Some months ago, I was approached by Chris Graham – the editor of the Counter Terrorist magazine - and asked if I would be willing to contribute an article or two to the magazine. I am honoured to have written two articles for this magazine. The first article, titled “UN Peacekeeping operations in Africa” appeared in the February/March issue of the magazine and the second article, titled “The Pirates of East Africa” is in this month’s issue (August/September 2010).
All credit must however go to Chris who guided me through the pieces and did an excellent job editing them.
The Counter Terrorist magazine strives to provide impartial and in-depth coverage of subject matter relating to terrorism and counter terrorism. This includes subjects and analysis on issues such as:
1. Catch and Release: Terrorist Recidivism
2. Profile of a Large, Violent, Hierarchical Trans-National Gang Operating Across the USA
3. Piracy and Counter Piracy Operations
4. Unmanned Surveillance Platforms for Domestic Use and so on.
To those who are interested in the so-called asymmetrical approach to warfare, this is an excellent magazine to subscribe to.
The Counter Terrorist magazine can be found on www.thecounterterroristmag.com
Those who are facebook users can also get a look at the August/September issue by visiting http://www.facebook.com/SSINEWS
47 comments:
Good Morning Eeben,
Very good news having more of your insight out into the print media.
Regards,
John
Thanks John. I am fortunate to have had a good editor at the magazine – so I cannot take all of the credit.
Rgds,
Eeben
Great news and I look forward to your future articles. I really liked your first one which discussed the cost effectiveness of EO versus the other 'options'. No contest there. lol
The magazine will also be a good platform to promote your books from.
Thanks for the compliment, Matt. As far as I am concerned, the cost comparison vs results was shocking to put it mildly. As you say “no contest”.
It is a good magazine but when it comes to marketing the book, I am now only about to complete Chap 8 – still a long road to walk and I guess it will depend on the publisher how they want to market the book. I shall definitely point them in this direction.
Rgds,
Eeben
Thanks for the information on the magazine. It looks like a great site to dig around at. Knowledge is
power or should I say good information is key to good intelligence work and success in the field.
regards,
ken
You’re welcome Ken – I am sure the magazine will give everyone who reads it something to ponder on .
You are very correct: Knowledge is power and we often forget that having knowledge allows us to assess the information we get in a more objective and accurate manner.
Until we remember that all military operations are intelligence driven, we will continue to flounder. Intelligence remains the golden key to success.
Rgds,
Eeben
What happened in Uganda will continue to happen, Private. The people who planned that loss of life, along with the LRA, must be hunted down and eliminated like the scum they are. But, as long as we dilly-dally with these issues, regard these people as having “human rights”, try to argue away their evil and give them front-page news, they will continue to get stronger while we get weaker.
Keep your chin up – losing friends due to RoE and other restraints put on us does make us bitter but we need to take care of those that are still with us.
Rgds,
Eeben
Speaking of the LRA, how would you deal with them at this point in their existence? When I did student teaching there was a supposed special interest group that wanted young people at the high school where I taught to get involved in protests to gain the attention of our national government to do Something to stop the LRA. One member of this group looked at me in dismay when I informed him that for various reasons our government and the ever-impotent UN would never get involved and that an African national army or a PMC would be needed to stop the LRA.
GCU
Apart from the numerous atrocities, the greatest tragedy is the use of children by the LRA and indiscriminate rape of men, women and children as a so-called weapon of war – now who termed it that??
Kony and his cohorts are not open to negotiation, GCU. Their actions have long disproved that false notion. The great irony here is that people continue to call on him to negotiate. It is almost as though he is being protected...at the expense of his victims.
Locating him is not that difficult. All military operations are intelligence driven. The intelligence is there and it is simply a matter of putting a team together and hunting him down like the rabid dog he is. But this takes well trained men to do so. And these men should not be restricted by unworkable RoE.
As for the strategy, that can only be determined once one is on the ground.
Rgds,
Eeben
I often overlook things, Private, but thanks for your offer.
I do not think the international community and in particular the UN would be too happy to deploy a force that really wants to hunt down these scumbags and rid the world of them. It would not be too good for their reputations – besides, I suspect these people are actually good for business and influence projection.
Rgds,
Eeben
I saw no disrespect in your comment, Private.
I cannot comment much on the IMF – apart from saying that they too had a hand in Sierra Leone’s collapse after forcing EO to leave there – but I can say a lot about the UN.
