tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post1014609703907537111..comments2024-02-06T08:33:52.695+02:00Comments on Eeben Barlow's Military and Security Blog: STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WAREeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comBlogger60125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-12401933905329941732013-08-10T10:16:44.456+02:002013-08-10T10:16:44.456+02:00There are many lessons to be learnt, Mike. But the...There are many lessons to be learnt, Mike. But the important thing is that we take note of them and apply them where applicable. <br /><br />Unfortunately, I do not see that happening much. <br /><br />Good luck with your studies.<br /><br />Rgds,<br /><br />Eeben<br />Eeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-6550762152233713552013-06-22T20:20:02.788+02:002013-06-22T20:20:02.788+02:00Eeben, working on a maters in history and a master...Eeben, working on a maters in history and a masters in military studies/asymmetric warfare. Looking forward to your new book. Read Executive Outcomes and it became my go to for effective counter-insurgency operations. Asymmetric warfare is the face of the new generation warfare, so your insights will be much appreciated. Strategy and tactics in warfare, specifically counterinsurgency, is in it's infancy. The United States military has yet to figure it out. Unfortunately the case of Executive Outcomes is ignored because no State wants to admit that a mercenary force did it right. <br /><br />Thanks, Mike Thr Right Wordhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04719924347666368114noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-89900946229692651982009-08-09T18:24:01.844+02:002009-08-09T18:24:01.844+02:00When I read that quote I must confess to being rat...When I read that quote I must confess to being rather surprised, Alan. That is some allegation.<br /><br />EO was not religious at all in terms of who we worked for. As we worked for Christian, Muslim and other religious groups insofar as governments are concerned, we respected everyone’s beliefs. The easiest way to find yourself isolated is to view any client’s belief with disrespect.<br /><br />Besides, it lets one lose objectivity.<br /><br />Rgds,<br /><br />EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-50050932566968643852009-08-09T18:02:15.602+02:002009-08-09T18:02:15.602+02:00Eeben and mates:
I would have been remiss had I n...Eeben and mates:<br /><br />I would have been remiss had I not forwarded this one, if for no other reason, pure comic relief. By the way, what particular religious order did Executive Outcomes represent? <br /><br />Cheers, Alan<br /><br />Allegedly sought to "wipe out Muslims and Islam" in Iraq US Blackwater's boss accused of Crusader beliefs<br /><br />http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/08/08/81171.htmlAlanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02155000096802114856noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-16724272296678105422009-07-15T07:30:33.504+02:002009-07-15T07:30:33.504+02:00Thanks for your comment, Michael. As for the book,...Thanks for your comment, Michael. As for the book, time is becoming a problem…but I will get there.<br /><br />Rgds,<br /><br />EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-72462618586456475872009-07-14T12:57:42.047+02:002009-07-14T12:57:42.047+02:00Sir,
Thank you for sharing this it was very ins...Sir,<br /> Thank you for sharing this it was very insightful.<br /><br />I look forward to your book.<br /><br />Regards<br /><br />MichaelUnknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10628026441974902677noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-17507986760927198182009-04-11T12:36:00.000+02:002009-04-11T12:36:00.000+02:00Usually volunteer soldiers are more motivated but ...Usually volunteer soldiers are more motivated but that is not always the case, L. We can create an environment that breeds motivation but we cannot really instil it as it depends on each person how motivated they will become. But, if I could, I would always choose volunteers and then subject them to a stringent selection process to weed out the misfits. <BR/><BR/>Rgds,<BR/><BR/>EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-20619501451699655102009-04-11T11:33:00.000+02:002009-04-11T11:33:00.000+02:00When I was talking about large conscript armies I ...When I was talking about large conscript armies I was thinking more about Russia and China than South Africa actually, in particular during the Balkan wars during the 90s. I just figured an all-volunteer army would have a different performance than an army composed mostly of conscripts, do you believe this makes any difference?Luis Francisco Angulo Andradehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02646174657378870713noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-43170324229165275932009-04-11T11:11:00.000+02:002009-04-11T11:11:00.000+02:00The SADF of old was largely a conscript army, L. Y...The SADF of old was largely a conscript army, L. Yet, it did remarkably well in combat. So I don’t think it is due to conscription but due to a weak foundation and inadequate training. This all leads to break-down of discipline, tactics and actions at the lower sub-sub-unit level and lower. <BR/><BR/>Rgds,<BR/><BR/>EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-9194461683508455552009-04-11T08:49:00.000+02:002009-04-11T08:49:00.000+02:00I