for which they are unqualified. And the constant desire by the public to know what work is being performed by the Intelligence Community is contrary to the clandestine/covert aspect of intelligence.W.C.H. Millerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09170821196875567006noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-9855775918486504992009-08-09T12:40:21.696+02:002009-08-09T12:40:21.696+02:00You make a very valid comment regarding informatio...You make a very valid comment regarding information overload, Eet Kreef. However, this overload often occurs due to unfocussed collection planning and incorrect use of sources of agents, especially those with poor access. <br /><br />Whereas healthy inter-service rivalry is a good thing, when it becomes unhealthy, one service often works against the other. Somewhat childish given the stakes. <br /><br />Rgds,<br /><br />EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.com