Rgds,
Eeben
Simon Mann didn’t “work” for EO Private although he appears to have told all and sundry he started the company. Besides, EO never went out to topple governments.
Sorry to hear that the economy is down and things are tough. However, I am not recruiting men for any African work and probably won’t be doing so. Of course, if you visit SA, I am sure time will be made to have a coffee or two.
Keep well and chin up.
Rgds,
Eeben
Hello Eeben,
Hope all is well with you and your family.
$19.95 for 7 issues is a good price for that magazine. Will you eventually publish the article in your blog?
I think my copy of EO is probably halfway here. It was shipped on May 28th, and estimated delivery was early September... I'll be completely surprised when it finally gets here.
Thanks!
Jared
Thank you for the kind thoughts, Jared. We are well and hope the same at your side?
I think CT magazine is good value for money especially as it covers many topics not found in the main stream media world.
I hope the wait for your EO book will have been worthwhile. Let me know when it arrives.
Rgds,
Eeben
Thanks for the tip.
I've read your blog for a while now as I was writing a small essay for my English class, which thesis stated that EO was much more effective then the UN. Your blog was really enlightening.
Best regards,
Isaac.
You are very welcome Isaac. I think the magazine is good value for money.
Rgds,
Eeben
Good Morning Eeben,
I do hope all is well.
I have been thinking on this thread, and waiting for my local bookstore to get the August issue of "The Counter Terrorist Magazine," while watching a pretty quick little discussion on the latest Wash. Post series on the intelligence "industry" here in the states. The quip that struck me was a mention of privatization of intelligence. Now I know EO, according to your writings, had its own internal intelligence function, and you are a veteran of your own coutnries intelligence services so have a perspective on both sides of the debate - have you had a chance to catch the series online? I have yet to read it so I'll hold judgement until I finish. On the surface though this may be a good discussion thread, or maybe even merit your thoughts out in the print media.
Regards,
John
I have been following the series in the WP, John and, in my opinion, I think that the US has had no choice but to expand the intelligence services, especially after 9/11 and the actions in Iraq, Afghanistan and others. I think that the effect of these military operations is that the internal threat in the US has risen dramatically.
I believe that many aspects of intelligence have been privatised over the years. What I do note is that there appears to be a lot of decentralisation in the US. When it comes to combat operations, decentralisation of command is a good thing as it allows for initiative, flexibility, ingenuity etc. But one of the principles of intelligence is “centralisation”. If that principle is not adhered to, a mass of duplication takes place and elements can actually work against one another instead of enhancing one another. Not only does this waste effort but it reduces focus at great financial cost.
Of my years in the military, my time in Intelligence was not sufficient for me to really consider myself a specialist. It did however allow me to understand the function and how it worked – or should work. It was the reason why EO started its own intelligence section – which was mainly me as the controller and a handful of infiltration and penetration agents. It was known as the “Strategic Intelligence Group” (SIG) to confuse people and make them believe that it was a very large organisation. In the field, combat intelligence was primarily obtained by small teams (3 – 5 men) deep in enemy areas, patrols, air reconnaissance (a King Air we fitted out with some gadgets), the local population (who we targeted heavily to get “on sides”)and POWs. That, added to our little ELINT element, gave us all the combat intelligence we needed and more.
The SIG focussed mainly on strategic aspects so that I could, on occasion, brief the Chiefs of Army and Intelligence on what to expect and how to react. This in turn led to the continual updating of both military strategy and grand tactics. But, it is also important to remember that we had a responsibility towards not only our clients but also to the men in our company and intelligence became the driving force behind every operation. Of course, we (in particular me) did not always get it right! But we got it right enough to win every conflict we got involved in with the minimum of casualties, minimal collateral damage, massive support from the local population and on-time and within budget. We couldn’t have asked for more.
Given that our situation was minuscule compared to the situation of a country as large as the US, I can understand the rapid growth of the intelligence community. Right now, the US faces threats not only from within but also from numerous countries on the outside. This makes it more than tricky for the intelligence community to keep track of what is happening where.
The WP series nevertheless remains most interesting, especially when looking at how the development is being done. From a personal point of view, I would like to know how much duplication of effort there is and how is “overload” dealt with.
Rgds,
Eeben
White men from overseas arrive in Africa to help. What could go wrong?
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/07/21/the_truth_about_africom?page=0,0
Cheers, Alan
You are most welcome, Private.