suppose I misinterpreted your original statement...I suppose I misinterpreted your original statements to a point. So, would you say that this is the reason why large conscript armies seem to be so ineffective, even when equipped with modern weapons and given proper support? breakdowns at the small unit level?Luis Francisco Angulo Andradehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02646174657378870713noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-16659501260728588682009-04-11T08:24:00.000+02:002009-04-11T08:24:00.000+02:00Although you raise some very good points, L, I vie...Although you raise some very good points, L, I view it differently because of my limited exposure to certain operations. I believe that basic training lays the foundation of discipline and an ability to follow drills, procedures and orders but as you rightfully point it, it is not the end – it is simply the beginning. <BR/><BR/>I have always viewed terrorism as more of a policing action than a military action. Whereas the military may be called in to hit targets, the approach is police work. In turn, this influences the political impact you so rightly refer to.<BR/> <BR/>During these police actions, the military is in a supportive role and does things such as influence operations, human mapping and so forth. The aim of these types of actions are to “divide and conquer” ie, find the friction in the ranks of the opposition and exploit them with the aim of isolating the enemy – “removing the water from the fish” to quote Mao. That leads to the wedge you refer to.<BR/> <BR/>Angering the locals is an indication that the war is being lost and frustration beginning to settle in. In turn, this adds to the trigger-pool of the insurgent. We should NEVER lose sight of the value of the locals and how we can get them to rather side with us, regardless of the belief or philosophy of the enemy.<BR/><BR/>Rgds,<BR/><BR/>EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-90100570945220626622009-04-10T22:17:00.000+02:002009-04-10T22:17:00.000+02:00I agree that there has been a shift towards techno...I agree that there has been a shift towards technology as a panacea, which has become a problem in itself. I believe it's really part of the zeitgeist and a byproduct of the modern military-industrial complex but I digress.<BR/><BR/>I will not and cannot argue that a return to basics isn't necessary, I am merely saying I believe by itself is insufficient.<BR/><BR/>For the sake of argument, lets assume that indeed the enemy does not have a vulnerable political center of gravity. A well organized western military force does, and that alone should be grounds to take political impact into consideration when defining acceptable tactics and the feasibility of a long term strategy, if only to avoid metaphorically shooting ones self on the foot.<BR/><BR/>But I believe at least in the case of muslim extremists they do. Al-Qaeda is very dependant on support from fundamentalist muslims and projecting a war against Islam in general only reinforces that bond, and that's exactly what using language like "crusade" or "islamofascism" did. We're never going to be best buddies with Islamic fundies nor I think it is desirable, I merely suggest driving a wedge between the two factions will make victory that much easier. And I believe if you examine insurgencies historically, no insurgency has ever been successful on the long run if it operates in an environment where the general public is hostile to them. Conversely, it is very difficult for counter-insurgency operations to work if the forces involved alienate and anger the locals.Luis Francisco Angulo Andradehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02646174657378870713noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-60686590169582295202009-04-10T13:54:00.000+02:002009-04-10T13:54:00.000+02:00War is more political nowadays as you rightly stat...War is more political nowadays as you rightly state, L, but I base my opinions on what I see and experience. Of course, it is good to disagree with me as we all have our own ways of looking at the situation and making our own deductions and conclusions. So I welcome your comments.<BR/><BR/>Irregular warfare remains irregular warfare, no matter how we look at it. The strategies and tactics depend on many factors but the truth is that the modern soldier is not as tough as his decades-ago counterpart. We see soldiers today being given “time-out” to recover whilst on courses, selection processes have been watered down, discipline has become more “relaxed” and so on. Additionally, the confusing messages given out by the politicians adds to this “softness” we witness – or that I perceive as “softness”. <BR/><BR/>The terrain soldiers are called to do battle in has not changed and whereas the terrain dictates tactics, the weapons have changed – leading to a modification of tactics – but not an overall change. As regards strategies, we have come to confuse strategy with gadgets- the “shock and awe” strategy is a prime example of a flawed approach to military strategy. <BR/><BR/>Of course, the role of the media in allowing the vanquished to achieve political victories is well known. (As regards your point of Iraqi militias, I am not well-suited to answer that but perhaps some of our other visitors will be). <BR/><BR/>In my opinion, in modern warfare the strategist needs to consider several