Rgds,
Eeben
Thanks for the link, Alan. I think Africom has created a set of concerns that did not exist earlier. Assistance was offered but very rapidly turned down as it was not needed. Instead, as you point out – white men from overseas arrived...and a lot is going wrong but no one seems to really care. But, on the continent, concern is growing.
Rgds,
Eeben
Of my years in the military, my time in Intelligence was not sufficient for me to really consider myself a specialist. It did however allow me to understand the function and how it worked – or should work. It was the reason why EO started its own intelligence section – which was mainly me as the controller and a handful of infiltration and penetration agents. It was known as the “Strategic Intelligence Group” (SIG) to confuse people and make them believe that it was a very large organisation. In the field, combat intelligence was primarily obtained by small teams (3 – 5 men) deep in enemy areas, patrols, air reconnaissance (a King Air we fitted out with some gadgets), the local population (who we targeted heavily to get “on sides”)and POWs. That, added to our little ELINT element, gave us all the combat intelligence we needed and more.
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You mentioned POWs in this portion, and to me, this is an important aspect of privatized warfare. When I was going through the various aspects of the Letter of Marque in my head, one of the things that hit me was the idea that POW's would be vital assets to a company that happened to capture them. Much like how POW's are vital sources of information to today's militaries.
It's one thing to find a guy and capture them. But once a company has 'first rights' to the interrogation of that individual before handing him over, well then now they are adding to their database and intellectual property. That information obtained from that capture could lead to other captures, which would equate to more money earned in prize courts or bounties.
In other words, for a private company to excel in the world of the Letter of Marque, the intelligence collected from their actions in the field would have a certain value and would be an important element to that process.
I imagine that the early privateers depended upon the intelligence they got from the folks they captured during the process of taking ships. Or they would gain personal information about mapping sea lanes and studying the capabilities of other ships.
What's interesting though is privateers really didn't care about hanging on to prisoners, because there was really nothing profitable about keeping them.(other than getting their info) So they usually dumped the prisoners off at the first garrison they could. But I am sure they interrogated those prisoners for any information about other ships or the locations of fortunes.
Intelligence then and now, certainly lead to successful ventures. Good topic.
I know that you are very keen on a LoM system, Matt, and your continual research on the matter benefits us all. Thanks for that.
If one looks at history, it is – as you mention – very evident that POWs have always played a very important role in assessing and building on a situation. Not only do POWs add to our database of knowledge, some of them become parts of the operation ie Koevoet, 32 Bn and similar units. They can also play an important role in pseudo-ops – on condition that the vetting was correctly done. If not, they can cause massive damage by striking from within.
Back to your LoM: I agree with you that the POWs can play a most valuable role. It is after all the POW who knows the latest plans, equipment, contacts, deployments, targets, etc etc. Their intelligence is also more current that that of an agent who cannot always submit his reports due to numerous factors.
Whereas technology may be able to locate an enemy force, it is only the POW or the defector who can accurately build on that info. Plus, you comment that they add to the knowledge of “terrain” is vital.
If we ignore the host of sources – and in particular the POW, we may lose an insight we needed at a critical time and place.
Keep up your good work.
Rgds,
Eeben
Good Morning Eeben,
Very good points on decentralization and centralization. Were you pointing at centralized evaluation of intelligence with widespread dissemination of those results to the independent strategic and/or tactical users? That looks to be exactly how EO operated. Granted you were smaller than the situation the US has found itself in but the principle is the same and will work at any level once implemented properly - which has not happened here.
What congress did in response to the 9/11 commission report (which is another piece of fluff with tidbits of wisdom thrown in to keep the readers interest) is go to their typical response - they set-up another layer of interference. This has actually hampered US intelligence by driving even more duplication and wasted effort by valuable human assets and kept vital work from being performed. It has also skyrocketed the costs.
More to come once I can sit down with the WP series for certain.
As to LoM - very interesting comment and thought. On first blush even floating the idea in the public arena would make the media's head explode figuratively - which is good in and of itself. Have to do some thinking there.
Regards,
John
P.S. Any more progress on your next magnum opus? Or forewarning on new articles with SSI?
Correct John. Determining the intelligence requirements and EEI at strategic level, as well as the tasking of sources ought to be centralised. However at tactical level, that responsibility lies with the commanders.
Layers of interference do exactly that: interfere. But even worse, they deny initiative and prevent pro-active operations. As you point it, it adds to duplication and wasted effort. Costs skyrocket. But the question remains: How long can it be sustained?
I would be interested in reading your comments re the WP series.
Matt has certainly put a lot of effort into LoM research. It will be interested to see which way it goes at political level but I am sure that as it has worked in the past, it ought to still work. But you can bet the media and the UN will fight to stop it.
The book is coming along (slowly) as a lot of actions interfere with my attempts to write it. As for SSI, the article always starts with a request from the editor and I know he is up to his eyeballs in work.
Rgds,
Eeben
Dear Eeben,
I've been following the blog for a while and I appreciate the time you take to maintain it as well as your honest, political B.S. free insights on whats going on in the Africa and the world.
Fanboyism aside, the reason I'm contacting you is to ask for your assistance. I'm a historian currently writing an academic thesis on the evolution of PMC's. Executive Outcomes features heavily and I was hoping to ask a few questions of you as regards how relevant EO was in terms of the development of the concept from David Stirling's adventures with the BMO in Yemen to the current situation with Aegis, Xe, etc in Afghanistan and further afield. I'm currently trying to track down a copy of your book but there are several questions that would best be asked directly and I would appreciate it greatly if you could help.
Finally, just to give a few cents on the Africom issue which is one of the main reasons I've been following you, everybody knows that the real motivation behind it is to counter Chinese influence in Africa. In the wake of the events of the financial crisis, China is now pretty much America's "Best Enemy" and with ever increasing economic co-operation there is every reason to assume that there will be increasing military co-operation, do you think this will have any bearings on Africom's future?
Kindest Regards,
Daniel Kelly
Thanks for the visit as well as your kind comment, Dan.
The media story that EO was “modelled” on Sir David’s group was another piece of rubbish they thought out. Anything to be sensationalist and prove their lack of credence was acceptable as it would be believed – after all, it was written...EO was very different form the modern-day PMCs who are not really “Private” at all but rather appear to rather be extensions of their respective governments.
I must admit that there seem to be many studies at present on PMCs/EO going around. If you think I can add to your work, you can fire away.
I also believe that AFRICOM was created to counter the Chinese in Africa. Our offer to assist was very quickly turned down when it was stood up. But China’s approach has been focussed primarily on resources and in many instances development in Africa. Given the USA’s reliance on much of what China produces, it will certainly be interesting to see who does not need who. I somehow suspect that China will be in the driving seat if one views it all objectively.
Rgds,
Eeben
Dear Eeben,
Thanks very much for replying, I'm very glad to have your support as you were one of the key people I mention in the thesis and thankfully seem to be the easiest to contact. It's true that a lot of studies are being conducted on PMC's at the moment simply because most people see them as a new phenomenon. My thesis aims to prove that there was a steady progress from the 1960's to present where states began to view contracting the use of military force as a legitimate act to protect national interest abroad. So far in my study I've concluded that EO was a critical development because it was the first true 'private army' in that it was not tied to a government in any way and was capable of combined arms warfare without external support. Contrasted with Stirling's outfit and modern day PMC's, EO seems to have been a special case. I can send you on what I have written so far if you would like, but there are a few questions I'd like to pose that have come up in the course of my research that I hope you could answer. They're long enough so I'll have to post this reply in two parts
Once again, thanks very much for your help.
Kindest regards,
Daniel Kelly
Dear Eeben,
The first few questions I'd like to ask are as follows
1 - What gave you the idea for EO to begin with. I know you said that stories about your firm being based on Stirling's model wasn't true, but I'm curious to know what actually influenced and inspired it The similarities in personality and background between Eric Prince and David Stirling lead me to believer the former was heavily influenced by the latter whereas you yourself don't seem to fit their molds by any stretch of the imagination.
2 - What are your opinions on, as you said, the obvious links that most PMC's have with the governments of their countries of origin. I'm a firm beliver that despite the conspiracy theories and some documents that are in circulation that EO was by no means a front for the CCB or South African intelligence simply because it wasn't really in the South African national interest at the time.
3 - Niccolo Machiavelli wrote in the 15th century warning against the use of mercenaries and stressing the need for governments to have both ideological loyalty and de-facto control over any troops that do battle on their part. From his time up to WW2 there was a steady decline in the numbers of privateers/contractors in use by states but do you think that since the Congo Crisis in the 60's there has been a reversal of the trend and do you think that it could swing around the other way again?