very important issues. Apart from the aim of the operation, issues such as technology, the enemy, etc all remain important. But technology is a force-multiplier and not a strategy in itself. But what we can use against an enemy, an enemy can use against us. The difference is that the enemy’s politicians are not so concerned about what their voters have to say. They want victory at all costs. <BR/><BR/>I believe we have glossed over the basics and tried to utilise other means to achieve success – those means have shown themselves to be somewhat flawed. <BR/><BR/>Rgds,<BR/><BR/>EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-47437182813640772492009-04-10T12:32:00.000+02:002009-04-10T12:32:00.000+02:00I respectfully disagree with your assesment of the...I respectfully disagree with your assesment of the west "going soft" Mr. Barlow. Yes, all the components you mention are key to a competent army, even more so in irregular warfare. I humbly suggest that its not that western military forces have changed for the worse, rather that war has changed, and returning to old tried and true doctrine (and actually following through and not just making "bold statements") would be insuficient and probably land mixed results. War is much more political these days.<BR/><BR/>Military planners are then faced with two options: Lament about the loss of the "good old days" and the rise of "political correctness" and refuse to evolve or accept the new operational environment and come up with ways to not only adapt around new problems but exploit opportunities. A few examples: The tet offensive during Vietnam was by all accounts a disaster for the North Vietnamese in terms of operational failure and losses incurred, but it was the political victory that ended up deciding the outcome of the war. You could chalk it up to the media, which brings me to the second example. During the first gulf war, amphibious landing exercises were carried out in front of CNN reporters by the U.S.M.C. in a succesful misinformation campaign against Saddam, he swallowed the whole thing to the point where his staff had extensive plans to turn beaches into kill zones. And now, while the insurgency in Iraq is still a problem, Al-Qaeda never gained a strong position exactly because of their ruthless tactics, they pissed off the general Iraqi public and from there on they would take a backseat to Iraqi militias in terms of relevance (correct me if I'm mistaken in this point).<BR/><BR/>Yeah war is more political and mediatic these days but the blade cuts both ways. Strategies for low intensity conflicts in the age of the internet and digital cameras MUST take into account this new battlespace if they are to be succesful, lest they become recipes for flawless series of tactical victories that end in strategic defeat.<BR/><BR/>To sum up, instead of complaining about political correctness a successful modern strategist ought to understand it and figure out ways to exploit that tendency both to get domestic support and make his opponent trip and stumble constantly, preferably into a pit of punji stakes.Luis Francisco Angulo Andradehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02646174657378870713noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-23301747983790782892009-03-23T05:31:00.000+02:002009-03-23T05:31:00.000+02:00If I survive the pressure, I shall let you know as...If I survive the pressure, I shall let you know as soon as I am able to submit my first draft to my publisher, Templar. Thanks for your interest.<BR/><BR/>Rgds,<BR/><BR/>EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-31645319892416730092009-03-22T22:05:00.000+02:002009-03-22T22:05:00.000+02:00Well, Sir, I am sure you are able to deal with a c...Well, Sir, I am sure you are able to deal with a certain amount of "pressure". ;-)<BR/><BR/>Thanks for answering so quickly.<BR/><BR/>Best Regards from Germany<BR/>TemplarTemplarhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16655173935599776920noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-81730799699232465032009-03-22T07:26:00.000+02:002009-03-22T07:26:00.000+02:00My publisher, like you, has been putting me under ...My publisher, like you, has been putting me under pressure to hurry up, Templar. I am trying to have a draft ready by June/July as they want the book available for sale by November/December 2009. <BR/><BR/>Rgds,<BR/><BR/>EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-60092657610089427282009-03-21T19:08:00.000+02:002009-03-21T19:08:00.000+02:00Eeben,I am looking forward to your book.Do you hav...Eeben,<BR/><BR/>I am looking forward to your book.<BR/>Do you have any news on this topic?<BR/><BR/>Best Regards from Germany<BR/>TemplarTemplarhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16655173935599776920noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-72261012496884873662009-03-21T19:07:00.000+02:002009-03-21T19:07:00.000+02:00Eeben,I am looking forward to your book.Do you hav...Eeben,<BR/><BR/>I am looking forward to your book.<BR/>Do you have any news on this topic?<BR/><BR/>Best Regards from Germany<BR/>TemplarTemplarhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16655173935599776920noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-61844466953708421362009-03-01T18:32:00.000+02:002009-03-01T18:32:00.000+02:00As a Monty Python admirer, I accept your apologies...As a Monty Python admirer, I accept your apologies on his behalf, D.