Regards,
Daniel Kelly
I must make it clear that EO was not an “army”, Dan. In essence, an army is a force that is both permanent and part of a nation’s armed forces, equipped to do battle with the enemy.
EO had no weapons of its own, nor did it act as a proxy for a foreign government, apart from those govts that hired the company to work within their countries and to uphold their territorial integrity. Even so, we were accountable to the Chiefs of Staff of those countries and were not a “law unto ourselves”. Although the company conducted a combination approach to warfare, we used what the contracting governments had in terms of equipment.
I shall look at and answer your questions as and when I receive them.
Rgds,
Eeben
The answers to your questions, Dan:
1. I cover this in some detail in my book. Suffice to say that we were not influenced by Sir David Stirling. Blackwater/Xe came long after we left the scene.
2. The links are very obvious. A US PMC gets US contracts, a UK PMC gets UK contracts, etc. They are very seldom, if ever, judged on performance. As long as the boxes are ticked, all is fine and they qualify. They all serve the foreign policy interests of their respective governments. As for EO ever having served the SA govt or being a front of it – I suggest you read the history to answer that. I suspect that you are basing your research on some very dodgy documents re EO.
3. Africa has long suspected that foreign armies train them badly. I know this from speaking to many senior officers in several armies. Also, they are increasingly seeing themselves as being proxies of foreign powers. That said, they have not sacrificed their control over their armies to foreign PMCs. They use them to give training the foreign powers either wont or are unable to do.
Hope that helps,
Rgds,
Eeben
Dear Eeben
This is all extremely helpful, thank you very much for your time.
As regards the allegations about EO having been a front for S.A. intelligence that I mentioned, it's a theory doing the rounds on a number of crackpot left-wing conspiracy theorists sites so I give no credence to it. I did find it funny that it suggested de Klerk was heading a committee to reinstate apartheid but it is an example of the bad public image PMC's have. EO seems, according to my research at least, to have been a well run, professional and efficient organization that would be unlikely to be a vehicle for any conspiracies primarily because, as you yourself said, there was no interference or 'steering' by any government or politicians. I find it makes for an interesting contrast with Blackwater et all where things started to go wrong as soon as they got mixed up with politicians and ended up becoming foreign policy tools whereas EO was subservient to no government and operated more like the honest to god business that it was more than any PMC before or after it. The objective of my research is to examine how and why this happened and how organizations like EO were able to break the mold and actually did good in the world rather than become a tool of a government.
By the way, is it alright with you that I use this correspondence as an appendix in my thesis for reference?
Regards,
Dan Kelly
Had EO been a front for SA Int, it would certainly not have been necessary for us to infiltrate Mil Int, Dan. Nor would Mil Int have been feeding intelligence to rebels and asking them to attack us. Nor would they have part of the operation to provide the rebels with a SAM to shoot down an EO aircraft, etc, etc.
Even the SA media finally admitted that they had been duped about EO with a full page apology in a broadsheet. EO’s greatest sin was to end wars in Africa and not keep them going. That did not bode well for certain political and business objectives. As far as these conspiracy theorists are concerned, after all one of their sites labelled me as the “anti-Christ”
As far as I know, EO is the only organisation that actually ended wars in Africa, in time and within budget. Not once did we try to keep any war or conflict going. Nor was the company ever awarded any mining contract as so often in mentioned.
When I challenged our then Min of Foreign Affairs to a live TV debate, along with some of his cronies and called them liars and thieves – on air – they refused to debate me. Ironically, they also never tried to sue me for tainting their “good names”. When I said that they intend to keep Africa in conflict on behest of their bank accounts, they never uttered a word to counter that. As far as I am concerned, that says it all.
Despite its own problems, EO tried to operate as ethically, professional and objectively as possible.
You may use what I say in your studies.
Rgds,
Eeben
Dear Eeben,
All of this does seem to be the case. EO truly was a remarkable case of how the PMC concept should be done properly, something that no company has since managed to accomplish. I'd credit some of that at least to your own seeming dislike and distrust of politicians and political agendas and a commitment to helping ordinary people. My last question is on the concept of using PMC's in peacekeeping roles or to deal with small scale conflicts either as a stopgap till or an alternative to a UN force arriving. Often it gets brought up by people like Eric Prince and Tim Spicer in an attempt to try to distract from the unscrupulous practices of their companies, but in a hypothetical situation where EO was still operational do you think you would be conducting these kinds of operations? Given how spectacularly unreliable the UN is in terms of enforcing peace, do you think it would be better for a state needing help in enforcing its own internal security to turn to a PMC?
Regards,
Dan Kelly
I cannot speak on the manner how others run their companies, Dan.
EO never got involved in an invasion of a country. It was a policy decision taken right at the very beginning. Even when we were asked by a US official to train the Taliban, we turned it down.
Given the inability of the UN to do anything – except nothing, African governments will be very silly to ask the UN to train their men.
However, doesn’t a government have the right to decide who it wants to use? But, this is where African governments find themselves in difficulties – foreign government “x” tells them they will pay for training but only on condition that the use foreign government “x” PMC. Sadly, I have seen some of the results of this training and it has been exceptionally poor.
Rgds,
Eeben
Eeben,
Thank you very much for your comments, I truly appreciate your input. I can send you on a copy of my thesis when it's done if you're interested, in any case I owe you a drink if I ever get the pleasure of meeting you in person.
Regards,
Dan
I look forward to receiving it, Dan, Thanks.
Rgds,
Eeben
Eeben Said:
As far as I know, EO is the only organisation that actually ended wars in Africa, in time and within budget. Not once did we try to keep any war or conflict going. Nor was the company ever awarded any mining contract as so often in mentioned.
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Awesome quote. This is the epitome of a truly professional PMC and how free market based warfare should work. Because if a company wanted more business, it must do well. If a company does bad, then it is up to the customer to fire them. I see this as one of the biggest problems with the way the US uses companies for warfare.
Sadly, to do well is no measure of being successful today, Matt. I am still astonished at how some companies are awarded contracts – however, I am not surprised when I see their inability to do most things correctly. Even more astonishing is how some of them have created their own sub-companies that they in turn sub-contract – and the money wheel keeps spinning, not to mention the other things some of them get up to.
In my view, all of this has nothing to do with ending a conflict but rather in keeping it going. But the longer it goes on, the more money is made. From my desk, this is the opinion I have formed and I have yet to be proven wrong.
Rgds,
Eeben
Eeben hope you are well.
A story in Beeld not related to your latest post
Three of the legends gone within two weeks.
Newsreport in Beeld
Regards
Tango
Legendes van Rhodesiese weermag sterf
2010-08-16
Oudlt.kol. Ron Reid-Daly. (Foto uit Selous Scouts Top Secret War deur Peter Stiff en Ron Reid-Daly.)
Erika Gibson
Die stigter van die Selous Scouts en nog twee legendariese lede van die destydse Rhodesiese weermag is binne twee weke dood.
Al drie was vroeg in die 80 en is aan natuurlike oorsake dood. Saam verteenwoordig hulle die einde van ’n era in wat nou Zimbabwe is.
Oudlt.kol. Ron Reid-Daly (82) is die afgelope week ná ’n lang stryd teen kanker in Simonstad dood. Hy was die laaste drie dae in ’n koma, het mnr. Tom Thomas, ’n oudmakker en voorsitter van die Selous Scout-vereniging, gesê.
Reid-Daly was die stigter van die Selous Scouts, een van die gedugste spesialemag-eenhede van die Rhodesiese insurgensie-oorlog.
Kort voor hom is oudlugmaarskalk Norman Walsh, wat van 1981 tot 1983 hoof van die Rhodesiese lugmag was, in Australië dood.
Enkele dae voor Walsh se dood het oudlt.genl. Peter Walls (83) op George se lughawe inmekaargesak kort voordat hy in die Krugerwildtuin sou gaan vakansie hou het.
Hy is op die toneel dood.
Walls was hoof van die gesamentlike veiligheidsmagte in die bewindstyd van mnr. Ian Smith.
Saam was die drie ’n gedugte span van gesoute en deurwinterde soldate wat geen nonsies geduld het nie, het Thomas vertel.
Walls en Reid-Daly het in die 1950’s as C-eskader in die Britse Special Air Service (SAS) in wat deesdae onder meer Maleisië is teen kommunisme geveg.
Albei was in Rhodesië lede van die Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI).
Rhodesië was in daardie tyd nog ’n Britse kolonie en dié eskader het hoofsaaklik uit Rhodesiërs bestaan.
Toe Walls in 1973 iemand gesoek het om ’n teen-insurgensie-eenheid teen die toenemende instroming van nasionalistiese guerrillas in Rhodesië op die been te bring, het hy hom tot Reid-Daly gewend.