<BR/><BR/>Apart from Michael Porter’s paper, there are many good books that deal with strategy and tactics. I believe that the theory is vitally important but if people have never applied the theory into practice, it remains theory they cannot measure the results of. And looking at some of the results, I feel that some of the practitioners of strategy have missed the mark and this has resulted in poorly executed tactics. And as you rightfully point out, this has a very negative impact on command and control, thus resulting in a poor end-goal. (Thanks for your offer re the Porter paper – I was sent a copy a few days ago).<BR/><BR/>Military leadership has a great deal to do with motivation and discipline as you mention. It is, however, easier to motivate people in the business place than under combat conditions. But without the discipline and leadership required, orders will not be followed to the letter and this can result in mission failure. So, I agree with your advice to business entities. <BR/><BR/>Unfortunately, many senior officers and politicians seem not to have realised that in the military (and in business), coming second means defeat. Whereas in business it can lead to the demise of a company, in war it can spell the end of a country. Perhaps the culture of winning is not developed strongly enough in the military for fear of offending some. <BR/><BR/>Your point is taken on gadgets. However, I am not anti-gadget; I am against planners placing so much faith in gadgets that the gadget dictates the strategy. Additionally, a lot of studies have been conducted on successful soldiers and commanders but until someone actually takes serious note of them, they remain academic works. <BR/><BR/>Rgds,<BR/><BR/>EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-86721107557141332472009-03-01T18:06:00.000+02:002009-03-01T18:06:00.000+02:00In researching your "strategy vs tactics" debate t...In researching your "strategy vs tactics" debate there is a strong body of work in the corporate world that can be adapted. Having run a business and being a wise man, I'm sure you will find the concepts easily adopted, adapted and improved (with apologies to Monty Python).<BR/><BR/>A good starting point on strategy vs tactics in business is Michael Porter's brief paper entitled "What is Strategy?" published in the Harvard Business Review, November-December 1996. [search Google for a PDF copy, and if that fails, respond and I'll email it to you directly].<BR/><BR/>As a business advisor, I've always told clients that any business, organisation or military has only three fundaments: strategy, process and people. Each is in systemic balance, depending on the situation and the type of activity. The strategy determines why and what you will do, the process determines how you will get the strategy operationally executed and the people implement it practically, probably adapting as necessary to do the best job on the ground. Without purpose and direction, your resources (and people) are improperly deployed; without the right processes (ie tools) too much pressure is put on people or on higher level resources are unnecessarily required. Without people (the correct people, motivated), nothing gets done.<BR/><BR/>Think of Mig vs Mirage over Angola. The Mirage was an aged, inferior weapon piloted by a motivated individual. Other than self-preservation, a Cuban Mig pilot would never have had the same motivation to achieve. Thus the motivation-man-machine system was more-or-less equal despite having very different weapons.<BR/><BR/>This brings me back to your “gadget” discussion. In a non-conscription military, the general grunts at the coalface or action are - unfortunately, but factually - never quite the cream of the crop. Thus, in my model explained above, the system is out of balance and greater reliance is placed on the process - in this case the gadgets.<BR/><BR/>This may sound too academic and unrelated to military activity, but I believe very strongly that in life’s fields of endeavour – be they battlefields, boardrooms or sports arenas – the principles of winning are universal.<BR/><BR/><BR/>PS: on the matter of traits of successful soldiers, there is a huge body of work readily available. The more modern work ranges from fairly basic and simple research done after world war one, to a strong body of empirically validated work in the modern age.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13170137035081332896noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-22453336810679460342009-02-18T19:06:00.000+02:002009-02-18T19:06:00.000+02:00Although I may be mistaken, I don’t recall anyone ...Although I may be mistaken, I don’t recall anyone with the name of C Haigh in EO, Lara, although I have met many people who claim to know me. I have even met someone who claimed he was me. <BR/><BR/>I don’t look at political issues on the blog and keep myself occupied with matters I think I have an idea about. That said, I have witnessed first-hand how politicians/diplomats from Europe have, straight-faced, given an African government bad advice, knowing full well the implications if that advice was implemented. <BR/><BR/>As for corruption: where does it not happen? <BR/><BR/>I am part of Africa and want to be part of its solutions.