Die Selous Scouts het in pseudo-oorlogvoering gespesialiseer en die vyandelike magte in die geheim geïnfiltreer. ’n Groot aantal van die eenheid se soldate was swart.
Namate dit duidelik geword het dat onafhanklikheid in Rhodesië onafwendbaar was, het Walls in samewerking met mnr. Robert Mugabe al die gewapende magte in die land probeer saamsnoer.
Erge teenkanting het uit die geledere van sy ondergeskiktes gekom en ’n groot aantal van die soldate het na Suid-Afrika of elders uitgewyk. Walls het tou opgegooi en ook Suid-Afrika toe getrek. Hy het nooit oor sy wedervarings geskryf nie.
Reid-Daly was volgens Thomas nooit iemand wat stilgebly het as hy sterk oor ’n saak gevoel het nie.
Hy het later bevelvoerder van die Transkeise weermag geword voordat hy sy eie veiligheidsonderneming in Suid-Afrika bedryf het.
“Ron het altyd sy soldate en die taak op hande eerste gestel. Politiek het hom koud gelaat. Sy leierseienskappe het hom van die meeste soldate onderskei,” het Thomas gesê.
’n Gedenkdiens vir Reid-Daly word Vrydag in Newlands, Kaapstad, gehou.( Beeld )
RIP
Hi Eeben,
Three legends of the former counter terrorist units in Rhodesia....Selous Scouts ..RLI have passed on within two weeks .
May they RIP.
Regards
Tango
Legendes van Rhodesiese weermag sterf
2010-08-16 22:44
Oudlt.kol. Ron Reid-Daly. (Foto uit Selous Scouts Top Secret War deur Peter Stiff en Ron Reid-Daly.)
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Erika Gibson
Die stigter van die Selous Scouts en nog twee legendariese lede van die destydse Rhodesiese weermag is binne twee weke dood.Al drie was vroeg in die 80 en is aan natuurlike oorsake dood. Saam verteenwoordig hulle die einde van ’n era in wat nou Zimbabwe is.Oudlt.kol. Ron Reid-Daly (82) is die afgelope week ná ’n lang stryd teen kanker in Simonstad dood. Hy was die laaste drie dae in ’n koma, het mnr. Tom Thomas, ’n oudmakker en voorsitter van die Selous Scout-vereniging, gesê.Reid-Daly was die stigter van die Selous Scouts, een van die gedugste spesialemag-eenhede van die Rhodesiese insurgensie-oorlog.Kort voor hom is oudlugmaarskalk Norman Walsh, wat van 1981 tot 1983 hoof van die Rhodesiese lugmag was, in Australië dood.Enkele dae voor Walsh se dood het oudlt.genl. Peter Walls (83) op George se lughawe inmekaargesak kort voordat hy in die Krugerwildtuin sou gaan vakansie hou het. Hy is op die toneel dood.
Many thanks for the cutting Tango. Likewise, I hope you are well?
Indeed a great loss to the military fraternity and to the men who served under these commanders. As time passes, we will sadly miss the passing of more great officers, NCOs and men.
Rgds,
Eeben
Very sad indeed Tango.
To our English-speaking visitors, the article Tango sent deals with the passing away of three military legends from Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Lt Col Ron Reid-Daly (founder and OC Selous Scouts), Gen Peter Walls, (Commander, Rhodesian Army) and Air Marshal Norman Walsh (Rhodesian Air Force).
Rgds,
Eeben
Eeben thank you for publishing the cutting.
A bit more history published in English on these 3 legends !
Regards
Tango
Air Marshal Norman Walsh
Air Marshal Norman Walsh, who has died aged 77, was a courageous pilot during Rhodesia's bush war and then appointed by Robert Mugabe, when he came to power in 1980, to command the first Zimbabwe Air Force.
Walsh's hopes of maintaining the long, proud tradition of the old Rhodesian Air Force under the new regime were dashed when a new fleet of British Hawk fighters acquired by the Zimbabwe government was blown up at base and his entire superstructure of white officers arrested on suspicion of sabotage. After being jailed and tortured they were eventually brought to trial.
Walsh was horrified by the treatment of his senior men, most of them close friends, especially when the Zimbabwe High Court acquitted them after a long trial only for Mugabe to order their immediate rearrest outside the courtroom. He resigned his command and moved to Australia.
Lt-Cdr Sammy MearnsNorman Walsh was born in South Africa's Eastern Cape province to a family with a long air force tradition.
After leaving the Queen's College in Queenstown, South Africa, he moved to the neighbouring British colony of Southern Rhodesia to enrol in the air force officers' cadet force, which had been established with the help of the Royal Air Force.
The RAF had a long association with Southern Rhodesia, which had provided a squadron (No 237 Rhodesia Squadron) that had seen action in East Africa during the Second World War.
More than 10,000 Allied airmen, among them Tony Benn, were trained for war service in Southern Rhodesia from 1940 to 1945, many of them choosing to return to settle in the country after the war.
Norman Walsh, demonstrating what his instructors described as "a natural aptitude for flying" rose rapidly through the ranks in the Southern Rhodesian Air Force, becoming a pilot attack instructor and later instrument rating examiner. By 1964 he was a squadron leader with No 1 Squadron flying Hawker Hunter FGA9 ground attack fighters.
He switched to helicopters – which he loved flying – becoming commander in 1968 of No 7 Squadron operating Allouette 111s used for troop transport, casualty evacuation and battlefield support. In an operation against an early guerrilla incursion from Zambia, he was awarded the Bronze Cross for conspicuous gallantry for his skilful low-level flying at night among the cliffs and rocky gorges of the Zambesi Valley.
The guerrillas had established themselves in a deep gorge and engaged the Rhodesian security forces with heavy automatic fire, machine guns and bazookas. Walsh provided close support from his helicopter and, under heavy fire, landed in broken terrain to rescue a wounded soldier.
continued.While never happier than when behind the controls of an aircraft, Walsh also showed great ability in administration and planning. He was promoted wing commander, and then, as the bush war against nationalist guerrillas intensified, to group captain on the Joint Planning Staff.
The Rhodesian Air Force played a key role in the bush war, adapting most of its ageing fleet of aircraft, including Canberra bombers and Dakota transports, to be deployed in tracking and attacking the elusive groups of insurgents operating from within the depths of the African bush. Walsh, by now an Air Commodore and a director general in the Joint Operations Command, was instrumental in organising and maintaining the fighting capability of the "blue jobs" – as air force personnel were affectionately known.
continued....
Many thanks for the English version, Tango.
Remarkable men who will be sadly missed by their troops.
Rgds,
Eeben
Hi Eeben,
The recent publication about the passing of the three Rhodesian Soldier legends made me look up how the war started in South West Africa with the first contact in SWA /Namibia Ongulumbashe base on August 26 1966.
If this is a duplicate already received please delete .
Regards
Tango
Exposé: AN EXPOSÉ ABOUT NUJOMA’S CIA CONNECTIONS: PART 20Published: Feb 29, 2008 - 07:06 PM
________________________________________
Critical Analysis by P. ya Nangoloh*
I have promised in Part 19 to tell you how and when SA security forces finally attacked the Ongulumbashe base on August 26 1966. In Part 19, I have also demonstrated to you, by means of inter alia excerpts obtained from a book written by former South African Republican Intelligence (RI) operative Lieutenant Piet Cornelius Swanepoel, how the CIA and apartheid SA Government apparently invited still exiled SWAPO leader Mr. Sam Nujoma to come on a top-secret visit to Namibia on March 20 1966. This was ostensibly in order to reveal the military and other secret plans of SWAPO. Despite the secrecy surrounding that clearly treacherous visit, it is now becoming abundantly clear to me that during that visit Mr. Nujoma had been accorded full red carpet treatment. This is how anyone would treat his or her VIP guest!
All the information at my disposal shows that the attack on Ongulumbashe base on August 26 1966 had its origins in that VIP arrival and that very warm reception that Mr. Sam Nujoma had received from the apartheid SA regime in Windhoek on March 20-21 1966. I am saying this because immediately after Nujoma was “deported” back to Zambia, SA security forces traveled straight to the southwestern bush of Ovamboland where six SWAPO guerrillas had their bases. The SA security forces immediately started to hunt down and take other concrete steps against the hitherto undiscovered SWAPO fighters hidden in an area near Uuvudhiya in southwestern parts of Ovamboland.
Source:
http://www.nshr.org.na/index.php?module=News&func=display&sid=898
PS: Politicians don't only know know how to start ,but they also know how to lose wars....not soldiers
Many thanks, Tango. It does one good to go back into history and see what happened and where. I read this some time ago but was not sure where.
My thoughts on some politicians are well known...
Rgds,
Eeben
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