<BR/><BR/>Rgds,<BR/><BR/>EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-84890437899008164172009-02-18T18:01:00.000+02:002009-02-18T18:01:00.000+02:00Eeben,Interesting blog. Came via Armchair Generali...Eeben,<BR/><BR/>Interesting blog. Came via Armchair Generalist. Quite an interesting synchronicity really. I tried to get hold of you a few years ago, soon after EO was disbanded, but only managed to get hold of nervous individuals who weren't about to give out your number. Had to do with a guy called C. Haigh; and just yesterday, I came across one of his letters, when he was with an outfit called Unisol.<BR/><BR/>And then came across the reference to you.<BR/><BR/>Anyway, got to agree with your thoughts:<BR/><BR/><I>Everyone – including the SANDF – knows that they could not find their way out of a wet paper bag, let alone fight their way out of a paper bag.</I><BR/><BR/>Ol General Georgie said it thus: "You can't run an army without profanity; and it has to be eloquent profanity. An army without profanity couldn't fight its way out of a piss-soaked paper bag. ... As for the types of comments I make, sometimes I just, By God, get carried away with my own eloquence."<BR/><BR/>Back to strategy, and Africa: I stand corrected, but from my observation, I don't see one black African leader with anything remotely considered a realistic leadership political, military or socio-economic strategy for their nation; by which I mean a strategy for the future five years from now, let alone next week. <BR/><BR/>They only thing they are interested in is self gratification at the public trough, and their own megalomaniacal power; and the corruption is horrific; and black Africans couldn't care less. They are incapable of long term visionary thinking -- 'strategy'. <BR/><BR/>Clausewitz, Constitutions, and Critical Thinking aren't issues they are cognitively capable of. I'd be more than happy to be proven wrong; but sorry to those who prefer to calling me a 'racist'. The only way I stop being a 'racist' is to find a black African whose got an interest in holding his fellow black African leaders accountable, and sitting down in a serious, brutally frank conversation about a cocreated future in Africa. In the absence of such black Africans -- white Africans, need to wake the f**k up and very quickly! Prove me wrong on the facts, show me some black Africans who are interested in such issues, and you got my attention. <BR/><BR/>And finally, I was wondering what your thoughts were on the military strategies and views of Homer Lea on the science of war, etc. (some stuff I set up about him at www.military-gospel.co.nr)<BR/><BR/>Regards,<BR/><BR/>Lara JohnstoneAndrea Muhrrteynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13455575591213217060noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-67162654290165546102009-02-18T09:26:00.000+02:002009-02-18T09:26:00.000+02:00That may be a good idea for a future blog, xEMPIR3...That may be a good idea for a future blog, xEMPIR3x but that would be a very subjective look at the problem. I also don’t think your comment reflects a bad attitude as it is a very valid observation. Furthermore, I can only give a semi-sensible response as my experience is different to those of others. <BR/><BR/>Noting the very high increase in suicides and PTSD is indeed a concern and I suspect that it can trace its roots back to poor combat preparation – training, discipline and leadership. The army I was in and the units I served in laid great emphasis on very tough training, rigid discipline (self and unit/team) and good leadership. Of course, we also had leaders who were not that good but those I served with and under were very good. We didn’t have TV, video-games – and seldom even had decent equipment but our training allowed us to improvise when needed. <BR/><BR/>As an example, the South African Special Forces was established in 1972. Up until 1988, 100 00 men had applied to do the prerequisite selection to get into Special Forces. Only 480 men ever qualified as Special Forces operatives. Of that 480, very very few foreign soldiers even made it past selection. Passing selection meant another 24 months of very tough training ahead before a soldier was considered to be an “operative”. So, my perception is that training, discipline and leadership make a world of difference. Added to that is self-pride, unit-pride, spirit de corps – and a desire to be the best soldier one can be in any given circumstance. <BR/><BR/>But that view is a gross generalisation as none of us can predict how we will react under fire or when it will simply become too much for us. I do however believe that the West has become soft and unable to cope with stress in general. Added to that is an over-reliance on gadgetry and a neglect of strategy and tactics. <BR/><BR/>I do not believe in giving pills to troops to cope with battle. Besides, drugs have numerous side-effects and I do not want to worry if the man next to me has had his tablet for the day. However, many people join the armed forces to escape their plight which may be social or economical. That does not make them bad soldiers. <BR/><BR/>Rgds,<BR/><BR/>EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-955273524757178757.post-59319741210971039322009-02-18T08:57:00.000+02:002009-02-18T08:57:00.000+02:00Thank you very much Lexington Green. I wasn’t awar...Thank you very much Lexington Green. I wasn’t aware of those sites and I shall visit them forthwith.<BR/><BR/>Rgds,<BR/><BR/>EebenEeben Barlow's Milsec Bloghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08942119485068301545noreply@blogger.com